Armed Forces: Capability

Baroness Jolly Excerpts

Thursday 12th January 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jolly (LD)]

My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, for the opportunity to engage in this discussion about the future. I also acknowledge the work that our Armed Forces carry out on our behalf, away from home and here in the UK, day in and day out, with little or no complaint or question. We also need to thank their families who are their rock and their support. As a team, they are the best.

The picture is not particularly rosy. The current international situation is becoming less stable and predictable. The post-Cold War global order may be at risk. Institutions such as NATO and the EU are weaker and global threats to the UK are increasing. Russia has re-emerged as a conventional and strategic antagonist. Right now all eyes are on the US, but the President-elect needs to be our ally and we should be his.

Unconventional terrorist threats continue, requiring international co-operation. In addition, climate change and mass migration are growing issues, which may effectively be tackled only multilaterally. Within this context, our Armed Forces do not currently have the capability to address the range of threats. Spending is down across NATO and the UK conventional Armed Forces are the smallest in the P5—and, of course, there is the Brexit factor to consider, which reduces our buying power.

Technologically and in terms of equipment, we do not necessarily hold an advantage. To ensure that the UK is able to insure itself in an unstable world, while promoting stability, trade and liberal values overseas, we must do everything possible to preserve and build our alliances and international institutions, while re-evaluating current defence policy in light of fast-changing global circumstances. New strategies should be developed to stay ahead of adversaries, not a commitment to fighting yesterday’s war.

In a globalised world, the UK Armed Forces will need the ability to deploy rapidly and take quick and parallel action across the globe. There is also a need to have sufficient conventional capabilities to be able to respond to any situation without having to resort to nuclear deterrence—short of course of the threat of nuclear attack.

The rise of hybrid warfare, cyberattacks on western interests and large-scale online assaults on allied nations’ systems mean that cyberspace should be considered an additional, non-kinetic strategic space. Informational systems and institutions must develop resilience against cyberattacks and the effects of anti-satellite warfare. Lawfare—the strategy of using law rather than traditional means to achieve an operational objective—is likely to be used more prominently.

On a more specific level, the UK must retain the ability to respond to any Russian attempt to test NATO’s commitment to Article 5 defence of the Baltics and other allied countries and interests in a resolute but proportionate way. To preserve the domestic and global economy, the UK must have the ability to ensure safe and open trading routes across the global commons, especially in the South China Sea and the Arabian Gulf.

The challenges faced by the UK are global, and require close co-operation with allies. These include the ongoing threat of foreign-initiated and foreign-inspired domestic terrorism, global terrorism, the migrant and refugee crises, climate change, and countering piracy. UK deployments of the early 21st century have largely been asymmetrical conflicts, with elements of peacekeeping, counterterror and nation building. UK defence policy may have focused on specialising in this operational environment at the expense of other capabilities. It should be reassessed in the light of future conflicts and not only in the light of counterterror operations.

In 2015, our defence spending was equivalent to about £46.5 billion, or 2.05% of GDP. In 2015-16, 56,860 UK Armed Forces members were deployed around the world. In April 2016, the number of regulars was 151,000, with 84,000 reserves—the smallest force of the UNSC P5. This was a reduction on the previous year.

Just before Christmas, General Sir Richard Barrons produced a private memorandum for the Secretary of State for Defence criticising the state of UK defence policy. Some of the key criticisms were that the MoD was working to “preserve the shop window” while critical technical and logistical capabilities had been “iteratively stripped out”. Sir Richard said that there was no military plan to defend the UK in a conventional conflict. He wrote:

“Counter-terrorism is the limit of up-to-date plans and preparations to secure UK airspace, waters and territory … There is no top to bottom command and control mechanism, preparation or training in place for the UK armed forces”,

to defend home territory. I would add that recruitment is sluggish at best, in particular in specialists and engineers, both regulars and reserves. I would expect the MoD to be defensive about the letter, but I am sure that many will see a grain or two of truth in it.

So what might the future look like? We should by then have cemented our defence relationships with key EU states, for security as much as defence. The challenges faced by the UK are global and require close co-operation with allies. These include the ongoing threat of foreign-initiated and foreign-inspired domestic terrorism, global terrorism and, as I mentioned, the migrant and refugee crises and countering piracy. More specifically, the UK must retain the ability to respond to any attempt to test NATO’s commitment to Article 5 defence of the Baltics or other Allied countries.

When the 2020 SDSR team sits down to start its planning, it will need to look at our defence policy in the light of possible future conflicts—which I have highlighted—and not only in the light of counterterror operations. With a clearer idea of our economy in the post-EU world, there may be a need to review our expenditure commitments in 2015 against the pressure to spend more.

What could be done to mitigate some of these issues? Investment in research and development. Falling behind adversaries in terms of numbers or spending may be fine if the UK is ahead technologically but will be a disaster if it is outnumbered and outgunned. The US invests a huge amount of money in its defence research programmes. We need to increase our work in conjunction with both universities and the private sector. The defence industry should become a sizeable part of the soon-to-be-published industrial strategy.

Perhaps we should consider less future spending on enormously expensive pieces of equipment. Our adversaries have only to knock out one, with comparatively cheap munitions, to hurt us enormously. We should spend more on equipment and forces prepared for a range of scenarios up to and including large-scale mobile warfare. Alliances for intelligence need to be secured. We need to review and increase cyber defences and technologies. This will help to deter our opponents and ensure that military forces can be deployed with maximum effect and efficiency. We still need more efficient procurement. The UK has smaller physical capabilities than comparable countries but spends more money on defence.

We were top of the soft power league both in 2010 and 2015. This position was deserved and in our current situation is no bad thing, but we need to use our diplomatic and soft power wisely to ensure that our allies take defence seriously. Collective self-defence is cheaper and more secure than all the alternatives.