Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 31st January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

My Lords, this group of amendments refers to the independence of the commission to be created. Throughout the Bill, there are restrictions on that independence in the form of not only the Secretary of State’s control over the number of commissioners, and in this instance the appointment of commissioners, and the budget, but many of the other requirements made of the commission and the various powers given to the Secretary of State.

I find some of these powers astonishing. They include the power to give guidance to the ICRIR about how to exercise its functions so as not to prejudice national security, put a life at risk or act in any way which might prejudice actual or prospective criminal proceedings. This exercises the minds of senior investigating officers, chief officers, prosecutors and judges on a very regular basis—decisions have to be and are made. Why do the Government think that the ICRIR will not be capable of making such decisions?

There is also a power to identify sensitive information to be given to the commission, the chief constable of the PSNI, chief officers of police forces in Northern Ireland, the Police Ombudsman, the director-general of the Independent Office for Police Conduct, Northern Ireland departments and Scottish Ministers. Managing and identifying sensitive information is done routinely by people such as chief constables. It is difficult to understand why the Secretary of State should be required to make regulations and give guidance in these situations. To those looking in from the outside, from whom I have heard quite extensively, it appears that this may enable the Secretary of State to control the work of the ICRIR.

The Secretary of State has a further extraordinary range of powers throughout the Bill, which we will come to later. Combined, they introduce a unique group of powers regarding the operations of the ICRIR. All the powers conferred on the Secretary of State to enable him to regulate, manage, control or otherwise dictate the proceedings of the ICRIR rest on the appointment of the commissioners. Amendments 12, 13 and 16, to which I have put my name, and Amendments 24 to 30, all in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Browne, seek to address a profoundly important control given to the Secretary of State in Schedule 1 by giving the appointment-making function for the commissioners to the Judicial Appointments Commission rather than to the Secretary of State.

The Judicial Appointments Commission comprises nine people, five of whom are judges and four of whom are not members of the legal profession at present. The requirement in the schedule on the Secretary of State to consult the relevant senior judge and such other persons as he or she considers appropriate will be indicative to many of those in Northern Ireland who want to see a truly independent commission of a total lack of independence. Noble Lords will know that perception is as important as reality in cases such as this. If the commission is to gain any credibility, it must above all be seen to be independent.

It seems to me that, were the House to agree the noble Lord’s amendments—which he has just said he will withdraw but which I may well retable on Report because they are so important—the Minister’s Amendments 14 and 15 would be unnecessary. In any event, they would not meet the requirement for an independent appointment. The appointment of a person who has gained experience outside the UK, as provided for in Amendment 14, may be an asset, but it could occur in any case, and it seems to me superfluous.

The one thing that emerges from a study of this Bill is that the ICRIR will not be enabled to be independent by its provisions. Rather, it is clear that so much power is reserved to the Secretary of State that it cannot be independent. There is no legislative consent Motion in support of this Bill and no support for it. We are talking about the past and future of the people of Northern Ireland. Independence is critical for this commission.

[Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Lab)]

My Lords, I support the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Browne of Ladyton. Over the last number of days, increasingly people have said to us, right across the community in Northern Ireland, that they are opposed to this Bill on the basis that it does not have victims and survivors at its heart and centre. Last night, I was very pleased to sponsor a meeting for SEFF in your Lordships’ House, where that was the message, yet again, that was given to us. Right across the community, irrespective of political or religious persuasion or, shall we say, whatever job the person may have had, as a victim or survivor, people do not support the Bill because their needs and requirements are not placed at its centre.

The need for the independence of the commission goes to the very heart of the Bill. We have seen quite clearly that the Secretary of State will have undue and unfettered powers. My noble friend Lord Browne is absolutely correct: the membership and work of the commission need to be independently determined and it must not be shackled by the unfettered powers of the Secretary of State.

In fact, many human rights organisations have concerns about the influence of the Secretary of State over the processes of the ICRIR as proposed by the Bill. For example, the Secretary of State will have the power to appoint its chief commissioner, who must be a UK judge, moving significantly away from the process envisaged in the Stormont House agreement of appointing an international figure to be jointly agreed by both the UK and Irish Governments. Where is this process of engagement and consultation with the Irish Government and, of course, the agreement that is urgently required? Things in Northern Ireland do not go ahead successfully unless there is reconciliation, consensus, agreement and consent. There is definitely not consent for this Bill. There will be no legislative consent Motion because there is not an Assembly at the moment, but the five main parties are opposed to the Bill, so it would not happen anyway.

While the proposed government amendments to Schedule 1 seek to provide that the Secretary of State consults relevant figures, they are unspecified. In advance of appointments, the wide discretion given to the Secretary of State in Northern Ireland over appointments to the ICRIR remains. Furthermore, requiring the Secretary of State to ensure, as far as practicable, that there is a commissioner with international experience is a weak substitute for an independent, international individual or group of individuals. I sincerely endorse the views of my noble friend Lord Browne and ask the Minister to go back and look at this issue.

The submissions given to us are quite clear. Liberty says that

“While this may be a ‘Northern Ireland Bill’ in title and in focus, it is explicitly one that is directed by Westminster. This is not just true in the exclusion of stakeholders in Northern Ireland and Ireland alike in the introduction of the Bill, but in the deep vein of political interference that runs through the legislation”,


and that the ICRIR

“stands a chance of working only if it is seen to be independent in its operation.”

Yet the hand of the Secretary of State looms large throughout all aspects of its function.

A similar view is expressed by Amnesty, which quite clearly states that the ICRIR does not meet ECHR procedural requirements, and that the Secretary of State retains control over the appointments, the resources and caseload of the ICRIR as well as the powers to terminate its work at any point. In view of that, it is quite clear that the ICRIR will not be independent and I would like the Minister to outline to the House how he and the Government will address that issue, and how he will toughen up the legislation by amendments on Report to ensure independence. If the needs and requirements of victims and survivors are to be placed at the centre of the Bill, this is an urgent priority and I urge the Minister to do that and to use the Judicial Appointments Commission to fulfil the requirements of the ICRIR in achieving independence.

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When I drew attention to this in our earlier debate, I was told that newspaper headlines are often misleading, but the Times law report is not the Daily Star. I went back and checked it and, to be blunt, that is an accurate account of what the Supreme Court ruled. That is a major change in the environment since the—

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

I thank my noble friend for giving way. I think the Supreme Court decided that the particular applicants in that case were not entitled to get their cases reinvestigated—or investigated. They did not say that there was no obligation on the state to provide investigation.

[Lord Bew (CB)]

I thank my noble friend for that intervention. I think the implications of the Supreme Court ruling are somewhat broader. I was going to say that, at some point or other, the Government will have to refer to this major change, possibly with the Attorney-General, because there is controversy about what it really means. We cannot finish the Bill as though something of that importance has not happened, because it clearly bears on the issues at stake in the Bill and on the international obligations or otherwise of the United Kingdom Government.

Like my previous amendments, my Amendment 36 is designed, essentially, to get the best possible practice in play for the commission. It calls for the ICRIR to publish

“guidelines containing best practice on the rights of those likely to be named in any reports”.

I think the Minister will have a reasonable reply. We already know that there is a process of Maxwellisation. During the long period of the Iraq report, many will have felt frustrated about the amount of time devoted to Maxwellisation but, none the less, people who are challenged in their conduct have every right to take time to give a decent reply.

I am sure that that will be the Minister’s reply—that we already have rights in law. But things have moved on since then. It seems to me that the best practice now is something that we might call Maxwellisation-plus. I again draw attention to the way in which the Green Paper to the Commons Treasury Committee sets out proceedings and an approach to the rights of those involved under questioning in the ICRIR, which the Government should adopt. They should follow that Green Paper.

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[Lord Cormack (Con)]

The noble Lord says that we cannot reject a Bill, but of course we can. It should be done very rarely. The Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949 make provision for it. There have been Bills rejected during my time in Parliament—only three in the 53 years that I have been here. The War Crimes Bill was rejected by the House of Lords. Mrs Thatcher pursued it, and it went on to the statute book, but I think I am right in saying that it has never been used in this country. Similar Bills have hardly been used elsewhere; they have little application. However, we have the opportunity to say, “Sorry, up with this we will not put”. To say that is entirely consistent with our constitutional position. It is not something that I would ever likely advocate, but it is something I would contemplate—and I think we have to contemplate it in this case. I do not like saying that, because I like to think I am a good constitutionalist. My belief is that this House has a duty to ask the other place to think again; it has an opportunity, if something is irremediable, to say, “Sorry, we won’t have this”.

Of course, if the Bill is then presented in an exactly similar form a year later in the next Session of Parliament, it will go through. However, I remind your Lordships that we are more than half way through this Parliament, and it probably would not apply in this case. That makes our responsibility all the greater before we do such a thing. Clearly, the obvious answer is to pause the Bill after Committee and to not have a Report stage—that is the tidiest and most constitutional way forward. I say to my noble friend—while, again, reiterating my admiration for his determination, sincerity, knowledge and commitment; all those words apply to him—that the Bill really should not pass.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

I will add to the words of the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, about the options open to the House at present. One of those would be to support an amendment such as the one I tabled at the beginning of Committee, and to decide that the Bill should not proceed until such time as a legislative consent Motion has been obtained from the Northern Ireland Assembly.

With the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Ritchie and Lady Suttie, I have indicated that Clause 18 on immunity should not stand part of the Bill. I agree that we have seen limited measures for immunity in Northern Ireland. We saw, for example, the legislative provisions which allowed the information to be supplied for the recovery of the remains of the disappeared, in which situation the information provided could not be used for a prosecution. We also saw the decommissioning of arms, the information gathered as a consequence of which could not be used for a prosecution. But we have not seen the like of this Bill before, and I do not know of any other democracy which has agreed to the like of this Bill before.

We are faced with a situation in which the obligations of the United Kingdom to provide processes for criminal investigation and prosecution, for civil action and for inquests are being removed, and in which immunity is being provided for perpetrators for their previous criminal offences. That is not compliant with our domestic and international legal obligations, which require the provision of processes to enable the investigation and prosecution of offences. For example, we have very clear obligations as high-contracting parties to the European Convention on Human Rights. Under Section 1, we are committed to securing that everyone in the jurisdiction has all the rights and freedoms provided for in the convention. Those rights were incorporated into UK law by the Human Rights Act 1998, although their application, as domestic rights, has been limited somewhat by the jurisprudence of the courts.

In addition, under the Good Friday agreement of 1998, the participants of the multiparty agreement dedicated themselves

“to the achievement of reconciliation, tolerance, and mutual trust, and to the protection and vindication of the human rights of all.”

They stated:

“The tragedies of the past have left a deep and profoundly regrettable legacy of suffering. We must never forget those who have died or been injured, and their families. But we can best honour them through a fresh start, in which we firmly dedicate ourselves to the achievement of reconciliation, tolerance, and mutual trust, and to the protection and vindication of the human rights of all.”


They agreed that

“neither the Assembly nor public bodies can infringe”

the European Convention on Human Rights, and that there should be

“a coherent and cooperative criminal justice system, which conforms with human rights norms.”

However, the Bill does not provide that.

In England and Wales, people seem to be under the illusion that paramilitaries no longer have areas of Northern Ireland under their control—that is not the case. Paramilitaries, both loyalist and republican, are still at work, and they still exercise, on occasion, brutal control in their areas. Since 1998, when the Good Friday agreement was signed, 155 people have been killed, and there have been 1,660 bombing incidents and 2,700 shooting incidents. Over 1,500 people have been arrested under the Terrorism Act, and 235 people have been charged with terrorist offences in the last 10 years alone. Terrorism is alive and well, although not to the scale of previous atrocities.

The mere existence of those paramilitaries means that people who may have information to give which might lead to the arrest and conviction of people for Troubles-related events will, very often, fear to do so, lest they themselves be attacked. The consequence is that it seems that many of Northern Ireland’s terrorists have, by their very existence, created for themselves de facto immunity from prosecution. Now the Government are preparing to enable immunity for those few who may come to fear that prosecution might become a reality.

It is said that the Bill owes its genesis to the statement in the Conservative Party manifesto:

“We will continue to seek better ways of dealing with legacy issues that provide better outcomes for victims and survivors and do more to give veterans the protections they deserve.”


Victims across the UK have stated that the Bill is not victim-centred and that it does not provide better outcomes for victims; rather, it deconstructs the existing legal framework, creating a web of protections for perpetrators. There can be no doubt that the Bill is intended to give veterans protection, but most veterans who served in Northern Ireland did not commit criminal offences—and certainly not the most serious Troubles-related offences created by the Bill.

I have mentioned before that it is said that the state kept records while the terrorists did not. However, the state forces did not keep records of instructions not to investigate, not to transmit information or intelligence to investigators, not to arrest or to interview suspects, to lose evidence, or to contaminate physical evidence so that it would be inadmissible. Those things emerge only through painstaking investigation, usually because there are gaps in the chain of evidence, and sometimes people come forward to explain that they tried to do something but were stopped. Those processes enabled murderers to continue their nefarious business, sometimes as agents of the state, despite the best-intentioned processes, such as the passing of legislation by Parliament designed to regulate and to help in this area.

For the record, it is not the case that state actors, such as soldiers and agents, are more likely to be prosecuted than terrorists—and, of course, some state agents were terrorists. According to a House of Commons Library research briefing paper of May 2022, four soldiers have been convicted and sentenced following the Troubles, and one case is currently before the courts. Some 300,000 soldiers served under Operation Banner, which continued until 2007. Since 2011, 26 prosecutions have been brought by the Public Prosecution Service, 21 of which involved republicans and loyalists.

The provisions of the Bill suggest that the commission, and on very limited occasions, to some extent, the criminal law, is supposed to fill the vacuum left by the removal of criminal investigation processes, civil actions to recover damages for harms caused and inquests. Until now, we have had processes which are compliant with all our legal and moral obligations. If this Bill is passed, we will no longer have such processes.

The Government have stated that their aim is to get to those people who need it information which might help them and to achieve reconciliation. The Bill, unfortunately, has only one provision for reconciliation, and it relates to memorialisation. The response of the political parties, the victims’ groups, the NIHRC, the Equality Commission and all the international organisations, including the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, do not indicate any confidence that the immunity provisions will actually achieve what the Government are aiming for. The general response that I have encountered in Northern Ireland, and among those British victims to whom I have spoken, is: “Why would they tell what they know? They don’t need to. They just need to sit it out”.

There is a view that immunity clauses and the provisions about early release et cetera create a perpetrator-focused regime, under which perpetrators will be able, should they wish to do so, to provide information which really will not be capable of challenge, and through which, should they avail of it, they will be free from all fear of prosecution. Clause 18 will enable an offender to provide a statement to secure immunity for prosecution for murder and other serious crimes which comprises limited information; information which has already been supplied in other circumstances, and even information which is already in the public domain. The information must be true, but there is nothing which says that it must be complete. Will the Minister tell the House whether there is a requirement that P should tell the whole truth?

The provisions in Clause 18(11) state that the commission can grant immunity for not only all identified offences but

“all serious or connected Troubles-related offences which are within a description determined”

by the commission. Will the Minister tell us what this means? I have read it several times and am trying to work out what those offences might be.

[Lord Caine (Con)]

Sorry, I missed that.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

It is complicated. Clause 18 provides that the commission can grant immunity for not only all identified offences but

“all serious or connected Troubles-related offences which are within a description determined”

by the ICRIR. Will the Minister tell us what that means and what types of offences are envisaged by these provisions?

Clause 18 does not provide that the commission must investigate whether there is information available which may undermine or assist the verification of P’s account. The commission will have to make the decision on the basis of the information supplied by P, the information already in its possession and P’s statement that to the best of his knowledge and belief it is true.

Clause 18 is fundamentally flawed. It is in contravention of our legal and moral obligations. It is actually offensive to those who are expected to believe that the perpetrator has fulfilled his obligation to provide complete information. My experience as Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, and even as chair of the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel during my service on the independent steering group for Kenova, has shown that perpetrators very often do not tell the whole truth even when they are swearing that that is what they are doing. Their information is frequently disproved by other available information when the necessary investigation occurs.

One of the most questionable things about the Bill is that, under Clause 18 and government Amendment 85, and the new schedule to follow Schedule 4, a perpetrator of Troubles-related sexual offences, which includes attempted sexual offences, cannot be granted immunity but immunity will be available for murder, and for things such as dropping concrete blocks on people’s limbs, shooting them in the knee so that they will live their lives with constant pain and disability, or other forms of torture. Paramilitaries were known for torturing people to confess to that which they had not done so as to justify their subsequent murder, with bodies left mutilated and naked on country roads as a warning to others, or even concealed for ever so that they became disappeared. These are the kind of offences for which the Government intend to grant immunity from prosecution in return for information. The big question is whether the commission would ever really be in a position to know that the whole truth, or even a semblance of the truth, had been provided, even if the proposed amendments are accepted. For this reason, Clause 18 should not form part of the Bill.

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[Lord Caine (Con)]

I appreciate what the noble Lord has said. I pay tribute to the work of Jon Boutcher, and I hope to see him to discuss it very shortly, but we have yet to see whether prosecutions can take place. There are cases before the DPP which have been sitting there for some time, so we have yet to see any outcome; and we await his first interim report, so we should perhaps exert a bit of caution.

Turning to the noble Lord’s Amendment 112, as I have said, conditional immunity will be granted to individuals who provide an account true to the best of their knowledge and belief. In determining whether that is the case, the immunity request panel, which is chaired by the chief commissioner, who will be a senior judge, retired or serving, will of course exercise professional judgment in that respect. In our view, the noble Lord’s amendment would give the immunity request panel too broad a discretion to refuse to grant immunity, even where the statutory conditions are met, and we do not consider that appropriate. The existence of such discretion would lead to uncertainty over the terms of the process for those who might come forward with information, potentially discouraging their co-operation. Additionally, the application of such a broad discretion may undermine the perception of fairness which is critical to wider public trust.

However, the Government are tabling amendments that will enhance the robustness of the immunity process. My Amendment 139 will create a new offence for people who knowingly or recklessly make a false statement to the commission, including as part of an application for immunity. People convicted of this offence could go to prison for up to two years and face an unlimited fine. I hope noble Lords will agree that that is a significant strengthening of this legislation. Amendment 43 makes an important consequential change to Clause 7, ensuring that a false statement provided to the commission can be used in evidence against the person who provided it if prosecuted for the new offence. Government Amendment 140 proposes that a person convicted of this offence in relation to a request for immunity will automatically lose that immunity and therefore, under provisions in part 2 of the new schedule to be inserted by Amendment 85, will not be able to apply for immunity for those offences again. I hope noble Lords will agree that someone who has been proven to have deliberately or recklessly provided a false account to the commission, potentially frustrating the objective of families to know the truth about what happened to their loved ones, should not retain any immunity granted in relation to that false account.

I am instinctively sympathetic to Amendment 124 from the noble Lord, Lord Hain, which would attach certain licence conditions to somebody granted immunity. I am also sympathetic to the intent behind Amendment 149, in the name of my noble friend Lord Dodds of Duncairn, which would widen the circumstances in which immunity could be revoked. I am very happy to commit to considering these further and sitting down with the noble Lords to discuss them between Committee and Report. I am very sympathetic to the intent behind both those amendments.

Regrettably, I am not able to say the same to the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, in respect of Amendment 131, which seeks to remove subsections (7) and (8) of Clause 21, which will allow the Secretary of State to publish general guidance relating to decisions on immunity. Without going over some of the same ground that we discussed in considering the previous group, the Government are very confident that the commission will retain full operational independence in making decisions, including decisions on immunity, and the Secretary of State will have absolutely no say whatever in any specific individual immunity application. The intention of the general guidance the Secretary of State may issue, and to which the commission must have regard, is to help the commission apply the statutory criteria in a consistent and transparent manner when taking decisions. It will be important that we engage with a number of experts, including prosecutors, when developing this guidance so that it is effective and workable. On the previous group, I referred to the fact that there are examples of this in other legislation, including the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998, which set up the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland.

Turning to the question of whether Clause 18 should stand part of the Bill, I would gently take issue here. The noble Lord, Lord Murphy of Torfaen, said that without this clause there would not be an argument. Unfortunately, one of the reasons we are here is that there was no equivalent Clause 18 in the report compiled by the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Eames, and Denis Bradley in 2009. There was no such clause in the Stormont House agreement, but there was no consensus around any of those attempts to deal with the legacy of the past. Yes, I agree that this clause is extremely challenging, and I have said on the record that it is extremely challenging for me, but to say that without it, everything would be perfect is probably mistaken.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

I thank the Minister for giving way. I would just like to ask him: does he think that Clause 18 is compliant with all our international legal obligations?

[Lord Caine (Con)]

I dealt with this to some extent last week, but I will go on to deal with it later in the course of my remarks; I hope the noble Baroness will bear with me. I was reiterating that I completely accept that this is the most challenging part of the legislation—I have been completely up front and honest; it is challenging for me, too. However, as I said a few moments ago, the difficult reality is that the prospect of successful prosecutions is vanishingly small, and a single-minded focus on them offers the prospect of achieving very little for families and for wider society.

Again, in response to some of the comments about pausing, pulling or repealing the Bill—which is, I believe, the official position of the Opposition—the difficulty is that, if we go back to square one, it will take at least another five years to come up with something. The reality is that no Government of either colour will go anywhere near this anytime soon, if at all. Maybe I am wrong and the Opposition have a fully fleshed-out and workable model—but the noble Baroness is shaking her head, which indicates that they do not. If they are starting from scratch, I can tell her that the process is extremely laborious and will take a long time.

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[Lord Caine (Con)]

It is fairly straightforward. The commission will ask whatever questions it believes to be appropriate. On the basis of the answers it is given, it will have to make its decisions regarding immunity. If a person is untruthful or unwilling to give information, that will of course be taken into account.

I am delighted to say that I am sympathetic to the proposed Amendment 130 from the Baroness, Lady O’Loan, to Clause 21(4), which is designed to ensure that the commission has to take steps to seek information beyond that which it holds already for the purposes of testing an account. I am very much open to exploring further with her how this issue might be appropriately addressed, when we move to the next stage of the legislation,

I wish to focus very quickly on some other amendments that I have tabled. Under Clause 23, the commissioner for investigations currently has the power to refer for possible prosecution conduct causing death or serious injury which is the subject of the review under consideration. My Amendment 137 clarifies that the commissioner is also able to refer conduct that constitutes “connected offences” within the meaning of the Bill. These are offences which do not themselves meet the Bill’s definition of “serious offence” but are nevertheless factually connected to such offences, for example because they form part of the same incident. This would allow, for example, the commission to refer to prosecutors evidence of sexual offences connected to a death or serious injury, if it came to light during the investigation.

Noble Lords will have noticed my intention to oppose the proposition that Clause 19 should stand part of the Bill. To reassure, this is simply because I propose to move provisions made by Clause 19 to the new schedule introduced by Amendment 85, titled “No immunity in certain circumstances”. This will bring together these provisions and those relating to the revocation of immunity mentioned before. Moving Clause 19—

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

I thank the Minister for giving way. Very briefly, his Amendment 137 refers to “other harmful conduct” that is not Troubles-related conduct serious enough to justify being dealt with under the Bill. But the Bill says that no prosecutions can be brought except in respect of Troubles-related conduct, does it not?

[Lord Caine (Con)]

I will need to read the clause through again and come back to the noble Baroness on that, if I may. As I was just saying, moving Clause 19 into the schedule is simply intended to make this legislation easier to follow.

The ability of commission officers to use their powers of arrest and detention as part of its investigations is important. That includes cases where a suspect, having not obtained immunity, needs to be detained for the purposes of questioning. That would happen as part of the case-building process in a criminal investigation before a file was referred to prosecutors. I have tabled Amendment 151 to remove any doubt as to the circumstances in which criminal enforcement action can be taken where immunity has not been granted, and where a referral to a prosecutor has not yet been made. In addition to allowing for the exercise of powers of arrest and detention, the amendment also ensures that the commission would be able to charge a person with an offence before a referral to a prosecutor had been made. The amendment also clarifies that those with existing powers of detention—for example, the police—may continue to use those powers where they are being exercised in connection with the commission’s functions.

Amendments 150 and 153 are related minor and technical amendments. We touched on the importance of the chief commissioner’s actions over the course of a review leading up to a report, as per Amendment 36. Under Clause 15, the chief commissioner is required to share the draft report with the person who requested the review, with victims, where applicable, and with any relevant family members as defined in the Bill. These persons will have the right to make representations, which must be considered before a report is finalised. Separately, the chief commissioner must share the draft report with any living individual subject to significant criticism in the draft report, who also has the right to make representations that must be considered before a report is finalised.

We have discussed today the referral of conduct to prosecutors. Amendments 114 and 135 specifically would expect the commissioner for investigations to refer conduct to prosecutors in cases where the threshold is met, unless there is a good reason not to do so. If the commission were under an obligation to refer all relevant conduct to prosecutors that it considered an offence, there is a risk this would place an unreasonable operational burden on it—a concern that was also relevant to the Stormont House agreement. I will try to get through this as quickly as I can.

I turn to post-Troubles sentencing, and specifically Amendment 149 in the name of my noble friend Lord Dodds of Duncairn. All offences, including terrorist-type offences, committed after 10 April 1998 will remain the investigative responsibility of the relevant police force. I recognise the intent behind this amendment but we have already tabled an amendment which could mean that people lose immunity if they are convicted of knowingly or wilfully misleading the commission. I am content to keep engaging with noble Lords and others on possible instances where we can strengthen the incentives to engage with the body and ensure adequate and proportionate penalties for those who do not.

The noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, and my noble friend Lord Weir of Ballyholme have probed the meaning of “general immunity from prosecution” in Clause 18. To be clear, as I have said immunity will be granted only in respect of conduct disclosed by an individual as part of their application. “General immunity from prosecution” does not mean immunity for all Troubles-related conduct in which individuals may have been involved but which has not been disclosed. Clause 18(9) makes it clear that, where immunity from prosecution is framed as a grant of general immunity, it must be framed by reference to the particular conduct that the person has disclosed. In other words, it will not confer immunity in relation to other conduct. The noble Baroness is looking at me slightly quizzically; I am happy to go through this again with her.

The noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, proposed an amendment to add an additional condition that must be met before immunity is granted: that the commission is satisfied that the grant of immunity would be compatible with convention rights, comply with the constitutional principle of the rule of law and satisfy the interests of justice. In response, the Government remain confident that the legislation is legally robust and complies with our obligations, so it is not necessary to make specific reference in the Bill to the compatibility of convention rights in respect of the commission discharging specific functions. It is the Government’s view that this is already covered.

The noble Lord referred in one of his questions to cases being initiated by the state or being initiated by families. While the commission will carry out reviews where requested to do so by a family or where a person has requested immunity, I assure the noble Lord that the Secretary of State and other public officials, such as the Attorney-General in Northern Ireland, will be able to request a review where this is necessary to ensure an effective and efficient investigation for the purposes of discharging the UK’s international obligations. Those powers are there.

As I have explained before, the commission, as a public authority, will be under a duty under the Human Rights Act to act compatibly with convention rights when exercising its functions and making any of its decisions. Working together with public prosecutors and making use of its full police powers, it will also be able to institute criminal proceedings against suspected offenders in cases where conditional immunity has not been granted.

In response to the noble Baroness, who I know disagrees with me on this, I set out at length last week that the Government’s view is that the absence of a prosecution or punishment outcome in individual cases where immunity is granted can be justified on the basis that the conferral of such immunity in a limited and conditional way is necessary to ensure the recovery of information about Troubles-related deaths and serious incidents that is extremely unlikely to come to light in any other circumstances. It is through the recovery of information for the benefit of families and wider communities, in part by means of the conditional immunity process, that the new body will be enabled to contribute to moving society forward in Northern Ireland. It is therefore consistent with the Government’s stated objective to provide more information to victims and survivors in a timely and efficient manner, which would not happen if we engaged in a single-minded focus simply on criminal justice outcomes.

I have gone way over time. I have tried to answer as many points as possible, but if there are any that I have missed then I am happy to sit down with noble Lords following Committee. On that basis, I urge noble Lords not to press their amendments, as I will not press mine.