UK Infrastructure Bank Bill [HL]

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Committee stage & Lords Hansard - Part 1
Tuesday 14th June 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)]

My Lords, it is pleasure to take part in this first group of amendments on the UK Infrastructure Bank. I support Amendment 1 tabled by my noble friend Lady Noakes. When my noble friend the Minister responds, will she fully explain why the bank would not wish to come under the auspices of the financial regulators—the FCA and the PRA—and why HM Treasury would not want it to do so?

My Amendments 38 and 42 have the same purpose: to underscore in the Bill the bank’s operational independence from HM Treasury. Amendment 38 would put on the face of the Bill that the bank will be able to lend to whatever level and by whatever means it chooses without having to have recourse to HM Treasury. Does the Minister agree that this is implicit in the Bill and that to have this statement in the Bill would make absolute sense?

On Amendment 42, I agree entirely with the point alluded to by my noble friend Lady Noakes. The reason I bring Amendment 42 forward again is to further assert in the Bill that the bank should have the ability to avail itself of the capital markets. Does my noble friend the Minister agree that, again, having this provision in the Bill would clearly underscore the operational independence of the bank, which is espoused in all the briefing notes on the Bill?

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, this group of amendments addresses two entirely different issues, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, identified. I rather fear that in the minds of the Treasury they are the same issue, which is slightly unfortunate but will probably explain a great deal of our debate today.

I will first address Amendment 42 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, which I very much support. This would allow the Bank to

“borrow on the international capital markets”,

putting that on the face of the Bill. We have a very small bank set-up here with only £4.2 billion in risk capital, which means that, for years, it will be able to do relatively little and will have to do it in such a way as to get substantial commercial returns to build up its equity base. That will allow it to grow and do rather larger things—but, since this is an important instrument for the whole goal of levelling up, you would think that impact and the need to act rapidly would be at the forefront of the Government’s thinking.

Obviously, being able to go to the international capital markets to access capital in the way that the European Investment Bank and KfW in Germany do—that is very well established—would be important. Also, given that there will be a green purpose to much that the bank does, it is important to note that one of the biggest movers in providing green financing has been the decision of the European Investment Bank as it goes to the capital markets to raise climate and sustainability awareness bonds to jet-propel finance into those markets. It is utterly beyond me to understand why those powers have not been given to the UK Infrastructure Bank; perhaps the Minister will explain.

Almost more importantly, perhaps, I want to address the issues raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble Lord, Lord Teverson. I very much support his notion that we must find a way to incorporate the senior managers and certification regime. Frankly, it has been quite a weak straw in the hands of the FCA. I do not want to entertain folks here for too long by going through the instances in which the FCA should have used it but has declined to do so, or has used it very weakly; but at least it is something to make sure we have real responsibility sited where it should be in senior management.

I want to pick up a rather different issue, which was mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, only in passing: whistleblowing. I will talk about this in more depth in the group of amendments beginning with my Amendment 30 about the operational independence of this bank, but when we get later into the Bill we will find that a framework has been established allowing the shareholder—in other words, the Treasury and the Government—to give directions, both specific and general, to the bank. The framework elaborates on that but recognises that the board of directors of the bank may well look at these specific directions and wish to reject them. The grounds that may be given, not in a rejection but a “reservation notice” to the shareholders, include infringement of

“the requirements of propriety or regularity”

or various other things including on “value for money” or “strategic objectives” and so on; we can go into that later. In the two sections that I want to address, a reservation notice can be sent on grounds of infringement of “propriety or regularity”, or of being

“of questionable feasibility or … unethical”.

In that case, the shareholder—the Treasury, or the Government, in effect—can send a notice to the bank overriding its letter of reservation, forcing it to go ahead with the activity, even if it is considered by the bank to be unethical. The bank is supposed to provide a written direction, which, when you first read this, looks as though it will be published. However, very carefully written into the framework is the phrase

“published (unless the Shareholder has directed in writing to the Company that the matter must be kept confidential).”

I think we can guarantee that any direction that is unethical or infringes on propriety will come with an instruction to keep it confidential. At that point, for the public and Parliament to know, we rely on whistle- blowers.

That brings me to the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. First, directors are not covered by the Public Interest Disclosure Act anyway. Senior employees would be, but to have any protection to be able to blow the whistle they would have to go to a regulator to make a protected disclosure. There is no regulator, therefore there is no mechanism for protected disclosure.

I want noble Lords to understand the jeopardy in which those directors or senior executives might find themselves. I suspect they will have been asked to sign some version of a non-disclosure agreement—it has many different names; I always tussle with the Government, because it turns out they have done it under a different name, such as a confidentiality agreement, but it is the same thing. There is even some talk of extending the scope of the Official Secrets Act, which could creep into this as well. I also noticed that the directors—I am sure those who have been appointed are excellent people—really would be taking steps of jeopardy if they blew the whistle, because most are making their careers as advisers to government or as chairs or directors of government-related entities, so they have a great deal of jeopardy at hand.

If this is unregulated, there is no mechanism for disclosure, even where actions within the view of the directors or senior employees of the bank infringe on propriety or are unethical. I would like the Minister to explain why the Government decided that that framework should be in place. I should also like her confirmation of whether there are non-disclosure agreements or their equivalent. If she cannot at this moment, by the time we get to the group beginning with Amendment 30 she will have had the opportunity to consult the Box. It will be a yes or no answer. I am certain we must get an answer either way.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I will ask a brief question about regulation in the sense raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. Chapter 11 of the framework published by the Treasury says:

“Notwithstanding any exemptions that may apply to the Company, the Shareholder acknowledges that the provision of certain aspects of the Company’s activities may be subject to … the ‘FCA Rules’ or guidance or principles … the ‘PRA Rules’ or guidance or principles and … other applicable laws or regulations.”


Could the Minister help the Committee by saying what these “certain aspects” might be?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

For the sake of the rest of the Committee, it may be worth me answering the noble Lord’s question during a subsequent group. I could make a good attempt now, but I think we will have a lot of discussions about the status of the framework document in the coming hours, so I want to make sure that I give the Committee the absolutely accurate answer. I undertake to do that during this Committee session.

As I was saying, the framework document outlines that UKIB has the freedom to set the pricing of its transactions, and it is already using this power. This is alongside the freedom UKIB has to set the terms and structure of its interventions, subject to delegated authority limits in place to protect the taxpayer for very large investment sizes or novel, contentious or repercussive transaction structures. UKIB can already determine the level of its own investments in line with its capitalisation and annual limits, which are agreed in its framework document. UKIB also already has the power to set the level of its lending rates.

Going any further than the existing freedom UKIB has, as this amendment seeks to do, would not be compatible with its status as a public body and would take it outside the framework through which the Treasury assures Parliament about the appropriate use of public money. With £22 billion of capital, it is right that the Government exercise some spending control to ensure it continues to meet value for money.

I further reassure noble Lords that the Government will review UKIB’s progress and financial performance by spring 2024 to ensure that it has sufficient capital to deliver its ambitions. By that stage, the bank will have closed a broader range of investments and developed a strong pipeline of further projects. I can tell my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, that, as part of this review, the Government will also consider again the question of UKIB’s regulatory position to ensure that it continues to be appropriate.

To give a brief answer to the earlier question about the framework document, it is essentially a memorandum of understanding and does have legal effect in so far as the bank can be accountable to it. I will see whether I can expand on that during discussion of subsequent groups.

I turn to the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. As she suggested, I may come back to her on the specifics when we get to the group beginning with Amendment 30, but I will reassure her now on one point. The Treasury must publish any direction that it gives to the bank. In this regard, what is set out in law in this Bill is the relevant piece of information, versus the framework document. That goes to some level of the discussion we will have when we consider what is set out in the Bill—it is the overriding thing to look at when it comes to UKIB’s operation.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

Perhaps the Minister could clarify one thing for me. As I read the two documents put together, the instruction must be published but not the fact that the bank has looked at it and deemed it to be improper, infringing “propriety” or

“of questionable feasibility, or … unethical”.

In other words, that opinion of the bank can be completely suppressed, as I understand it, by the language of the Bill and of this document. If that is not correct, it would be most helpful if the Minister could tell me.

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

I will definitely pick up on that further point of detail, which relates closely to the noble Baroness’s question about non-disclosure agreements, to which I will seek to get an answer as we undertake consideration in Committee.

I hope that I have set out why the Government have at this stage taken the approach to the regulation of the bank that they have, but, as I say, it will be kept under review, specifically by 2024. I therefore hope that my noble friend will withdraw her amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

I will endeavour to also get back to the noble Lord during this Committee—but, if I do not, I will include my answer in my letter on his noble friend Lord Teverson’s question about what aspects of the senior managers regime we plan to apply to the bank.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I am sorry to remain persistent on this, but the Minister just said that the bank is not required to publish its letter of reservations. Is it not correct to say that what the document says is that the shareholder may effectively prohibit the bank from publishing its letter of reservations—so it is a gagging clause? That is what it says in the framework.

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

In picking up the noble Baroness’s other point, I shall ensure that my response covers that specific point.