Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lord Paddick

Monday 17th December 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I recognise that this amendment is not perfect and I am sure that the government draftsmen could make a better job of it, but the Government have shown that they are open to amending the Bill to improve it and to put in the necessary safeguards for journalists and others. For that reason, I ask the Minister to look again at the Schedule 3 power and to add proper oversight of its use.

The existing powers in Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act have already proved open to abuse. When David Miranda was stopped at the border on the instruction of the security services, it was because he was the partner of Glenn Greenwald, a journalist reporting on the facts released by whistleblower Edward Snowden. It is thanks to these heroic individuals that we now know the true extent to which the American National Security Agency spies on just about every person who owns a phone or a computer. David Miranda was stopped at Heathrow Airport to confiscate any documents and data that he might have been holding in relation to the whistleblowing. There was no judicial oversight and no legal protection for the sensitive journalistic information that the security services sought to confiscate.

This amendment is not just an issue that I have cooked up because I do not trust the Government or something that NGOs have asked me to bring forward. It was the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the David Miranda case, where the Master of the Rolls said that the existing Schedule 7 power, on which Schedule 3 is based, is in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights. It was the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that,

“in relation to journalistic material … it is not subject to adequate safeguards against its arbitrary exercise … It will be for Parliament to provide such protection. The most obvious safeguard would be some form of judicial or other independent and impartial scrutiny conducted in such a way as to protect the confidentiality in the material”.

What have the Government done to rectify this breach of human rights law? Given that the existing Schedule 7 power has already been ruled in breach of human rights by the Court of Appeal, how have the Government chosen to bring another power which replicates the breach in its entirety? In that light, how was the Minister able to put a statement on the Bill that it is in accordance with the Human Rights Act when it is not? We have to amend this provision in some way. The alternative is that we pass a measure that we know has already been declared in breach of the human rights convention and is certain to be declared so again.

Journalists do essential work. They are the lifeblood of any free country, yet they face constant threats across the world for speaking truth to power. In the USA, despite constitutional protection, they are labelled by the President as “enemies of the people”, and have had bomb scares and other threats made by the far right. In Saudi Arabia, and far too many other countries, they face arrest, violence and death. It is against this backdrop that I am grateful to the Minister for tabling a number of amendments to the Bill which seek to protect journalists and their sources from the powers contained within. However, Schedule 7—and by extension the Schedule 3 power—do not protect journalists, and expose their sources to interference by the state.

My amendment gives journalists the right to say no when asked to hand over confidential information. I recognise that this is a sticking plaster for now. The Government can and should bring their own amendment to resolve the issues in the Miranda judgment, and give proper judicial oversight of this kind of confiscation. I hope this is just an oversight, and that the Minister has not yet tabled all her amendments to Schedule 3. While we wait for those to be forthcoming, can the Minister reassure us that we will come back to this at Third Reading?

Amendment 34F builds on the points I have just made. At the moment, the Schedule 3 power at least contains a safeguard so that any statements a detainee makes while detained cannot be used in court. The same protection is not given to information or documents that are confiscated. There should be protection for journalistic material and journalists’ sources, so that they cannot be exposed in court. I look forward to seeing the Minister’s amendments, which would resolve this problem.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I rise to support the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, at least in principle. There is clearly a conundrum here. You have people potentially being detained and questioned at ports, for up to a maximum of six hours. They may be in possession of documents that are genuinely confidential journalistic material—for example, information about journalistic sources—or they may be legal documents, subject to legal privilege. As this amendment suggests, however, to allow someone to refuse to hand over the documents or information on the basis that this is what they contain, would be open to abuse by foreign spies, or people who have adverse intentions towards the United Kingdom. There is a dilemma between protecting legally privileged material and confidential journalistic material, but at the same time—and within the timescales and practicalities of a Schedule 3 or Schedule 7 stop—finding some mechanism that protects those fundamental human rights and enables the Border Force to carry out its job in protecting the United Kingdom.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lord Paddick

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 14th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

Can I just say to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, that I was not trying to corner the market in protest? I was thinking that perhaps a lot of Members would not have the time to do that sort of thing.

[Lord Paddick]

I was not going to speak, and perhaps I should declare an interest, in that I have probably been to more protests than any other Member of this House, but mainly in uniform rather than to protest myself.

I am struggling to understand which part of the Bill the noble Baroness is concerned about that would directly impact on peaceful protest. That is why I hesitated to make a contribution.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

My concern is that this is repressive legislation, and we are already finding that peaceful protest is heavily affected by other parts of terrorism legislation. I therefore think that this would have an impact as well.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick]

I agree with the Minister on the civil liberties issue. The other problem is that taking a DNA sample would assist in identifying who the individual was only if that person’s DNA had already been taken and was on the database. I do not think we have many Russian spies’ DNA that we would then be able to use to identify that they were hostile actors by taking a DNA sample from them. It is only a small proportion of the UK population who have been arrested and convicted and whose DNA would therefore appear on the database. So, in addition to the infringement of civil liberties of completely innocent people having to provide DNA samples, the proposed measure would be of limited benefit because of the limited nature of the existing DNA database against which the DNA sample could be compared.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

I support the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. It is quite rare for me to agree with the noble Earl so I thought I would take this opportunity to do so. More importantly, there would be widespread condemnation of this particular move; it would be deeply unpopular. It would be hard enough getting ID card legislation through without a lot of resistance, and this idea would be even tougher.

Investigatory Powers (Codes of Practice and Miscellaneous Amendments) Order 2018

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lord Paddick

Wednesday 18th July 2018 Grand Committee

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

I absolutely did not mean to imply that. I understand how they are recruited: I did not mean that.

[Lord Paddick]

I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, but I think it is important that that misinterpretation is not put on it.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said, yes, the Explanatory Memorandum is clearly inadequate, as is the letter from the Minister. It is almost contemptible in failing to address these issues. Clearly, it would be different if the Grand Committee had known in advance about these independent inspections of the use of CHISs, and the particular importance that inspectors pay to juvenile CHISs; but the fact remains that these inspections are post-event. These are not procedures that could prevent a juvenile being put into a dangerous situation beforehand.

The managing of informants, or CHISs, as they are now called, is one of the most sensitive areas of policing, fraught with danger—and that is just for adults. Using juveniles as CHISs is an order of magnitude more dangerous, as other noble Lords have said. Young people, through their immaturity and inexperience, are far more at risk when being employed effectively as spies, as the noble Baroness said, in criminal enterprises. They are far more likely to make mistakes and to blow their cover than mature and experienced adults. Law enforcement and other public agencies have always recognised this, and that is why, in the police service, the extraordinary step—and it is extraordinary—of employing a juvenile CHIS has to be authorised by an assistant chief constable, a commander or a more senior officer.

Until now, the authority has lasted one month. Clearly, the longer the CHIS is undercover, the greater the chance of being exposed and the greater the potential psychological strain and therefore risk of harm the young person might be subjected to. For that to be extended to four months without an officer of such seniority being asked to renew that authority is putting the young person in grave danger, in my personal and professional judgment. These decisions were always taken with the greatest care and consideration, and it was ensured that the case for engaging and renewing was taken by a very senior officer, several levels above the investigating officer, and therefore with objectivity and independence, crucial to ensure the safety of that young person.

The world is a much more dangerous place than it was when I was a police officer, let alone a detective chief inspector. As the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, has said, the Explanatory Memorandum talks about child exploitation, terrorism and gang and drug crime involving more and more young people. There is a real danger that juvenile CHISs could become victims of child sexual exploitation, or the discipline meted out to members of gangs by other members of the same gang, including sexual assault, rape and being stabbed in the leg. These levels of violence among juveniles were rare in my time as a police officer but are now far more common.

At a time when the threat to CHISs is increasing and the threat to an immature and inexperienced CHIS is even greater, the Government are seeking to reduce the safeguards for these vulnerable young people. That is unacceptable. I do not want it on my conscience that a juvenile CHIS has been killed or seriously injured as a result of relaxing the necessary safeguards that are in place at this time. I seriously ask the Government to rethink this provision, not least because the consultation on these changes does not appear to have included organisations or specialists in the welfare of children such as those who work with gangs, ex-gang members, or child psychologists.

Given more notice and time and at a different point in the parliamentary timetable, I would have prayed against this provision and divided the House. It is not too late for the Government to withdraw this order, at least until the Minister has satisfied herself that appropriate advice has been taken on the potential risks associated with these changes.