Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Baroness Merron Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 6th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Markham (Con)]

Building on from that, that is correct: there are two different approaches here. There are those among us who believe that choice should come first, and within that choice there should obviously be protections and safeguards. Then there are those people who have equally very firm beliefs that the restrictions should be in place first as protections. To summarise, a lot of the amendments in this group are about having certain illnesses and certain groups, such as disabled groups, that should be excluded from the Bill, and that you should be allowed to have this only if you have unbearable pain or suffering, or if there is no chance of treatments to extend life.

I will bring two points in here. Public opinion is overwhelmingly in favour of choice, at 70% in all the different opinion polls. I include disabled groups in that: they show that 70% of disabled people are in favour of it. Then, there are the personal experiences of people who are terminally ill: first, they do not want to die. They would be delighted if there were treatments that would extend their lives beyond six months, or for much longer. But, for them, getting the opportunity to have a death of their choosing is a great comfort and insurance. It does not mean that they are going to rush out and take it as soon as they have it. In a lot of cases—about 30% in other countries—they will not use it at all.

However, the fact is, those people want it to be there, like an insurance policy, so that if, towards the end of their life, they really do have unbearable suffering, however they define it—which might be pain, a loss of dignity, a feeling that they really do not want to go on—then they can have that choice and reason for wanting to do it, whatever their choice is. That is the important thing that we are trying to ensure. Yes, there will be protections, but giving people the ability and autonomy to have the comfort and the choice of being able to die in the way they wish is the most fundamental right of all.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Baroness Merron) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions on eligibility and definition of terminal illness. Once again, I will keep detailed comments limited to amendments on which the Government have major legal, technical or operational workability concerns.

First, I will give a reassurance to your Lordships’ House in response to the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Harper, and the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, about the modern service framework on palliative care and end-of-life care. We acknowledge that there has been a drafting error, which the noble Lord and the noble Baroness picked up on. The drafting error is in the national cancer plan. I reassure your Lordships’ House that, as has been stated previously, the interim update will be published this spring and the full modern service framework will follow in the autumn. That issue was purely down to a drafting error.

I turn now to the amendments. Amendments 71, 77 and 79 were tabled by the noble Lady, Baroness Finlay, and Amendments 83A, 104 and 105 were tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Polak, my noble friend Lord Hunt of Kings Heath and the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson. Noble Lords may wish to note the Government’s workability concern with this set of amendments. Key terms and concepts in the amendments are undefined, which may introduce uncertainty when determining who is eligible under the Bill and, particularly under Amendments 71, 77 and 79, what it means to slow a disease. There is a risk that unclear eligibility criteria could result in ambiguity for those applying the legislation, which may give rise to legal challenges to decisions made under it.

Amendment 105 could also give rise to legal challenge on the basis that excluding people with particular conditions from assisted dying may not be justified under Article 2 or Article 8 of the ECHR and may amount to unjustified discrimination under Article 14. Any differential treatment would need to be objectively and reasonably justified in order to comply with ECHR obligations.

Amendments 74 and 94, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Holbeach, would exclude from the definition of “terminal illness” any individual whose condition can be meaningfully halted or controlled by available treatment. Clinically, it may be difficult to determine whether an illness or disease can be “meaningfully halted, or controlled” by treatment, and it is possible that an illness or disease could have a short halt before deterioration starts again. This will make it difficult for clinicians to decide whether a person is “terminally ill” and eligible for assisted dying and is likely to lead to challenges to decisions. These amendments may result in a person becoming ineligible, irrespective of whether they choose to take the available treatment.

Amendment 75, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, would amend the definition of “terminally ill” by removing the test of death being reasonably expected in six months, and replacing it with a requirement that the rate of progress of the disease, with treatment in line with NICE guidelines, indicates that death can be expected within six months. Introducing the concept of treatment in accordance with NICE guidelines may create difficulties, as the amendment would require clinicians to assess the patient’s prognosis as if they were treated in accordance with NICE guidelines. This may result in a person becoming ineligible, irrespective of whether they chose to have treatment in accordance with NICE guidelines. This amendment therefore requires clinicians to make a judgment on a potentially hypothetical basis.

Amendment 80, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, would provide that a person is “terminally ill” where their death has an 80% likelihood of occurring within six months, according to the written opinion of two specialist, consultant-level hospital doctors. These doctors must be knowledgeable about and have experience of treating patients with the progressive illness in question. This amendment would create significant operational workability concerns. It would require the clinician making a determination about the person’s prognosis to meet a high threshold of certainty. The criteria could be especially difficult to meet for a person who has a rare progressive illness or disease, about which there may not be widespread clinical knowledge or experience.

Amendment 82, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Polak, would require two consultants to provide a view on an individual’s life expectancy, and for them to determine that their death can be “highly probable” within six months, rather than the current drafting of, can be “reasonably expected”. Several terms are not defined in the amendment and are likely to lead to ambiguity, including operational issues, around which doctors are to assess life expectancy and to what standard.

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[Lord Moylan (Con)]

May I pursue a point the Minister made about my Amendment 85? My understanding of the Bill, as drafted, is that one has to have an inevitably progressive illness or disease, not that one has to have a six-month prognosis of one’s death. The two might be quite separate.

One might, as the noble Baroness said, have a combination of circumstances that means one is likely to die within six months without having a specific, identifiable disease. The Minister seems to be saying that the Government’s interpretation of this clause is that one does not need to have a specific, identifiable terminal illness; one simply needs to have a set of circumstances that together might result in a prognosis of death within six months.

If that is the case—and that is the Government’s view of the meaning of that clause, as the Minister seems to imply—that widens to an astonishing extent the conditions that might qualify for the Bill. I would like to hear the Minister say—and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, may possibly want to comment on this when he speaks—whether it really is their interpretation that it could be any set of circumstances that lead to a six-month diagnosis without there being an identifiable illness.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I will briefly look at the actual amendment. As I said in my response, the workability concerns are about the specification of a list of illnesses or diseases. I have already outlined why that would be unworkable—because it is often a combination of illnesses, as well as the complications of those illnesses, that are interacting, rather than there being just one. I referred earlier to why it would be extremely difficult. I have been looking at the specifics of the amendment, but to do what it says would create more ambiguity than there is currently. In reality, my response is covering our concerns; where I do not make a comment, there are no workability concerns.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach (Con)]

As the Minister will know, I have made it clear that I am concerned about suffering in the last days of life. One of the key elements of that is palliative care. When one talks about treatment, one of the incentives for death is suffering. Does the Minister have anything to say to the Committee about the status of palliative care within the National Health Service? Are there any plans afoot, and when will this particular course of treatment be available to people? Otherwise, many people faced with terminal illness will be tempted to seek assisted suicide, which I think should be discouraged.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

We are discussing a group of amendments about the definition of terminal illness. I have already placed a letter in the Library of the House outlining all the work in respect of palliative care. I have also made reference to the modern service framework.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

Having listened to my noble friend Lord Moylan respond to what the Minister said, I confess to being a little confused. The Minister seemed to be saying, in her comments about some of the amendments in this group, that the problem with having a list of conditions is that you could quite often have a terminal diagnosis as the result of a group of conditions, circumstances or illnesses. In my reading, the Bill does not say that. The Bill says:

“For the purposes of this Act, a person is terminally ill if … (a) the person has an inevitably progressive illness or disease”—


not lots of them; one—

“which cannot be reversed by treatment, and … (b) the person’s death in consequence of that illness or disease can reasonably be expected within six months”.

I carefully read the amendment, which talks about a specified list of conditions. Incidentally, coming back to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Markham, twice as many members of the public support that approach than a terminal illness. The Minister’s answer to my noble friend Lord Moylan seemed to be disagreeing with what is actually in the Bill, so I am now more confused than I was before she got to her feet. Can she clear that up?

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I am sorry the noble Lord is confused. I know that my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer will be pleased to assist him with any confusion that there is in the case of this amendment.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I suggest to the Minister that the answer to the noble Lord, Lord Harper, is very simple. An unfortunate person may have more than one inevitably progressive illness or disease, each of which will lead to their death within six months. It is a standard principle of statutory interpretation that the singular includes the plural.

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Debate on Amendment 87A (to Amendment 87) resumed.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. Amendment 87, tabled by my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer, the sponsor of the Bill, would clarify the intention of the current Clause 2(2), which is to prevent someone becoming eligible for an assisted death due to an eating disorder. Amendment 87 replaces Clause 2(2). The Bill’s sponsor in the other place indicated that they would look to improve the clarity on who is and who is not eligible in this clause. The noble Lord, Lord Harper, asked about interpretation. I hope those comments will be helpful, because the eligibility of people with eating disorders under the Bill is, of course, a policy decision, not one for government. I am sure that my noble and learned friend heard the noble Lord’s point.

This amendment, as is usual practice, has been drafted with the technical support of the Government, within the policy intent of the sponsor and of the other place. The amendment excludes from the definition of “terminally ill” any illness or disease caused by the person not eating or drinking, where not eating or drinking occurs as a result of a mental disorder. It also makes it clear that this expressly covers cases of limited eating or drinking. Given that Amendment 87 replaces Clause 2(2), if noble Lords accept it, a number of the other amendments in this group will, of course, fall away.

I turn to detailed comments on amendments that the Government consider have major legal, technical or operational workability concerns. Amendment 89, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Polak, would lead to a person not being considered terminally ill under the Bill solely as a result of withdrawing medication, hydration or life-sustaining devices. Amendment 91, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, would mean that those whose refusal of nutrition is due to a mental illness would not be considered terminally ill under the Bill.

Amendment 92, tabled by my noble friend Lady Debbonaire, would exclude a person from eligibility if their terminal illness was

“solely as a result of standard medical treatment being refused or withheld”.

This amendment could have the potential undesirable impact of undermining a person’s autonomy and right to make informed choices about their own medical care. The definition of “standard medical treatment” is unclear here: the exclusion from eligibility could apply to a patient who refuses one standard medical treatment in favour of an alternative standard medical treatment. A refusal of standard medical treatment would mean that a person would become ineligible for ever, even where their refusal had no impact on their prognosis.

Amendment 101, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Parminter, would prevent people with physical effects or complications of a mental disorder being eligible for an assisted death. This may be difficult for clinicians to apply, as “physical effects” is an undefined term. The current drafting also layers a “for the avoidance of doubt” provision on top of another “for the avoidance of doubt” provision, which could lead to ambiguity about how the legislation should be interpreted. I heard the noble Baroness say that she was concerned about the drafting, so I hope those comments will be helpful to her.

Amendment 103, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, would remove from eligibility people who, because of the effect of a mental disorder, refuse life-saving treatment and develop a terminal condition. Where amendments limit eligibility for specific groups, they could give rise to legal challenge under Articles 2 or 8, with Article 14, of the ECHR if such restrictions are not objectively and reasonably justified. As I have said, it is for noble Lords to consider the amendments in that light, should they wish to.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

First, I detect that the mood of the Committee is that I should put my Amendment 87 into the Bill, but subject to the amendment tabled by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, and by the noble Baroness, Lady Berger, so I am minded, unless anybody indicates to the contrary, to let that process go ahead. I accept that, in putting it in, there are those who would like to build on it on Report, but I think we should put it in now.

I will deal very quickly with the other amendments in the group. Amendment 88, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, would leave out “solely”.

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[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, before the Minister rises to speak, I have a question for her about workability arising from one of the amendments included in this debate. In his Amendment 581A, my noble friend Lord Sandhurst posed a specific question on capacity at the moment when a person is given the substances with which they will take their own life. He is surely right that at that critical moment appropriate safeguards are needed where, for any reason at all, there is doubt about the person’s capacity—for example, where there is a history of fluctuating capacity. The doctor should clearly know how to respond to that situation. Can the Minister say whether she believes that the situation that my noble friend has described would require specific guidance to be issued by the Government over and above guidance already issued under the Mental Capacity Act?

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions on mental capacity and eligibility. As usual, I will keep my comments limited to those amendments on which the Government have major legal, technical or operational workability concerns. Indeed, if I do not refer to an amendment, clearly that is not the case, as was just suggested.

I wish to make a point to the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, who asked about consideration about compliance with ECHR. It is probably helpful for me to re-establish the consideration about that. It is the role of the Government—this is what I am doing—to highlight where there is a risk of issues in respect of the ECHR. However, it is for the House to decide whether policy choices might create a risk and whether that amount of risk is acceptable or not. The other thing, if it is helpful to the noble Baroness, is that, if it is found that primary legislation is incompatible, there could of course be a declaration of that incompatibility. It would not invalidate legislation. That is probably the main point that I want to emphasise, but this is ultimately a matter for decision by the House.

Amendments 117 and 892, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, would remove Clause 3 and insert a new clause requiring the Secretary of State to make regulations that establish an alternative framework for assessing and determining capacity, based on a psychological assessment, rather than reliance on the Mental Capacity Act. How to make that assessment on capacity—noble Lords have referred to this—is a policy choice and is therefore a matter for Parliament. However, as drafted, Amendment 117 uses a number of undefined terms such as “validated, standardised instruments” and “evidence-based methodology”, which, without further clarification or definition, are likely to create workability concerns. Amendment 892 would mean that the majority of provisions under the Bill could not come into force until the regulations under Clause 3 were made. This would make the backstop provision in Clause 58(4) ineffective.

I turn to Amendment 108, tabled by my noble friend Lord Hunt of Kings Heath. It would introduce a departure from the MCA framework by linking a lack of capacity in one area, to consent to care and treatment arrangements that amount to a confinement, to lack of capacity around another decision, the decision to end one’s life. This could create confusion and require additional guidance and training for practitioners.

It appears that Amendment 119 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thomspon, would introduce a separate specialist capacity assessment process for adults with a learning disability. This departs from the MCA framework, which requires proportionate, decision-specific assessments, rather than separate processes for particular groups. Operationally, this could create significant training and resource demands, as specialist assessors would need to be identified. The Committee may wish to note that the amendment restricts any publicly funded provider from undertaking the mental capacity assessment, which would mean that individuals with learning disabilities would have to self-fund the assessment from a private sector provider. There are also technical drafting issues, including a lack of definition for “learning disability” and other terms such as “relevant professional regulator”, which could lead to uncertainty in how the legislation is applied.

Amendments 117, 892, 108 and 119 would all involve introducing differential treatment, by treating different groups of people differently. As such, they could give rise to legal challenge on the basis of ECHR obligations, specifically Article 14, which prohibits discrimination when read with Article 8. Any differential treatment, as I said more broadly earlier, would need to be objectively and reasonably justified in order to comply with ECHR obligations.

I turn to Amendment 235 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan. The effect of this amendment is that certain groups of people would not be able to make a valid first declaration, as the noble Lord said. This could exclude people with learning disabilities, mental disorders, as per Section 1 of the Mental Health Act 1983, and autism from accessing assisted dying. An individual who may experience substantial difficulty in understanding processes or communicating their views, wishes or feelings would also be excluded under this amendment from accessing assisted dying. The definition of “mental disorder” in the Mental Health Act is extremely broad and will include those with conditions such as ADHD, dyslexia, anxiety and sleep disorders. The Committee may wish to note that these groups would be excluded, even if their condition had no impact on their ability to fully understand the relevant information.

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[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I am sure that both I and my noble friend will be very pleased, together or separately, to reply to the noble Baroness.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I shall deal with the issues raised in this debate under the following heads. First, what is the correct test and legal framework to apply in relation to mental capacity? Secondly, how do we deal with the question of particular conditions that people have? Does it make it inappropriate, or should there be exceptional protection? Thirdly, what about Clause 22, which is the independent advocate provision?

First, on capacity, as noble Lords know, the Bill provides that the tests under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 shall be applied to determine whether or not the person seeking an assisted death has the capacity to make such a request. Remember as well, for what it is worth, that, in addition to having the capacity to make that request, the person, in order to get an assisted death, also has to have a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life, and has made that decision to end their own life voluntarily and has not been coerced or pressured by any other person into making it. Those last two protections—a clear, settled and informed wish, voluntary and no coercion—are separate from the question of capacity.

The question of capacity is: is that person capable of making the decision? The Mental Capacity Act, which has been in force for approximately 20 years, starts from the assumption that a person does have capacity to make a particular decision, and only if it is shown that the person does not have that ability are they not able to make that decision themselves.

Should we change that assumption? There are two big proposals in front of us. First, there is Amendment 115 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Findlay of Llandaff, and supported in particular by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, who made a speech in favour of it. Subsection (1) of that proposal says:

“In this Act, a person has capacity to make a decision to end their own life if they do not lack capacity to make that decision, and references to “capacity” are to be read accordingly”.


I shall read that again for those who did not get it first time round. In this Act, the proposal is that

“a person has capacity to make a decision to end their own life if they do not lack capacity to make that decision, and references to “capacity” are to be read accordingly”.

That looks almost identical to the existing provisions, and I am quite unable to see what the difference is that is being proposed.

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Blencathra for opening the debate on this group. He is right that we should consider carefully how the most vulnerable will be protected under this legislation. Having a multidisciplinary specialist review before a person in a care home is certified to have capacity seems an interesting and a sensible safeguard. It was not clear to me whether the five working days is from the date of the review or from the date of the findings of the review, but no doubt that could be looked at and clarified.

Of course, generally, social care is a policy area that needs attention. We know that too many older people receive inadequate care in old age, and I must say that it seemed to me that the personal experience of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and that of my noble friend Lord Deben can both be right. It is likely that there are excellent care homes and care homes that need improvement. I am afraid that that is probably the society we live in.

Effective communication is a challenge that older people face. This is an obstacle for the process under the Bill for assessing capacity. It therefore seems sensible for specialists to be involved when the person requesting assistance is in a care home. We also have to consider the risks of institutionalisation, which I know from experience can certainly be a factor for people in care homes. I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm what the Government’s conclusions are on this proposal and its workability. Would it be prohibitively costly or could it be delivered?

On the amendment from my noble friend Lady Eaton, this additional process and heightened evidential standard for persons in care homes is a constructive and interesting suggestion. I invite the Minister to update the Committee on whether the Government have considered the two separate proposals in this group and come to a view on which would be the more workable and effective if implemented. That assessment would not only be helpful to the Committee but might enable the House in due course to make a more informed decision on the best way to improve this part of the Bill on Report. If that assessment has not yet been made, perhaps the most appropriate way forward would be for Ministers to write to the Committee to update it, at some point between now and Report.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, I am most grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate on assessing capacity in care homes. As noble Lords will be aware, my remarks will be limited to areas where the Government have assessed that there may be major technical or operational workability concerns.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, that that will include matters relating to the ECHR. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, already picked that up in his own characteristic way, but I gently say to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra—I know he is aware of this because of his experience—that Government Ministers have a duty to advise your Lordships’ House of implications. As I explained in the last group, decisions on the ECHR are ultimately for Parliament. I am sorry to frustrate him with repetition, but it is appropriate to the relevant considerations. I will just ask him not to listen if he feels it is very irritating.

This may be helpful to the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, as well. Amendments 112 and 111, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Eaton, spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, aim to strengthen safeguards for care and nursing home residents by ensuring that capacity in these cases is established through specialist clinical assessment and that capacity assessments seek to rule out reversible medical causes of impaired or fluctuating capacity. The Government consider that Amendment 111 may be inconsistent with the Mental Capacity Act’s assessment framework, which does not require enhanced assessment for certain groups. I dealt with this in more detail in the last group. By requiring expert psychiatric input before capacity is confirmed, Amendment 112 could create inconsistency with the MCA’s presumption of capacity and the principle of proportionate, decision-specific assessments.

Amendment 110A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, would affect care home and nursing home residents’ capacity assessments and require expert psychiatric input before capacity is confirmed. Again, this could create inconsistency with the MCA’s presumption of capacity and the principle of proportionate, decision-specific assessments.

If passed, each of these amendments would lead to a difference in treatment between care home and nursing home residents and all other citizens in assessments for assisted dying. That difference in treatment—the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, may wish to close his ears at this point—could give rise to challenge under the ECHR, particularly Article 8, which refers to respect for private and family life, and Article 14, which concerns the prohibition of discrimination. The differences in treatment would need to be justified, necessary and proportionate.

[Lord Deben (Con)]

If the Committee decided that the conditions in a care home were such that it would be better to have a system there that was slightly different from the one for those who were not in a care home, surely that is justification enough. As the Minister knows, I am entirely in favour of the ECHR and disagree very strongly with my noble friend, but this seems a bit of a red herring, frankly. The fact of the matter is that, if this was the policy that was put forward, I think it very unlikely that anyone would find it possible to stop it under the ECHR.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

It would not be possible in any case to stop it in that way, because it would not invalidate legislation. I am just drawing the Committee’s attention to the fact that it would require further work. As the noble Lord will know, if a court finds that primary legislation is incompatible, it may make a declaration of incompatibility. As I said, although it does not invalidate legislation, it is usual practice for the Government to consider and address these matters.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I am afraid that the Minister is between a rock and a hard place here. If these amendments are not passed, she might find that the Government are in breach of Articles 9, 10 and 11. I would be grateful if she could consult her lawyers in relation to that matter.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I will consult my lawyers with pleasure.

Lastly, all the amendments in this group address complex issues and, if they were passed, considerable further policy and drafting work would likely be required.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Smith of Newnham and Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, for sharing their significant and painful experiences. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for doing the same in relation to the last months of her mother’s life.

This group deals with the question of whether there should be special provision for people in care homes. Two routes are suggested: first, in the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Eaton, which was spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, that there be a higher evidential standard; and, secondly, that a series of additional tests should be raised.

I think that everybody in the Chamber is agreed that care homes vary across the country; there are those of the highest possible standards and those that do not have the same high standards. It is also the case—a point made forcibly and effectively by the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins—that one should not confuse the fact that there are people in long-term care and people in high-tech nursing homes who are being rather elided here. People become institutionalised and may suffer long-term cognitive problems from being in care homes for a long time. The question raised is whether additional steps beyond those provided for in the Bill should be put in place to check that such people, particularly those who have been in care homes for the long term, have capacity.

The current arrangements require that the co-ordinating doctor is satisfied, after discussion with the patient and anybody else, that they have capacity, and similarly in relation to the independent doctor. Then, the panel has to be satisfied, and then the co-ordinating doctor has to witness the second declaration of the patient. The co-ordinating doctor can witness that second declaration only if he or she is satisfied that, among other things, the patient has capacity. Fifthly, the doctor providing the assistance also has to be satisfied that the patient has capacity. The question posed is whether, despite the fact that there are five separate occasions on which a doctor or a panel have to be satisfied of capacity, for somebody in a long-term care home, one should make additional provision for separate assessments or have a higher evidential standard.