Planning and Infrastructure Bill

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 24th July 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Kramer]

53A: After Clause 12, insert the following new Clause—
“Whistleblowing and oversight body for nationally significant infrastructure projects(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, by regulations establish an independent body for the purpose of receiving and investigating protected disclosures in connection with nationally significant infrastructure projects.(2) The body must have responsibility for—(a) receiving disclosures of information from individuals or organisations relating to suspected misconduct, mismanagement, breach of environmental regulations, or any other matter of public interest connected to nationally significant infrastructure projects;(b) assessing whether such disclosures fall within its remit and merit investigation;(c) undertaking investigations where appropriate and referring matters to relevant regulatory, law enforcement, or oversight bodies; (d) providing advice and guidance to individuals considering making protected disclosures in relation to such projects;(e) reporting to the Secretary of State on the nature, volume, and outcome of disclosures received, with appropriate protections for confidentiality and whistleblower anonymity;(f) establishing and maintaining a framework setting out the protections afforded to whistleblowers, including remedies for individuals who suffer detriment as a result of making a disclosure, and procedures for seeking redress.(3) For the purposes of this section, “protected disclosures” are those that meet the conditions set out in section 43B of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (disclosures qualifying for protection), as they relate to the planning, development, or operation of nationally significant infrastructure projects.(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations make further provision about—(a) the governance structure of the body;(b) the process and criteria for assessing disclosures;(c) collaboration between the body and other statutory regulators or planning authorities.(5) Regulations under this section are to be made by statutory instrument.(6) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause would require the Secretary of State to establish an independent body to receive and investigate whistleblowing disclosures relating to nationally significant infrastructure projects, including responsibilities for oversight, guidance, referral, and protections for whistleblowers.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 53A is in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Shipley, who is unable to be here today. This Bill is part of the Government’s programme to unleash new infrastructure projects across sectors and in every part of the country. It is a vital part of the strategy for growth. Such projects are hugely costly and complex and contain many uncertainties, especially in their early stages. Many of them will involve public investment or have a major impact on ordinary people, which means that integrity and transparency are vital if we are not to waste money, undermine public trust and fail to get the outcomes we need.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Khan of Burnley (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 53A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, seeks to insert a new clause that would require the Secretary of State to establish an independent body to receive and investigate whistleblowing disclosures relating to nationally significant infrastructure projects, including responsibilities for oversight and protections for whistleblowers.

The NSIP regime is responsible for delivering consenting decisions on the most complex and critical infrastructure projects. The framework, underpinned by the Planning Act 2008, is based on principles of fairness and transparency. As noble Lords have heard throughout the debates on the Bill so far, it is vital that the Government’s decisions on major infrastructure projects are properly informed by relevant expert bodies, as well as those who are affected by the application, including landowners, local authorities and local communities. That is what the Planning Act and NSIP regime enables.

This planning process includes the transparent appointment of an examining authority, which has six months to consider the views of members of the public, local authorities and other interested parties as part of the examination of an application. It also involves interested parties such as regulators, including the Environment Agency and Natural England, in examinations, and enables them to outline any concerns they have. Ultimately, based on evidence and the legal framework, the Secretary of State has the ability to grant or refuse consent for the development consent order, and must prepare and publicise a statement of reasons for their decision. Finally, the lawfulness of decisions can be challenged in the courts.

While I have been interested to hear the noble Baroness’s views today, I am afraid that I do not share the view that whistleblowing is a widespread issue within the NSIP regime or that there is currently sufficient evidence to warrant action. More broadly, I understand that the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, has long called for the introduction of an office of the whistleblower to centralise and triage disclosures, enforce standards and provide advice and support to those considering making a disclosure of information. However, the Government do not support the establishment of an office of the whistleblower at this time. Such a step would introduce a significant structural change to the whistleblowing legal framework, which the Government believe should be considered as part of a broader assessment of the operation of the framework. I also do not agree that this is something which should be tackled through this Bill.

The Government are keen to work with organisations and individuals who have ideas on how to further strengthen the whistleblowing framework. Our first priority is the Employment Rights Bill, which delivers on our commitment to strengthen protections for whistleblowers who report sexual harassment at work. I do not think the fact that they are not NSIPs is the best argument to make, given that they are so evocative. It is a really important issue to discuss here, with the relevant focus. No examples were given by the noble Baroness that would give consent to the NSIP regime or go through the system. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to beg leave to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I am obviously not encouraged by the government response. It seems a weakness not to recognise how essential it is that there is transparency in major infrastructure projects, for the sake of everybody involved—but I was very encouraged by the comments across the Floor. I am not precious about how whistleblowing is structured, except that the channel needs to be genuinely perceived as being independent and having the power to protect whistleblowers, making sure that investigation follows where necessary.

I will make two comments. First, on grievances, part of the reason for having an expert body is that it will be expert at identifying the truth. Sometimes under a grievance there is real truth that matters, but there can be mischievous reporting. Whistleblowing expertise is very good at quickly winnowing that out, because obviously that is not where you are going to focus your time, energy and effort, and you want to make sure that it is stropped in its tracks. But we know from experience across the globe that that is very well managed.

Secondly, on the issue of changing the culture—that is what they used to say in the United States, until offices of whistleblowing were introduced widely across the financial sector and are now being picked up by the Department of Transportation. That may change with the Trump Administration, but you are seeing them picked up across other areas in the United States, because having an Office of the Whistleblower with the appropriate kind of powers has had a dramatic impact on the culture. There has been a sharp drop in bad actors, because people know that they are not safe. There is no greater deterrent than knowing that somebody will speak out, and it very much changes the whole culture within an industry.

It is also important to recognise that, with a good whistleblowing system, you get information very early—it is the canary in the mine. Therefore, in the case of the Elizabeth line, you know very early on that something is going wrong when you have scope to act, correct and manage. It is truly an important mechanism to save a project as well as protect the public.

I am fascinated that this argument is beginning to get widespread recognition and traction. I am totally supportive of a great deal of new infrastructure across the UK, so let me suggest that we must have with it a mechanism that means that disclosure and transparency happen at the earliest possible moment when things go wrong and before they turn into project-destroying phenomena.

Amendment 53A withdrawn.

Planning and Infrastructure Bill

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 20th October 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Kramer]

22: After Clause 12, insert the following new Clause—
“Whistleblowing and oversight for nationally significant infrastructure projects(1) For the purposes of this Act, the National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority (NISTA) is responsible for receiving and investigating protected disclosures in connection with nationally significant infrastructure projects.(2) In particular, NISTA is responsible for—(a) receiving disclosures of information from individuals or organisations relating to suspected misconduct, mismanagement, breach of environmental regulations, or any other matter of public interest connected to nationally significant infrastructure projects;(b) assessing whether such disclosures fall within its remit and merit investigation;(c) undertaking investigations where appropriate and referring matters to relevant regulatory, law enforcement, or oversight bodies;(d) providing advice and guidance to individuals considering making protected disclosures in relation to such projects;(e) reporting on the nature, volume, and outcome of disclosures received, with appropriate protections for confidentiality and whistleblower anonymity;(f) establishing and maintaining a framework setting out the protections afforded to whistleblowers, including remedies for individuals who suffer detriment as a result of making a disclosure, and procedures for seeking redress.(3) For the purposes of this section, “protected disclosures” are those that meet the conditions set out in section 43B of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (disclosures qualifying for protection), as they relate to the planning, development, or operation of nationally significant infrastructure projects.(4) NISTA is responsible for ensuring it has—(a) an appropriate governance structure;(b) clear processes and criteria for assessing disclosures;(c) mechanisms for collaboration with other statutory regulators or planning authorities.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment places responsibility on the National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority (NISTA) to receive, investigate, and oversee whistleblowing disclosures relating to nationally significant infrastructure projects, ensuring protections for whistleblowers and coordination with relevant regulators.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I recognise there is a lot of business to get through tonight, so I will be brief.

When whistleblowing was discussed in Committee, speakers from around the Chamber—except, sadly, the Government—seemed to recognise that the current whistleblowing framework is unfit for purpose. It is the framework that left whistleblowers on HS2 and Crossrail at best sidelined and at worst silenced and persecuted. The cost to the taxpayer because trouble was covered up and not nipped in the bud and managed has run into billions. This has happened on many other transport and power projects where problems are covered up and exposed too late.

In Committee, as I have done before, I proposed a new whistleblowing framework, including an office of the whistleblower. In that debate, the noble Lord, Lord Grayling, constructively suggested that, instead of a separate office, the National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority, NISTA, could be an effective body in which to place whistleblowing powers and a whistleblowing channel related to infrastructure. A redrafted amendment, Amendment 22, now reflects that proposal.

I still have a preference for a single office of the whistleblower under the Cabinet Office, but I am also a realist. Change on that scale will not be achieved anytime soon. However, if we launch a new drive for infrastructure—which we all recognise is essential for growth—without fixing the whistleblowing framework, we would be fooling ourselves if we expect not to repeat the scandals we have seen historically. Cover-ups will continue and will seriously damage the growth agenda. I hope that the Government, with this revision, will respond more constructively to the issue of whistleblowing and to the approach that places the framework inside NISTA.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly. It is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, as I did recently in the Moses Room on the same issue of whistleblowing. The noble Baroness is our pioneer, expert and leader on whistleblowing. I signed this amendment because it is important to demonstrate that this is an issue of broad concern.

The noble Baroness made clearly the case that we have huge problems with effectively and cost-effectively delivering major projects so that they do what they say they will do on the tin. The people who are most likely to know that something is going wrong are people within the organisation. It is terribly important to ensure that whistleblowers feel safe and will not tear their life apart if they come forward to report the issue.

The noble Baroness, helped by other Peers, has come up with a creative solution for NISTA to pick up this role in this context. I therefore hope that we will hear some movement from the Government on the issue.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Wilson of Sedgefield) (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 22, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, proposes that the National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority—NISTA—be given a new responsibility to receive, assess, investigate where appropriate and oversee whistleblowing disclosures related to nationally significant infrastructure projects. The amendment seeks to ensure appropriate protection for whistleblowers and co-ordination with relevant regulators and planning authorities.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for raising this important issue and have listened carefully to her remarks. While I recognise the intention behind the amendment, I must say again that I do not share the view that there is evidence of whistleblowing being a current, widespread concern within the NSIP regime. As she will know, there is already a well-established framework of prescribed persons and bodies to whom whistleblowers may turn, independent of their employer, as provided for under the Employment Rights Act 1996. They include organisations covering areas such as environmental protection, health and safety, transport, utilities and local government, which are of direct relevance to NSIPs.

Adding NISTA to this list would duplicate existing functions already carried out by regulators, such as the Environment Agency, which have the appropriate expertise and statutory powers. Given this existing framework, we believe that adding another body to the list would create a duplication of roles and, in any event, would not require primary legislation to achieve, as new persons or bodies can already be prescribed through Section 43F of the Employment Rights Act 1996. In the light of this, I respectfully invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I am saddened by the Government’s response. The next time we have a major project and there is a major scandal, they will have to take ownership of it. They looked at the framework that delivered us the problems on HS2. The names of the whistleblowers are now public: Doug Thornton and others reported that financials had been distorted, misrepresented and covered up, which delayed the making of a series of appropriate decisions on HS2. In the end, they were fundamental in requiring the truncation of what had been a much larger scheme. Crossrail is a similar example. Until about eight weeks before it was due to open, nobody in political decision-making knew that the project had fallen into deep trouble. It ended up being delayed by four years and was £4 billion over budget. This is repeated again and again. We have had similar problems with Hinkley Point and many other projects. That is what the current framework, which the Minister defends, actually delivers.

If the nettle is not grasped, we will see the same experiences again. Even if it is in only 10% of the projects that are anticipated for the future and that will be relevant to the growth agenda, the consequences will be significant. The existing framework, no matter what it says on paper, has demonstrated that it is unfit. Look at the Post Office scandal, the contaminated blood scandal, the issues in the NHS, the PPI scandal and the series of financial scandals—the framework does not work.

I ask the Minister to take the issue away, speak with some of his colleagues and see what can be done to make sure that, at least within the context of infrastructure, there is an effective channel that works. It must provide protection for whistleblowers in a real way, not just on paper, and lead to the necessary investigations. Given that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 22 withdrawn.