Financial Services and Markets Bill

Baroness Worthington Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 25th January 2023 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Baroness Worthington]

21: Schedule 2, page 124, line 12, leave out paragraph 45
Member’s explanatory statement
These amendments maintain the duty for FCA to set position limits on commodity derivatives and over the counter equivalents, and the associated powers to request information and intervene, whilst onshoring the power to set limits which are appropriate for the UK.

[Baroness Worthington (CB)]

My Lords, I am very pleased to speak to this group of amendments this afternoon, having sadly been unable to make Second Reading. I declare my interest as a co-chair of Peers for the Planet. I also declare my relative ignorance of this topic, as I am not steeped in the details of financial services. I very much approach this issue from a layperson’s perspective, guided by common sense. Much of my efforts here are to apply parliamentary scrutiny to this very complex issue and to seek reassurances from the Minister.

As we debated in the previous group, it is vital that we have proper scrutiny of proposed changes to laws and regulations governing financial markets. Potentially poorly regulated markets could have significant negative real-world consequences, as we have seen in the past. Complexity is now endemic in this sector and can catch regulators, and indeed parliamentarians and Ministers, out. Derivative markets are particularly complex and require especially careful scrutiny.

My Amendments 21 to 25 and 41 concern the proposed future regulation of trading in commodities and their derivatives. Many noble Lords will be aware of this, but to give some background, derivatives are used in the financial markets and the wider economy to hedge exposure to commodity prices in the future. However, this opens up the opportunity to speculate and seek profit from volatility. Roughly two-thirds of commodity trading relates to commodities in the energy and food markets. Therefore, unchecked speculation and poor regulation in these markets can have very real-world consequences. Some types of commodity derivative investment are of course socially desirable. For example, soft commodity or energy producers seeking to insure themselves against future risks arising from such things as weather and an unstable climate are making a necessary hedge to keep products economic. However, there are dangerous aspects of this as they relate to food and energy, which affect people’s lives and the affordability of living.

Momentum-based trading strategies can exacerbate steep price rises and the cornering of markets, by which I mean taking large positions that are disproportionate to your genuine participation in the market, which could force unnatural or artificial scarcity into the market and raise prices. More generally, increasing volumes of capital being tied up in future derivatives removes money from the real economy today, where it could be delivering much greater real-world impacts.

There is overwhelming evidence that unchecked speculation produces price bubbles. I do not intend to go into this in detail, but in relation to oil, a 2021 piece in Resources Policy looked back at a whole host of research dating back to 2009 in highly cited journals. So firm is the consensus that there is now a whole body of techniques dedicated to measuring and modelling bubbles. We are well past the point of discussion of whether there is a risk; it is now about how we manage it and its impacts.

The co-author of last October’s UN Conference on Trade and Development—UNCTAD—trade review said that a ratio of around 70% real hedging and 30% speculation might be seen as “healthy”. However, he added that what we see in the market today indicates that the ratio has been reversed: 70% speculation and 30% real hedging. The same report warned of a policy-induced global recession. The report said that insufficient attention has been paid to the “betting frenzies” on future markets in the current crisis and called on Governments to tighten rules on speculation. However, with this legislation we seem to be doing the opposite.

EU legislation on commodity derivatives was introduced, and it was not simply pointless bureaucracy. There was clear evidence in the run-up to and during the financial crash of 2008 that food and energy prices were being driven upwards not by shortages but by fevered speculation, so action was taken. Investment banks were seen to be profiting by around $16 billion a year from commodity trading. Thanks to these new approaches, we have seen that profit-making fall by around three-quarters, according to analysis from the research firm Coalition. So there was a reason for the EU regulations that we are seeking to modify as we translate to post-Brexit financial regulation.

The general point is that we should be seeking to allow the socially beneficial, but not allowing bubbles to be created in this market. We should not be making it easier to do that but keeping a careful eye and tracking trends, while requiring clear data and better disclosure. You could argue that the EU perhaps overreached or did not get it exactly right, and that we should seek to take our own approach, but I have some questions about the Government’s proposals in the Bill.

It appears to me, and I seek reassurance from the Minister on this, that Schedule 2 is handing the power of setting appropriate position limits and controls—and the maximum position any firm can take on trading on a commodity—to financial exchanges, or certainly taking the power to do so. But are those exchanges not incentivised commercially to maximise liquidity and volumes of trade, so does this not create something of a conflict if they are also setting their own limits?

These new arrangements would see the FCA retaining backstop powers to give directions, but only in certain fairly narrowly defined circumstances. It can request information and intervene, but the drafting suggests that the exchanges would be free to set their own limits. Is this the case and, if so, how does the Minister expect them to handle this potential conflict between their commercial interests and a more cautious approach to the prevention of harmful speculative bubbles?

There is also the question of what will be regulated in future. The current rules cover both over-the-counter trades and exchange trades but, as I understand it, this new approach is about simply deciding not to continue to seek oversight of over-the-counter trades. From what I have been able to read, this seems to be based on the fact that those consulted said it was too difficult to do. That does not seem a good enough reason to remove the oversight of OTC trades and focus simply on exchange trades.

There is also the point about exchanges having less oversight of systemic risks building up in the global market. Whereas the FCA engages via the IOSCO, the International Organization of Securities Commissions, and the FSB—

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[Baroness Worthington (CB)]

I shall seek to remember where I was in my speech. I was talking about international co-ordination and how the FCA currently is part of a global network of regulators, and therefore has a more effective chance of spotting systemic risks building up in the global markets, and that the exchanges would not be plugged in at the same level of international co-operation and co-ordination. The FSB warned, in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, that

“prices have swung wildly, with liquidity temporarily evaporating in some commodity derivatives market segments and a number of traders coming under strain”.

So I ask the Minister: in these uncertain times, how certain are we that UK exchanges can be patched into that wider market scrutiny and regulatory infrastructure, which the regulator currently has the power to do?

The powers retained by the FCA are limited to intervening on operational objectives and, most relevantly here, consumer protection and integrity, but I am concerned that that definition of consumer may be rather too narrow. It could refer, as it does in Section 1 of the 2000 Act, to the investor, rather than the man or woman on the street. I worry that “integrity” could simply refer to soundness, stability, orderliness and lack of crime. I would welcome the Minister’s view on how this maps on to the existing grounds for regulation that are to be revoked, which are much broader and relate to preventing market abuse and market distortion and try to ensure that there is no artificial inflation of commodity prices.

My concern is that we can have a sound and orderly market which works very well for investors but inflates prices for consumers and businesses and adds extra costs on to essential commodities. I believe the FCA should retain the power to intervene in these cases, and that the definition of grounds for intervention should be as broad as it is currently.

I mentioned the over-the-counter derivatives no longer being covered in regulation. I was rather worried to read in the Treasury’s consultation on wholesale markets that:

“The objective of including them as part of the regime was to prevent market participants from circumventing regulatory requirements that are applicable to exchange traded commodity derivatives by dealing in lookalike OTC contracts. However, in practice, identification of these contracts has proven difficult, and they have only been reported in a very small number of instances.”


Therefore, the Treasury concluded that

“the inclusion of these contracts and uncertainty about the scope of this requirement imposes increased legal risk and potential compliance costs for firms.”

To me, that sounds as though something important is proving difficult and, rather than seeking to solve it, make it easier and provide clearer guidance, we have decided to drop it altogether.

The consultation goes on to say:

“to ensure market integrity, the government proposes that the FCA and trading venues should continue to take account of relevant OTC contracts when monitoring markets.”

But amendments to Regulations 27 and 28 take away the power from the FCA to do this and to request information on these contracts. That is my reading of it, but I look forward to reassurance or clarification from the Minister. If the FCA is not able to monitor these transactions, how can we oversee them? Would it not be more desirable to have the FCA retain the powers it has?

I am grateful for the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, for my amendments. Essentially, they seek to unhook the legislation from the EU but continue to require the FCA to maintain the same powers to set position limits and to intervene as widely as possible to ensure proper consumer protection and maintain international co-ordination, which is so essential in these markets.

Amendment 41 requires the FCA to make rules requiring listed companies to publish the revenue and earnings attributable to trading commodity derivatives and economically equivalent over-the-counter contracts. I think this is important because I have personal experience—and there is plenty of anecdotal evidence—of firms that are operating very significant trading activities but hiding their profits in their financial statements and in other parts of their accounts, because to disclose quite how much was being made from trading would bring a lot of questions about the nature of those companies. I am specifically talking about energy companies, which have very significant trading activities and are not, at the moment, required to disclose in their accounts the level of profit they are making from those activities.

This is important because it materially affects the ability of financial services to assess the health of these companies. If we are not seeing the extent to which they are engaged in these derivative-trading activities and we are unable to see where the profits are being made, how can we make fair and open assessments about the nature, success and propriety of their business? It is important that we give ourselves the transparency to see exactly how much of this is happening and the degree to which it is altering the balance sheets of companies in these sectors, which are so essential to maintaining our standard of living and, in the case of energy and food companies, have such a material impact on our environment and global climate.

I am sorry that that was a very long speech, but I look forward to hearing the Minister’s responses and to continuing the debate.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Worthington. I do not support them, because I think that what the Government are trying to do in this Bill is moving in the right direction.

We have to remember that derivatives are basically a success story. It is a huge financial activity. The total value of derivative trading is sometimes estimated to be a multiple of global GDP. Of course, commodity trading is only a relatively small part of that, but it is important because the advantages of trading allow effective risk management, price discovery and market efficiency. Those are the sorts of things that actually help consumers, at the end of the day, so we must be very wary of trying to interfere in what is fundamentally a successful part of our financial infrastructure.

Of course, speculation is involved in derivatives, there is risk for some counterparties—and sometimes systemic risk—in derivatives, and sometimes they are extremely complicated as individual instruments, even to understand. But they are part of and underpin something that works well for markets overall. We should intervene in that only if absolutely necessary.

My own view is that the changes in the Bill probably do not go far enough to take the dead hand of EU prescriptive regulation away, but they are a solid move in the right direction. As the noble Baroness, Lady Worthington, pointed out, they replace a mandatory regime with a permissive one that allows the rules to be designed for the particular markets. In particular, the changes in Schedule 2 will allow the FCA to transfer responsibility for setting position limits to trading venues, if indeed position limits are needed. For some time now, the FCA has not been enforcing excesses on position limits in respect of the majority of contracts, and the world has not come to an end.

I think Amendments 21 and 22 are a step backwards in trying to preserve a mandatory EU regime. So too is trying to drag over-the-counter derivatives into that regime, because—as the noble Baroness pointed out—it has been found that they are extremely difficult to identify. Their removal from the regime was almost universally supported in the consultation that the Government carried out on changes to the derivatives regime.

Amendment 41 from the noble Baroness, Lady Worthington, is about putting additional information in annual reports and accounts. There are already obligations on companies to report things that are material to an understanding of the financial position of those companies. They are required to describe their trading model and the operating segments that are relevant to them, but they are not required to identify income streams from particular instruments that they operate. There is a good reason for that. Annual reports are already very long, complicated and difficult to understand, and the noble Baroness is asking for information that in very many cases will be wholly irrelevant to an understanding of the financial position or operations of the companies that involve some trading. For many, it is embedded in their marketing activities for the products they engage in. I do not support any of the amendments put forward by the noble Baroness.

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[Baroness Penn (Con)]

There is no sunset clause on this power, just as there is no sunset clause on the powers in Clauses 3 and 4, so it is consistent with the approach we have taken with those other powers.

I thank the Committee for allowing me to address those points in this group. With that and the further information I shall deliver to the Committee on some of the questions from the noble Baroness, Lady Worthington, I hope that she will withdraw her Amendment 21 at this stage and will not move her other amendments.

[Baroness Worthington (CB)]

My Lords, I am genuinely grateful to the Minister for her response, which was very helpful and contained information about which I was not aware—I thank her for that. I will read Hansard in great detail. In her letter, can she explain a little more about those 18 contracts that will be covered and the retained powers? I would find that very interesting, although I am sure I can also google it.

I will now sum up. I am very grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles and Lady Kramer, for their contributions. Returning to the statements by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, I am sure it is seen as a great success that we have this $600 trillion market in stuff that exists in the future, which is hugely complex and can crash the global economy. Some people will have benefited hugely from it; I have no doubt that some of those people may be in this Room. The point is that there is someone paying at the other end of that profit, and often it is the people at the very end of the chain who are trying to buy food in supermarkets or heat their homes. If a bubble in that market is definitely benefiting some—even maybe benefiting the Government, if they are receiving revenues from it—it comes at a cost, so we should be very mindful of the need to regulate that market. There is evidence after evidence of these bubbles forming because, quite frankly, the incentives to make cheap money are huge. Compared with the real economy, where you actually have to do things, build things, sell things and employ people, the desire to make money fast is overwhelming, and I do not want the UK to become the home of ever more exotic derivatives that allow us to make money the quick and easy way. Let us make banking and the financial markets boring again by getting them back to basics: using money to further society’s aims. If we cannot do that individually, we should do it collectively. I do not want to get on my soapbox, but the fact that we are exiting Europe makes that more difficult, so even more scrutiny needs to be applied now that we are setting our own rules.

I am grateful for the responses. I will end by saying that I had the pleasure of meeting a gentleman who worked in a bank that was more than 500 years old. I asked him about its ESG policies, and he listed them. They started with, “We will make no profit at all from soft commodities”, then went on to the usual checklist about arms and whatever else. I asked him where that came from, and he said, “Oh, we can’t remember”. Because it was such an old-fashioned concept—that we should take a moral position that we will not engage in profiteering from soft commodities—it sort of lapsed into the history of time.

Banking was moral once. I am not saying it is immoral now, but it is incredibly complicated. The incentives to make money in ever more novel ways are always there. Even the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, alluded to the fact that systemic risks exist. They have existed in my lifetime and I am sure they will come again.

I am glad that we are here to do this scrutiny and very glad of the Minister’s offer to write. I hope that we will revisit some of these questions, and I will end on Amendment 41. I have personal experience of how energy companies are loath to disclose how much of their profits rest on trading. If that is the case, the markets should care about it and disclosure is the most obvious step to address it. With that, I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 21 withdrawn.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Baroness Worthington Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 1st March 2023 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Baroness Worthington]

168: After Clause 50, insert the following new Clause—
“PRA dutiesReview of capital adequacy requirements risk weights and solvency capital requirements
(1) Within six months of the day on which this Act is passed the PRA must complete a review of the risk weighting and capital requirements applied to loans, guarantees or investment via shares or securities in—(a) group undertakings engaged in existing fossil fuel exploitation and production,(b) group undertakings carrying out new fossil fuel exploration, exploitation and production, and(c) group undertakings otherwise at significant risk from the low carbon transition, including but not limited to those engaged in fossil fuel-based power generation, agriculture, automotive engineering, aviation and heavy industry.(2) In conducting this review, the PRA must have regard to—(a) the full implications of climate change for the risk of investments including physical climate risks, transitional climate risks and climate liability risks,(b) the likelihood of assets becoming wholly or partially stranded before the end of their normal cycle,(c) the impact of climate change and climate change-related disruption on financial stability, and(d) the advice of the Climate Change Committee.(3) The Treasury must lay before Parliament the outcome of this review within one month of its completion.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the PRA to complete a review of the risk weighting and capital requirements of banks and insurers in relation to firms engaged in financing fossil fuel exploration, exploitation and production alongside other climate-risk exposed sectors, taking account of the climate risk on those investments and on financial stability, the likelihood of the assets becoming stranded, and the advice of the climate change committee.

[Baroness Worthington (CB)]

My Lords, moving on to a different set of topics, Amendment 168 is in my name, and I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Sheehan and Lady Drake, for lending their support. This is the only amendment in the group which has my name on it but I am broadly supportive of many of the others in it, as they seek to address a broad range of questions relating to how risk is taken into account in financial services regulation, with a specific focus on climate risk, as in my amendment.

Amendment 168 is about the risk weighting of assets for the purposes of capital adequacy requirements, in the case of banks, and solvency capital requirements, in the case of insurers. It is not a terribly prescriptive amendment. It would require the PRA to complete a review of these matters in relation to loans, guarantees or investment in firms engaged in new and existing

“fossil fuel exploration, exploitation and production”

and other sectors which are particularly exposed to low-carbon transition and climate risks

“including but not limited to those engaged in fossil fuel-based power generation, agriculture, automotive engineering, aviation and heavy industry”.

Proposed new subsection (2) sets out a number of matters to which the PRA should have regard, including the different types of climate risk and the risks to both individual stranded assets and wider macroeconomic financial stability. It also requires it to take advice from the Climate Change Committee. I have referred to loans, guarantees and investments in relation to the group undertakings to capture particular climate risks in the wider groups of firms. A loan to a firm engaged in clean technologies is still exposed to financial risk if it is a wholly owned subsidiary of a firm which is significantly exposed to low-carbon transition, or if the firm itself owns firms which are.

To be clear, I am seeing this through the lens of financial risks to firms. I have noted that Sam Woods, the chief executive of the PRA, has said that the organisation should not seek to pursue a climate policy in stealth mode or on the quiet, as a second Government, unless government gives it that duty. He says that the PRA and Bank of England remits are currently to pursue financial stability and accordingly to manage climate risk, which has the potential—I go so far as to say the likelihood—to constitute a huge risk to financial stability. I agree with him, but I do not believe that, for the management of these risks, the tools that the bank has deployed to date are sufficient; in fact, they include methodological issues that are disastrously understating the financial risks.

Before I turn to that issue, I should address one other point. During the passage of the Financial Services Act 2021, an amendment in relation to capital risk requirements was tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Oates. In response, some Peers said that there was no emergency embedded in banks’ balance sheets, as corporate lending in short to medium-term in nature. However, I need to emphasise that significant impairments are possible in both the short and medium-term.

This is not only as a result of more unpredictable and extreme weather—more particularly, it is as a consequence of technological and societal change. Global investment in low-carbon technology has increased by 20% a year in the past five years alone, and has now overtaken global fossil fuel investment. There is a whole economy change under way. It is not about a few companies and discrete sectors that have failed to take into account incremental improvements but about whole sectors exposed to broad-based technological change, increasing the rates of company failure, and the rapid shrinking of some industries, accompanied by the expansion of others. Banks and insurers that have not taken account of such changes face much higher impairments and, given the systemic risks of allowing them to fail, socialised public bailouts. It is right that the PRA should assess that these risks are being adequately managed and that the banks and insurers participate in supporting that review. It is about investing a little now to avoid spending a lot further down the road.

How are these risks being managed? Currently, through the climate biennial exploratory scenario, or CBES. In this exercise, the PRA offers up sample temperature rise scenarios and underlying assumptions of the implications for different assets, and firms plug in their portfolios to get the impairment data out as a result. This all feels safe and precise, but the climate is something that cannot be predicted specifically in those ways with any degree of accuracy. It is about the extent and nature of the risks that must be taken into account. This whole streamlined, reassuring and seemingly precise approach is hopelessly wrong in the face of climate risk.

A paper by the noble Lord, Lord Stern, of this House highlights that the methodologies employed by such climate risk models rest on flawed foundations, with huge error bars and unknown unknowns. Critical methodological problems have led to perverse outcomes, such as the suggestion that a 3 degree temperature rise, global average, offers the optimal balance of benefits and costs. That is more or less what we get from CBES. Where temperature rises are limited to under 2 degrees or rise to more than 3.3 degrees, the drag on company profits is predicted to be at around 10% to 15% on average. I have no idea how any model could reach that conclusion that had any bearing with what is actually happening to our physical climate.

Let us remember that the economy and the financial markets are a wholly owned subsidiary of our natural environment, and we are now in a destabilised climatic environment. This same 3 degree rise, which is the global consensus, involves steep drops in food production, dire water shortages, a sharp increase in urban heat waves, forced migration and mass extinction events. An increasing body of literature sets out why the models do not work. The former chief economist of ING Group in a Policy Exchange publication concludes that central bank scenarios have so far been based on assumptions and models that ignore or downplay crucial evidence of climate risks—notably the rising frequency of extreme weather events and critical triggers, tipping points and interdependencies between the climate, the economy, politics, finance and technology.

That is true for the CBES model. The underlying assumptions in the CBES paper highlight minimal economic impact from inaction on climate change over the next 25 years and a reduction in GDP growth of only 0.12% in 2050—another ludicrously precise number, given all the future uncertainties that lie ahead of us. That is very poorly aligned with the scientific consensus. Other academics have identified dangerous underlying assumptions in the functions that feed into those used by CBES, including that 90% of GDP will be unaffected by climate change because it happens indoors, and using the relationship between temperature and GDP today as a proxy for the impact of global warming over time, ignoring any possibility of cascading climate feedbacks and tipping points.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Baroness Worthington Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 7th March 2023 Grand Committee

[Baroness Worthington (CB)]

I will interject on behalf on the amendment I drafted, as the noble Lord has completely mischaracterised what we are attempting to do here and has narrowed the debate into a very narrow conversation about oil and gas assets. We are talking here about climatic risk across the whole economy. It is not just oil and gas operators; it is anybody who has any money wound up in any of the sectors that will be affected by the physical risk, the risk of transition and the societal risk when we finally realise that science does not negotiate with oil and gas companies, financial regulators or anybody who pretends to be able to predict the future. We have poor modelling, we have terrible risk assessments, and the PRA and the Government need to issue better guidance so that we can understand the risks we are facing. Let us not reduce this to a narrow discussion about oil and gas interests.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I read the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness. Proposed new subsection (1) refers to

“group undertakings engaged in existing fossil fuel exploitation and production … group undertakings carrying out new fossil fuel exploration, exploitation and production”.

If this is not about fossil fuel exploration, that is not very clear from her amendment. I am dealing specifically—

[Baroness Worthington (CB)]

My Lords—

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

Hang on, I must have the right to reply to the previous intervention before I take the next. I am not dealing with things other than fossil fuels. I am talking just about fossil fuels. It seems to me that the noble Baroness’s amendment is about fossil fuels, in large measure. My arguments have not been responded to because they are fundamentally logical. They are the whole basis of government and CCC policy. But I give way to the noble Baroness now.

[Baroness Worthington (CB)]

The amendment lists certain sectors which are likely to be most affected. It does not in any way say it is limited to those sectors, and I think it is egregious to assume that this is a narrow amendment when it is, in fact, a very broad amendment.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My remarks are narrow. The noble Baroness’s amendment may be broad. Can we agree on that and deal with the aspect of fossil fuel investment?

[Baroness Worthington (CB)]

Yes.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

We ought to allow the industry to invest as long as we are phasing out demand. If it invests too much, it is its problem. If it invests too little, it is our problem.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

The Government understand and agree with those points. That is why we are also seeking to find a way forward on this work and have driven considerable work at a global level to try to tackle deforestation. I hope noble Lords can take some heart from our commitment on that.

On Amendment 232, also from the noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan, my noble friend Lord Naseby will be pleased to hear that NS&I’s retail green savings bonds, which I think have been available for a couple of years, are integral to the continued successful delivery of our green finance programme. We clearly have more work to do in promoting them, so the NS&I will continue to promote them and encourage retail investors to help finance the fight against climate change and other environmental challenges.

The Government committed to publishing a biennial impact report by September 2023, which will detail the environmental impacts and social co-benefits of the green financing programme’s spending. This will include available reporting on greenhouse gas emission reductions of projects financed by the green savings bonds and green gilts. The upcoming impact report will complement the programme’s first allocation report, published in September 2022. These annual allocation reports detail how funds raised from sales of green gilts and green savings bonds contribute to different green priorities such as clean transport and renewable energy.

Amendment 232 proposes publishing an assessment of the scope for future green financing. Decisions on future green financing ambitions are based on eligible green spending commitments and will be taken each financial year as part of wider decisions for the Treasury’s budget. Financing decisions are also influenced by gilt and retail savings market conditions and consultations with investors. Reporting on the future scope of green financing in advance, rather than at the beginning of each financial year, could create the risk that future spending requirements and conditions in the gilt and retail savings market are disregarded. That would make the successful delivery of the green financing programme more challenging.

I turn to Amendments 233, 235 and 236 from the noble Baronesses, Lady Wheatcroft and Lady Hayman, which concern sustainability disclosure requirements, green taxonomy and transition plans. Sustainability disclosure requirements—SDR—are designed to provide an effective and co-ordinated reporting framework for sustainability information. This is already being taken forward at pace. The FCA recently consulted on new sustainability-related disclosure requirements for all regulated firms and more detailed rules for asset managers and asset owners.

The Government’s 2021 road map made it clear that disclosure of transition plans will be a part of SDR. The Government launched the independent Transition Plan Taskforce in April 2022 to develop a gold standard for transition plans. The task force has since made huge progress, having just consulted on its recommendations, framework and guidance, with the final framework and guidance to be published later this year, alongside additional sectoral guidance.

The FCA has already implemented the guidance from the Taskforce on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures for transition plans for asset managers and asset owners, on a “comply or explain” basis. It is continuing to work closely with the Transition Plan Taskforce to develop and implement its recommendations.

As I reaffirmed to noble Lords in a previous debate, the Government are committed to implementing a green taxonomy as part of their sustainable finance agenda and, as I set out in my Written Ministerial Statement to the House on 14 December 2022, the Government will provide an update as part of the green finance strategy. We are clear that the value of a taxonomy rests on its credibility as a practical and useful tool for investors, companies, consumers and regulators in supporting access to sustainable finance.

Noble Lords have only to look at the implementation challenges the EU is facing, including on data availability and reporting, coherence with regulatory frameworks, and international interoperability, to see that this is a complex exercise. We have been clear in the UK that, with the support of our Green Technical Advisory Group and with public consultation, we will take the time to get the taxonomy right to ensure that it is usable and effective.

On Amendments 201 and 237, the Government and regulators are taking steps to improve the UK’s regulatory framework to support more effective stewardship. We have already discussed in Committee the Financial Reporting Council’s world-leading Stewardship Code 2020. This asks trustees and managers to disclose how they have considered environmental and social factors, including climate change, in their investments. The Department for Work and Pensions’ recent stewardship guidance for pension scheme trustees came into effect last October.

In addition to these existing initiatives, the DWP, along with the FCA, the Pensions Regulator and the Financial Reporting Council, has already committed to a review later this year of the regulatory framework for effective investment stewardship, to ensure that it is consistent across market participants and financial products. I recognise that this is a complex issue and recognise the concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, about the specific framing of the amendments. This is an issue that would warrant further discussion before Report.

On Amendment 241A, tabled by my noble friend Lady Altmann, UK pensions have been at the forefront of tackling climate risk and will undoubtedly continue to play a crucial role. The Government are working hard to drive consolidation among pension schemes so that they deliver increased scale, better value for money and improved access to investments such as green infrastructure. As part of this drive, the DWP recently published a consultation on a value for money framework for defined contribution pension schemes. Furthermore, the pooling of Local Government Pension Scheme assets, from the 86 funds into eight asset pools, has already led to £380 million in net savings to March 2022; these are projected to exceed £1 billion by March 2025.

We are also working hard to lower the barriers for individual pension schemes to invest in green. The DWP is reforming the treatment of performance-based management fees to enable individual pension schemes to invest more easily in assets such as green infrastructure.

Finally, when it comes to the noble Baroness’s amendment, we are aligned in wanting to see more of this pool of capital able to be directed in the way we have discussed in this Committee. It is important that we lower barriers to such projects and solutions. We do not see the benefit in creating a distinct, lighter-touch regulatory regime to support pooled investments in green projects. There may be risks in reducing regulatory oversight in this way.

The UK’s world-leading regulatory standards are important in providing market participants with the confidence to invest and we should be cautious about changes that could undermine that confidence. I say to my noble friend Lady Altmann and the noble Baronesses, Lady Hayman and Lady Drake, that we want to think about how we can make progress in this area. While the specific amendments suggested might not be the right way, we should continue to put our thinking caps on when it comes to how we can guide progress in this area.

With that, I hope that, for now, the noble Baroness, Lady Worthington, is able to withdraw her amendment and that other noble Lords will not press their amendments when they are reached.

[Baroness Worthington (CB)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the Minister’s reply to this varied group of amendments covering a range of issues that fundamentally speak to the need for the financial sector to take a more serious look at how it can help prevent the exacerbation of environmental challenges, including climate change, and invest in solutions at scale.

I was encouraged to hear that the Government are about to produce their green finance strategy. I wonder whether it might have been a good idea to have done that before the Bill, as then we might have had—

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

We produced our green finance strategy in 2019 and we provided a green financing road map in 2021. I very much hope that before we reach the end of the Bill noble Lords will have sight of the refreshed green finance strategy.

[Baroness Worthington (CB)]

That is great, but my point still stands. It would have been good to have had the refresh before the legislation so that we could have incorporated any findings into the Bill.

On my amendment on the assessment of risk in relation to capital requirements, it is not the case that everything is fine in the world of climate modelling. It really is not. If you spend time with climate scientists who are empirical scientists out in the field witnessing the impact of climate on the natural world, they will tell you that the models are not in line with what they are witnessing. That tells you that we have not got a handle on the speed and pace of change in the physical world thanks to decades of unmitigated emissions of greenhouse gases and the never-ceasing increase in concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.

The noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Naseby, may well say that it is fine and that we are just going to look at demand. We have been doing that for about 30 years. It has not made a jot of difference. The reason for that is that we have an economic system based on an incumbent power that is very adept at keeping demand for its product healthy and at finding new sources of demand for its product, so we absolutely need to cut with both sides of the scissors. We need constraints on demand and constraints on supply; otherwise, we will carry on with this merry dance and the emissions in the atmosphere, which are what matters, will continue to rise.

I believe that the finance sector is not the place to solve this. We need political will across all member states to pass the legislation necessary to drive capital into solutions and to stave off the continued licensing of extraction. That will take time, but it needs to be done.

In the meantime, if we walk into believing that the finance sector has got this—“Don’t worry; the models are all fine”—we will be making a grave error. These models are not sufficient; they do not take a whole host of measures into account. The noble Lord, Lord Stern, is not here, but he is an expert in these matters and he will tell you how flawed these models are. How can they be sufficient when many of them conclude that a global increase of around 3 degrees will take roughly 5%, 10% or 15% from GDP? That is ludicrous. Do not forget that an average global increase of 3 degrees means warming at the poles at three times that rate and hugely different regional impacts. That is not a safe place to be.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Baroness Worthington Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 23rd March 2023 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Baroness Worthington]

241FC: After Clause 71, insert the following new Clause—
“Climate and nature offsets
In Schedule 2 to FSMA 2000 (regulated activities) after paragraph 9 insert—“Climate and nature offsets(9ZA) Selling, or offering or agreeing to sell, climate and nature offsets.””

[Baroness Worthington (CB)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan, for lending her name to this amendment. I am not at all wedded to the exact wording of it. I would welcome discussions with the Government about approaches to this issue; however, I stress that this is a really important issue that needs regulatory approaches.

Currently, my amendment would add these activities to Schedule 2 to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000:

“Selling, or offering or agreeing to sell, climate and nature offsets”.


This would make them regulated activities and enable the setting of minimum standards by the FCA, the regulator. By “off-sets”, I have in mind the voluntary carbon market and the nascent market in biodiversity, where an entity voluntarily seeks to compensate for the greenhouse gas emissions or loss of biodiversity arising from its activities by reporting an equivalent amount of emissions reduction or removal, or biodiversity gains, outside of its boundary that it has purchased through a credit or a financial mechanism.

There are more formal markets, particularly in carbon, where participants are required to participate. These are compliance markets. It is not my intention to focus on those, although there have been incidents in such markets, where there may well also be a need for more oversight. Despite the mandatory nature of the market, there have been examples of fraud and mis-selling. There is a lack of transparency even in these markets.

I return to the voluntary market. By making the trade in climate and nature off-sets a regulated activity, the FCA could make rules setting out principles, standards or regulated guidance that off-sets must then meet. I am not seeking to tie the FCA’s hands by setting out what rules it should make; it is a complex issue. It will need to invest in relevant expertise and be led by evidence, but it does need to invest in that expertise.

This amendment is supported by financial market participants. I put on record my thanks to Scottish Widows; Railpen—the Railways Pension Scheme; the Brunel Pension Partnership, which manages the assets for local government pension schemes in the south-west; and employees of the Environment Agency and the Church of England Pensions Board. These organisations collectively are responsible for more than £250 billion in assets; they have written to me in support of this amendment, and I am sure would welcome a meeting with government to discuss it further. They tell me that it is widely known that this market is not functioning well at the moment, and that the voluntary certifications and quality codes are not delivering the transparency, reliability and quality of off-sets for financing to flow freely into projects that could make a real difference in the fight against climate change and nature loss.

Given that, to achieve net zero, the majority of firms will have to rely on some form of tradable off-set or tradable credits for their residual emissions, which could be impossible to eliminate through actual investments, regulation of this market would serve the purpose of building trust for firms to allocate finance in this area—and I agree with them. Currently the market is relatively small, but it is growing and has increased fivefold since 2018, and many have called for it to scale further, including the former Bank of England Governor, Mark Carney. The Climate Change Committee estimates it to be a $2 billion a year market, accounting for 300 megatonnes of carbon dioxide per year—around 1% of global emissions and not far from the total contribution of the UK to the climate change problem, so it is not insignificant.

However, this market in climate mitigation or activities will not scale or endure without better regulated standards that can underpin confidence in the market. As the need to demonstrate a response to the growing climate risks increases, more and more companies and individuals will be tempted to buy their way to a cleaner carbon footprint or a cleaner reputation. Already, one-third of FTSE 350 companies include off-sets in their emissions reduction plans. Off-sets account for between 35% and 80% of their pledged emissions reductions—so it is a significant piece of financial architecture that people are relying on to get to net zero.

Companies will want to be seen to do the right thing, but this will be challenging. It is extremely difficult to assess whether emissions reductions being purchased are both real and durable. This offers an opportunity to unscrupulous providers to market poor-quality products to unsuspecting companies and investors. As I said, even the regulated carbon markets have seen examples of fraud and poor-quality off-sets entering markets. In the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, the Europe-wide carbon market, the market had to be closed to overseas investments in credits, partly in response to an oversupplied market but also partly due to persistent questions about the quality of the credits entering the market.

The potential for mis-selling in this market is high. Some noble Lords may remember that, in 2011, a listed company on the Canadian stock exchange, the Sino-Forest Corporation, went bankrupt after an investigation revealed that the company’s claims were vastly out of line with reality on the ground. The case related to a standard forestry offering; it is far easier to verify whether the land has been purchased and the trees are there than it is to verify whether those forests are actually absorbing or storing carbon—an invisible commodity that we are essentially turning into a tradeable commodity. Similarly, how much biodiversity the forest may hold is a far harder thing to verify.

The difficulties of verifying this market make it very attractive for unscrupulous actors and, as excitement and financial flows increase in this market, that attractiveness to potentially rogue actors will only grow. One UK-based carbon market ratings agency has already reported that it believes that only 30% of offsets on the market are high quality, and 25%—one-quarter—could effectively be classed as having junk status. The Swiss-registered offset provider, South Pole, one of the largest in the market, had the integrity of its offering called into question by an article in Tages-Anzeiger in February this year. This sent shock waves through the industry, and a lot of attention has now been placed on the question of integrity.

Most of the focus of the carbon market quality checks is on credits generated in the biosphere—so-called nature-based solutions. Trees are the most common product to which you will find financial instruments attached, but carbon is stored in other ways, too, and it is even more difficult to verify some of those other sources of carbon store because they are far harder to count and track. Below-ground carbon in soils is one example: it is notoriously difficult to get a handle on exactly what is happening in the carbon cycle in soils. It is even harder with below-water carbon—blue carbon—stored in sea grasses and other marine ecosystems, where you cannot even see the commodity being sold. These difficulties are pronounced.

The Minister may say, “Don’t worry; normal regulations against fraud and corruption will be sufficient to protect against outright fraud and corruption”, but these markets are uniquely complex. Often the problem is not that actors are wilfully seeking to do wrong but rather that there is an unhelpful lack of independent standards in the market to help determine what constitutes an additional or biodiversity benefit. In that uncertainty, it is not just investors who will potentially find that their investments are not delivering what they expected; the whole planet is being short-changed. This is because the sale of an offset permits the continued emission of greenhouse gases, minus the guilt; and, if the offset purchase is not genuine, atmospheric concentrations, already at dangerously high levels, will continue to rise. As we saw in the latest assessment report from the IPCC, this is starting to imperil us all.

Independent observers of the integrity of this market have highlighted concerns. A report published on this topic by IOSCO, the International Organization of Securities Commissions—the global standard-setter for investment securities—explains in detail the issues with the quality of carbon credits and the lack of a uniform definition of what constitutes high quality. I will not run through them; there are at least 10 reasons why this market is complicated.

At the top line, there are questions about additionality—whether this action is genuinely additional to what would have happened anyway—and about permanence and the risk of reversal. There are risks of leakage: you may be protecting something in one area, but that activity is just displaced to somewhere else and the emissions still occur. There are concerns about double counting, registry and transparency. There are potential conflicts in the market, and there is a lack of legal clarity, no standardisation, poor data and, overwhelmingly, a very large risk of greenwashing and, from that, legal risks and potential litigation cases. We are not in a good situation today. The market is small now, but it will grow, and it is really timely to be considering whether the Government should take powers now to regulate it.

This is a volatile market, as you can imagine, such is the uncertainty, with the mis-selling of fraud and the mistaken assumptions. There have been plenty of studies into why that might be the case. I will touch on an example of why regulations are needed: pension funds. In the UK, they are now investing in forest carbon offsets for the long term. This relates to both defined benefit offerings, where there are some protections for savers, but defined contribution schemes are increasingly entering this market too.

The long-term future of the biosphere in a changed climate is deeply uncertain and pension fund advisers and managers need better guidance. They simply should not have to determine whether something they are being sold is correct with no guidance from government and no regulation. There could be risks from litigation, as I mentioned: should vendors of these products be hit with legal claims or go bankrupt, savers will be hit by that outcome.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Worthington (CB)]

I thank the Minister for her response and I am encouraged and reassured to know that those powers already exist. I will go away and consider that.

I am going to come back on a couple of points. It is true that some initiatives have been launched—I was involved in one—but they have no statutory basis at all. It is a group of individuals—business leaders and some academics—fighting it out with no governance or democratic representation. It will come out with standards, but the quality control over that process is not being led by sovereign nations. It was launched at COP 26, but there was absolutely no involvement of negotiators, member states or anything with public sector status. Although we look forward to their outcomes, something in that process may lead to less than favourable outcomes.

I ask the Minister: if we are to proceed internationally, which part of the architecture of the UN or any multilateral fora does she see acting as the holder of this important set of regulations? It cannot be left to industry to mark its own homework, nor to the voluntary sector, with its general lack of resources or certainty of funding. It needs to be led truly internationally, through member states and a multilateral process.

Perhaps the Minister would agree to write to me, because I am interested to understand how this can be done internationally. Individual member states have to lead; one or two progressive countries have to start the process, as we have seen with the green taxonomy: Europe started and now the UK has done ours. You do not always have to wait for a UN or international process, but can move forward and take leadership, especially if you are trying to make the City of London the centre of green finance.

Although I am encouraged, there are still some large questions to be answered about how we ensure quality, get the right standards, and involve democratic processes and member states—but I am pleased to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 241FC withdrawn.