Ivory Bill

Baroness Jones of Whitchurch Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 12th September 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch]

36: Clause 12, page 8, line 7, leave out subsection (2)

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 36 would remove the defence of ignorance for those found to be in breach of the Act. At Second Reading numerous concerns were raised about how unsuspecting members of the public could accidentally flout the ivory ban. There was much discussion about selling an item found in grandma’s attic or at a car boot sale that, unbeknown to them, contained ivory. Of course some of this challenge comes down to publicity and communication. As with all new legislation, there is a need to make the public aware of their new responsibilities, and indeed progress has already been made. As we discussed, the consultation received a record number of responses, which is indicative of public and industry awareness. This will undoubtedly grow when the UK hosts the international Illegal Wildlife Trade Conference, at which the Secretary of State has already made it clear that he intends to highlight this flagship legislation. So really everyone should know the situation regarding the sale of goods containing ivory and understand that it has changed. Meanwhile the National Wildlife Crime Unit will have to focus its scarce resources very carefully. It simply will not have the staff to visit car boot sales on the off-chance of a transgression. As the unit itself has made clear, it will,

“deal with the ones who have a complete disregard for policy protocol legislation … who are deceptive, who lie and who want to make money out of this”.

While we understand the principle behind this subsection, we believe that genuine accidental transgressions of this type can be dealt with lightly through an enforcement undertaking with no monetary penalty, and that this provision is therefore unnecessary. We are concerned that unscrupulous traders could exploit this loophole so that they could continue to deal in ivory with impunity, only to feign ignorance if they are caught. We know that new elephant ivory is offered for sale and is often mislabelled as antique ivory, ivory from other species or other material altogether, such as bone. In some instances this may have been due to genuine unawareness, although deliberately mislabelling it is a well-known tactic in the illegal ivory trade. For the ban to be effective, it is imperative that any exemptions are narrowly defined and that breaches can and will be enforced. That is why we believe the defence of ignorance would undermine the intention and effectiveness of the Bill. I hope noble Lords understand the point that I am making and will support this view. I beg to move.

[Lord De Mauley (Con)]

My Lords, I reiterate my declaration of interest as chairman of LAPADA, the art and antiques dealers’ trade association. We have worked closely with BADA, the other major trade association.

On the face of it, Clause 12(2) provides protection against prosecution for those people who are not aware that the item they are handling contains elements of ivory. That they may be prosecuted only if it can be shown that they knew or suspected, or ought to have known or suspected, that an item was made from ivory appears to me to be reasonable. I suppose that I could see that the interaction between this subsection and Clause 35(4) could cause confusion and potentially prove unjust. As I understand it, Clause 35(4) means there is the presumption that, if a material can be proved to be ivory of any animal, it can be assumed to be the ivory of an elephant unless proved otherwise. If one takes the case of someone who genuinely believes an item to be made from the ivory of another species and not from elephant ivory, I am not sure whether they would receive the protection of Clause 12 because it does not refer specifically to elephant ivory. I wonder whether the Minister can shed any light on this point.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Lord Gardiner of Kimble) (Con)]

My Lords, this amendment would mean that persons could not use a defence that they did not know or suspect, or ought to know or suspect, the item was ivory. I should therefore explain why this provision was included and how it would be applied.

This provision has been included to help tackle the problem of illegal ivory items being deliberately mislabelled as another substance, such as bovine bone. It is also to protect those who fall victim of mislabelling of ivory and who, and I underline this, genuinely did not know that the item they were buying contained ivory. The purpose of the Bill is not to penalise or criminalise unnecessarily people who have made a genuine mistake. This provision also allows the police, enforcement bodies and courts to use their professional discretion when considering the most appropriate approach to deploy for individual defendants.

The issue of labelling ivory as another substance when it is sold is a common one. Illegal ivory items are often deliberately mislabelled as another substance, such as bovine bone, in order to evade existing restrictions on ivory sales. For this reason, the Bill ensures it is an offence to deal in ivory where that person knew or suspected, or ought to have known or suspected, that it was ivory. In practice, this means that, where it is clear that a person is deliberately mislabelling ivory as some other substance in order to attempt to circumvent this ban, this will be an offence. Likewise, anyone buying items of mislabelled ivory who could reasonably be expected to know it is elephant ivory will also be liable.

The enforcement bodies and courts will consider the position of the person when taking a view as to whether they should have known or suspected the item was ivory; for instance, if the person is an antiques dealer or a member of the public. They may also, for example, take into account if it is a repeat offence or if the seller deliberately mislabelled the item and then provided other information to indicate more discreetly to potential buyers that the item was in fact ivory. For example, sellers have been known to include close-up photographs in order to show the tell-tale lines or crosshatching, which are characteristic of ivory.

I will need to reflect on what on my noble friend Lord De Mauley said, but the Bill at this moment relates to elephant ivory. We will come on to further amendments that relate to the ability of this legislation potentially to extend to other species. For the moment, the Bill is dealing with elephant ivory.

Clause 12(2) is phrased to capture some instances of genuine mislabelling, where there was no intention to breach the ban and where the person could not reasonably be expected to know the item was ivory. This element of the Bill is designed to protect such people, who may be buyers, sellers or those facilitating a sale or purchase and whose prosecution I think your Lordships would accept is not what we are seeking in this legislation. I hope for those reasons the noble Baroness is able to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch]

My Lords, I think that we want to achieve the same thing here. It is a question of whether the existing wording achieves what the Minister has outlined. We do not want to penalise or take to court any innocent person who is trapped in this way. That is not our intention and clearly it is not the Government’s intention. However, I do not know how you can prove that someone genuinely did not know that something had ivory in it. I have a feeling that we are trying to prove a negative here, which in terms of enforcement will be quite difficult.

Therefore, we are in the game of asking how you prove that somebody ought to know and how you prove that somebody could not possibly have known. It is quite unusual to have a get-out clause in a Bill that says, “If you didn’t know about it, we’ll let you off”. With most legislation—it might be banning smoking in cars—it is not normally a defence to say, “I didn’t know”. Equally, I find it odd that the Bill is introducing a situation where someone can say, “I didn’t know, so maybe I should be let off on this occasion”.

I think that we want to achieve the same thing; I just do not feel that the wording here delivers what the Minister is trying to get at, and I would like to reflect a little more on his response. I hope that, in return, he will listen to what I am saying because, as I said, I am not sure that this wording delivers his exact intent. Maybe there is another way through this but, for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 36 withdrawn.

Moved by

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch]

37: Clause 12, page 8, line 20, leave out “six months” and insert “12 months”
Member’s explanatory statement
This is a probing amendment concerning the discrepancy between the maximum term of imprisonment for breaching the prohibition in Northern Ireland compared to England and Wales, and Scotland.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch]

My Lords, this is very brief probing amendment. It concerns the discrepancy between the maximum term of imprisonment for breaching the prohibition in Northern Ireland compared to England, Wales and Scotland.

The Bill states that the criminal sanction for breaching the legislation in Scotland, England and Wales is 12 months’ imprisonment, whereas it is just six months in Northern Ireland. Can the Minister confirm that this discrepancy reflects the fact that the United Kingdom does not have a single legal system? Is the law somehow different in Northern Ireland or is this simply a drafting error? On the face of it, the current wording does not seem fair or logical. I look forward to the Minister’s response and beg to move.

[Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville (LD)]

My Lords, I support the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, on this probing amendment. Although I accept and respect that it is for the devolved Administrations to set their own penalties, we must keep in mind the difficulties that this will cause. As we all know, the devolved arrangements in Northern Ireland have broken down and there appears to be little prospect of them resuming in the near future. This would leave a situation where the penalties in one part of the UK were lighter than in the rest.

Those seeking to circumnavigate the law and benefit from the proceeds of trading ivory might be prepared to risk a six-month imprisonment term instead of 12 months. These are, after all, hardened criminals. It would be extremely unfortunate if the trafficking in illegal ivory and ivory products were shifted to Northern Ireland because the penalties there were more lenient. I respect completely what the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, said, and I am sure that the Minister will give clarification—but I wonder whether the Government and the Secretary of State might consider having uniformity of sentencing across the UK.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, seeks to increase the maximum prison term for breaching the prohibition in Northern Ireland. As a result of the devolution settlement, Northern Ireland has the power to adopt practices concerning criminal justice that are different from those in England and Wales. The sentence that would apply in Northern Ireland is up to six months and is set out in the laws applying to that nation.

In England and Wales, Section 154(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which would increase the maximum sentence available on summary conviction from six months to 12 months, has not been commenced. This means that currently the maximum sentence available in England and Wales on summary conviction is six months. Therefore, the two are in alignment and thus the penalties are the same across the UK. Should the relevant section be commenced for England and Wales, the maximum available prison sentence would increase to 12 months—the Bill provides for that—and the two would no longer be in alignment. With that explanation, I hope that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for that explanation. We were just trying to establish the facts of the case, and she has clearly set them out. Obviously we will respect the devolution package and we certainly do not want to force something on Northern Ireland where it thinks it has some control of its own in these matters. I am grateful for that clarification and need not say anything more on it. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 37 withdrawn.

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[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I, too, have signed to give notice of opposition to the clause standing part of the Bill. I endorse the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, with whom I agree totally. Like him, I have no problems with what the Bill seeks to achieve; the principle is wholly worthy. Indeed, I have no problem with other parts of the Bill either. My concern is with this clause. I do not see why it cannot be excised from the Bill leaving the other parts in place.

Given the clauses that precede and succeed it, I do not see why this clause is necessary. It confers a particular power on civilian officers and civil servants in a way that is remarkable. The Explanatory Notes seek to claim that the powers conferred in the clause are not unusual, but they cite only one example as a means of doing that. One example is not sufficient to demonstrate that this is “not unusual”. It strikes me that these are remarkable powers in themselves, which means that there would have to be a compelling case for this House to go along with them.

There is already a problem with the actual powers, therefore, but then, as the noble and learned Lord indicated, we have to look at what they are designed to achieve. Subsection (2)(a) is free-standing. It confers on civil servants the power to enter purely for the purpose, as the noble and learned Lord put it, of giving a pep talk. I would be rather amazed if even police officers wanted the power to come in and simply give one a pep talk, so to confer that power on civil servants strikes me as remarkable. It is not linked to the enforcement powers; it is simply to go in and, effectively, to seek to educate people about the provisions of the Bill.

Therefore, the power of entry is remarkable but so is what it is used for. Perhaps the Minister can tell us whether there are provisions in any other Acts that confer on officials powers of this sort to go in and simply remonstrate or give a pep talk to those whom they feel need to be educated. I am at a loss to understand why the clause is in the Bill, given the other provisions that it contains.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch]

My Lords, we very much welcome the interventions by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, members of the Constitution Committee and other noble Lords who have raised concerns about the status and powers of accredited civilian officers. The noble and learned Lord has done a fantastic demolition job on the provisions in the existing clause. I also welcome his overall support for the objectives of the Bill, which are indeed very welcome.

While we have argued throughout that there need to be robust enforcement mechanisms in the Bill, we equally accept that the creation of a new breed of civilian enforcers, with the widespread powers envisaged in the Bill, goes far too far. We would have hoped that providing extra resources for the National Wildlife Crime Unit would provide a more acceptable alternative to the challenge of effective enforcement.

I do not intend to say a great deal because I know that the Minister is keen to find a way to resolve these concerns. I hope that he is able to reassure us that the Government will be tabling their own amendments to bring enforcement back in line with the practice of legal enforcement using comparative situations. I therefore look forward to hearing his response.

[Lord Gardiner of Kimble]

My Lords, I express my gratitude to the Constitution Committee for publishing its valuable report, which raised some important points regarding the powers conferred by the Bill on accredited civilian officers. I place on record that I am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, for meeting me and officials so that we could discuss and, in turn, reflect on the concerns that he and the committee expressed. I am also mindful of the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Cormack.

The issue of enforcement is critical and I am sure that the Committee would agree that it is paramount that the enforcement of the ivory ban must be both proportionate and robust. As noble Lords will be aware, when I refer to accredited civilian officers, I am referring to the officers of the regulator, which will be the Office for Product Safety and Standards. OPSS is part of the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. It is an experienced enforcement body that currently enforces a range of regulations on behalf of the Government, including regulations on timber, biodiversity, waste and chemicals, and carbon reduction. For example, OPSS ensures that timber traders are complying with the regulations to ensure that their products are made from legally sourced timber.

OPSS also has experience of co-working with the police, the National Wildlife Crime Unit and Border Force, which will also play a critical role in the enforcement of the ivory ban so that we make sure that the enforcement is effective and that all parties are clear on their role and remit. For all those reasons it was considered to be the most appropriate regulator.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord De Mauley]

My Lords, I will also speak to Amendments 52, 54, 56, 57 and 58 in this group. Many antiques, regardless of the materials used in their construction, can be fragile and need to be handled with care. For example, ivory is sometimes incorporated into bronze sculptures. To the uninitiated, bronze may seem a strong material, capable of withstanding a gentle knock or two. However, one important feature of bronze sculptures is the patina of their surface. Application of a sticky label in the wrong way or allowing a metal watchstrap to rub against the surface could damage it, destroying the sculpture’s integrity and thus reducing its value. Antique dealers spend a fortune purchasing professional packing services when moving or shipping antiques and the handling of antiques is a specialist skill in its own right.

A badly informed officer, believing that he is seizing an ivory item that breaches the provisions of the Bill, may treat the item casually, even before it has been properly assessed by someone with knowledge and understanding of antiques. Ivory in particular can be brittle and will not take kindly to rough handling. What we need to avoid is antiques being seized, subsequently found to be compliant and then returned damaged to their owners. This amendment is intended to place an obligation on officers to take extra care when handling the antiques that they have seized.

On Amendments 52 and 54, as drafted Clause 29 allows not just the Secretary of State but also police officers and accredited civilian officers to decide the fate of cultural property that has been seized. The factors that need to be considered in disposing of a cultural artefact differ greatly from those that apply to endangered species that do not also possess cultural and historical attributes. A seized item may well be an object of cultural significance that a museum may wish to acquire and, consequently, a decision about its future should involve the input of people possessing specialist knowledge of objects of the same type. This is knowledge that police officers and accredited civilian officers will not have. For this reason, the amendments would limit the decision about the fate of seized objects to the Secretary of State alone and require him or her to take the advice of someone who is able to provide specialist advice, such as a museum curator or art market professional.

I turn finally to Amendments 56, 57 and 58. The aim of amending Clause 31 is similar to that of amending Clause 29. In this case, it concerns the people who are granted the power to decide the fate of previously seized objects where the person entitled to the object cannot be traced. At present this power is granted to a police or customs officer, as well as the Secretary of State. For the reasons that I referred to on Clause 29, the decision should be limited to the Secretary of State alone and be taken on the advice of someone familiar with the type of ivory object whose return has been attempted. I beg to move.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch]

My Lords, I will make just a few brief comments in response to the noble Lord’s amendments, which seem in the main unnecessary. First, it is self-evident that the officers would take care to avoid damaging seized items. This would apply equally to the process of seizing other high-value goods including stolen artworks, with which they would be familiar. I am not convinced that the need for that level of care needs to spelled out in the Bill, given they have that specialist training.

Secondly, we have already addressed the concern about the role of accredited civilian officers, but it does not seem practical or sensible that the only person able to determine how a piece should be disposed of should be the Secretary of State. Thirdly, as we discussed earlier, we would expect a decision to dispose of an item to be taken with guidance from individuals with clear expertise in this area. Again, we are not convinced this needs to be in the Bill. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s undertaking on how these disposals will work in practice and hope that he will be able to reassure his noble friend that these amendments are not necessary.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton]

My Lords, the first amendment in this group would require police and customs officers to take account of an item’s physical nature and exercise reasonable care when searching premises under the powers in the Bill. I am sure that noble Lords will agree that officers must always have regard to their surroundings and the objects therein when conducting a search and should not wilfully damage anything. Police and customs officers have vast experience of conducting searches in many different types of premises and for a wide range of items—valuable, delicate, dangerous or otherwise. I therefore do not think it necessary to include wording to that effect in the Bill. Indeed, it may be counterproductive. For example, if it is omitted from other Bills in future involving similarly delicate items, will it be assumed that care is not needed in those cases?

The other amendments in this group remove the discretion from police and customs officers to dispose of seized or forfeited items and instead require the Secretary of State to consult an expert in ivory items before making decisions on the disposal of such items. Police forces have well-established processes for dealing with seized property of all types. In the first instance, owners have the opportunity to appeal against a seizure and therefore the item may be returned. But if the seized item cannot be returned to the original owner, there are well-established methods for its disposal.

There are many possible uses for seized items containing ivory that cannot be returned to the original owner. For example, they may be used for educational, training and research purposes, when it is in the public interest to do so. Ivory items seized by police and customs officers in recent years have been used for training officers in the identification of ivory products or donated to accredited museums or to conservation bodies for awareness raising. Zoos, for example, might display examples of illegal wildlife trade products made from endangered species.

I hope that this explanation will be sufficient to satisfy my noble friend and that he will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch]

64: Insert the following Preamble—
“Whereas the 1989 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) agreed to ban the international trade in African elephant ivory; and the resolution adopted at the 2016 Conference of Parties to CITES agreed to phase out domestic ivory markets which contributed to poaching or illegal trade in ivory:
And whereas it is expedient to give effect in the United Kingdom to the restrictions on domestic trade:”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would insert a Preamble linking the Bill to the resolution adopted unanimously by governments at the 2016 Conference of Parties to the UN Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) which called on all governments to close domestic ivory markets which contribute to poaching or illegal trade in ivory.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch]

My Lords, this amendment would insert a preamble linking the Bill to the resolution adopted unanimously by Governments at the 2016 Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, or CITES. This called on all Governments to close domestic ivory markets which contribute to the poaching of, or illegal trade in, ivory.

Unfortunately, the government amendment introduced on Report in another place had the accidental consequence of removing the only explicit link between this Bill and CITES. There is now nothing in the Bill to make it clear that this legislation was drafted partly in response to the resolution adopted unanimously at the 2016 Conference of the Parties to CITES.

An amendment of this type was specifically requested by the David Shepherd Wildlife Foundation and the Born Free Foundation, which shared our concern that the link to the conference commitment had been deleted. We believe that such a preamble would strengthen the Act against possible judicial and equalities challenges by confirming that the legislation enables the UK to comply with international obligations to control domestic ivory markets under a UN-backed treaty. There are already precedents for this, notably in the original legislation to implement CITES in the UK—the Endangered Species (Import and Export) Act 1976—so this amendment would protect the Government’s resolve to comply with international treaties and strengthen their legal defence. I hope that noble Lords and the Minister will see the sense of the amendment and feel able to support it. I beg to move.

[Lord Gardiner of Kimble]

My Lords, the noble Baroness’s amendment would insert a preamble at the beginning of the Bill to draw a link between the provisions in the Bill and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora.

The United Kingdom is a party to CITES in its own right and will continue to be bound by and committed to its obligations under this important convention. Indeed, the UK is a very active participant in CITES. At the last CITES Conference of the Parties in 2016, the UK played a major role in achieving strong outcomes for endangered species, which will help ensure their survival in the wild. The UK ivory ban is consistent with both CITES and the EU Wildlife Trade Regulations. Under the withdrawal Act, these regulations will become part of UK domestic law. The UK ivory ban goes further than CITES and the EU in restricting commercial dealing in ivory.

Clause 35, which deals with the definition of ivory, previously referred to CITES for a specific reason—in order to limit the future application of the Bill to CITES-listed ivory-bearing species. As I alluded to in the previous group, the amendment made in the other place made it possible to broaden the scope of the Bill in the future to all ivory-bearing species, thus removing the need for a reference to CITES. No other provision in the Bill could be limited by a reference to CITES.

The Ivory Bill will apply alongside our existing obligations under CITES and the EU Wildlife Trade Regulations, and therefore there is no need to reference CITES or indeed the regulations in the Bill. As is customary, the Long Title of the Bill outlines the matters covered by it. As I said, we are acknowledged as one of the strongest participants in CITES but, given the amendment introduced in the other place, we do not think that CITES requires to be cited in this Bill. For the reasons I have set out, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch]

I thank the Minister for that explanation. The purpose of the amendment was to strengthen our hand in the Bill so as to avoid legal challenges that might otherwise have been made. In seeking to insert this preamble, I do not think that it was ever our intention to restrict what the Bill could achieve in terms of broadening out beyond CITES-specified endangered species. Nevertheless, I hear what the Minister says. I will again reflect on his views and his response, and I will take some soundings from those who have encouraged us to put forward this amendment. However, for the time being, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 64 withdrawn.