Health and Care Bill

Baroness Thornton Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Wednesday 26th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Walmsley (LD)]

My Lords, we have been reminded many times during the debates in Committee of the aims of the Bill to improve the health and well-being of the population, to improve the quality of care and to use NHS resources sustainably through integration, co-operation and collaboration. Of course, the point at which these resources are used at the coalface, known as “place” in the Bill, is in these place-based organisations. To ensure integration at this level, we are told that the ICB must create an integrated care partnership, otherwise known as a place-based integrated care board, which probably has an acronym as well. There is, however, very little detail about those, despite their crucial importance, and these amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, are an attempt to put a bit of flesh on those bones.

I put my name to Amendment 166, but I could just as easily have put it to Amendment 165. Amendment 166 says that, within the place-based partnership, there should be mandated a provider network board with duties delegated to it by the ICB. It would be under parliamentary scrutiny and have an obligation to meet in public. These networks already exist and exert considerable influence, but it is essential that they operate in this new integrated care system under a regulated constitution, with obligations to consult and financial provisions. This amendment would ensure the transparency, for which the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, called, over how well integration is operating at this very important level so that there can be proper control and accountability and scrutiny as to where the money is being spent and whether it is achieving the duties placed on all these systems by the Bill.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

I thank my noble friend for tabling these amendments; I have added my name to both of them. They are about transparency and legitimacy, raising very important questions which the Minister needs to answer.

I go back to what the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, said at Second Reading, which I think my noble friend referred to. He said that

“we have new provider collaboratives which, in fairness, is where the power in the NHS will lie. The Bill makes no provision for them in terms of transparency, openness or accountability.”—[Official Report, 7/12/21; col. 1789.]

I do not need to say any more than that. The Minister needs to answer that question, because it needs to be resolved before the Bill completes its passage.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, for bringing us back to the subject of place-based structures and taking us into the issues relating to provider networks. I hope it will be taken as a given that the Government have sympathy with the intentions behind his amendments.

On Amendment 165, we absolutely agree on the importance of place, and I hope I can provide the Committee with reassurances on that score. First, the linchpin to the accountability issue is, I suggest, the ICB constitution, which is required to set out how its functions will be discharged. That may include how functions will be carried out by committees and sub-committees, which will include place-level committees. The best size for an ICB area varies according to local circumstances, and some of the smaller ICB areas are coterminous with the local authority. In those systems, place arrangements will quite rightly look very different from the large ICB areas.

ICBs need to be clear about the expectations and roles of place-based structures, including what they are responsible for commissioning, what powers have been delegated to them, and what resources they are responsible for. The current legislation provides for the ability to establish place-based structures and set them out clearly in ICB constitutions. However, Frimley is not Cumbria, and Essex is not Manchester. We want to give ICBs the flexibility to determine structures that work best for them. To help them do that, NHS England has the power to issue guidance to ICBs on the discharge of their functions, and is working with CCGs and the current non-statutory ICSs to develop model constitutions for the future ICBs. Those constitutions will, of course, also have to be approved by NHS England before the ICB is established. This approach should achieve the right balance, because it allows us to support ICBs to develop, without the danger of putting in place further legislation which could act as a barrier to future evolution. Requiring the establishment of a separate place-based board is simply not necessary and would come at a bureaucratic cost.

I turn to Amendment 166. I appreciate the noble Lord’s concern about transparency and accountability for groups of providers working together where they are exercising functions that an ICB has delegated. I shall come on to the concern expressed by my noble friend Lord Lansley, about the purchaser/provider split. Provider collaboratives are intended to deliver the benefits of scale, with providers working together to implement best practice and reduce variation in access, experiences and outcomes for patients and populations. For example, this could involve sharing workforce and managing capacity on a wider scale. Depending on the local circumstances, such arrangements may include a delegation of ICB functions. ICBs and providers should have the flexibility, in line with guidance that will be issued by NHS England.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

Has the Minister actually seen the model constitution that will be imposed by NHS England, and does it do what he is suggesting it does? Maybe the rest of us could see it, too.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My understanding is that it is work in progress—so no, I have not seen it.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

Is it not then unsatisfactory that we should complete the passage of the Bill without having sight of the constitution, so that we can be assured that the assurances that the Minister is giving us will in fact work?

[Earl Howe (Con)]

I do not think that is a reasonable ask by the noble Baroness, if I may say so. I am trying to describe a structure that should deliver what I am sure she wants to see—safeguards and good pointers for ICBs to make their own decisions, while also ensuring that some of the pitfalls mentioned in the debate are not fallen into. If I can let her see the work in progress, I shall certainly be glad to do so—I do not have a problem with that—but I suggest that it is not necessary for her to do that to accept the proposition that I am trying to put forward.

As I have mentioned, the Bill requires an ICB to set out in its constitution how its functions will be discharged, including any arrangements to delegate functions to provider collaboratives. Furthermore, as an additional safeguard, the Secretary of State may impose conditions on the exercise of the power through regulations.

--- Later in debate ---

The Bill lays out in some considerable detail the powers and duties of the new integrated care systems, and the Government tell us they do not want to be prescriptive as to how these duties should be carried out—yet here, we are expected to rubber-stamp an enormous set of powers which could do absolutely the opposite. Clause 39 is not needed. In addition to all the regulatory and guidance powers in the Bill, the Government still hold the overall purse strings and can always provide additional resources after the initial budgets have been set if particular needs arise. The Secretary of State should then leave it to those who have been so carefully chosen and so rigorously regulated to get on with the job. I support removing Clause 39.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

My Lords, I am nearly convinced that I should have put my name to the opposition to Clause 39 standing part of the Bill.

We have had a very informed and interesting debate which comes to the heart of the balances of power that the Bill seeks to change. My noble friend Lord Hunt set out concerns over Clause 39, which gives general powers of direction to NHS England. Amendments 174A, 174B, 175A, 176A and 175 seek to mitigate the power and to put in safeguards. This is very much in tune with concerns expressed across the Committee, by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, and by the Constitution Committee. Our amendments stop short of that from the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, but theirs is a more elegant solution in many ways. However, the Minister will need to explain why some powers of direction are required, and we on these Benches will listen very carefully indeed.

This is all part of the balance between the responsibilities of the Secretary of State, especially to Parliament, and the powers the Secretary of State has to enable them to discharge their duties. If there is a clear and consistent solution to this, we have yet to hear it. In a way, we are repeating debates we have already had in Committee. The Bill has been severely criticised as a clear and disturbing illustration of disguised legislation, and it will need to be changed. We will need to move on to proper talks about how to do that.

On whether Clause 64 should stand part of the Bill, the issue is a different one. The 2012 Act introduced the formal notion of NHS bodies having autonomy, and since 2003, foundation trusts have had some degree of at least theoretical autonomy. But in the years of austerity a lot of that has gone, and all trusts of all kinds are simply struggling to manage day by day. It may have been the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, who observed that the difference between a trust and a foundation trust was a distinction without a difference. For some years, the process of managing foundation trusts has been the same as for trusts.

We have been hearing in our recent deliberations about local flexibilities. Our scepticism about this has been strong, because it appears—and this group of amendments addresses this—that any flexibility will be as great as NHS England permits. Let us not reject autonomy. Why remove the duties to promote autonomy? Why not replace them, for example, as the noble Lord, Lord Mawson, said, with a duty around subsidiarity and localism?

I will not repeat what was said by the Constitution Committee, but it was very critical of the powers that the Secretary of State seeks to take. Indeed, I raise a different issue: the fact that I thought NHS England was undertaking implementation of the Bill before it has finished its passage through Parliament. It is all part of the same pattern. Since we have an undertaking from the Minister to respond to that concern, we will look for an undertaking from him to provide an explanation and perhaps further discussion about why he wants autonomy removed from the Bill.

[Lord Kamall (Con)]

I thank all noble Lords for their amendments and for challenging the issues around the power of direction. We believe that we must have the right framework for national oversight of our health system. Following the merger of NHS England with Monitor and the Trust Development Authority, NHS England will be one of the largest arm’s-length bodies in government, responsible for over £130 billion of taxpayers’ money. Without this power, we would be expanding the functions and responsibilities of NHS England without ensuring that there are enhanced accountability measures in place.

Accountability must run from NHS England to Ministers, from Ministers to Parliament, and from Parliament to the public. This is what the power of direction supports. Indeed, a number of politicians from different sides agree that if you walked out into Parliament Square and asked people who is responsible, they would expect us to have answers. Therefore, we want to make sure there is the appropriate power of responsibility.

I also want to give reassurances that we expect the situations where the Government issue directions to NHS England to be rare. Where it does happen, Ministers will of course ensure that the direction is clear, appropriate and has suitable timeframes. It is paramount that this power can be deployed quickly when required, and limiting it to specific instances, or prescribing a time limit as to its efficacy, would undermine the intent of these provisions.

That said, we agree it would be inappropriate to use this power to intervene in clinical decisions, and we have specifically exempted this in the Bill. For example, we have made sure that a direction cannot be given in relation to drugs, medicines or—interestingly, given our previous discussions—on treatments that NICE has not recommended or issued guidance on. The noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, rightly questioned the draft guidance that NHS England has given—we are trying to find a copy of that. However, we recognise the unique role the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care plays in the system. The Secretary of State could use the powers to request to see the guidance developed by NHS England before it is published, to ensure that NHS England is working effectively with other parts of the system, such as local authorities, given the concerns that both the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, raised.

On Amendments 176A and 174A, we have already included a number of exemptions to the power of direction in the Bill to ensure the Secretary of State is not able to intervene in day-to-day operational matters. There is also no intention that the power will be used to direct NHS England on procurement matters. Any decision to exercise the power will be subject to and guided by general public law principles and general statutory duties. This means, for example, that Ministers will have to use regulations where they exist, as they do for procurement, and that the Secretary of State cannot direct NHS England to breach procurement regulations, since this would be unlawful.

In relation to allocations to ICBs, NHS England uses a formula to allocate NHS resources to different parts of the country based on long-standing principles of equal opportunity of access for equal needs and informed by the independent Advisory Committee on Resource Allocation. There is no intention to use the power to interfere in this process.

In relation to local organisations, I make the point that the Bill will provide more practical autonomy at a local level by strengthening local leadership and empowering local organisations to make decisions about their population, while also allowing for national accountability. This is the approach we want to take with this power: directing NHS England only on the functions it holds in respect of local bodies, to provide necessary support and assistance to them, especially if they are failing. It is also vital that a power of this nature is accompanied with appropriate safeguards and transparency requirements.

On Amendment 174B, which relates to public interest, the clause already ensures that all directions must be made in the public interest.

On Amendment 175A, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has called for directions to be laid in Parliament. It is already the case that any direction issued must be made in writing and will have to be published. This will allow Parliament to hold Ministers to account for use of this power.

On Amendment 175, Ministers already work in partnership with NHS England, and any direction made would come after close working and considered discussion. NHS England will continue to make the vast majority of its decisions without direction, consulting the Government as it needs to. We believe that this power provides additional transparency by ensuring that where Ministers direct NHS England, it is clear, published and available for scrutiny by all. Any direction will come after a considered discussion with NHS England and advice, including on the impact and deliverability of such a direction. Ministers will of course consider, with NHS England and others, that the priorities being set are the right ones and whether they are affordable. However, it is important that we do not put in place too bureaucratic a structure that would bind Ministers’ hands when decisions have to be made quickly.

I end by addressing the questions put forward by my noble friend Lord Lansley and the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, about Clauses 39 and 64 being removed from the Bill. Clause 39 is part of our ambition to put increased accountability for the Secretary of State at the heart of these proposals while committing to the NHS’s clinical and day-to-day operational independence. We reiterate that the power will add to the existing ways that the Secretary of State and NHS England work together. The mandate to NHS England, which has been an established means of providing direction since 2013, will continue to be the main place for strategic direction-setting.