Criminal Procedure Policy: EUC Report

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Monday 4th February 2013 Grand Committee

[Baroness O'Loan]

My Lords, I have the honour to serve as a member of European Union Sub-Committee E under the noble Lord, Lord Bowness.

The questions coming before the House in relation to the European Union and our ongoing membership are many and varied. There can be no doubt that in any field of European law, as in any field of law, there will be many measures which could be improved, there will be measures which are redundant, and there will be measures which are critical to the functioning of particular parts of our national systems. It is therefore interesting to note that this 30th report of the EU Committee does not find any major stumbling blocks in the path of criminal justice in the UK consequential upon the activities of the European Union and its legislative process. Indeed, the report states:

“We find that there is significant benefit to be gained from EU legislation setting minimum rights for defendants and victims, particularly for British citizens travelling within the EU who, on the whole, enjoy a high standard of rights at home. However, those minimum rights must be firmly grounded in international law norms, such as the European Convention on Human Rights, to minimise the risk of disrupting the UK criminal law systems”.

The committee also states in paragraph 55 in relation to its scrutiny functions, to which noble Lords have already referred, that,

“we have not yet found it necessary to raise a subsidiarity objection”.

Of course, we have stated our ongoing commitment to scrutiny.

The case-by-case approach to opt in has resulted in the Government opting into all the proposals for criminal procedure legislation, with the exception of the proposal for access to a defence lawyer. That is not yet so formed that it would be viable and would not interfere with the operation of the criminal justice systems. It is just not clear enough. However, in other cases, my noble colleagues have indicated the range of protections available to United Kingdom citizens who find themselves, for whatever reason, as either victims of or witnesses to a crime, or indeed as perpetrators of a crime, in countries outside the United Kingdom. The overall tenor of this report therefore is that there are no significant problems and that the Government should take a positive approach in principle to exercising the UK opt-in in relation to road map legislation.

As my noble friends have said, the report concludes by drawing attention to the decision to be made next May in relation to whether the United Kingdom opts out of the pre-Lisbon EU legislation, including the European arrest warrant. We are conducting a separate inquiry into that matter. I make no statement as to whether the United Kingdom should or should not opt out of the pre-Lisbon measures. As the noble Lord, Lord Bowness, said, we are still hearing evidence. However, I should like to revert for a moment to the report—the subject of this debate—and I draw your Lordships’ attention to the comment by Professor Spencer in paragraph 113 that an “unthinkable mess” would ensue were we to opt out of the EAW.

The EAW of course is not a stand-alone measure. It has coherence with a number of other vital measures, and my question for the Government is whether they are now in a position to enlighten us as to their strategy for dealing with these matters. In June last, the Government responded that they were examining the issue. As noble Lords have said, mutual recognition has proved to be profoundly important for that trust, which is essential to the international fight against crime and terrorism.

However, the reality is that such is the nature of the world in which we live that crime, which has always had its international dimensions, is now in its cross-border dimensions—a major problem for Governments and for the protection of national interests, including national security, and of the public good. Over almost 10 years a series of measures has been agreed by the member states of the EU which has as its purpose the effective and efficient delivery of a coherent response to the threats of international crime and terrorism within and without EU borders. Those measures have included the EAW, a process through which member states may seek the co-operation of other member states in securing the arrest of individuals suspected of crime who are resident in that other state. The UK makes regular use of the EAW, and indeed, in its published evidence, ACPO recently stated that the EAW was the most important of all the measures.

Much is made by some of the fact that the UK receives a very significant number of requests for extradition of individuals to other member states and of the cost of the extradition process. The reality is important. Our ability to extradite rapidly persons who are a threat to public order and safety in the UK provides a protection for people in the United Kingdom. It is simply neither possible nor proportionate to screen every EU citizen coming across borders, yet ACPO statistics show that in 2011-12 the Metropolitan Police Service received 50 European arrest warrants for homicide, 20 for rape and 90 for robbery. The evidence is also available to demonstrate that criminals who take refuge in the UK do not invariably begin to live lives as model citizens. They may well reoffend. The EAW, or possibly a similar process, enables processes through which other states can secure their return, maybe before further crime has been committed in the UK. There is a significant public safety benefit to the existence of such mutual co-operation that is considered in this report—something that the United Kingdom has consistently supported.

The UK made 221 requests to other states in 2011-12 and 93 people were surrendered to us through that process, the existence of which has worked to our benefit. Looking back we know that an Algerian national, Ramda, was arrested in the UK in 1995 in relation to a terrorist attack on the Paris Metro. France sought extradition—a process that took 10 years. Mr Ramda spent those 10 years in custody in the United Kingdom at massive cost to the United Kingdom. When Osman was identified as a suspect in a failed bomb attack on Shepherd’s Bush Tube station in July 2005, his extradition under the new mutual co-operation processes saw him surrendered within three months. He was sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment for conspiracy to murder. There is a stark contrast between the 10 years and the few months that mutual co-operation has enabled. The capacity for mutual co-operation is a very strong crime prevention measure that has the ancillary benefit of significant financial savings when one takes into account the average cost of keeping a prisoner for a year, which is estimated by the Ministry of Justice to be in the region of £40,000.

Under analogous measures we can seek: orders freezing property or evidence; confiscation orders; and evidence warrants to obtain objects, documents and data for use in criminal proceedings. We can transfer prisoners to serve their sentences in their home country, which brings benefits not only to the prisoners themselves, who are being restrained in a language and culture they understand, but also to their families who can visit them more easily. Non-custodial sentences can be carried out in the home country, again reducing the cost to the UK taxpayer of such criminal sanctions. None of these measures is perfect, but the report shows that there have been significant improvements.

Many other relevant systems have been created over the years, including Eurojust and Europol. They include the Schengen information systems and the potential for joint investigations across Europe. Even if we take into account the effectiveness of a European arrest warrant, surrender can occur only when the home country knows that the suspects are in a particular host country. If the home country does not know where the suspects are it cannot seek them. The host country does not know that it has a potentially dangerous criminal on its territory. The system for the exchange of criminal records, which includes provisions enabling a court in this country to be informed about and to take into account similar crimes in respect of which the accused has been convicted in other member states, is useful. The provisions provide protection for public safety in respect of people who are identified for one crime here because, following an exchange of criminal records, decisions which need to be made about bail et cetera will be informed by the individual’s previous records, thus enabling individuals who are a serious threat to public safety to be detained. Sometimes people question the value of the co-operation and the European criminal procedure processes, but the report demonstrates that it is advantageous to the United Kingdom that we are engaged as we are.

The 30th report does, however, state:

“Opting out of this legislation would have significant repercussions on UK criminal enforcement”.

The former Lord Chancellor stated his scepticism, which noble Lords can find in paragraph 114 of the report. The 30th report also states—the noble Lord, Lord Maclennan, referred to this—that:

“We share the scepticism that it will be possible for the UK to ‘pick and mix’ by opting out of all the subsisting pre-Lisbon legislation and immediately opting back in to some only”.

This report paints a picture of a process of co-operation in the European Union’s policy on criminal procedures which is generally positive and is operating according to the required standards in terms of compliance with the requirements of human rights law. In such circumstances the publication of the Government’s proposals for the protocol 36 arrangements should inform the debate which is now required on whether or not we should opt in. I would emphasise that there is no guarantee, as I understand it, that we would be able to opt back in: we can apply to opt back in. This has to be one of the more important decisions facing us at this time. It will rightfully be informed by the debate and the vote in both Houses and, indeed, by the report by the two sub-committees currently working on the issue. Mutual recognition and the trust which is consequential to it has proved, however, to be a significant protection for the people of the United Kingdom from both crime and terrorism.