Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Baroness Merron Excerpts

Friday 20th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

Causation is denied. My noble and learned friend can read it in Hansard, and I spoke to her outside. It is a testament to her dedication that she has been following this on TV. I do not know whether that shows how poor daytime TV normally is, though those of us who were here on Wednesday will remember that your Lordships’ House is very late night TV as well.

I spoke on the amendments when we first touched on this topic in Committee, right at the beginning. As my noble friend Lady Coffey said, those amendments interrelate with what has been discussed today. The Front Bench is focused on the question of making sure that we do not end up with a situation where different citizens and residents in the United Kingdom have substantially different rights in areas as important as this. I listened carefully to what the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, said about what actually happened in the Senedd. The phrase “voting in the dark” was a stark one, which I think we ought to remember.

On the question of what the Bill actually does, I am reminded of when I studied private international law, where you have something called the characterisation question—something that lawyers often like. It basically goes like this: in order to get the answer you want, you rephrase the question to focus on the bit of the problem which you want to focus on. In this case, you ask the question, “What does this Bill do?” The noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Carlile of Berriew, rightly say, as a matter of form, that the Bill amends the criminal law and therefore is a competence of Westminster. In reality, assisted dying will not be provided by the criminal justice system. In practice, it will be provided by the health service. That is why I listened carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Birmingham, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, said: in practice, this is a Bill which touches on health, which is a devolved competence.

That brings me to the wider and more important point. Earlier this week, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, raised Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man—the Crown dependencies—in the debate on the Crime and Policing Bill. We also learned this week that the Scottish Parliament has chosen not to proceed with the version—and it was a different version —of this Bill proposed there. If this Bill were to receive Royal Assent, we would therefore end up in a position where substantially different rights would exist for different residents and citizens in the United Kingdom.

That raises an important point of principle, on which I would be interested to hear the noble and learned Lord’s view. Does he see it as a success of devolution that, on an issue as significant as this, people living in different parts of the United Kingdom—and for the purposes of this group of amendments, Wales—might have different rights in law, or does he have a potential solution to create a situation where, as close as possible, people have the same or substantially the same rights?

I respectfully ask the Minister to respond on this point as well. Frequently, we have heard from the Front Bench the phrase, “We are neutral”—that the Government are interested only in workability and will look at these issues as and when they arise. However, this is a deep constitutional issue. The Government cannot be neutral on the point of whether they are content in principle that people in England might have different rights on assisted dying from people in Wales. The Government ought to have a stance on that fundamental constitutional position. The Government also ought to have a position on the point raised by my noble friend Lord Deben as to whether, if this Bill were to go through, with palliative care being such an important part of the overall process, they would equalise funding to make sure that residents of Wales have the same access in practice to palliative care as those of us who live in England do.

For those reasons, I look forward to the responses of both the noble and learned Lord and the Minister.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Baroness Merron) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the views that have been expressed today. As usual, I will keep my remarks to those amendments that raise significant legal, technical or operational workability concerns. I very much associate myself from these Benches with the welcome to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Prentis. We were delighted to see her return to your Lordships’ House and look forward to hearing from her.

I turn first to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey. Taken together, they would restrict eligibility for assisted dying to England only and exclude people resident in Wales, registered with a Welsh GP or who have recently moved across the border. They would remove the powers of Welsh Ministers to issue regulations and guidance and limit the commissioner’s monitoring functions to England. Individually and as a group, the amendments could have complex effects, risk significant unintended consequences and lead to a lack of clarity about eligibility and the effect of the law across the England-Wales border.

Restricting the Bill to England, as we have heard, would also create a divergence in the criminal law of England and Wales. The protections in Clause 32 would not apply in Wales and the Suicide Act 1961 would continue to apply there as it does at present. It would therefore be an offence to take steps in Wales to assist access to an assisted death in England even where lawful under the Bill in England. That would represent a significant divergence in homicide- and suicide-related offences and run counter to the current devolution settlement.

Amendment 887 would remove Clause 57(2) and (3), preventing certain provisions from extending to Scotland and Northern Ireland, including those on approved substances, advertising, and employment protections. This would risk parallel and potentially conflicting regulatory regimes; may allow advertising of services in Scotland and Northern Ireland, contrary to restrictions in England and Wales; and could leave health professionals who, for example, live in Scotland but work in England and Wales without the same employment protections as someone in England.

There are a number of further amendments in this group concerning powers in the Bill relating to the provision of an assisted dying service in Wales; namely, Amendment 765, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, Amendment 764, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and Amendments 742, 743, 844, 903, 905 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith. I bring to the attention of noble Lords that these amendments may alter or impinge on the devolution settlement. Any such changes would usually be made following consultation across the UK Government and with the Welsh Government to explore the wider implications. Further, the Senedd would be expected to consider material changes that affect devolved competence.

Amendment 762, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, would require the Secretary of State to specify which organisations will provide assisted dying services in Wales, within one month of the Act passing. This raises workability concerns as it requires clarity on who provides services before key implementation decisions have been made. This could be an interference with the ability of the Welsh Ministers in the devolution settlement to exercise their powers in a devolved area. As regulations under Clause 42 are made using the affirmative procedure, this amendment would also require parliamentary debates in both Houses within one month of the Bill being enacted.

Amendment 767A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, appears to seek to limit the power of Welsh Ministers to make regulations related to private services only and would make Welsh Ministers unable to establish a publicly commissioned service. As currently drafted, the Bill leaves this as a decision for Welsh Ministers. This amendment would therefore have devolution impacts and, if passed, the Welsh Government would need to be reconsulted and the consent of the Senedd would need to be sought for this provision.

I make no comments on the other amendments in this group. As noble Lords are aware, those amendments have not had technical drafting support from officials. Therefore, any further revision and corresponding amendments may be provided to provide consistent and coherent terminology throughout the Bill.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

My Lords, may I question the Minister? The 49th report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee drew attention to the very unusual nature of the clause in the Bill that allows the delegated powers to be used to do anything that an Act of Parliament can do and drew attention to the fact that this is extremely rare. Is the Minister saying that that is acceptable in this Private Member’s Bill and therefore potentially sets a major precedent in relation to other legislation? Can she clarify whether the Government, simply in relation to that, not to any other part, dispute the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee’s conclusion?

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I am sure that all noble Lords welcome that report and its comments but, as the noble Baroness is aware, it is a matter for the sponsor to decide the response to that rather than the Government.

[Baroness Smith of Llanfaes (PC)]

What is His Majesty’s Government’s approach to the legislative consent Motion process and making sure that the Sewel convention is kept to? What intergovernmental discussions have this Government had with the Welsh Government on the constitutional implications of this Bill in particular?

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

As noble Lords will be aware, engaging with the devolved Governments is a matter for the sponsor, not the Government.

[Lord Empey (UUP)]

My Lords, we have heard talk in this debate about respecting the devolution settlement. No, we do not. It is not that long ago, for instance, that the Northern Ireland Assembly voted against abortion but got abortion, and everybody on both Front Benches voted for it. So let us not fool ourselves that we have this great commitment to devolution and respect the views of the relevant assemblies. No, we do not.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I note the comments that the noble Lord has made.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I express my personal pleasure at seeing the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Prentis, back in the House. She was an extremely successful Attorney-General because she was wise and knew the law. I am very glad that she is back here to keep us in order.

On issues in relation to Wales, we have understood throughout the importance of complying scrupulously with the devolution settlement. The people of Wales have to be respected and the devolution settlement has to be respected. On two propositions here, there is no doubt.

First, this is about the criminal law. If a Bill were passed in the Senedd that sought to change the Suicide Act under the existing devolution settlement, it would have no effect because it would not be within the Senedd’s power to do it. That has to be dealt with by this Parliament.

Secondly, and separately, as a matter of practicality, how assisted dying is to be introduced in the health service and the provision of health in Wales is, in practice, a matter for Welsh Ministers. The approach that we have taken is that this Parliament must deal with the criminal law and Welsh Ministers must be left to deal with the decisions about how it is introduced. It may be that that requires an Act of the Senedd. Because of that possibility, we have included in the Bill the power for Welsh Ministers to give the National Health Service in Wales the power to take steps. That power would normally be given by the Senedd, but so that there could be no doubt about that, and so that it would not wait upon the Senedd, we have included it in the Bill.

Constitutionally, we are allowed to include it in this Bill. Even if there was no legislative consent Motion agreeing to it, we could go ahead without the consent Motion. I and the sponsor in the other place have made it clear, specifically and in writing, that we respect the devolution settlement and that if there is no legislative consent Motion in Wales that consents to this Parliament legislating in an area normally dealt with by the Welsh Senedd then we would withdraw those provisions, because we would not be respecting the devolution settlement. From our point of view, we have proceeded with these provisions only once the LCM has been given. That is our position in relation to it.

I shall now deal with the amendments in that context.

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[The Earl of Effingham (Con)]

My Lords, before I speak to the substance of the amendments in this group, I pay tribute to the noble Baronesses, Lady Nicholson, Lady Berridge, Lady Fraser of Craigmaddie, Lady Grey-Thompson, Lady Hollins and Lady O’Loan, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Newcastle. They have all stood up for a particularly vulnerable group of people, and they are absolutely right to do so. I am sure that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, is listening most carefully to their arguments.

Individuals with speech, language and hearing difficulties are particularly vulnerable, and it is imperative that they fully understand the process, their rights and the terms of the Bill before they can access the provisions made within it. My noble friend Lord Blencathra said that we really need to know that an individual understands what they are doing, and the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, used the phrase “crystal clear”. They are both absolutely right.

Surely how society cares for the most vulnerable of its citizens is an unmovable benchmark. Society must protect people with communication difficulties. The noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, specifically questioned the Government, and His Majesty’s Loyal Opposition believe that it is fair and reasonable to ask the Minister what specific work officials and Ministers have undertaken to establish the core risks posed by the Bill to those with hearing, speech and language impediments. In the view of His Majesty’s Government, how effective are the safeguards currently in place? Can the Bill be improved from a neutral perspective of workability to ensure that no one who faces the challenges we have discussed in this group ends their life without being given the obvious support that they need to fully understand the life-changing decision on which they are embarking?

As the noble Lord, Lord Winston, referenced in the previous group, during the course of the Bill, noble Lords have debated detailed provisions and addressed complex moral issues with a laser focus. However, the question at hand is not a complex one. Those who are not able to understand the situation without proper support must be provided that support if they are to take the decision to end their life. Surely that is non-negotiable.

The noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, said that we have to think differently and challenged the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, to lead by example. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Southwark took the words out of my mouth when he said that he remains hopeful that the noble and learned Lord will agree with this line of thought and commit to engaging collaboratively with all noble Lords whose amendments in this group aim to implement the right and appropriate protections for this vulnerable body of individuals.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, I am most grateful for the debate that we have had today. In keeping my comments limited to amendments on which the Government have major legal, technical or operational workability concerns, I turn first to Amendments 171A and 174A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Nicholson. The duty outlined within these amendments may prove difficult for doctors to discharge as they are ambiguously drafted and use undefined terms such as “religious, cultural or sex-based” barriers. It is also a mandatory duty that does not afford discretion to the doctor to refuse unreasonable requests.

The duty to appoint an advocate conflicts with Clause 22. It is unclear how these proposed advocates would be appointed or trained, or what their role or responsibilities would be. Furthermore, your Lordships’ Committee may note that where a person has religious, cultural or sex-based barriers, the amendment would also require such a person to be provided with an advocate who has training in and experience of relevant safeguarding issues and must be the same sex as the person seeking assistance. Introducing a more extensive mandatory duty for the provision of adjustments, including an advocate, may give rise to workability issues, as the cohort of advocates meeting these criteria could be very limited and may result in a person being delayed or unable to take part in a preliminary discussion.

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

We all know what we are talking about here, but yes, absolutely.

This all goes back to the fundamental point of the Bill. I am addressing this point because the hypothesis is that the person has less than six months to live but, notwithstanding that, we are making sure that this particular group of people have an independent advocate. My point is simply that, if we are going to go down this road, there needs to be consistency: if they are not going to have an independent advocate, they really need to confirm it rather than merely indicate it. I apologise for my slightly loose language; the noble Baroness was quite right to pick me up on that. I hope the noble and learned Lord will consider my point as to whether “indicating” is actually the right test in subsection (2)(b)(ii) of his proposed new clause.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I am most grateful to noble Lords for their contributions to this debate on independent advocates. I will limit my comments to those amendments on which the Government have major legal, technical or operational workability concerns.

I turn first to Amendments 168, 300 and 553, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson. Without further consequential changes, Amendment 168 would result in an internal inconsistency with the framework currently set out in the Bill, which provides an independent advocate only for certain qualifying persons.

Similar concerns arise with Amendment 300, which seeks to establish a new system of advocates for disabled people. It is important to note—not just in reference to these amendments, which I heard the noble Baroness acknowledge are not quite as she might wish them to be, but in relation to the debate—that the Equality Act 2010 definition of disability is very broad. For example, it includes those with cancer. As a result, most people who are terminally ill for the purposes of the Bill would fall within that definition. That means that the amendment could apply to the majority of those seeking an assisted death.

Amendment 300 would require the independent advocate to confirm that the person has been offered

“all practicable social, medical, and palliative supports which are financially supported”.

However, there is no provision to ensure that the independent advocate would have access to the information needed to confirm this, which could make the amendment unworkable.

Amendment 553 relates to young adults aged 18 to 25. People in this cohort are legally adults, so the requirement for parental or guardian consent and to have an independent advocate may raise Article 8 ECHR issues relating to private and family life. To be lawful, these requirements would need to be objectively and reasonably justified and proportionate.

My noble and learned friend Lord Falconer, the sponsor, tabled Amendments 548A, 549A and 862A to address workability issues with the current drafting of the Bill by clarifying the regulation-making powers and parliamentary procedures in Clause 22. The amendments set out when a qualifying person must be informed about independent advocate support and the circumstances in which that support must be provided.

Amendment 544A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, would create a conflict with Clause 22(3), which sets out the role of the independent advocate in providing support and advocacy to a qualifying person. The amendment would remove the definition of “qualifying person”, which would result in confusion about who is a qualifying person and the role of an independent advocate appointed to assist a person who is not a qualifying person.

Amendment 553B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Weir, would place a duty on the commissioner to offer the support of an “independent disability advocate” to a disabled person as defined under Section 6 of the Equality Act 2010. As mentioned previously, given the breadth of the Equality Act definition, this duty would apply to most people seeking an assisted death. The amendment is unclear about the duties, training and qualifications that would be required of them.

Amendments 191 and 195 to 199, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Frost, and spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Gove, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, would require the Secretary of State to establish a scheme of neutral advisers to whom a person must be directed in the situation where a registered medical practitioner is unwilling or unable to conduct a preliminary discussion. The amendments are broad, ambiguously drafted and could give rise to significant workability issues.

Amendment 196 in particular would require neutral adviser organisations to make a number of very broad declarations. For example, under the amendment, a neutral adviser must declare that they do not and will not employ

“any person who has taken part in the provision of assistance for assisted dying”.

This could result in a potentially unworkable duty, as it would require the adviser to make a declaration about current and future conduct. These broad declarations could therefore be practically unworkable and create resourcing challenges by excluding significant parts of the workforce, if interpreted broadly.

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[Captain of the Honourable Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms and Chief Whip (Lord Kennedy of Southwark) (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, I have noticed that the time now is 5.18 pm. We have no intention of moving on to another group. When this group is finished, I will seek to adjourn the House. I say to any colleagues waiting for another debate that it will not be happening this week.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, The Government do not have major workability concerns with Amendments 175 and 384, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, whom we are very pleased to see in his place; long may he continue to be there.

I will say a few words about clinical practice, which may be helpful in addressing some of the points raised, including those just now by the noble Earl, Lord Effingham. Most of the questions were really about the Bill and are therefore matters for the sponsor, but I will make a couple of points about clinical practice. It is rare for a clinician to base prognosis on a median life expectancy. In addition, explaining the data used is not common clinical practice. I hope that is helpful to noble Lords.

The issues raised are rightly for noble Lords to consider and decide. Of course, that means that the way the amendments are currently drafted may require further consideration to be fully workable, effective or enforceable.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

My Lords, can I share everybody’s genuine pleasure that the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, is here? Can I not congratulate him on telling us about it? I would have done, but he told me he did not want it, so I respect his wishes. I thank my noble friend Lord Rooker for being willing to share his experience of the death of his first wife. I also associate myself with my noble friend Lady Royall; from personal experience, one should not feel that one has got some obligation or is in some way defective if one dies quickly of cancer or takes a particular attitude. We should not be censorious one way or the other as to what attitude people take when confronted with a terminal illness. How would we all react when confronted with it? We probably do not know.

First, we have had a debate about the six months, and I am incredibly unkeen to revisit the six months because I do not think that that was the frame within which the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, tabled his amendment. His amendment is about what is to be told to the patient rather than whether six months is right—I am gratified that the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, is nodding. I will focus on the issue: how should the patient be told? His amendment is in Clause 5, which is about the preliminary discussion. It requires the doctor conducting the preliminary discussion to discuss the person’s diagnosis and prognosis. It requires the doctor to refer to any treatment available to the patient, and the likely effect of the treatment, and it requires them to go through

“all appropriate palliative, hospice or other care”—

it is not just palliative and hospice care; it is other care as well—

“including symptom management and psychological support, and offer to refer them to a registered medical practitioner who specialises in such care for the purpose of further discussion”.

It is a detailed discussion about the prognosis, diagnosis and likely effect of treatment.

I was struck by the speech made by the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins. The idea that you are told you have six months to live, and that is it, is extraordinarily unusual. The idea that this happens is very unlikely; that it could happen in this context seems to me to be extraordinarily unlikely. Noble Lords will be aware that, in Clause 7, there must be a record kept of this conversation. The iniquity that one is trying to deal with seems to me to be unlikely to arise.

Should we be putting into the Bill the specific statistical material that has to be given? If you are relying on a median or an average, do you have to say that you are doing that and what the variations are? No, I am not in favour of that. There is a power for the Secretary of State, by codes of practice or guidance, to give indications as to how it should be dealt with. I trust doctors more than many people in this debate. It would be unhelpful to put in words such as those in the amendment into the Bill, so I am against the amendment.

On a completely separate issue, we have debated the question of the prognosis and the reason for the six months. I strongly adopt the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, that this is not the view of one person; this is the view of two doctors and a panel of three. This is not just a question of one prognosis and it is over. That is an issue that we dealt with previously. I am delighted that the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, was in a position to move the amendment. I am sorry to say that I do not agree with it.