Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Baroness Meacher Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Report stage
Wednesday 8th December 2021 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Meacher]

11: Clause 9, page 11, line 45, leave out from “legislation” to “, or” in line 47

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to move Amendment 11, and speak to Amendments 22, 25 and 30. I thank the Minister for our very helpful meeting this morning, and for the detailed letter I received at 4 pm. I have carefully considered the points raised, and reread the letter to ensure I had understood it, but the basics facts remain the same—as I think the Minister realises—and I will do my best to explain them.

My comments also apply to Amendment 25, but I will focus on the three identical amendments to the three clauses. They ensure that disclosure of information by one public body to another under Part 2 of the Bill does not contravene data protection legislation. This is an incredibly important principle, yet the data sharing provisions in Part 2, as the Bill stands, would enable data protection legislation to be breached. Data protection legislation does permit information to be shared for the purposes of preventing crime, which is important too. If Amendment 11, along with identical Amendments 22 and 30, is passed, personal data could be passed to be police, but professionals could not be forced to do so against their professional judgment. That is the key principle we want to achieve.

The Minister’s letter says that the data shared under the duty is intended primarily to consist of aggregated and anonymous data, et cetera. But we have to focus on what the Bill says, rather than what our excellent Minister may intend. As I said to her this morning, if our Minister were Home Secretary, I might be content with the wording in the Bill, on this issue—I am not sure about everything else—as I have great respect for both our Ministers.

The Minister also says the duty applies to duty holders, not directly to front-line professionals, including youth and social workers. But it is these professionals who hold the information which the police may find helpful, not directors of social services, for example.

It is vital that, if we are to deal with serious violent crime, we do not undermine prevention work. It is therefore important that young people trust their teachers and youth workers. We believe these professionals must be able to exercise their professional judgment about whether it is more effective and important, in preventing serious violence, to be able to continue working with vulnerable and potentially dangerous young people to steer them away from drugs and crime, or to pass on information to the police. There will be times when the sharing of information with the police may be the first, and immediate, priority. However, if in the professional judgment of the teacher or youth worker working with the young people is the top priority, then she or he must be able to exercise that judgment, in my view.

The Minister is likely to argue that the modification of the disclosure of information legislation envisaged in the Bill is similar to that in other Bills and therefore should be accepted. We had a lengthy discussion on that issue this morning. On checking these other Bills it appears the context is quite different, as is the nature of the information that may be shared. The closest example is the Environment Act, which uses similar wording to that in Clause 9, under which information sharing may be required. However, in the Environment Act, this relates to whether public authorities are complying with environmental legislation; it has nothing to do with personal information for law enforcement purposes, which is an entirely different matter. The Medicines and Medical Devices Act only requires information to be shared without consent in a veterinary context—you cannot really ask a cow for her consent to pass on information about her. Therefore, this is not relevant to this Bill.

It seems the Government may not have drawn the right conclusions from the criticism of the Met Police’s gangs matrix system. As the Minister knows, Corey Junior Davis was murdered after his details in the Met Police’s gangs matrix were shared and fell into the wrong hands.

The system that produced that breach is being reproduced in the Bill. Surely, we will see replicated across the country other harms generated by the Met Police’s gangs matrix: young people losing college places that would probably have given them a route out of trouble; the application of eviction notices likely to lead them on a downward spiral of drugs and crime; and endless costly and pointless stop and searches, thereby undermining young people. We could also expect a repeat across the country of the discriminatory profiling that was inherent in the Met Police’s gangs matrix.

I very much welcome the Government’s acceptance of the need to respect the professional judgment of medical and social care personnel. All that we are asking for in the amendment and, indeed, the other two in the group is that the same respect for personal judgment be applied to teachers and youth workers as the Government now recognise should be given to doctors and others. Without these amendments, the work of the key public servants to prevent serious violence will be jeopardised, an issue that I should have thought the Government would be concerned about.

The Bill also gives the police the power to monitor compliance with the duty to require other bodies to share information with them, and it gives the Secretary of State enforcement powers to back those police powers. The amendment offers vital protection for professionals in exercising their judgment on how best to reduce serious violence by their clients.

The Minister has said that the collection of data is necessary in order to identify the kinds of serious violence that occur in an area and, so far as it is possible to do so, their causes, and then prepare and implement a strategy with bespoke local solutions. I am sure that the Minister knows that no personal information is required in order to do that. It is well established that anonymous data is sufficient to develop appropriate strategies. The draft statutory guidance says that most information will be depersonalised, but it does not say in what circumstances it will not. If it were clear that it was all about professional judgment, that would be fine—and that is what we are seeking.

These are incredibly modest amendments that, added to the government amendments, would go some way towards protecting the efficacy of our public services and enable young people to benefit from preventive and therapeutic interventions. These are the best hope of preventing serious violence over many years. We are not talking just about a one-off crime here. We are talking about the culture and style of life, and these public servants are working on the front line to try to divert these young people into education, training, jobs and so on. Instead of doing that, it is a huge thing to somehow divert those people into the criminal justice system. Punitive responses are never the right answer to vulnerability and deprivation—generally the backdrop to serious violence.

[Baroness Brinton (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the Minister and her officials in the Home Office and the Department of Health and Social Care for meeting me, the noble Lord, Lord Ribeiro, the General Medical Council, the British Medical Association and the National Data Guardian, and for listening carefully and agreeing that a patient’s personal information should not be disclosed under regulations made under Clauses 9, 15 or 16 by a health or social care authority, which currently includes a clinical commissioning group in England and a local health board in Wales, or under regulations made under those clauses. However, I wonder whether the Minister can help me and confirm that Clause 17, where the Secretary of State can instruct the transfer of information, even if a specified authority refused, will definitely not apply to patient data.

I am entirely supportive of the amendments in the group tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester and my noble friend Lord Paddick. While I am grateful that the Government have recognised that there is something particular about a patient’s personal health data, there still remains the issue relating to staff in a specified authority being asked to hand over personal data to the police and other bodies. There are some roles, such as youth workers and children’s home workers, where trust has had to be built up with the people who come to them. Any data relating to those at-risk people, whether potentially violent or potential victims, should not do anything to harm that relationship. As the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, has said, anonymised data can be used.

As we know from doctors’ and nurses’ ethical arrangements, there are exceptional times when it is important for such information to be passed to the authorities. I believe that we can rely on the workers in other sectors to see that responsibility. Amendment 24 specifically sets out the ethical and legal rules that should apply.

Finally, I believe that the Secretary of State should not have these powers, however rarely they might be used, so I also support my noble friend Lord Paddick’s Amendment 35.

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Clause 15 will create a new information-sharing gateway for specified authorities, local police bodies and education, prison and youth custody authorities to disclose information to each other for the purposes of their functions under the duty. Again, this clause will permit, but not mandate, authorities to disclose information to each other.

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

My understanding is that the police are able to require information to be given and Clause 17 gives the Secretary of State the power to reinforce that. As the Minister suggested this morning, the matter would then have to be determined in the courts. This is really the nub of it. We want professionals to feel able to undertake their work to prevent serious violence, with children and young people who really are pretty problematic, without feeling that, in the end, it will go to court to decide whether they are allowed to exercise their professional judgment.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

If the noble Baroness will be patient, I will get on to Clauses 16 and 17 in just a second.

Going back to Clause 15, this will permit, but not mandate, authorities to disclose information to each other. It simply ensures that there is a legislative basis in place to enable information to be shared between all authorities exercising functions under Chapter 1 of Part 2 of the Bill. The clause also ensures that any disclosures must only be made in compliance with data protection legislation and cannot be made if certain prohibitions on disclosure set out in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 apply.

Clause 16 provides a power for a local policing body—a PCC or equivalent—to request information from a specified authority, educational authority, prison or youth custody authority for the purposes of enabling or assisting the local policing body to exercise its role to assist duty holders and monitor its functions to prevent and reduce serious violence. While Clause 16 places a statutory requirement on the specified authority, education authority, prison or youth custody authority to comply with such a request, a disclosure is not required if it would contravene data protection legislation or prohibitions in specified parts of the IPA 2016. The provision does not place any mandatory requirements directly on individual professionals to disclose information they hold under the duty, be that confidential information or otherwise.

There are also a number of safeguards in relation to the information that can be required. As proposed by government Amendment 20, local policing bodies must request only information already held by that authority. Requests must be related to the organisation or function to whom the request is made, except when functions are contracted out. Additionally, the information supplied under Clause 16 must be used by only the local policing body that receives it to enable or assist that body to assist the relevant authorities or monitor the activity it undertakes under the duty. The information received is not therefore to be used or disclosed onwards to any other bodies for other purposes, such as law enforcement.

It is against that backdrop that we need to consider the provisions in each of Clauses 9, 15 and 16 which Amendments 11, 22 and 30 seek to strike out. These provisions state that, in determining whether a disclosure would contravene the data protection legislation,

“the power conferred by this section is to be taken into account”.

This allows the power or duty to disclose to be taken into account when determining the impact of the data protection legislation. This is to preserve the effect of the data protection legislation, dealing with the logical difficulties that can arise where an information-sharing gateway, such as that proposed by these provisions, prevents disclosure in breach of the data protection legislation, but the data protection legislation allows a disclosure which is required or permitted by the enactment. This is to ensure that these provisions can be taken into account when authorities are determining the legal basis for processing data under Article 6 of the UK GDPR.

This Bill is by no means unique in including this drafting. The provisions have been used for a number of other information-sharing clauses, including most recently the Environment Act 2021 and the Forensic Science Regulator Act 2021. I know that I am not allowed props in your Lordships’ House, but if I hold up the list to myself, there are a huge number of Bills to which this pertains. This is a standard provision. I also reiterate that both Clause 15 and regulations made under Clause 9 provide for permissive gateways, meaning that they do not impose any obligation to share information. That is a crucial point.

On Amendment 25, I totally agree that any decision to disclose an individual’s personal data should not be taken lightly. The rationale for not excluding all personal data sharing under the duty is clear. Private and confidential health data has a unique status and needs special protection or trust between patients and doctors. That could be undermined, with individuals actually going as far as to avoid treatment for fear of their data being shared. However, in order for the duty to be effective, we really must still support sharing of case-specific information on individuals at risk to both safeguard them and support vital interventions; I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, agrees with that point. Decisions about whether disclosures of personal data can lawfully be made under these provisions would always need to be made on a case-by-case basis, and always in line with data protection legislation.

As I said in previous debates, we are not seeking to replace existing data-sharing agreements or protocols, including those under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. All authorities subject to the duty should have clear processes and principles in place for sharing information and data. Any and all exchanges of data and information under Clauses 15 and 16 or regulations made under Clause 9 must not contravene existing data protection legislation or provisions of the IPA 2016.

I turn to the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. Amendment 18 seeks to ensure that relevant authorities are obliged to comply with the serious violence duty only to the extent that it does not conflict with its other statutory duties. We do not support this amendment, as it is essential that all relevant authorities are legally required to collaborate with the specified authorities or with other education, prison or youth custody authorities in their work to prevent and reduce serious violence when requested to do so, and to carry out any actions placed on them in the strategy. There are already sufficient safeguards in place, including considering whether the request is deemed to be disproportionate to the local serious violence threat level, whether it would be incompatible with an existing statutory duty or, indeed, whether it would have an adverse effect on the exercise of the authority’s functions, or would mean that the authority incurred unreasonable cost. In determining whether any of those conditions apply, the cumulative effect of complying with duties under Clause 14 must be taken into account.

We think that this approach strikes the right balance in ensuring that institutions which are affected by serious violence, or may have a valuable contribution to make to local partnership efforts, will be drawn into the work of the local partnership without placing unnecessary burdens on those which may not. This approach is also consistent with the structures and processes in place for existing safeguarding legislation and would allow for an effective and targeted approach within both the education and prison sectors.

Amendments 24, 32 and 33 require that any information disclosed under Clauses 15 or 16 or under regulations made under Clause 9 must comply with any duty of confidence owed by the person making the disclosure, where disclosure would amount to a breach of that duty, the Human Rights Act 1998, the Equality Act 2010, the data protection legislation, the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, and any other restriction on the disclosure of information, however imposed. In addition, Amendment 33 also specifies that no regulations may be published under Clause 9(2) prior to the Secretary of State publishing an equality impact assessment, a data protection impact assessment and a description of any guidance or codes of practice.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, as I understand it, they must be read with Article 6 of the GDPR, so it is a read-across. Yes, I am tired—my brain is not working very fast today.

Clauses 9, 15 and 16 also already ensure that data can be disclosed only in compliance with the data protection legislation; I mentioned that that requires a case-by-case consideration of the necessity and proportionality of a disclosure.

Obligations of confidence and other restrictions on disclosure are not breached by a disclosure under Clauses 15 or 16, or regulations made under Clause 9, but patient information and personal information held by a health or social care authority should not be shared in line with our proposed amendments, as it is vital that authorities are able to share their data when necessary to determine what is causing serious violence in local areas. Our draft statutory guidance provides some additional steers on this, and the guidance will be subject to formal consultation following Royal Assent and can be revised if it needs further clarification.

I turn to Clause 17, and first I shall answer a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. A direction under Clause 17 cannot be made to require information requested under Clause 16 to be provided if the information is patient information or if the health or social care authority is requested to provide personal information. I hope that she finds that clarification helpful.

Amendment 35 strikes out Clause 17, which confers a power on the Secretary of State to direct a specified authority, educational, prison or youth custody authority, where it has failed to discharge its duty imposed under the Bill. I assure the House that we expect these powers to be seldom used and utilised only when all other means of securing compliance have been exhausted. However, in order for this duty to be effective, there needs to be a system in place to ensure that specified authorities comply with the legal requirements that we are proposing to help prevent and reduce serious violence.

I hope, in the light of my explanation, that the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, will be content not to press their amendments and support the government amendments.

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

My Lords, first, I thank the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, very much for their support for these amendments and their excellent contributions, and I thank all other noble Lords who have contributed today—in particular the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, who has been very helpful behind the scenes, despite a slight issue this evening, as we know.

I thank the Minister for her reply. Her remarks must have left noble Lords completely confused because, of course, if these clauses really were benign, we would not have Amnesty International, Liberty and about a dozen other organisations desperate for these amendments to pass this evening. The fact is that they are not benign, and I congratulate the Minister on the brilliant wording that has somehow left me bemused, along I am sure with everybody else in this Chamber.

I regard the issue of the ability of professionals to exercise their professional judgment in deciding whether to pass information to the police, which could jeopardise the very vulnerable young people they are working with, as a very important issue of principle. It is for that reason that I wish to test the opinion of the House—albeit I know our numbers are severely limited at this very late hour—and call a vote.