Resolution of Central Counterparties (Modified Application of Corporate Law and Consequential Amendments) Regulations 2023

Debate between Baroness Kramer and Lord Livermore

Monday 20th November 2023 Grand Committee

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, when the original legislation that sits behind all this was debated in the House—for many hours—I remember a conversation afterwards with one of the clerks, who had sat through nearly all of the proceedings. The clerk said to me, “I have sat in this House for years and have been through many debates of all kinds, but this is the first time I have sat through a debate and not understood a single word of the entire discussion”. I am feeling some brotherhood with that clerk at the moment. I remember the past, but I have to admit that I still find utterly daunting the complexity of CCPs and the various pieces of legislation.

I have been digging through my memory and am trying to understand whether these SIs are essentially tidying-up measures designed to give more flexibility to the Bank of England—in its role as the resolution authority—in somewhat changed circumstances, and measures to increase its efficiency. I ask the Minister: is there anything in here to which she would draw our attention as representing a more fundamental change? I admit that I cannot find it, but I thought I should ask the question, given the narrowness of my understanding of this complexity.

As I remember, the resolution of the insolvency of a CCP was structured using a waterfall of liability. First, equity and the CCP came into use, and, after that, if necessary, so did a default fund, to which the clearing members had contributed. My colleague, my noble friend Lord Sharkey, and I pushed on this question, because it seemed apparent to us that the combination of equity and a default fund could work if, say, one clearing member collapsed, or perhaps even two. But, if the collapse were systemic, very quickly only the taxpayer would have the resource to step in. The taxpayer would need to do so immediately to prevent chaos in the financial sector nationally and, probably, globally. The Minister will be aware that virtually all CCPs around the globe essentially have common ownership and, in many ways, need to be looked at almost as a network, rather than a series of individual operations—certainly when one thinks about resolution.

So we asked the then Minister—I believe it was the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon—to clarify why members should not be forced to make bigger contributions in the case of insolvency, above and beyond equity and the default fund, because, obviously, sitting behind CCPs are huge banking institutions and, in other cases, oil companies. As I remember, we were told that, if faced with additional liability, those who operate or participate in the CCPs would choose to use exchanges outside, rather than inside, the UK. So, do these additional SIs empower the Bank of England to require members to make additional cash contributions? I am somewhat concerned that the negative SI—which we are not debating today but which sits with these, as the Minister rightly said—and its cash call powers might have that possibility. I am not saying that I am opposed to that, but I just wonder whether the Minister can do anything to help me understand it and whether there are therefore any implications for the attractiveness of the UK as a location for clearing.

The Minister kindly assured all of us that assets held in the CCPs as margin—collateral, in effect—are fully protected, and there are no implications for netting or off-set. I think I have understood that correctly. But, in a dynamic situation, there must be some adjustment to netting and off-set because, if there is an insolvency, changes in value take place on a moment-by-moment basis. Is there a way to encapsulate how that piece of it works? I am concerned about saying that there are absolutely no implications for netting and off-set, when it is very hard to see that there would not be in an insolvency situation.

I just want to confirm again with the Minister that the “no creditor worse off” safeguard is still fully robust and whether the SIs—the negative and the positive together—weaken it in any way. Is the taxpayer liability, as the ultimate backstop, changed at all by these SIs? Are there, therefore, any implications for public sector net debt? In other words, regarding this liability to act as the rescuer of last resort—it is implicit in CCPs because we are looking at a “too big to fail” situation if we have systemic insolvency—are there any accounting implications for the national debt? Is there any possibility that these changes would drive towards putting the liability on the books?

The notional value of outstanding over-the-counter derivates, which represent the largest body cleared through CCPs, exceeds $600 trillion at any point in time. What is now LCH—I still call it the London Clearing House—dominates that market. A third of that business reflects the clearance of euro-based derivatives under an equivalence granted by the European Commission for UK clearing houses. However, that will last only until June 2025. I know that the City and the Treasury are convinced that the EU will extend that equivalence grant out of necessity, but if it does not, the implications for the City of London will be huge. This is not a time for complacency. I ask again: are there any competitive issues to which we should be alerted in these SIs and which may have consequences for either the EU grant of equivalence or our dealing with the consequences if that grant is not given?

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I begin by warmly welcoming the Minister to her new role. I very much look forward to working with her in the months ahead.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

May I offer my apologies for not having welcomed the Minister to her role? We talk to each other across the House so often that I hardly realised a change had happened; I apologise.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

As the Explanatory Memoranda accompanying these two SIs note, the current CCP regime was implemented around a decade ago, in part as a response to the global financial crisis. The Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 has introduced an expanded CCP resolution regime, with that Act giving the Bank of England, as the UK’s resolution authority, what the Government call

“an expanded toolkit to mitigate the risk and impact of a CCP failure and the subsequent risks to financial stability and public funds.”

Preserving market stability is of paramount importance. The UK’s financial services industry plays a vital role in boosting economic growth and delivering skilled jobs in every part of the UK. Almost 2.5 million people are employed in financial services, with two-thirds of those jobs based outside London, and the sector contributes more than £170 billion a year to GDP.

The City of London is one of only two global financial capitals and is at the very heart of the international monetary system. The UK’s reputation and success as a leading international financial centre depends on high standards of regulation as well as a stable and independent regulatory regime. Much of what is being implemented by these two SIs is a carryover between the old and new CCP regimes. Paragraph 3 of the impact assessment outlines that, if these steps were not taken, it

“would mean that there is no protection in place to ensure that the Bank’s powers do not disrupt normal market procedure.”

We therefore fully support both these SIs.

However, I want to ask the Minister a number of questions. First, an issue frequently raised with this type of SI is the sheer breadth of legislation that it tends to amend and the difficulty that those in the sector may face in familiarising themselves with all the changes once they have taken effect. The first of the SIs we are debating today makes a long list of changes to corporate law to ensure that the new Schedule 11 CCP regime will function effectively. The second SI somehow manages to be even more technical; it deals with partial property transfers and the writing down of liabilities, needed to ensure that they do not disrupt the new system’s operation. I ask the Minister, therefore, how interested parties will be, or have been, notified of the contents of these instruments, and when the guidance referenced in paragraph 11.1 of both Explanatory Memoranda will be laid. Will that guidance be laid before Parliament, or at least sent to the relevant parliamentary committees?

Consumer Rights Act 2015 (Enforcement) (Amendment) Order 2023

Debate between Baroness Kramer and Lord Livermore

Wednesday 12th July 2023 Grand Committee

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I confess that usually when I speak on a statutory instrument I am trying to look for why it really should have been in primary legislation, not secondary. In this case, this strikes me as a genuine SI. It is almost a moment of great excitement.

I am very happy to say that these Benches support this measure, which, as the Minister says, enable trading standards to investigate more effectively illicit tobacco sales by small operators and retail outlets and to refer evidence of contraventions to HMRC for action, with potential penalties up to £10,000. We know from past surveys that some 18% of tobacco sales have been illegal. That leads me on to a series of questions to the Minister for further clarification.

At this time of cost of living pressures, some people will be tempted to buy cheaper, illegal or illicit cigarettes. I ask the Minister: is illicit activity increasing now at this time of increasing cost of living pressures, or are we continuing to see a diminution? I would be interested to know what the impact is and whether there has been any significant change that requires aggressive action.

When will the relevant guidance for businesses be published? I do not believe that is available yet. Indeed, when will the sanctions be implemented? Perhaps the Minister could give us some sense of the timetable. There is also no statutory review clause, so how will we know how effective these new powers are? If the powers are granted but are generally not used, I think the Minister knows that potential offenders will feel doubly empowered by new rules that then turn out to have no teeth, so it seriously matters that we track this. When we are tracking, will there be any measures to let us estimate the deterrence effect of the measure? That is probably one of its most important aspects.

Behind illegal sales by small and local outlets there is sometimes just a very small-scale operation, but at times it is very much linked to organised crime on a major scale. How is that link going to be investigated as trading standards becomes more engaged in this process?

The sale of tobacco to children is obviously a serious concern to all of us. Are outlets engaged in underage sales to be a particular target? Will there be any prioritisation, as far as the Minister is aware? Will enforcement involvement include the sale of non-compliant tobacco, blunts and shisha, which have sometimes been seen as a way to manoeuvre around the rules in the recent past?

The tobacco industry has a history of offering to help, or provide intelligence to, local trading standards. I have to say that civic society groups that are attempting to decrease smoking tend to view that with deep suspicion as a conflict of interest, designed to basically push tobacco sales from the illicit side but into legal purchasing rather than discouraging purchasing as a whole, and to improve the industry’s general standing and reputation. I wonder how that is going to be handled.

Does this measure also impact on non-compliant sales of e-cigarettes and vapes? We know these products are increasingly being targeted at non-smokers and youngsters, even though we have little information at the moment on what the effects are of the long-term usage of e-cigarettes and vapes.

The Government have a target to make the country free of tobacco smoking by 2030, and we support their goal of achieving a smoke-free generation. Smoking, as the Minister has said, remains a leading cause of premature death and is related to many severe and chronic illnesses and damages lives, as well as being a drain on the NHS. However, the pace of decline in smoking that followed the 2007 ban on smoking in English pubs and clubs has dwindled. How much is this measure expected to focus on reducing overall smoking? I confess that there is always a slight suspicion when HMRC is involved that the focus will be more on increasing revenues to HMRC than on reducing the overall activity—in this case, just moving it from the illicit arena into the legal arena.

If the Minister could add a little more enlightenment, we on these Benches are happy to support the statutory instrument.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, we support this measure. I shall reiterate a couple of facts mentioned by the Minister. Smoking is the biggest cause of preventable death in the UK. It accounts for some 76,000 deaths each year, with half of all smokers dying of a smoking-related illness. It is estimated that smoking costs NHS England over £2.5 billion every year. Alongside high-level policy, such as the smoking ban introduced by the last Labour Government in the Health Act 2006, evidence suggests that high duty rates have had a positive impact by reducing the number of people who start smoking and increasing the numbers seeking to cut down and quit.

With 21% of cigarettes sold in the UK currently illicit, clearly the illegal trade in tobacco products undermines these important contributions to public health. It deprives the Exchequer of vital revenue and reduces the deterrent effect of high duty rates. We therefore support harsher penalties for those who seek to avoid paying such duties and commensurate powers for trading standards to tackle those who procure, supply and distribute illegal tobacco and profit from the illegal trade.

I would like to ask the Minister three questions. First, she mentioned that the combined application of fines, powers to seize illicit products and the new sanctions is designed to have a deterrent effect on retail outlets and street-level distributors. This point was also made by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. Are there any plans to communicate these powers to potential offenders so that the deterrent effect might be enhanced? Secondly, where illicit product is sold through retail outlets, what data exists on whether the owner of a retail outlet is aware of such sales versus illicit sales carried out surreptitiously by an employee, and therefore whether enforcement measures are always correctly targeted? Finally, what communication, co-operation and co-ordination exists between HMRC and the Border Force to tackle the supply of illicit product at source?

Mortgage Charter

Debate between Baroness Kramer and Lord Livermore

Wednesday 28th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, when the Chancellor made his Statement on Monday, he did so against a rapidly deteriorating backdrop for Britain’s mortgage holders. Interest rates have risen 13 times to a 15-year high of 5%, but inflation is stuck at 8.7%. The average two-year fixed-rate mortgage has increased from 2.6% to well over 6%. Average mortgage costs this year will increase by £2,900. Multiple lenders have withdrawn all new mortgage deals from the market, just as 1.5 million homeowners are set to come off fixed-rate mortgages.

The Resolution Foundation estimates that home owners will pay a combined total of £15.8 billion more in mortgage payments every year by 2026. Data from the Institute for Fiscal Studies shows that, on average, mortgage holders will see their payments rise by £280 per month, equivalent to 8.3% of their disposable income, with some 1.4 million people losing a huge 20% of their disposable income. The latest data from the Bank of England shows that the value of outstanding balances with arrears increased by 9.5% in the first quarter of this year. These figures all show the level of pain among mortgage holders, which will only grow in the months ahead.

We should, of course, remember that those who have bought their own homes have done nothing wrong. They have worked hard, saved for a deposit and taken pride in having a home of their own. But the security that comes with that has, for many, turned to dread, as month after month they receive a letter from their lender telling them their bills are going up by hundreds of pounds a month.

The Government often argue that responsibility for this rapidly deteriorating picture lies in global factors, yet the figures suggest a different story. The latest data show that a typical household in Britain is now paying over £800 more per year for their mortgage than in Germany, £1,000 more per year than in Ireland and £2,000 more per year than in France. The UK has the highest inflation in the G7, with core inflation last month rising to 7.1% in the UK, a 31-year high, while in other advanced economies, including in the eurozone and the US, it has started to fall. Food prices in the UK are currently rising 20% faster than in France, 30% faster than in Germany and more than three times the rate in the US.

Interest rates first spiked dramatically last autumn when the Government gambled with people’s livelihoods in their disastrous mini-Budget, sending markets into meltdown. Since then, things have only got worse, as the instability the mini-Budget created has continued. Now, with inflation higher for longer in the UK than in other similar economies, the two-year gilt yield today stands at 5.24%, a new 15-year high, half a percentage point above that at the time of last year’s mini-Budget, and above its US equivalent. Markets now see a 70% chance of rates over 6% by the end of this year.

In this context, with millions of home owners struggling to pay their mortgages and with private sector rents rising by more than 10%, the Government’s new mortgage charter is clearly necessary, but it is also clearly insufficient. It is insufficient because, while many banks and building societies are doing the right thing by their customers, a purely voluntary set of measures will leave more than 1 million households missing out on the mortgage support they need.

Last week the Labour Party set out proposals to help people across Britain who work hard, pay their mortgages and rents and are now being hit hard by rapidly rising payments. Labour’s measures are compulsory, across the board and required of lenders. We would require lenders to allow borrowers to switch to interest-only mortgage payments for a temporary period, or to lengthen the term of their mortgage. We would require lenders to reverse any support measures when the borrower requests it. Were we in Government, we would bring in a renters’ charter to end no-fault evictions and introduce four-month notice periods for landlords. It is also important to say that we should not see a big fiscal injection into the economy at this time. If that happened, interest rates would go up even more, crippling the hopes and opportunities of the very people we seek to help.

I therefore ask the Minister the following questions. The Chancellor said in his Statement that the voluntary measures would cover 85% of the mortgage market. That leaves more than 1 million families who are not covered because their lender has not signed up to this scheme. Will the Government now consider making the measures in their mortgage charter mandatory? The Chancellor did not mention renters in his Statement, but many are paying higher rents because their landlords’ mortgage costs have gone up. What plans do the Government have to help them? Despite recent increases in the rates that lenders are charging on mortgages, there has not been an equivalent rise in the rate they offer on savings. This gap has grown by more than 50% for two-year products. What action will the Government take to ensure that savers see the full benefits from higher rates, just as borrowers are feeling the full pain? Finally, why does the UK continue to have the highest inflation rate in the whole G7? I thank the Minister in advance for her answers to these specific questions.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I rarely speak to such a thronged House. The number that we should focus on is core inflation, which removes the volatile issues over which we have little control and which has shockingly risen to 7.1%—a 31-year high, as the noble Lord, Lord Livermore, said. This number is key to interest rate rises and captures the sheer economic incompetence of the Government, as well as their wholly inadequate trade relationship with Europe post Brexit—the sharp drop in exports, British firms removed from supply chains, a collapse in business investment, the fall in sterling, customs friction driving up the cost of imports, labour shortages and incredibly low productivity.

Three groups of people will be particularly hard hit by the sharp and continuing rise in interest rates: mortgage holders with variable-rate or expiring fixed-rate mortgages, renters whose landlords face significantly higher mortgage costs and small businesses with short-term loan exposure. The mortgage charter will help some to push the pain into the future, but at a price. The hardest hit who face repossessions will feel the full force only after the next general election; I understand the Conservative strategy there.

Unlike this Government, I do not think it acceptable for the hardest hit, who face the destruction of their family finances, to take the bullet for the economy as a whole. Will the Government now put in place the emergency proposals that these Benches have made to assist those in the toughest position, who will get no help from the banks because they are regarded as unattractive customers? This is a voluntary system and the banks will use their standard approach of favouring customers with whom they want long-term relationships and denying opportunity to those with whom they do not.

Reversing cuts in the bank levy and the surcharge would do more than cover the cost of this, and I am with the noble Lord, Lord Livermore, in saying that the banks are really in a position of profiteering at this point because of their rejection of any pressure to share higher interest rates with their savers.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Debate between Baroness Kramer and Lord Livermore

Report stage
Tuesday 13th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I had the privilege of serving on the Economic Affairs Committee, with the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, as chair, when it produced the report. Your Lordships will gather that my views on whether we adopt a digital currency are distinctive somewhat from others who have spoken today. It is not that I am some enthusiast for it; I recognise all the issues and disadvantages that have been named today, particularly financial stability and privacy. However, 18 countries will be adopting a central bank digital currency this year—including China, initially for its domestic market. It has been piloting it in 12 cities, but eventually it will become an offering that it takes to the many other countries where it expects to exercise influence, in both Asia and Africa.

I am afraid that we are facing potentially a King Canute situation: we may not particularly want such a currency but might simply have to accept that to remain in the forefront and in play within financial services and as a major exporter and participant in global trade, we may have no choice but to go down this route. But I absolutely share with every other speaker the view that this should be determined by Parliament in primary legislation. The issues are sufficiently fundamental and far-reaching. They carry risk, and they require judgment and perspective—and it is in debates in the other place and here that that can happen.

It seems to me that something so fundamental as currency surely is the responsibility of a democratic Parliament. It cannot be transferred, in effect, to either the Treasury to run through an SI, or to the regulators to not even bother with an SI but largely to put it in place through various regulatory changes. So, here we have absolute common ground; this should be on the face of the Bill. I am concerned that this may be the last piece of legislation coming forward where we have the opportunity to put it in the Bill. There might be a further opportunity in a year’s time, but it depends on the speed of change that we experience.

Guarantees from the Government would be good. I am glad that a letter has been written to Harriett Baldwin and the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, but we need something that recognises the significance and importance of doing this through primary legislation.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, we welcome the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, which has enabled this short and informative debate on the process for establishing a central bank digital currency. As technology develops and people’s habits change, it is vital that we keep pace. Therefore, the principle of a digital pound has much to commend it, although the arguments, implications and details clearly need to be properly worked through. The introduction of a digital pound would represent a significant step, and it is therefore right for the noble Lords, Lord Forsyth and Lord Bridges, to ask about the underlying processes, though it is a novel experience for the two noble Lords to be asking for commitments from this side of the House.

We very much welcome the clarification offered by the Chancellor in his letter to the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, and the Economic Affairs Committee that there would be primary legislation before a digital pound could be launched. We agree that this is an important safeguard.