Baroness Hamwee
Main Page: Baroness Hamwee (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Hamwee's debates with the Home Office
Crime and Courts Bill [HL]
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(11 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, in many ways this is quite a difficult Bill to scrutinise fully. Some information relating to the Bill is missing today: we do not have the framework document, which would be extremely useful as your Lordships consider how the NCA board will operate.
Our amendments today are intended to bring some sense to the Government’s words, which is not necessarily reflected in the Bill, and to ensure that the new National Crime Agency has operational independence. The Government have quite rightly gone to great lengths to emphasise that the NCA—the body that takes over from the Serious Organised Crime Agency, the National Policing Improvement Agency and CEOP—will be operationally independent, but I am somewhat puzzled about how this is going to operate. SOCA was, of course, a non-departmental government body, or NDGB. The NCA has been classified as a non-ministerial department, or NMD, and that is similar to other bodies such as the Crown Prosecution Service and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, as the Home Office fact sheet identifies. This is significant and appropriate because, as a rule, NMDs are considered to be more independent of Government. I quote from a research paper on the Public Bodies Bill from the House of Commons Library, which says that they,
“answer directly to Parliament on issues where it has been deemed appropriate to remove executive political interference”.
Examples given by the Library in the other place are Ofgem and the UK Statistics Authority. Both the Crown Prosecution Service and HMRC, which the Government give as models for the designation of the National Crime Agency, have corporate governance structures which have a strategic direction and strategic accountability exercised by a board, and that board reports to the Secretary of State. That is true currently for both SOCA and the NPIA. The benefit of that is that it ensures and preserves the agency’s independence from Government, but it also maintains, quite rightly, the ultimate strategic oversight by Government.
In this Bill, the Government seem to be proposing a departure from that. Under current proposals, the NCA will have no board and instead will be governed by just one individual, the director-general, who will report directly to the Home Secretary. The Home Secretary’s responsibilities are to set the strategic priorities for the NCA. He will authorise the director-general’s annual plan of strategic and operational practices and priorities. The Secretary of State has the power to appoint and fire the director-general and the power to designate the director-general’s operational powers on the direction of an advisory panel, and we shall return to both those issues in later amendments.
It seems to us that this kind of structure is not conducive to operational independence and is at odds with other NMDs that the Government have set up and support. Compared with Ofgem, the Financial Standards Authority, the Serious Fraud Office, the Office of Fair Trading, the CPS and HMRC, the National Crime Agency would be unique in its level of direct ministerial oversight and influence. There seems to be some contradiction within the Bill and within the Government’s priorities because although they are talking about devolving operational power to the police, they seem to be retaining more power, but without responsibility, to the Secretary of State. The Bill does not seem to do what the Government have said they intend, which is to put power in the hands of the police force. It is very much a top-down structure and, if one were being unkind, one could say that the Secretary of State is happy to devolve responsibility but, at the same time, is centralising power.
The amendments that we have tabled today have two impacts. Amendment 1 will remove the responsibility for direction and control of the NCA from the director-general, and instead the NCA board will have responsibility for the strategic direction and control of the NCA, while the director-general will be responsible for the exercise of the NCA’s operational and administrative functions. Amendment 4, which is quite long, sets out the structure of the new NCA board and is modelled on the existing governance structure of SOCA. We would be quite happy if, at some later stage, the Government were to bring back this amendment to look at the detail of it. There may be items within it that are not as appropriate for the NCA as they are for SOCA. However, broadly speaking, it seems to us that the governance arrangements for SOCA, with a board structure, would be more appropriate for the National Crime Agency than the sort of direct-line accountability to the Secretary of State for one individual, the director-general.
I suppose we are seeking answers to a number of questions from the Minister, in trying to understand why the Government have proposed this structure. Can the noble Lord explain why the Government believe that there are benefits to the National Crime Agency from not having a board? The organisations that are to become part of the National Crime Agency have had boards, so the Government should really explain that and justify their reasons for having a different governance structure in this case. Why does the NCA have to be directly accountable to the Home Secretary, unlike the Serious Organised Crime Agency? Again, that is a departure from current practice.
Given that the Government have rightly changed the structure from that of the Serious Organised Crime Agency, which is a non-departmental government body, to a non-ministerial department, can they give any indication of the model that they used for the NCA? I am not aware of any significant body that is a non-ministerial department and that has the same kind of structure reporting directly to the Secretary of State, but not through a board. In looking at these areas, it would be very helpful if the Minister were to give some explanation of those issues and say whether he will consider looking again at governance and introducing a board, which we think would be the appropriate way to manage and run the agency.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, we have tabled Amendment 5 in this group. The amendment, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, does not seek to change the architecture of the proposal—I thought I would get that in quite quickly because my noble friend hates the term. It is not a governing board and accountability would still be that of the Secretary of State. However, it is good practice to provide infrastructure and support in this sort of situation.
The Home Office itself has a supervisory board. I would have taken my amendment from that, had I been able to get into the Home Office website at any time when I tried over the past few days. The form and function of the model is, I suppose, not very different from that of other government departments, so I looked at CLG, another department with which I am fairly familiar. The description of its roles seemed to be very much what I was looking for. It tells us that:
“The Board’s role is to advise and support ministers on the operational implications and effectiveness of policy proposals, focusing on getting policy translated into results”.
It refers to leadership, effectiveness, accountability, and sustainability—that is, sustainability in the sense of taking a long-term view about what the department is trying to achieve.
“The board advises on, and supervises, five main areas: Strategic Clarity … Commercial Sense … Talented People … Results Focus … and … Management Information”.
Those are listed with descriptions that I will not trouble your Lordships with this afternoon, because I think the CLG website is pretty accessible. I am not wedded to any particular model but I am wedded to good governance. In 2012, as has been the case for some years, the private and voluntary sectors have had to focus very much on governance, and I think that a new government agency should focus on it too.
Lord Henley
My Lords I am not sure that these booklets will come from the Home Office website. I will double check and make sure that I get an appropriate response to the noble Lord. All I am saying is that it is within the Home Office website that we have been having this problem. We want to get it right and are desperately keen to be open and fair. We want to get things across, and that is why I want to make sure that I can deal with all these matters and why I will write to the noble Lord’s noble friend, copying it to my noble friend and no doubt copying it also to the noble Lord, Lord Harris, and others who wish for a copy. We might discuss this later.
It might be useful if I set out—I hope not at excessive length—what we are trying to do with the National Crime Agency, where we are trying to get and why we think the Government’s arrangements are appropriate. Then we shall listen to the response from the noble Baroness. As she is aware, the National Crime Agency will be operationally focused, with a demanding mission to fight serious and organised crime and protect the public. We considered carefully how we would get the right governance arrangements for this agency to make sure that it maximises its effectiveness, accountability and, of course, minimises bureaucracy. That is something that the noble Lord, Lord Harris, did not stress, but might have done.
We have drawn up in the Bill the arrangements which we firmly believe achieve that right balance. Ever since I came to the Home Office, I have been talking about balance and it is important that there is the right balance between strategic oversight by the Home Secretary and effective operational leadership of the agency by the director-general. The director-general will lead and direct the agency and be directly accountable to my right honourable friend the Home Secretary and through her to Parliament, because she is answerable to Parliament. I must make it clear that this is entirely consistent with the tried and tested arrangements in place at many non-ministerial departments, of which there are a number. Let us, for example, take two that have a Home Office focus: law enforcement agencies such as the Serious Fraud Office—despite what the noble Baroness said—and the Crown Prosecution Service. As she will be aware, there are others outside what we could call the Home Office family. For example, there is the Food Standards Agency, which is chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Smith, and is answerable to the Department of Health or Defra—I forget which. Again, it is a non-ministerial department that responds to a department.
The noble Baroness proposes creating an NCA board, headed by a non-executive chairman, which would lead and direct the agency and to which the director-general would report. Instead of an operational crime-fighter, the Opposition want to put a non-executive chairman and board in charge of the NCA. Instead of the director-general being directly accountable to the Home Secretary, he would report through the board, which would inevitably be a slower and—I stress—more bureaucratic process. That is not the best governance model for a law enforcement agency that has to respond quickly and decisively to threats to protect the public. It would be like having your local police force, for example, run by a committee instead of by the chief constable.
In that example, chief constables must be held properly to account on behalf of the electorate, as must the director-general. However, people want to see effective accountability, not bureaucratic accountability. Creating more quangos, which is, in effect, what the noble Baroness suggests in her amendment, is hardly the way to protect the public from crime. Chief constables will be accountable to a single, directly elected police and crime commissioner in their force area. He will be visible and able to be held to account by local communities. In the same way, the director-general will be accountable to the Home Secretary, who can then be held to account by the taxpayer, noble Lords in this House and colleagues in another place. It is the Home Secretary who ultimately has responsibility for ensuring that the public are protected from crime and who will come before Parliament to account for the performance and impact of the NCA. Inserting a predominantly non-executive board and chair between the director-general and the Home Secretary will not increase accountability; it will just create more bureaucracy and more officeholders.
The amendments suggested here essentially replicate the arrangements that were put in place for the Serious Organised Crime Agency, which are more typical of non-departmental public bodies. However, SOCA is the only law enforcement agency with the sole responsibility of fighting crime that has this quango structure. It was always an anomaly. I do not know why the previous Government thought it was necessary, compared to, say, the Serious Fraud Office or the Crown Prosecution Service. Putting that non-executive chair and committee in charge of SOCA has inevitably led to more bureaucracy without adding to accountability. It has reduced the clarity over who is responsible for what.
In saying that, I make no criticism of the current SOCA chair and board members, who are distinguished professionals in their fields and who have done a very good job as a committee. However, I do not believe that it was the right structure for a law enforcement agency. The NCA is an agency that will have the power and responsibility to investigate serious and organised crime, and the officers of which will, like the police, be able to use coercive and intrusive powers. In its work to protect the public, there must be absolute clarity of accountability. What the noble Baroness proposes in her amendments would do away with that clarity.
Amendment 4 further specifies that the NCA board should include representatives of police and crime commissioners in England and Wales and of the police service. They are obviously key partners for the National Crime Agency and the director-general will want to work with them. However the Bill already clearly provides that these key policy partners will be part of the group of strategic partners and will have the opportunity to influence the strategic direction of the agency. Clause 3 requires the Home Secretary and the director-general to consult strategic partners before determining the strategic priorities for the NCA. Clause 4 also provides for these partners to be consulted on the agency’s annual plan.
The noble Lord, Lord Harris, put forward the idea of the importance of non-executive directors to be part of the internal governance of the NCA. He referred to the framework document, which will be issued in due course. In accordance with the principles of good governance set out by the Cabinet Office and the Treasury, in that document we will set out what those internal arrangements must be. They will include the role of potential non-execs, which we will consider carefully as regards the NCA but not in the manner suggested in the noble Baroness’s amendments. We will make an outline of that framework document available to Parliament in due course, as I think I made clear at Second Reading, to make sure that we can discuss these matters at later stages of the Bill.
Turning to Amendment 5, my noble friend Lady Hamwee is right to emphasise again the importance of good governance for the NCA, with which we agree. We will set that out in the framework document in due course. But the supervisory board proposed by my noble friend is a step too far. As I have said, we believe that the NCA should be led by the operational head, the director-general. Unlike the Opposition’s amendments which we have just discussed, this amendment sensibly leaves the director-general as the person responsible for “leadership and control” of the agency as set out in Clause 1.
However, creating a supervisory board headed by the Home Secretary muddies the waters over the director-general’s line of accountability. Therefore, I do not think that I can give it much support at this stage. I hope that those explanations are sufficient to deal with the concerns raised by noble Lords about the governance of the NCA. Obviously, we will discuss other more detailed matters on some later amendments. No doubt, we will come back to this issue at later stages of the Bill. I hope that I have largely dealt with most of the concerns put by noble Lords as regards this amendment and that the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, before the noble Baroness tells the House what she proposes to do with her amendment, perhaps I may raise with the Minister the way in which references to the framework document are set out in Schedule 2. We are told that the document will deal with ways in which the NCA is to operate, including how it,
“is to be administered (including governance and finances)”.
No doubt the Minister and his officials will consider further the points that have been made today—I am by no means certain what should happen after this stage on this issue—and at least they will consider whether the term “administered” covers the issues of governance which noble Lords have raised. To me, governance is not something which is included in administration; it is an issue on its own. To include it within administration downgrades its importance.
Lord Harris of Haringey
Before my noble friend responds to the debate, perhaps the Minister will also tell us precisely when we are likely to have this framework document. Clearly, he is saying, “Don’t worry your heads about the governance arrangements because when you see the framework document you will be entirely satisfied and it will all be all right. Therefore, this amendment is unnecessary.”. We are in Committee and have not yet seen the framework document. The Government announced their intention to create a national crime agency nearly two years ago, so it is quite extraordinary that this fundamental piece of the jigsaw is not available to us. It would be very helpful to have it.
Incidentally, while the noble Lord was speaking, I checked on the Food Standards Agency. As far as I can see, it has a fully functioning board; I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, is its chair rather than the head of the agency, but that is a mere detail.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee
I wish to speak also to Amendment 3. These are both probing amendments.
Amendment 2 seeks to remove Clause 1(10) from the Bill. That subsection excludes prosecution from the NCA’s crime reduction function. Is the point simply what the NCA itself can do? If so, why cannot it prosecute on its own behalf? The crime reduction function is defined and includes activities to combat crime listed in Clause 1(11), which refers to prosecution. If the NCA cannot itself prosecute, how is it anticipated that the process will work? Common sense tells me how it will work but I would like to hear that from the Minister. Why cannot the NCA have the option of prosecuting instead of commissioning prosecution, as it were?
Amendment 3 seeks to understand what is intended by the activity of mitigating the consequences of crime. Of course, that is not something to which I am in any way opposed, but can the Minister expand on that? Is it expected that the NCA will work in partnership with the many organisations which deal with mitigating the consequences of crime such as the Restorative Justice Council and Victim Support? I was pleased but a little surprised to see that referred to and would be glad to have some flesh put on those bones. I beg to move.
Lord Rosser
My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has explained, she is, as I understand it, seeking an explanation of why the National Crime Agency is precluded from pursuing its own cases. Presumably, the National Crime Agency would pursue only more serious and organised offences although there is provision in the Bill for NCA officers to become involved in dealing with any crime, so perhaps that is not necessarily the case. Subject to the Minister putting me right, I assume the Government consider that the Crown Prosecution Service would become involved in pursuing most cases. If I am right in thinking that, one advantage is that the Crown Prosecution Service is able to take an independent look at the evidence available to support a charge, and make a decision on whether there is sufficient evidence to put before a jury with a reasonable prospect of success, whether it is in the public interest to proceed and whether the charges being brought are the appropriate ones in the light of the evidence.
One can argue that where an agency or body which is the one that has investigated the case and produced and collated the evidence is also the one that makes the decision on whether the evidence is sufficiently strong to make the charge stand up, there is a possibility that that agency or body may be too close to the case and too involved to make the necessary judgments in an entirely objective manner. We will listen to the Minister’s response to the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and to the explanations that she is seeking. My only further comment is that independent agencies do not always seem to have a high reputation when it comes to pursuing cases successfully. Some might raise the Serious Fraud Office in that context.
Lord Henley
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for putting forward these amendments and for making it quite clear that they are probing amendments. I hope that I can deal with some of her concerns.
I start with her first amendment, which simply suggests leaving out subsection (10). As I said, she put it forward as a probing amendment and I understand what my noble friend is seeking to ask. In setting out the expectation that agency investigations will lead to prosecutions, it is necessary to provide clarity on the role that the agency will take in relation to prosecutions—hence subsection (10), which provides that the agency does not have the function of prosecuting offences or, in Scotland, the function of instituting criminal proceedings. Rather, the agency will work closely with the prosecutors—that is, the CPS in England or the Lord Advocate in Scotland—to ensure that the right criminal justice outcome is achieved. I think it is right that those two agencies should do that, along with, in Northern Ireland, the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland. Therefore, there is no inconsistency here. The NCA will not itself undertake prosecutions but will work with others to undertake activities to combat serious organised crime. Such activities must, quite rightly, include the prosecution of offences.
I turn to my noble friend’s Amendment 3, which would insert at the end of subsection (11)(d),
“in conjunction with other appropriate persons”.
I am very grateful to her for indicating that she also wanted to get over the fact that this is important in terms of the relations of the victims of crime. We have been clear that the reason for establishing the National Crime Agency is the need to respond to the changing nature of the threat posed by serious and organised crime—it has changed and will continue to change—and to ensure that our response keeps pace with the changing threat now and into the future.
As we are all well aware, where there is a crime, there is also a victim of crime. If we are committed to the agency tackling some of the most serious and pernicious forms of crime that we face, so too we must be committed to the agency playing an important role and working with other agencies and the voluntary sector to support the victims of crime. I suspect that my noble friend would like the reassurance that the agency will be able to work with any partners as it deems necessary to carry out its work. I can certainly give her the assurance that the agency’s primary relationships will be with other law enforcement partners but it will also be important for it to build wider partnerships with the private and voluntary sectors.
I hope that that assurance goes as far as my noble friend would like. I want to assure her that in due course the agency will take its responsibilities for all people, but particularly for victims, very seriously. With that, I hope that she will be sufficiently satisfied and will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am glad of that reassurance. I expected it but I am glad to have it. Indeed, there is something of a change in the nature of crime and the need to recognise what is required to assist victims of crime. We will no doubt come on to that in more detail with the next group of amendments.
I remain a little perplexed as to why it does not remain an option for the NCA to undertake prosecutions. Indeed, one might have thought that this was something that the framework document would address and give some explanation of, as it is about the way that the NCA is to operate. However, I have heard what the Minister has said and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Henley
I take the noble and learned Baroness’s point and I will certainly consider a specific reference when it comes to the framework documents. I was dealing with what was in the Bill, which I think is very important due to the reason that I set out—the changing nature of crime. For example, 10 or 15 years ago we had never heard of cybercrime. Now we have. Things change and move on and the danger of listing things in primary legislation in the manner that she suggests is that it may confine us unnecessarily and is not the best way of dealing with these matters.
I hope that those assurances are sufficient for my noble friend to feel able to withdraw his amendment. We might want to have further words and noble Lords and noble Baronesses might want to see more in due course, but for the moment I hope that he is satisfied. I await what he has to say with interest.
Baroness Hamwee
Following up the noble and learned Baroness’s point, surely one would expect, among the strategic priorities that the Secretary of State has to address and determine under Clause 3—she will have to report to Parliament—the issues of child and adult trafficking to which she referred and the different purposes of trafficking.
Lord Henley
My Lords, I look forward to my right honourable friends setting out their strategic priorities and to reports in due course. Whether I am the one who has to respond in this House when they appear is another matter. I am sure that the sort of pressure that my right honourable friend will be coming under will be such that she will certainly take on board what the noble and learned Baroness has had to say.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I can be extremely brief on this. Paragraph 13 of Schedule 1 provides for secondment to the NCA. My amendment would allow for secondments both ways. I felt that it was an issue worth raising because I think that secondment can often be extremely helpful to both organisations involved. It may be that the Minister will tell me that it is not necessary to provide for NCA officers to be seconded to a UK police force because that would be covered by some other existing police legislation. If it is covered, that is well and good; if it is not, why not? I beg to move.
Lord Rosser
My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, this amendment makes provision for National Crime Agency officers to be seconded to a UK police force, as well as for persons to be seconded to serve as National Crime Agency officers. I would like to raise two points on this paragraph in Schedule 1. It refers to “persons” being seconded to the National Crime Agency to serve as National Crime Agency officers. There is no qualification before the word “persons”. Could it literally be anybody and still be within the terms of the statutory provisions of the Bill? I ask that because paragraph 7(2) of Schedule 1 says:
“A person may not be appointed as Director General unless the Secretary of State is satisfied that the person—
(a) is capable of effectively exercising operational powers; and
(b) is a suitable person to exercise operational powers”.
In other words, if the Secretary of State makes an appointment that stretches credibility, and the Secretary of State could have satisfied himself or herself on the points referred to, presumably the appointment could be challenged under the provisions of the Bill. There is, however, no apparent requirement on the part of the director-general to satisfy himself or herself on any point in relation to “persons” seconded under the Bill as it stands, or indeed to National Crime Agency officers seconded under the terms of the amendment, although one could take the view that if they were existing National Crime Agency officers there ought not to be a problem.
Can the Minister say why there is no requirement in the sub-paragraph that we are discussing for the director-general to have to satisfy himself or herself that any person seconded to the National Crime Agency has to be, for example, appropriately qualified, bearing in mind that the Bill lays down requirements on the Secretary of State over the appointment of the director-general?
Finally, can the Minister say what the definition is of a National Crime Agency officer? Is it anyone employed by or working for the National Crime Agency, or does it refer only to certain kinds of posts or activities being undertaken within the National Crime Agency?
Earl Attlee
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for moving this amendment. I appreciate that she is keen to encourage the exchange of staff both to and from the National Crime Agency. Indeed, interchange in both directions will be key to ensuring that the NCA benefits from the collective experience of policing as well as sharing its knowledge and specialist skills with UK forces.
SOCA officers regularly operate alongside operational colleagues in the police service, and it is vital that NCA officers are able to do the same. It is for this reason that the Bill provides for police officers to be seconded to the NCA and to be designated with the powers of an NCA officer during the period of their secondment. Two-way assistance provisions in Schedule 3 allow for NCA officers to operate under the direction and control of the chief officer of a UK police force and vice versa. However, there may be some merit in providing separately for more formal arrangements whereby NCA officers could be seconded to a UK police force for a sustained period of time. This might allow forces to benefit from the experience of NCA officers on a longer-term attachment.
If my noble friend will agree to withdraw her amendment, I can undertake to consider the matter further in advance of Report. At this stage I cannot commit to bringing forward a government amendment, but I agree that we should explore this issue in more detail. I will, of course, write to her once we have reached a conclusion.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked me a few technical questions. I suspect that I will have to reply to some of them in writing. He asked whether any person can be seconded to the NCA. The answer is yes. There is no reason why any person could not be seconded. However, there must be clear arrangements for the use of powers. It is worth pointing out that a person can be an NCA officer, but various powers can be designated for that person. Of course, it is important that powers are designated only where the person is properly qualified to exercise those powers.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, the less I speak, the more concessions we get, and I am very grateful to the Minister for that. Of course I will seek to withdraw the amendment. When the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, was raising some perfectly valid questions, it seemed to me that the terminology of paragraph 13—that the director-general “may make arrangements”—was likely to cover qualifications and scope. “Make arrangements” is a pretty broad provision.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, on the need for qualifications, the director-general will want to be advised of the suitability of potential secondees. They will be treated as NCA officers and will need to satisfy the usual criteria in order to be designated with powers.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I look forward to talking to the Minister further about secondment and I am grateful for his offer. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee
This amendment concerns the same paragraph of the Bill with regard to specials, whom I am beginning to think of as the National Crime Agency’s equivalent of interns.
Paragraph 14(4)(c) provides that the NCA is not prevented from,
“providing for the payment of sums to, or in respect of, current or former NCA specials to compensate for loss of salary attributable to injury or death resulting from the performance of duties as NCA specials”.
This is a probing amendment, the aim of which is to seek a better understanding of the provision. I assume that we are talking here about salary from their normal job, as it were, given that they are not being paid for being specials.
I was prompted to table the amendment by the thought that any claim that is made following injury or death in the course of a special’s employment is likely to be for far more than his salary. I am not sure that it is possible to exclude a claim for the normal areas of compensation that would arise in the event of injury. It certainly seems to me that it is not proper to do so. Why is this provision required? Is it as narrow as I have understood it to be? If it needs to be stated because the powers of the NCA would not be adequate if it were not, should it not be stated in full in the way that I have indicated? I beg to move.
Lord Thomas of Gresford
I speak in support of this amendment. When I looked at it, I thought that I would not advise anybody to become a special in the National Crime Agency as not only do you not get paid but even if you are injured or killed in the course of your employment as a special, you get nothing other than compensation for salary. Therefore, if you are not a salaried person—for example, if you are self-employed—you get nothing. You get nothing for the injury itself. Presumably, the Government have in mind that you would sue somebody, whether it is themselves or the criminal concerned who caused the injury or death. Do they have in mind that a person should go to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board to recover compensation? Putting in compensation for salary is so limiting that there must be some purpose behind that wording. I look forward to hearing it.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for moving her amendment. It is, of course, important that the National Crime Agency is able adequately to provide for the rare and very sad occasions when an NCA special is injured or killed in the line of duty. I would like to point out that when I joined the TA I did not know that I was going to be paid. I suddenly started receiving giro cheques when I was at school which were double the recommended term’s pocket money. I spent about 18 years in the TA as a junior NCO. If, sadly, I had been injured, I would have expected that a war pension would be paid on the basis of my rank, which stayed very junior for the first 18 years. Given the different status of NCA specials within the agency, the Bill expressly provides for the NCA to be able to pay sums by way of compensation for loss of salary in such an event. The details of that scheme will need to be drawn up over the coming months.
I suspect my noble friend will find that the inverse speaking time law applies to this amendment as well. She questioned whether the compensation should be limited to loss of salary alone. That is a fair question. An NCA special injured in the line of duty could, I accept, suffer other financial loss. If my noble friend would agree to withdraw her amendment, I should be happy to consider this point in more detail over the summer. At this stage, I cannot commit to bringing forward a government amendment on Report but I can certainly assure her that we will carefully consider the points she has raised and let her know the outcome of that consideration in advance of the next stage.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, the Government need have no fear that their schedule for getting through this Bill in Committee is in any danger, because I think that we will speak for briefer and briefer periods. I am grateful to the Minister and look forward to seeing how this goes. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I have Amendment 21 in this group and it concerns a more general point. I do not know whether—how did my noble friend Lord Attlee coin it?—the law of inverse speaking time will apply here but I think that it should.
Clause 2(4) provides that:
“An order under this section may amend or otherwise modify this Act or any other enactment”.
My amendment, which may not be perfect in its drafting but is, I think, clear enough in its intention, would add,
“for the purposes of counter-terrorism functions”.
My noble friend Lady Thomas of Winchester is here for the next debate and I had not warned her about this, but I will set her, as chair of the Delegated Powers Committee, on to the Minister if the Government do not acknowledge that there is something in this.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, I listened to the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, with some care. As noble Lords know, I have maintained an interest in Northern Ireland issues, having spent a number of years as a Minister there. I find it very difficult to understand how the Government can proceed with issues that affect Northern Ireland, particularly in this area, if there is not agreement from the First Minister and Deputy First Minister or discussions have not been held with David Ford, the Minister for Justice.
This is a sensitive area and I appreciate that, as the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, said, these things can take some time to resolve when the Executive in Northern Ireland meets. Decisions by the Executive may not always be speedy, but the passage of the Bill will not be speedy either in that the Committee stage will continue after the Summer Recess. I hope that the Minister will take on board the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, which we support. We think that the First Minister and Deputy First Minister should have an opportunity to comment on this and I hope that some agreement can be reached prior to moving forward with these clauses.