Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Noakes
Main Page: Baroness Noakes (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Noakes's debates with the HM Treasury
(10 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the Government are committed to bringing payment systems under formal economic regulation to address deeply rooted failures in the UK’s payments market. In Committee, the Government tabled amendments to establish the new Payment Systems Regulator. The Government are now introducing a small number of further provisions and making amendments to some of the clauses previously tabled to ensure that the regulator is able to perform its functions effectively and that the right procedures apply to powers contained in the Bill.
First, these amendments will introduce provisions modelled on measures in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 which prohibit the regulator and those working for or on behalf of it from disclosing confidential information without the consent of the information owner. The prohibition will be enforced by a new criminal offence. However, further provisions will permit confidential information to be disclosed to certain prescribed persons in specific circumstances, including the provision to the regulator of certain information held by the Bank of England. This will be an important element of the Payment Systems Regulator’s regulatory regime. Without a prohibition on the disclosure of confidential information, people may be dissuaded from providing to the regulator important information which would assist it in the discharge of its regulatory functions.
The Government are bringing forward a number of other amendments which mirror provisions that already exist for the FCA under the Financial Services and Markets Act. The FCA will be able to collect levies for the purpose of maintaining adequate reserves for the regulator, which will help it to meet any contingencies. Another amendment will require that the regulator uses a sum equal to its enforcement costs for the benefit of its regulated population by reducing their levy the following year. A further amendment will ensure that the FCA does not have to produce a cost-benefit analysis when drawing up fee-levying rules to govern the collection of fees to meet the costs of the Payment Systems Regulator.
The other amendments tabled today will ensure that the right procedural requirements apply in respect of certain powers in the regulator clauses. The regulator will have a power to direct participants to take or not take specified action, and amendments are tabled to expand the concept of a “general” direction that applies to more than one person. The consequence will be that more directions fall within the category to which consultation requirements apply. Another amendment will require the Treasury to publish its decisions to designate payment systems to bring them within the regulator’s scope. The amendments also make some technical drafting changes to assist the reader of the legislation, as well as some consequential amendments to other legislation to include references to the regulator—for example, to ensure that the Freedom of Information Act applies to information held by it.
Overall, this set of provisions will contribute to the creation of a robust and well functioning regulatory regime for payment systems that can deliver on the Government’s objectives. I commend these government amendments to the House.
There is also an amendment in this group in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. In Committee, the Government tabled amendments which included a provision for the regulator to order banks to give indirect access to payment systems to other financial institutions. The noble Baroness has tabled amendments to this power with a view to addressing a concern that ordering a bank to provide another institution with indirect access to a payment system would expose the access-providing bank to additional operational and compliance risks. I should like to reassure the House that the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness are not required to address the concerns that have motivated them.
This power was designed to serve as a necessary back-stop in case banks with direct access to payment systems reacted to being brought within the regulator’s scope by ceasing to provide indirect access. This would have left smaller players with no access to the vital systems. The Government envisage that the regulator will be likely to exercise this power only in such a situation. It would be used to safeguard the position of the smaller banks reliant on the larger banks for continued access to the systems and to prevent the detrimental consequences for competition in UK retail banking if such access were denied.
The Government are confident that the regulator will not exercise this power in any way that results in banks having to take on undue operational or compliance risks. The power can be exercised only if an institution applies to the regulator to exercise it. The regulator would, in practice, inform the bank which it was proposed be ordered to grant the access and would consider the circumstances of the applicant. It would be open to the bank that was subject to any order to make representations to the regulator about the applicant or any other matter concerning the application. The regulator would consider any such representations in making its decisions. It would not exercise the power if it thought to do so would expose the bank, the subject of the order, to additional risks which it would not be reasonable for it to bear. The Government would expect the regulator to provide in industry guidance more detail on the circumstances and manner in which it would consider using its powers. In the light of that, I would ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
At this point, I shall deal with the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, to certain of the provisions of the proposed regulatory system for payment systems. I should like to reassure the noble Lord that his amendments are not necessary to achieve the end of a proportionate and balanced regulatory system, which I am sure we share. The noble Lord has proposed some additional safeguards to the Treasury’s power to designate payment systems so that they fall within the regulator’s scope. I should like to reassure the noble Lord that the power would be exercised by the Treasury only after proper consideration and where it is genuinely satisfied that the available evidence indicates the designation criteria are met, and that the exercise of its discretion to designate is necessary and proportionate in the circumstances. It is not necessary to make this an express requirement in the Bill. No such provision was included in the precedent power, contained in Section 185 of the Banking Act 2009, under which the Treasury recognises systems for Bank of England oversight. I should also like to reassure the noble Lord that the additional matters that he has proposed should be considered by the Treasury when deciding to designate a system would in any event be considered, and that it is not necessary to state them in the Bill.
Under the procedural provisions, the Treasury must notify operators of payment systems that it proposes to designate and consider any representations made, so we do not believe it is necessary to write into the legislation that the operators must be consulted as that is, in practice, what the Treasury would do. The drafting of this provision matches that contained in the precedent—Section 186 of the Banking Act 2009. In relation to the regulator’s competition objective, it is important to maintain flexibility as to the matters to which the regulator may, rather than must, have regard when considering the effectiveness of competition, particularly given the fast-moving, high-tech nature of the payments industry. The Government do not think that it would be right to accept the noble Lord’s proposal to change this discretion to a duty. The regulator should be free to consider the factors which it considers relevant at any given time to its assessment of the effectiveness of competition. The Government also do not think it is necessary to add to the list of factors the two proposed by the noble Lord. The consistency of treatment of payment systems operators and the impact of any past or proposed regulatory intervention are matters to which the regulator will generally be obliged to have regard as a matter of good administration. For the same reason, the Government believe that the amendments tabled by the noble Lord to the regulatory principles to which the regulator is to have regard are unnecessary. The regulator, as a public authority, would need to act fairly and consistently, and not take action if not necessary or not justified on the basis of the evidence available.
In relation to the regulator’s innovation objective, the Government believe that the noble Lord’s suggestion to supplement it with the objective of promoting the creation and sustaining of a regulatory environment that is conducive to innovation is unnecessary. It is implicit that the regulator will consider how its system of regulation can best support innovation, and it will exercise its regulatory powers only where it thinks that will serve to promote innovation.
On the regulator’s power to order a disposal of an interest in an operator of a payment system and its power to vary certain agreements relating to payment systems, the Government disagree with the noble Lord’s proposal that these powers should be exercisable only where the Competition and Markets Authority has decided that the interest held in the operator of the system has resulted, or is likely to result, in a substantial lessening of competition. This is a power that the Government want the regulator to be able to exercise independently, given the specific knowledge and expertise it is hoped the regulator will acquire in relation to the markets in payment systems and the services provided by them. However, it is important that the interests of all concerned are adequately protected, so the use of this power, and the power to vary agreements concerning payment systems, will be subject to appeal to the Competition and Markets Authority, which could, on the application of the appellant, suspend the effect of the regulator’s decision pending the determination of the appeal. It would be open to the CMA to quash the regulator’s decision and substitute its own for that of the regulator.
In summary, the Government believe that the legislation as drafted provides a balanced and fair regulatory system. In light of that, I would ask the noble Lord not to move his amendments.
My Lords, as the Minister has said, I have Amendment 138 in this group. He has explained the amendment and the answer to it so well that I did not need to bring my speaking note with me. I thank him for the comments he has made, which have fully answered the points that lay behind my tabling of the amendment. He asked me to withdraw the amendment but as I have not moved it I cannot withdraw it. However, I confirm that I shall not be moving it when we reach the appropriate time on the Marshalled List.
My Lords, I congratulate the Minister on his patience and courtesy in always being the Minister to answer my criticisms of the Bill. The patience and courtesy with which he meets my generosity in this regard fairly ought to be shared at some stage by the noble Lord, Lord Deighton.
The purpose of the amendments is to raise with the House and the Government two broad questions: first, on the need to avoid regulatory overload; and, secondly, on the need to ensure the adoption of robust regulatory principles in dealing with different sectors of the banking world. The amendments are directed at card payment systems, not the interbank arrangements to do with BACS, CHAPS, the clearance of cheques and so on, which have caused a great deal of difficulty.
First, on regulatory overload, this system, described in more than 60 sections, will be under the overall control of the Financial Conduct Authority, albeit the payment system regulatory structure will have its own chairman and board. It is a matter of real concern to note how much the FCA is being given to do in so many different regulatory contexts. This is a concern, first, as to manpower; secondly, as to skill and competence; and, therefore, thirdly, as to effectiveness.
Yesterday afternoon, in one of our debates, it was pointed out to me that the banking sector, or the financial sector, will pay for these regulatory costs. That is to state the obvious. The reality is, I assume, that the regulatory system hereby created will not be permanently in debt and bailed out annually by the financial services sector. Rather, it sets a budget a year ahead and the financial system pays it at the end of the second year in arrears. That gives the regulators two years of a relatively fixed budget. So, in determining how much responsibility to give to the regulators, including the Payment Systems Regulator, particular regard should be had to their capacity to carry out the job effectively.
It is therefore very important for the regulatory principle that the FCA and the PSR should not be given jobs they feel they have to do when present circumstances do not require them to do them.