Baroness Smith of Basildon
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Crime and Courts Bill [HL]
Baroness Smith of Basildon Excerpts(11 years, 11 months ago)
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( ) There shall be a Director General, who is to be one of the NCA officers, and who shall be responsible for the exercise of the NCA’s operational and administrative functions.
( ) Schedule (The NCA Board) has effect.”
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, in many ways this is quite a difficult Bill to scrutinise fully. Some information relating to the Bill is missing today: we do not have the framework document, which would be extremely useful as your Lordships consider how the NCA board will operate.
Our amendments today are intended to bring some sense to the Government’s words, which is not necessarily reflected in the Bill, and to ensure that the new National Crime Agency has operational independence. The Government have quite rightly gone to great lengths to emphasise that the NCA—the body that takes over from the Serious Organised Crime Agency, the National Policing Improvement Agency and CEOP—will be operationally independent, but I am somewhat puzzled about how this is going to operate. SOCA was, of course, a non-departmental government body, or NDGB. The NCA has been classified as a non-ministerial department, or NMD, and that is similar to other bodies such as the Crown Prosecution Service and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, as the Home Office fact sheet identifies. This is significant and appropriate because, as a rule, NMDs are considered to be more independent of Government. I quote from a research paper on the Public Bodies Bill from the House of Commons Library, which says that they,
“answer directly to Parliament on issues where it has been deemed appropriate to remove executive political interference”.
Examples given by the Library in the other place are Ofgem and the UK Statistics Authority. Both the Crown Prosecution Service and HMRC, which the Government give as models for the designation of the National Crime Agency, have corporate governance structures which have a strategic direction and strategic accountability exercised by a board, and that board reports to the Secretary of State. That is true currently for both SOCA and the NPIA. The benefit of that is that it ensures and preserves the agency’s independence from Government, but it also maintains, quite rightly, the ultimate strategic oversight by Government.
In this Bill, the Government seem to be proposing a departure from that. Under current proposals, the NCA will have no board and instead will be governed by just one individual, the director-general, who will report directly to the Home Secretary. The Home Secretary’s responsibilities are to set the strategic priorities for the NCA. He will authorise the director-general’s annual plan of strategic and operational practices and priorities. The Secretary of State has the power to appoint and fire the director-general and the power to designate the director-general’s operational powers on the direction of an advisory panel, and we shall return to both those issues in later amendments.
It seems to us that this kind of structure is not conducive to operational independence and is at odds with other NMDs that the Government have set up and support. Compared with Ofgem, the Financial Standards Authority, the Serious Fraud Office, the Office of Fair Trading, the CPS and HMRC, the National Crime Agency would be unique in its level of direct ministerial oversight and influence. There seems to be some contradiction within the Bill and within the Government’s priorities because although they are talking about devolving operational power to the police, they seem to be retaining more power, but without responsibility, to the Secretary of State. The Bill does not seem to do what the Government have said they intend, which is to put power in the hands of the police force. It is very much a top-down structure and, if one were being unkind, one could say that the Secretary of State is happy to devolve responsibility but, at the same time, is centralising power.
The amendments that we have tabled today have two impacts. Amendment 1 will remove the responsibility for direction and control of the NCA from the director-general, and instead the NCA board will have responsibility for the strategic direction and control of the NCA, while the director-general will be responsible for the exercise of the NCA’s operational and administrative functions. Amendment 4, which is quite long, sets out the structure of the new NCA board and is modelled on the existing governance structure of SOCA. We would be quite happy if, at some later stage, the Government were to bring back this amendment to look at the detail of it. There may be items within it that are not as appropriate for the NCA as they are for SOCA. However, broadly speaking, it seems to us that the governance arrangements for SOCA, with a board structure, would be more appropriate for the National Crime Agency than the sort of direct-line accountability to the Secretary of State for one individual, the director-general.
I suppose we are seeking answers to a number of questions from the Minister, in trying to understand why the Government have proposed this structure. Can the noble Lord explain why the Government believe that there are benefits to the National Crime Agency from not having a board? The organisations that are to become part of the National Crime Agency have had boards, so the Government should really explain that and justify their reasons for having a different governance structure in this case. Why does the NCA have to be directly accountable to the Home Secretary, unlike the Serious Organised Crime Agency? Again, that is a departure from current practice.
Given that the Government have rightly changed the structure from that of the Serious Organised Crime Agency, which is a non-departmental government body, to a non-ministerial department, can they give any indication of the model that they used for the NCA? I am not aware of any significant body that is a non-ministerial department and that has the same kind of structure reporting directly to the Secretary of State, but not through a board. In looking at these areas, it would be very helpful if the Minister were to give some explanation of those issues and say whether he will consider looking again at governance and introducing a board, which we think would be the appropriate way to manage and run the agency.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, we have tabled Amendment 5 in this group. The amendment, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, does not seek to change the architecture of the proposal—I thought I would get that in quite quickly because my noble friend hates the term. It is not a governing board and accountability would still be that of the Secretary of State. However, it is good practice to provide infrastructure and support in this sort of situation.
The Home Office itself has a supervisory board. I would have taken my amendment from that, had I been able to get into the Home Office website at any time when I tried over the past few days. The form and function of the model is, I suppose, not very different from that of other government departments, so I looked at CLG, another department with which I am fairly familiar. The description of its roles seemed to be very much what I was looking for. It tells us that:
“The Board’s role is to advise and support ministers on the operational implications and effectiveness of policy proposals, focusing on getting policy translated into results”.
It refers to leadership, effectiveness, accountability, and sustainability—that is, sustainability in the sense of taking a long-term view about what the department is trying to achieve.
“The board advises on, and supervises, five main areas: Strategic Clarity … Commercial Sense … Talented People … Results Focus … and … Management Information”.
Those are listed with descriptions that I will not trouble your Lordships with this afternoon, because I think the CLG website is pretty accessible. I am not wedded to any particular model but I am wedded to good governance. In 2012, as has been the case for some years, the private and voluntary sectors have had to focus very much on governance, and I think that a new government agency should focus on it too.
Lord Henley
My Lords, as the Bill makes clear, it is quite obvious that we want those key stakeholders to be involved. How formalised that should be is another matter. I would hope that the noble Lord would be prepared to wait for the framework document and how we consider it. It will be for all of us to decide how formal, formalised or informal that is, and what is the right balance—again I use that great Home Office word. It is getting the balance right.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, I appreciate that the Minister is trying to be helpful regarding the framework document. However, I hope that he understands how difficult it is for your Lordships’ House to consider properly the governance arrangements when we are told that we are going to get a lot of the information later, probably at Report. He said that we will not complete the Committee stage until after we return from the Summer Recess, with his great sacrifice of missing his party conference. The only reason the Committee stage is finishing so late is that in another part of the Bill the consultation, which will inform the clause in the Bill, has not yet been completed. As I said at Second Reading, I wonder whether this Bill should have come before your Lordships’ House at this stage or whether it would have been better, in order to consider properly the governance arrangements and the later clauses on community sentences, to have had that information with us now. We have already heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and my noble friend Lord Harris of the difficulties of trying to make suggestions and looking at exactly what the Government are proposing when we do not have a lot of the information with us today. I am slightly disappointed by the Minister’s response because even without the framework document being available to noble Lords he dismissed the idea that there could be a more formalised structure for involvement in a governance board, as the noble Lord, Lord Condon, said, before we had even had a chance to look at and consider the framework document.
I have listened to comments from around the Committee and there seem to be several points of agreement. There is a general recognition that the NCA is a big beast, taking on what the Minister called a “demanding mission”. It is clear that noble Lords want it to succeed in tackling some of the worst and most difficult crimes in our country. The only reason why we would discuss governance structures at all is not to make the Minister’s life more difficult or deny him the opportunity to attend his party conference, but because we want those structures to reflect the importance of the organisation and ensure that it has the best possible information, advice and governance to be adequate to the task that it faces. As other noble Lords have said, nobody is wedded to any specific structure, but there has to be some recognition that it is not really satisfactory to have a relationship whereby the director-general responds and reports to the Secretary of State, who sets the guidelines that the director-general works under.
The Minister mentioned some kind of advisory body. There is provision in legislation for that, but with a very limited capacity. That is not particularly clear, either. My noble friend Lord Harris referred to the importance of the relationship between the director-general of the NCA and policing bodies and PCCs across the country. The power of direction in the legislation is something that the Minister has said will be used in exceptional circumstances and that agreement would be sought at all times. Surely, if there is a board or some kind of body of which the director-general is part and to which he reports, which involves the police and the police and crime commissioners, among other people whom the Secretary of State may choose, that makes those relationships and understanding of the work of both much better and, therefore, more effective.
I take the Minister’s point about bureaucracy, but I do not think that that should be an excuse to remove good governance processes and practices, which have proved themselves in other regards. As my noble friend Lord Harris said, the Minister gave the example of the Food Standards Authority, which has a board. I asked what the benefits were of the NCA not having a board, why it needed to be accountable directly to the Home Secretary and what the model was for the organisation. I did not really get an answer to those questions in the Minister’s reply.
I have another point that I would like the Minister to think about a bit more. He said that one concern that he would have if there was a board was that the response from the director-general would be slower, and that it would be more bureaucratic, when he had to respond quickly and decisively to any threats. The role of the board as we see it would not be an operational one but strategic and about giving advice. I would not expect the director-general to consult the board every time he thought that he or his colleagues had to respond to a specific threat. That would clearly be unacceptable. We are talking about the role in the legislation that the Minister and the Government intend for the Secretary of State, and our suggestion is that it should be the board’s role. When the Government create bodies such as police and crime commissioners, we have to look at how they are brought into the general architecture of how the police and other law enforcement services work. It is unhelpful to good working practices to sideline them as they are in this Bill.
I would like to take this matter away and reflect on it. I do not intend to pursue it further at this stage. There may be more opportunities as we go through the Bill and debate other clauses around the issue of governance. At some stage, we will have a framework document, but I hope that it comes some time before Report. This House cannot do its duty of scrutiny as well as it should when we do not have such information. To suggest that it will be there for the Commons stage and that therefore we do not need it is unsatisfactory. I am sure that we will return to the issues of governance and, depending on how things go in the course of the debates in Committee, we will decide whether or not to return to them at a later stage. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“(1) It is the duty of the Secretary of State to ensure that the NCA is provided with sufficient resources to enable its functions to be discharged effectively and efficiently.”
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, the reason for this amendment is not dissimilar to the reason for the previous amendment that I spoke to: the contradiction that I find at the heart of this Bill around the role of the Secretary of State and whether it is strategic or operational. We are very firmly of the view that it should be and must be a strategic role. As I indicated in my earlier comments on governance, it is an issue of power and responsibility: who holds power and who takes responsibility. We have seen it in other Bills and on other issues.
We are very clear that funding is a strategic role for which the Secretary of State should have responsibility. By way of example, I remind the Minister of a question I asked him on police and police cuts with reference to my own county, Essex. We now have no 24-hour police stations. A number of police stations are open only part-time or during the day, and we have lost or are due to lose several hundred police officers. When I queried him on the Government’s policy on this, he referred me to the chief constable and said it was his responsibility not the Government’s. Surely, the chief constable takes such decisions only in light of the funding laid down by the Government.
I want to make it quite clear in this amendment that the responsibility for the funding of the National Crime Agency is a very strategic role and one for the Secretary of State to ensure that the agency has the funds to do all the work that it needs to do to be effective.
The national plan states that the National Crime Agency,
“will not exceed the aggregate of the Spending Review settlement for the precursor organisations and the cost of the fully funded functions it is agreed should migrate into the NCA”.
That is helpful in many ways, and the Government have since confirmed that the NCA budget for 2014-15 will be around £400 million.
While we understand that the Government are saying that the budgets will migrate with the organisations, which we certainly welcome, in reality we have to look at the cuts that those organisations have already sustained and the loss in their budgets and the savings they have found, in many cases to their credit. The National Policing Improvement Agency has found, I understand, around a £100 million reduction in its budget. Its headcount has gone from 2,200 to 1,400 and it is facing further deep reductions to its budget over the remainder of the financial review period. Clearly, if the NCA is to operate in the same spending envelope as its predecessors, it is unclear how it can manage what it does now and be the co-ordinating body for the organisations that have been moved under its control.
I raise this issue because we want to see the NCA succeed and to be able to do the work that it is going to do, but I wonder whether it would have been cheaper and more cost-effective just to have the organisations working more closely together and to mandate closer working between existing agencies.
Lord Henley
My Lords, I quite understand the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Condon, and we understand that very difficult decisions have been made by different police forces up and down the country about where they are going to rein in expenditure, just as all agencies of the Government of one form or another are having to make very difficult decisions, but we believe that the cuts that they face are manageable. We also believe, and I think this is something to get over, that merely throwing money at a problem does not necessarily, as we discovered before 2010, solve problems, and increasing budgets does not always bring improvements in the service that the public have a right to expect from all services that the Government and taxpayers provide in one form or another.
It will, no doubt, be difficult for the NCA, which, like SOCA, will have to live within its budget and the review settlement. The NCA’s budget will be based on the budgets of the precursor organisations. It will have to deliver that wider remit through enhanced intelligence, tasking and co-ordination arrangements that I hope will make more effective use of its resources—its own assets and those of others. Creating the agency will also provide opportunities to rationalise some functions, remove duplication in others and generate efficiencies.
Turning to the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and her question, in effect, about the responsibility of the Home Secretary, the important point is that the Home Secretary is ultimately accountable to Parliament for public protection. She has a vested interest in ensuring that the National Crime Agency has sufficient resources to deliver the priorities set for it. The Home Secretary will want to make sure that sufficient resources are therefore provided for the important work of the NCA when she negotiates with colleagues in the Treasury. The noble Baroness knows exactly what this is like and I look at other Ministers who have negotiated these things in the past. Sometimes those negotiations can be difficult, but it is something that the Home Secretary will have to address after the next spending review.
Importantly, she will remain responsible and answerable to Parliament after those decisions have been taken for making and setting the strategic priorities for the NCA. Again, the Home Secretary will consult others, whether it is the director-general of the NCA or whomsoever. The director-general will be able to provide that operational understanding of the resources required to deliver in this area. He will also need to ensure that the resources are allocated in the most effective and efficient manner. The important work of the NCA will need to be delivered within the budgets of its precursor bodies in those first years of operation. The budget constraints for the remainder of this Parliament will obviously continue to remain challenging. That means that the NCA, like many other bodies, will look closely at identifying duplication of effort and maximising opportunities for savings. I believe it will be able to ensure greater efficiencies by more effective prioritisation and smarter use of its own assets and those of others.
It is in the interests of the Home Secretary to work with the director-general to ensure that there are adequate resources for the National Crime Agency. The fact that my right honourable friend is answerable to Parliament means that the amendment is unnecessary and I hope that the noble Baroness will feel able on this occasion to withdraw it.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
I am grateful to the Minister, but I wonder whether saying that the Home Secretary is accountable to Parliament is adequate. He will recall that I asked him a question about Essex police. Obviously he is accountable to Parliament, but he told me that it was the responsibility of the chief constable. If the Home Secretary is questioned about funding not being available or adequate to the task, will she merely say, “That is an operational matter for the director-general”? Allocating funding within the organisation would be a matter for the director-general, but it is the overall envelope of funding that puts pressure on him. I am encouraged by the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Condon, which I share, that he is reassured by the intelligence and commitment of those who will be involved in running the NCA. However, the Minister has said that it is going to be difficult. Hearts must sink when people go into a new organisation, really wanting it to succeed, but they are told that it will be difficult to make it work within the budget.
I am also disappointed by the Minister’s comments that we cannot just throw money at a problem. I do not think that anyone has suggested that money be thrown at a problem, but there could well be a problem if the resources for the NCA are not adequate for the task that it has to undertake. If the NCA starts by struggling for funds and not being able to fulfil its obligations, it will lose credibility. I understand the point that he makes and I do not think that he is going to concede as regards looking at the funding or funding additional responsibilities that the NCA will take on. I wonder whether there is a case for reviewing the expenditure and operation after one year. Perhaps a Select Committee could undertake that role and we might return to it. For now, I take on board what he has said and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“( ) the relevant Departmental Select Committee of Parliament,”
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, we return to the recurring themes of governance and operational independence, this time in relation to the provisions of Schedule 1 on director-general appointments and resignations. I entirely agree with the Government that the NCA should preserve strict operational independence. That is why the director-general should not have such a close relationship with the Home Secretary as the one proposed in this legislation, including in Schedule 1.
Looking at Amendment 10 first, it would mean that the director-general would be employed by the National Crime Agency board. The terms and conditions of employment would remain determined by the Secretary of State, which would preserve the ultimate accountability to the Secretary of State but avoid the direct oversight that is currently envisaged in the legislation. Amendment 8 would require pre-appointment scrutiny of the director-general by the Home Affairs Select Committee. In these amendments, I have tried not to be just my normal, moderate, reasonable self but also to look at bringing the wording broadly into line with the Government’s thinking as well as in line with the direction that they have indicated they wish to travel. The Government have indicated that scrutiny of appointment by Select Committee is appropriate and could be best practice. In this case, allowing the Home Affairs Select Committee to do pre-appointment scrutiny would offer an opportunity to consider issues such as skills. Later in the debate, we will look at a schedule on designation and the designations that will be given to the director-general by the Home Secretary. It would be helpful for a body such as the Select Committee to look at issues prior to appointment rather than the Home Secretary making that decision post-appointment.
Lord Henley
My Lords, I hope that I can deal relatively briefly with the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness. I can assure her that in moving the amendment she was, as always, her usual moderate self, for which I am very grateful. Perhaps I may deal first with Amendments 9 to 13 and then deal with Amendment 8 in more detail. Since Amendments 9 to 13 deal with discussing these matters with the chairman of an NCA board and so on, and since we have already dealt with an amendment on which I made it clear that we are not minded to have an NCA board—the noble Baroness will no doubt want to come back to that on Report—it seems somewhat artificial to discuss this issue at this stage. In the absence of a board and the absence of our desire to have a board, discussing such matters is possibly, dare I say, a waste of time.
As regards Amendment 8, I repeat again that the Home Secretary is ultimately accountable for public protection. She will account to Parliament for the progress made by the National Crime Agency. It is therefore right that she should be responsible for appointing and, if necessary—although I hope that it will not happen—dismissing the director-general. She will make any appointment on merit following a fair and open competition and will consult, as the Bill makes clear, her counterparts in the devolved Administrations, reflecting the fact that the NCA will be a UK-wide agency. Under Amendment 8 the noble Baroness seeks to ensure that the selection and appointment of the director-general is subject to scrutiny by the relevant Select Committee, which in this case would be the Home Affairs Select Committee.
We accept that there is a place for departmental Select Committees to undertake pre-appointment hearings for certain key public appointments but we do not believe that this is one of them. I should remind the noble Baroness that the Liaison Committee considered this issue in its July 2011 report on public appointments. It argued for a role for Select Committees where the post exercised one or more of three types of function, including,
“scrutiny of government over matters of propriety, ethics and standards in public life … uphold and defend the rights and interests of citizens; and/or … stand in the shoes of Parliament by exercising direct scrutiny or control over the activities of Ministers”.
None of those criteria apply to the NCA. Perhaps I may add that, for example, the director-general of the Serious Organised Crime Agency was not on the Liaison Committee’s list of appointments to be subject to Select Committee scrutiny.
The Home Affairs Select Committee obviously will have a role in scrutinising the work of the agency in the same way as it has scrutinised the work of SOCA. I believe that it is in that capacity that they can best contribute. But in line with the advice of the Liaison Committee, we do not believe that it is necessary for the Home Affairs Select Committee to have a role in the appointment of the director-general. That is a matter for the Home Secretary. I repeat, and I will probably have to repeat it again, that the Home Secretary is responsible to Parliament and it is right that she should be. Therefore, I hope that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw Amendment 8.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for his explanation. When we put forward Amendments 9 to 13 it did not occur to me that he would not accept our amendment for an NCA board with open arms. We thought that it would be a welcome suggestion and that we were being very helpful to him. We may return to those particular issues as I am disappointed with his response.
There seems to be ambiguity in Schedule 5 regarding the skills and abilities required of the director-general and those requirements can change. Given the provisions of Schedule 5, to which we will come later, some oversight by a Select Committee would be helpful to a Home Secretary in making appointments. I take on board what the noble Lord has said at this stage. Perhaps we may return to it when we discuss Schedule 5. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, in moving government Amendment 14, I shall speak also to Amendments 18, 19, 52 and 53. I can be brief with these technical amendments. The Bill already makes provision in relation to people who volunteer as police special constables who become NCA officers or NCA specials. These amendments will extend those same arrangements to members of the Police Service of Northern Ireland Reserve. That includes ring-fencing the powers of an NCA officer or NCA special, so that where a person is both an NCA officer or NCA special and a member of the Police Service of Northern Ireland Reserve, any powers conferred on him or her in the former NCA capacity cannot be exercised when the person is acting in the latter—the PSNI Reserve—capacity. I beg to move.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Earl for his explanation. I ask him to clarify a couple of points. Have these amendments had the approval of the Northern Ireland Executive and the Justice Minister, or the appropriate Minister, in Northern Ireland? The only point I can make generally about this Bill on the relationship between the NCA and the PSNI is that there can never be a situation where a police officer or special in Northern Ireland is subject to direction and control from London without the same accountability as officers in Northern Ireland, whether they are part of the National Crime Agency or not. That would also apply to the specials that the noble Earl is talking about. I seek some guidance from him that this has been discussed with the Northern Ireland Executive and that Northern Ireland Ministers are content with this amendment.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, I cannot answer that point for certain, but it is inconceivable that the Government would table such an amendment without the agreement of the Northern Ireland Executive. If I am wrong, of course I will write to the noble Baroness.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, this is a probing amendment to clarify and understand the role of specials in the NCA and what they will do. When I read this clause, I thought I understood the role of specials. I went to my favourite police force—Essex—and looked at its website and at the government factsheet on specials in the NCA to try to tie the two together.
The government factsheet says that volunteers will be,
“similar to the police Special Constabulary”,
with,
“some or all of the policing powers available to”,
the NCA. It describes specials as,
“civic-minded volunteers in … public protection work … who may have particular specialist skills … in the fight against serious, organised or complex crime”.
Yet in all the information that I can find regarding the recruiting of special constables in the police force, not one mentions specialist skills or experience. In fact, it talks about special constables being unpaid volunteers and says that they are,
“a manifest sign of partnership between the public and the police”,
with key responsibilities of, for example, performing,
“police duties at public events eg. airshows, concerts and county shows to complement the regular police provision”,
and in emergencies performing,
“additional police duties to assist regular officers”.
It talks about how they have a range of skills, but mainly it is about having more visible policing on the streets.
I would like an explanation of how this translates into specials with the National Crime Agency. Will the agency seek to recruit only specialists—and, if so, what kind of specialist, and how would it seek to recruit them? Surely the work of the NCA is very different to that of a local police force. It is investigative and is to do with serious organised crime, with very complex issues. Police specials have to do a minimum of four hours a week; it is quite difficult to understand how a special in the NCA could fulfil any meaningful function in that time. The Bill refers to part-time specials, but then paragraph (14)(3) says that they can be “otherwise than … part-time”—and the only definition that I know of that is full time. I am not clear why someone would be regarded as a special if they were seconded or taken on a full-time role.
I am happy to be reassured and am looking for reassurance, but I am slightly uneasy as to how this would look across a range of functions and different commands within the NCA—with border control, for example, or CEOP. Did any of the constituent bodies previously use volunteers or specials in this way? Did CEOP do so, for example? Those who wish to abuse children are sometimes very cunning and intelligent in many cases in trying to get to the place where they can get information. Have volunteers been used in the past—and if an NCA special volunteer worked in one area, would that volunteer be allowed to undertake work across the range of NCA functions and responsibilities? What will they do exactly? Also, given the relationship with the PSNI, has there been a discussion with the Northern Ireland Executive on this part of the NCA’s work there? I am a bit puzzled as to how this would work in practice, and any information that the Minister can give would be greatly appreciated.
Lord Henley
My Lords, the noble Baroness pays tribute to her favourite police force in Essex, so I will say a word or two in relation to specials in Cumbria. I mention them in the other end of the country purely to make a point. Two Saturdays ago, I went with them to Appleby for the horse fair, where a very large number of the travelling community descend on a very small town and there are quite serious public order issues. It is the biggest issue in the Cumbrian police force’s annual list of events; from a very small police force it has to provide something like 200 officers over the course of that week on duty to make sure that things remain under control. As a result, I am very proud to say, they make enormous use of their specials in Cumbria, as I am sure that Essex would do in its events. We should all pay tribute to those who give their efforts unpaid and voluntarily as special constables for the work they do and how effective they can be. The role of the NCA specials will be somewhat different than for ordinary specials—if you can call them ordinary—in Essex or Cumbria or wherever.
It may be useful if I set out in some detail how we see the specials developing and the NCA recruiting its own cadre of NCA specials. Enabling the recruitment of NCA specials will build on the approach that has worked effectively for many years in the Police Service. Like ordinary police specials, NCA specials will be unpaid and part time. But we expect many to be recruited on the basis of particular specialist or technical skills that they can offer, such as an understanding of complex financial products to aid the NCA’s counterfraud efforts or expertise in information technology and the internet to help tackle cybercrime. This is not that different from how reservists are often used in the Armed Forces. The noble Baroness will know that there are many specialities that it would be impractical for the Armed Forces to keep in large numbers, in full employment the whole time. But it is worth while having reservists that they can bring in to act as doctors, as they do in Afghanistan.
Like other NCA officers, NCA specials would be able to be designated with operational powers to play a full role in the agency’s work to tackle serious, organised or complex crime. Again, like other NCA officers, NCA specials would be required to be suitable, capable and adequately trained before being designated with the appropriate powers, which, for NCA specials, will be limited to the powers and privileges of a constable, in England and Wales only. NCA specials will not have operational powers in Scotland or Northern Ireland. So there is a distinction there.
The terms and conditions of NCA specials will be for the director-general to determine, but the Bill sets out some core principles. Although NCA specials are NCA officers, they will not be covered by every provision applying to other NCA officers. It will not be possible for the director-general to delegate his or her functions to an NCA special, and they will not form part of any group of NCA officers provided by way of assistance to another law enforcement body. That means that NCA specials will always operate under the direction and control of the NCA director-general. An NCA special will also not be able to form part of the advisory panel designating the director-general with his or her powers.
As unpaid volunteers, NCA specials will not be provided with a wage, a pension or allowances, and will not be covered by the no-strike provisions, which no doubt we will deal with later, for paid NCA officers. They will not form part of the Civil Service. But they will be reimbursed for expenses, and provided with the necessary subsistence, accommodation and training needed to perform their role. They will be able to receive payment to compensate for loss of salary in the event of injury or death resulting from the performance of their duties.
Finally, we have provided for the powers of an NCA special to be ring-fenced so that when a person is both an NCA special and a special constable or Northern Ireland reservist, any powers conferred on him or her as an NCA special cannot be exercised when acting in the latter roles.
We believe that these measures on NCA specials will represent an attractive opportunity for individuals who want to volunteer and to contribute to protecting the public, as well as bolstering the expertise of the National Crime Agency across its remit. The idea behind it is to bring in expertise that might not otherwise be available. They will form an important part of the agency’s stronger co-operation with the private sector, harnessing skills that exist, and are constantly refreshed, in the private sector.
I hope that that explanation is sufficient for the noble Baroness and that we will in due course see them performing as valuable a role as specials in the rest of the police force, although obviously that will be rather a different role bearing in mind their expertise and the nature of the NCA.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
I am grateful to the noble Lord for that explanation, which is certainly helpful, although I do not think that it necessarily answers all my questions. From what he said, I assume that the unpaid people employed,
“otherwise than on a part-time basis”
could be on secondment. If they are to be full time, as he said, this could involve a partnership with the private sector to bring in expertise that is useful to the NCA.
I am slightly puzzled to note that paragraph 14(4) refers to reimbursing the expenses of specials and providing for their subsistence and accommodation. However, if they have left a job to give some of their expertise and time to the NCA, I would expect their salary to be reimbursed unless there is an arrangement with their employer to continue paying their salary as if they were on secondment. However, paragraph 14(4)(c) provides that they can be compensated for loss of salary only if they die or are injured in the course of their work for the NCA. Therefore, unless the Government have an arrangement with the employer of the person who is on secondment to compensate the relevant person for loss of salary in such circumstances, that person will not receive compensation. I partly understand the provision but perhaps not all the details have yet been worked out because, given the pressures on the private sector at the moment, I cannot see how private sector employers would release staff with skills that would be useful to the NCA unless there is an arrangement in place, including a financial arrangement—perhaps it will be exclusively financial in some cases—to encourage them to release these staff.
I think that we are talking only about specialist staff and not volunteers coming to help in the office or with investigations, if I have understood the noble Lord correctly. However, there is still doubt about how those specialist staff will be attracted to work for the NCA. Therefore, I am partly reassured but still slightly puzzled.
Lord Henley
As I said, they will be unpaid in exactly the same way as existing specials are. We hope that we will find volunteers but the NCA is looking to find people with the relevant expertise. Until I came to this job I was not aware that specials were unpaid. I presumed that they were in exactly the same position as my noble friend Lord Attlee, who has had long and distinguished service in the Territorial Army, where he would have been paid for the days that he served and the weeks and months of service when he was on Operation Telic and other such matters. However, the specials have always been treated differently; they are unpaid. We are leaving them in the same position. Just as the ordinary police—I should not say “ordinary”—can manage to get specials who will do this work unpaid, for which we are very grateful, we believe that the same will be true of the NCA. The NCA will be looking for the specialist expertise that it needs which some people—for example, those who are experts in IT—might feel that they can offer in their spare time. That is much the same process as happens with specials at the moment except that they are not offering that expertise.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
I still have some doubts that this process will work although I hope that I am wrong. It might be helpful if the director-general includes in the annual report something about the role of specials. I hope that the noble Lord will write to me on the following question, which he did not answer: namely, whether any of the organisations such as SOCA or CEOP have had specials working in this way. I understand that specials are unpaid, a bit like shadow Ministers in your Lordships’ House. Incidentally, I am happy for him to write to me on the other point as well.
Lord Henley
I can give the noble Baroness a partial answer. There is no comparable scheme within the Serious Organised Crime Agency. However, I understand that some police forces have made use of specialists as specials; for example, the City of London police do so for some fraud inquiries. I think that the same is true of the Metropolitan Police e-Crime Unit, which makes some use of specials in this way: that is, in bringing in expertise. However, as I said, within the precursor organisations, SOCA certainly has not had the ability to do that. I do not know about CEOP and others but I will find out and write to the noble Baroness.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
I appreciate that. CEOP is the body about which I have the most concerns and queries. However, given the Minister’s explanations and his offer to write to me, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I have Amendment 21 in this group and it concerns a more general point. I do not know whether—how did my noble friend Lord Attlee coin it?—the law of inverse speaking time will apply here but I think that it should.
Clause 2(4) provides that:
“An order under this section may amend or otherwise modify this Act or any other enactment”.
My amendment, which may not be perfect in its drafting but is, I think, clear enough in its intention, would add,
“for the purposes of counter-terrorism functions”.
My noble friend Lady Thomas of Winchester is here for the next debate and I had not warned her about this, but I will set her, as chair of the Delegated Powers Committee, on to the Minister if the Government do not acknowledge that there is something in this.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, I listened to the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, with some care. As noble Lords know, I have maintained an interest in Northern Ireland issues, having spent a number of years as a Minister there. I find it very difficult to understand how the Government can proceed with issues that affect Northern Ireland, particularly in this area, if there is not agreement from the First Minister and Deputy First Minister or discussions have not been held with David Ford, the Minister for Justice.
This is a sensitive area and I appreciate that, as the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, said, these things can take some time to resolve when the Executive in Northern Ireland meets. Decisions by the Executive may not always be speedy, but the passage of the Bill will not be speedy either in that the Committee stage will continue after the Summer Recess. I hope that the Minister will take on board the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, which we support. We think that the First Minister and Deputy First Minister should have an opportunity to comment on this and I hope that some agreement can be reached prior to moving forward with these clauses.
Lord Henley
My Lords, there are possibly two issues here. The first is the wider one on the order-making power in Clause 2, to which we will come later when we deal with whether the clause should stand part of the Bill. I trust that that will happen after we have broken for dinner, which may be convenient because I suspect that, in the light of the Constitution Committee’s report published today, it is a debate on which a number of noble Lords will want to speak and one on which we may want to take a reasonable amount of time.
The duty of the Home Secretary to consult Northern Ireland Ministers before laying before Parliament a draft order on counterterrorism functions is important. I hope that I can give some reassurance about the consultation that we are undertaking, who we have discussed these matters with and where we are at the moment. I am sure that my noble friend knows as much as I do about where this is with the Executive at the moment.
I recognise that the amendment seeks clarity on the relationship between the NCA and arrangements in Northern Ireland if a decision is made in the future—I stress if such a decision is made in the future—that the agency should have that counterterrorism function. That has been at the forefront of our consideration of these arrangements, not just for the order-making power but in relation to the agency as a whole, balancing the need for an effective United Kingdom response while respecting the important accountability arrangements for policing in Northern Ireland.
We recognise the particular sensitivities of the arrangements in Northern Ireland which is why in this clause we have already provided specific arrangements that recognise the responsibilities of the chief constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, who has operational responsibility for the police response to terrorism in Northern Ireland. It is absolutely vital that we are clear about the relationship between the NCA and the Police Service of Northern Ireland in the event that the agency were to take on the counterterrorism function. That is why Clause 2(2) provides such clarity by stipulating that the agency may carry out counterterrorism activities in Northern Ireland only,
“with the agreement of the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland”.
Furthermore, any draft order will be subject to the super affirmative process, which includes a requirement for the Home Secretary to consult those persons whom she considers will be affected by the draft order. Again, we will discuss that in somewhat greater detail when we get to Clause 2 stand part, which it would be appropriate to leave until after dinner, if everyone is happy with that suggestion.
Seeking clarity on the consultation requirement in relation to Northern Ireland is understandable and the broad nature of the consultation requirement in Schedule 16 could, of course, include the devolved Administrations—that applies to Scotland as much as it does to Northern Ireland—as well as operational partners, government departments and others. I do not think that we have a gap there.
As the House will be aware, under the terms of the Northern Ireland Act 1998, national security is an excepted matter and the National Crime Agency will be a reserved matter. A duty to consult on excepted and reserved matters therefore sits uncomfortably with the devolution settlement as it relates to counterterrorism matters. I recognise that counterterrorism policing in Northern Ireland cannot be divorced from the generality of policing which is, of course, a transferred matter. Indeed, the National Crime Agency itself will undertake a mix of reserved and devolved activity in relation to its serious and organised crime remit. That is why the provisions in Part 1 of the Bill will require the Northern Ireland Assembly to adopt a legislative consent Motion. That is also why there are provisions throughout the Bill which provide for the necessary checks and balances to reflect devolution at certain points. Obviously, there needs to be consultation with the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland.
I understand that the Justice Minister and the Justice Committee of the Assembly—I am sure that my noble friend knows as much as I do—have agreed in principle to take forward a legislative consent Motion, and officials in the Department for Justice in Northern Ireland are seeking to secure the agreement of the Executive Committee before proceeding to the next stage. Any legislative consent Motion needs to be adopted by the Assembly before the Bill reaches its last amending stage. Although things have not been proceeding quite as quickly as we might wish them to have done, since we know that the Bill is designed not to proceed as quickly as sometimes Ministers wish Bills to proceed and we will not complete the Committee stage until October, there is a considerable chance that we will get to that stage before the Bill gets on to the statute book.
I hope that my noble friend Lord Alderdice will accept that we are making progress. We will continue to do more and continue to discuss this with my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and others. We will carefully reflect on my noble friend’s points between now and Report, which will not happen until some time in late October or thereabouts.
I will quickly say a few words about Amendment 21. It seeks to limit the extent to which an order under Clause 2 may be amended or otherwise modified by the Crime and Courts Act and other enactments. I can give an assurance that Clause 2 is already limited purely to counterterrorism functions. While that is not restated expressly in subsection (4), the effect of that subsection when read with the clause as a whole is to limit the power to make amendments to primary legislation to those that are consequential on conferring counterterrorism functions on the National Crime Agency. Again, I suspect that that is a matter that we will discuss in greater detail when we come to the Clause 2 stand part debate. It was considered by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. The committee made no recommendation in respect of that power in its report. In fact it went so far as to state that the idea of adding to a statutory body’s functions by subordinate legislation subject to parliamentary procedure is well established. I hope that my noble friend will feel that her Amendment 21 is therefore not necessary.
Going back to the original amendment of my noble friend Lord Alderdice, I hope that what I have said gives him the appropriate reassurance. We fully understand the sensitivities in this area and I hope that he will therefore feel able to withdraw his amendment on this occasion.