Burma (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Northover
Main Page: Baroness Northover (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Northover's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(5 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in moving this Motion I will speak also to the Venezuela (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, the Iran (Sanctions) (Human Rights) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 and the Republic of Guinea-Bissau (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019.
Noble Lords will be familiar with the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, which passed through this House last year. It provides the UK with the legislative framework to continue to meet our international obligations, implement autonomous sanctions regimes and update our anti-money laundering framework after we leave the EU—although the last of these is not under consideration today.
Noble Lords will also be aware of the importance of sanctions. They are a key element of our approach to our most important international priorities. They help to defend our national interests, support our foreign policy and protect our national security. They also demonstrate our support for the international rules-based order. The United Kingdom has been a leading contributor to the development of multilateral sanctions in recent years. We have been particularly influential in guiding the EU’s approach, which is why we intend to carry over the policy effects of the EU sanctions regimes by transitioning them into UK law. I will say more about that in a moment.
The principal interests and threats facing the UK and other EU member states will not change fundamentally when the United Kingdom leaves the European Union. The Government recognise sanctions as a multilateral foreign policy tool and intend to continue to work in close partnership with the EU and other international partners after we leave the European Union to address those threats, including through the imposition of sanctions. We are committed to maintaining our sanctions capabilities and leadership role after we leave the EU. The Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 was the first major legislative step in creating an independent UK sanctions framework.
However, although the Act set out the framework needed to impose our own independent sanctions, we still require statutory instruments to set out the detail of each sanctions regime within that framework. Such statutory instruments set out the purposes of our regimes, the criteria under which the Secretary of State may designate individuals and entities, and the types of restrictive measures imposed. They do not specify which individuals or entities will be sanctioned. The Government will publish a list of those we are sanctioning under UK legislation when those prohibitions come into force. We will then seek to transfer EU designations in each case, but these decisions will be subject to the legal tests detailed in the sanctions Act. Any EU listings that do not meet the tests will not be implemented.
Noble Lords will recall an important feature of the sanctions Act that we discussed in detail during its passage: the right to challenge. Anyone designated under these instruments will be able to request that the Minister carry out an administrative review of their designation. The procedure applicable to such requests for reviews is set out in the Sanctions Review Procedure (EU Exit) Regulations, which were made in November last year and which are now in force. If, following the review, the Minister’s decision is to uphold the designation, the designated person has the right to apply to the High Court, or the Court of Session in Scotland, to challenge that designation decision. The court will apply judicial review principles to determine whether the designation decision should be set aside and will apply the procedure set out in the amended civil procedure rules for England and Wales, the rules of the Court of Judicature for Northern Ireland and the rules of the Court of Session for Scotland, which in particular allow for closed material proceedings to take place in relation to such challenges. The regulations underpinning this process have already been subject to debate and approved by this House. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing these statutory instruments extremely briefly—more briefly than his right honourable friend in the Commons.
We all agree that sanctions can play a key role in the implementation of the rule of international law and we support all four of the SIs. Clearly, no one wants our sanctions regime to lapse if we leave the EU. As the Minister said, the UK has been a leading contributor to the development of multilateral sanctions in recent years and we have been particularly influential in guiding the EU’s approach. Indeed we have—but we risk losing that influence. I am sure that the Minister will agree that sanctions carry greater weight as part of an EU-level arrangement, rather than going it alone. The Minister said:
“We are committed to maintaining our … leadership role after we leave the EU”.
Can he say how this is supposed to happen?
I note that in response to a Written Question on 8 October 2018 on the UK’s sanctions policies, Sir Alan Duncan stated:
“In future it will be in the UK’s and the EU’s mutual interest to discuss sanctions policy and decide where and how to combine efforts to the greatest effect”.
In light of that, are there any differences in the arrangements here or do they completely mirror what we have in the EU? What exploration has there been on how alignment will be assured in future?