Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement

Baroness Smith of Newnham Excerpts

Monday 17th January 2022 Grand Committee

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords, I feel as though we might be in the middle of a game of parliamentary musical chairs and that at some point one of us making winding speeches is going to find that we are interrupted by the bell, so I am not sure whether I should aim to speak for a very long time, get to the bell and stop or should expect to be interrupted in the middle of my speech.

In opening this debate, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, pointed out that we are talking about an agreement of considerable strategic significance. As the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, pointed out, the treaty that we are scrutinising today is in some ways quite limited. It is very specific. I want to start with some general points and will make a few specific points about the agreement.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, pointed out, the context of the treaty is very important. In announcing AUKUS back in September, the Prime Minister said the

“‘AUKUS’ partnership will work to protect our people and support a peaceful and rules-based international order.”

We had a brief opportunity to consider the AUKUS announcement in September when we discussed a Statement, but a Statement repeat in the Lords almost by definition means very little time for debate— 40 minutes—and very little opportunity for those of us who contributed to that debate to stop and assess what our Government and the Governments of Australia and the United States were seeking to achieve. Everybody, with the partial exception of me speaking from the Liberal Democrat Benches, seemed to greet the agreement with acclaim. My slightly more sceptical voice was because I was a little concerned about whether Her Majesty’s Government had spoken to France. It quickly became clear that they had not. As we heard this afternoon from the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, and the noble Baroness, Lady Liddell, this has created certain concerns. So while we support the AUKUS agreement and the agreement we are looking at today on the exchange of information on naval propulsion, can the Minister tell the Grand Committee what Her Majesty’s Government are doing on our wider diplomatic relations to ensure that as we move forward with our agreements with the United States and Australia, we are keeping our other NATO and Five Eyes allies on board? We cannot afford another diplomatic incident. I do not think the fact that the French did not withdraw their ambassador from London is a sign that we did a better job diplomatically than Australia and the United States. What are the Government doing to make sure that our diplomatic relationships are in good order?

Several noble Lords have expressed concern about parliamentary scrutiny and how far we are able to scrutinise this agreement and the wider aspects of AUKUS. While listening to the noble Baroness, Lady Liddell, I wondered whether the International Agreements Committee should be thinking about some sort of parliamentary visit to its Australian counterpart, but I think that might not be possible for all sorts of reasons. I wonder to what extent there is scope for the committees of this House to talk to opposite numbers in Australia and the United States about best practice and how far it can be imported to this House and the United Kingdom Parliament more generally. The Minister clearly cannot answer for a House of Lords committee, but she should be answering for the Government, so can she explain what the Government intend in terms of reporting to your Lordships’ House and the other place, both in terms of this treaty, which is a relatively limited treaty for the next 18 months, and for wider discussions on AUKUS moving forward? That is clearly of importance to the whole House.

In terms of the AUKUS provisions in general, there is a suggestion that it will strengthen the United Kingdom’s defence and international relations. That may well be the case, and certainly the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, was keen to say how important it is because, in particular, it has given China a sense that the United Kingdom along with the US and Australia are willing to confront China. However, if that is the case, and part of the purpose of AUKUS is to take on China, to what extent does the United Kingdom have the resources to be able to do that? We have heard from the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Boyce, and the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, that there are some questions about our capabilities. To what extent will this agreement be beneficial to the United Kingdom in a military and export sense and to what extent do we think it might be a pull on our defence budget? As the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Boyce, implied, if we are working with Australia, and the main AUKUS deal was sold to Parliament as hugely important in terms of our defence exports, surely we do not stand to benefit if the Australians ultimately do not procure submarines.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

The point I was making, as we were interrupted by the bell, concerns what happens if this agreement does not take us in the direction anticipated and work is undertaken, perhaps by the United Kingdom and UK businesses, but ultimately, we do not see any submarine sales on the order books.

I want to raise two final issues. One is strategic and the other relates to small points in the agreement. The strategic one is the extent to which the Government are still keeping an eye on our own region. A tilt to the Indo-Pacific might seem strategically important and is clearly significant in terms of concerns about China, but to what extent are we able to tilt to the Indo-Pacific and, at the same time, ensure our own continent is secure?

Turning to my two points on the treaty specifically, Article VI talks about not communicating any naval nuclear propulsion information to people of

“other nations, foreign or international entities, or individuals who are not nationals of the Parties.”

In light of the security guidance we were given last week and concerns about a Chinese national, who I assume is a dual national, could the Minister explain to the Committee whether “nationals” here means people with only a single nationality? What happens if a dual national has either Russian or Chinese nationality alongside British, American or Australian nationality?

My final point relates to Article VIII and intellectual property. Is there any concern that, by sharing information and the guarantees under intellectual property, British researchers could lose out in any way, or are the Government satisfied that that clause gives guarantees that are as sufficient and desirable for researchers as they are for the defence sector generally?