Debates between Baroness McIntosh of Pickering and Lord Kerr of Kinlochard during the 2019-2024 Parliament

Mon 7th Nov 2022
Mon 28th Feb 2022
Nationality and Borders Bill
Lords Chamber

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Report stage & Report stage: Part 1
Mon 7th Sep 2020
Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill
Lords Chamber

Committee stage & Committee stage:Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords

Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Debate between Baroness McIntosh of Pickering and Lord Kerr of Kinlochard
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard Portrait Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)
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I have reached the same conclusion as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, but via a slightly different route. I heard the noble Baroness and the noble Lord refer to talks proceeding amicably and constructively. The noble Lord, Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon, has regularly assured us from his own involvement in the talks that they are proceeding satisfactorily and are in no way being derailed by this Bill.

I am miles away from the action, of course—like the noble Lord, Lord Dodds of Duncairn, I would be very grateful if the Government could find the time to give us some reports on the talks from time to time—but I get a rather different impression of the view in Brussels. My impression is that there is not a great deal going on in these talks, and that the officials involved do not have the kind of instructions which give them discretion to do any negotiating. My impression is that British Ministers are not particularly hands-on, that they are not very closely involved in the talks and that, in fact, no real political input and impetus has been given as yet.

On the EU side, I think there is a natural tendency to wait and see whether the arrival of a new Government and a new Prime Minister in Britain will bring about any changes in the British position. The Commission has succeeded in persuading the member states that the CJEU cases against us can be left in limbo for the moment; a number of member states would have preferred to proceed to having these cases heard, but they stay in limbo and there seems to be a sort of consensus on that. But there is absolutely no pressure that I can detect among member states for any softening of Šefčovič’s mandate or any change in the instructions he is getting, perhaps partly because they are waiting to see whether there is some change in the instructions our people have. I detect no sign of anybody believing that Šefčovič’s instructions will change while the threat of this Bill hangs over the negotiations.

In my view—I repeat that I am miles away from the action, so I may be quite wrong—the only real debate among member states is whether contingency planning should be started on their side and whether it is this Bill reaching the statute book or actual use of the powers it contains that should trigger resort to action. The action would of course be the end of the talks and the necessary review of the terms of the trade and co-operation agreement. I think everybody believes that in Brussels. As the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, reminded us on our last day of Committee, we committed ourselves in the TCA to carrying out our obligations as in the withdrawal agreement, which include the protocol. So if we were to use the powers in this Bill or, as some say—I am among them—put this Bill on the statute book, we would be in breach of not just the withdrawal agreement but the TCA.

So I think the debate is about contingency planning for that eventuality, rather than for any change or softening of the EU position in the talks. Therefore, it seems to me, we should recognise that what we are doing here, if we were to pass this Bill, is setting ourselves up for a rather serious trade war with the EU and for the return of all the problems in Northern Ireland that will result from Northern Ireland no longer being a member of the single market. We will go back to a different form of frontier problem, from which the protocol was designed to have us escape.

So I reach exactly the same conclusion as did the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, but by a slightly different route. I do not think that the talks are going particularly well, and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, will act on the promise that he made on our last day in Committee to see if he could ensure that we receive progress reports on the talks. Though I am miles away from the action, it seems to me that, if we proceed with this Bill, we are heading straight into a thunderstorm that will sink the ship.

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Portrait Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
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Before the noble Lord sits down, could he go one step further and ask my noble friend the Minister, in responding to this debate, to say whether he agrees with the analysis of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, which I do, that we would be in breach not only of the withdrawal agreement but of the trade and co-operation agreement? It would be very good to get that on the record at this stage. Will he just go so far as to press the Minister, in summing up, to say whether he agrees with his analysis?

Nationality and Borders Bill

Debate between Baroness McIntosh of Pickering and Lord Kerr of Kinlochard
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Portrait Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
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My Lords, when I tabled these amendments, I had sought to seek a greater reassurance from my noble friend the Minister than I achieved in Committee. Obviously, I realise, given the result of the last few votes, it may be that Amendment 28, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, and others, will find greater favour with the House. However, I shall take this opportunity to set out my opposition in principle to what the Government are seeking to do here: it is not just the fact that two groups are being created, but the way in which those two groups will be treated differently.

Perhaps the most offensive provision in Clause 11 is subsection (5). The Explanatory Notes refer to it as

“differential treatment of refugees based on their group. Differences may, for example, apply in terms of the duration of their permission to remain in the UK, the availability of routes to settlement, the ability to have recourse to public funds, and the ability of family members to join them in the UK. There is no obligation for these powers to be exercised and discretion may be applied.”

The greatest difficulty that I have is that it is not clear that there will be discretion or, indeed, how that discretion will be applied.

I hate to say it to my noble friend, but I find it offensive that this differential between groups 1 and 2 has been created. In taking the two groups out and substituting the general term “person”, I draw attention to Amendment 27, which asks for “reasonable discretion” to be exercised. I believe that is the key to all the amendments before us. This comes directly from the advice that I have received from the Law Society of Scotland as to how the provision will apply, if the original clause is left unamended. It says:

“We take the view that how a person enters the UK should not impact on family reunion. Safe and legal routes have been reduced since the UK left the European Union with the removal of the Dublin III Regulation. This provision appears to be actually reducing the prospect of families using one of only the two safe and legal routes the Asylum seeker has i.e., refugee family reunion – the other being UNHCR resettlement. Fewer safe and legal routes are likely to result in more unsafe and perilous journeys.”


Given the new situation arising daily in Ukraine, and the dreadful humanitarian crisis that we see there, I hope that the Government will resist the provisions in the clause and look favourably on my amendments and think again—but I fear that perhaps the House will favour the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard. I beg to move.

Lord Kerr of Kinlochard Portrait Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)
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My Lords, I welcome the new clause proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, but we need to do a belt-and-braces job here. I am afraid we have to go back to the issue of compatibility and “Oh yes it is; oh no it isn’t.”

In Clause 11, we are introducing something entirely new. This two-class categorisation of refugees—the real refugees who came direct and the class 2 refugees who did not—is not anywhere in the refugee convention. None of that is in the refugee convention. The Government say that it is all perfectly compatible with the convention and assert that it is our right to interpret the convention in this new way, differently from the way that it has been interpreted up to now by our courts, differently from the way that the UNHCR, the custodian of the convention, interprets it in its authoritative judgment on our Bill, and differently from the way in which 146 signatory states interpret it.

We did the “Oh yes it is; oh no it is not” game at length in Committee and the Government stuck to their view, but I think it is fair to say that the Committee found it rather hard to understand the Government’s view. I wondered whether the Minister perhaps let the cat out of the bag when he told us:

“It may … be”—


to be fair, he did put it tentatively—

“that a convention entered into in 1951 is not absolutely suitable for the world of 2022.”—[Official Report, 8/2/22; col. 1463.]

Tonight, we heard the Minister seeming to hint that it might be time to review the convention as if it was in some way out of date. I could not disagree more.

I refute the Minister’s contention in one word: Ukraine. Life itself—zhizn’ sama, as a Russian would say—refutes the Minister’s contention. In the world of 2022, we see these hundreds of thousands of people—now over 500,000, the UNHCR says—abandoning their homes, trudging the motorways, crowding on to the trains, fleeing the tanks and rockets, and streaming into Poland and Hungary, Slovakia, Moldova and Romania. Are they refugees? Yes, of course they are refugees, just like the Hungarians in 1956 and the Czechs in 1968. Are they entitled to refugee convention rights? Yes, of course they are. But if the Bill, including Clause 11, is enacted or had been enacted, any of them who wanted to come to this country could be only group 2 refugees, without full convention rights, because they had not come directly from Ukraine and could have asked for asylum in Poland or Hungary. That is even though there are no direct flights from Ukraine, and even though we say Ukrainians have to have visas to come here—although we do not issue visas to asylum seekers.

The key point for the House tonight is that there is nothing in the convention or, as I understand it, subject to correction from the legal authorities round me, anywhere in international law requiring an asylum seeker to apply in the first safe country they reach. This, the rationale for Clause 11, is a Home Office invention. The convention sets only one test: not how the refugee got here, but why. What was it that drove him to come here? Was it a well-founded fear of persecution back home? That is the question. But if Clause 11 is approved, that question or test becomes redundant and irrelevant because, no matter what horrors he is fleeing from, if a refugee did not come here directly he could be only a group 2 refugee, subject to the harsher regime, detention and offshore processing set out in all the subsequent clauses that we are also going to have to look at closely, in my view. This just will not do.

My concern is with the refugees but also for the reputational damage we do to ourselves, if we go down this road, and the practical consequences for the refugee convention. Suppose our new invention caught on and other countries started following suit. Well over 20 million refugees are in countries contiguous to their homelands—just across the border—and nearly all these countries are developing countries. Suppose the convention were in future to be interpreted by all and sundry to mean that the exiled Syrians and Iraqis must always stay just across the frontier in Lebanon or Jordan, and that the Afghans must always stay in Pakistan, but the developed world can wash its hands of these problems and leave it to the Jordans and Pakistans, because the refugees could never move on and obtain asylum elsewhere. The only places they could obtain asylum were in the Jordans and the Pakistans.

What would the consequences of that be? They would be disastrous for the first host country; there are 1.5 million people in Lebanon from Iraq and Syria, and more than that from Afghanistan in the camps around Peshawar in Pakistan. We would be saying that Pakistan and Jordan are going to be stuck with that for ever, as far as we are concerned. It would be disastrous for the refugees, too.

If this doctrine caught on—if it were the general reading of international law that first hosts had sole responsibility—anyone seeking to flee persecution would find the gates of freedom clanging shut in their face. If we leave Clause 11 in the Bill, we do not just betray our values and trash our reputation, we could kill the refugee convention, sadly, though we need it in the world of 2022 as much as ever. I propose that Clause 11 be deleted.

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Baroness McIntosh of Pickering and Lord Kerr of Kinlochard
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Portrait Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]
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My Lords, I am delighted to follow the noble Baroness. I associate myself with comments made during this debate by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe, and I would like to ask a couple of questions in this regard.

If the purpose of the Bill is to repeal EU law on the free movement of people and if the provisions are not already enshrined in retained EU law elsewhere, can my noble friend the Minister take this opportunity to explain why, as has already been mentioned, Clause 1 is required? Like others, I would like to say how much I benefited from the free movement provisions—which have been in place since 1973—as a student and then as a stagiaire in the European Commission. I went on to practise European Union law before becoming an adviser to, and eventually being elected to, the European Parliament.

I come to my main concern with Clause 1. Can my noble friend put my mind at rest that, in repealing EU law on the free movement of workers from the EEA and Switzerland, we will still have access to a constant supply of labour in essential services such as health and social care? I would also like to add food production, farming, and vegetable and fruit growing. I know that the amendments failed in the other place, but I hope that my noble friend will look very carefully at this with fresh eyes.

It is also extremely important to ensure that those whom we welcome from the EEA and Switzerland after 1 January 2021 are made to feel welcome and are employed and given access on exactly the same basis as UK nationals. In this regard, will my noble friend confirm that migrants will continue to be employed on the same basis as UK nationals? Will the principle that has existed to date of non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality still apply, so that no employer can discriminate between a UK national and an EEA or Swiss national who might find employment in this regard?

I am conscious that there have already been a couple of very unfortunate cases of Covid-19 outbreaks in food processing plants, partly due to the fact that the working environment is very cold but also partly because, by necessity, the employees probably sit very close to each other. We will obviously need to revisit many of these conditions going forward, but will the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality still apply to the Bill and other provisions?

Given my background, I have some sympathy with those who have put their names to and supported Amendment 60, and I will listen very carefully to what my noble friend says in replying to that debate.

I support the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who spoke to his amendment. I regret the lack of transparency and what appears to be very poor drafting, and, again, will listen very carefully to what my noble friend says in summing up on that. However, as regards this amendment, those are the questions I would like to put to my noble friend at this stage.

Lord Kerr of Kinlochard Portrait Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB) [V]
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My Lords, I strongly support what was said so authoritatively about Amendment 3 by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fookes. We need to hear what our Constitution Committee has said, and I hope the Minister will tell us that the Government will do this.

My purpose is to say a few brief words on Amendment 61 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Before I do so, I want to say a quick word on the wider context. Admirable though the quality of this debate is, I cannot help feeling that we are fiddling while Rome burns. In Downing Street, it seems that the Government are planning to take powers in the internal market Bill to override certain provisions of the withdrawal agreement—in particular, Articles 5 and 10 of the Irish protocol. Tearing up ratified treaties is what rogue states do; sanctions usually follow. If such a proposal were put to us, I would expect us to examine it particularly stringently. I cannot recall any precedent in UK diplomatic history. What we are doing today is important, but what we might have to do then would be historic.

Turning to Amendment 61, it seems to me that it is either completely unnecessary or absolutely essential. I hope the Minister will be able to assure us that it is unnecessary because the Government have no intention of making our closest neighbours stand in a queue at the frontier. If she cannot make this assurance, we must surely ask the Government to think again.

It seems highly likely that, for the next few years, the relationship with the EU will become damagingly rebarbative. That would, of course, become a racing certainty if we tore up the withdrawal agreement, but even if we do not, the disruption, the economic damage and the inevitable frontier friction—deal or no deal—is likely to drip poison into the relationship for some time to come. So we should be careful about choosing to add insult to injury. We have left the EU, but we do not need to leave Europe. If the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, is right to detect a risk, we would be right to support her Amendment 61.