United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Debate between Baroness Humphreys and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 26th October 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, it is always somewhat intimidating to follow an introduction such as the one we have just heard from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. I think I heard him correctly when he said at one point that he did not have a monopoly of wisdom. That was the only bit of his speech that I really disagreed with.

As we heard from the noble and learned Lord and from the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, we need a mechanism to ensure that the common frameworks are at the start of the process before market access principles are applied. How exactly that can be finessed between the menu of options we have in front of us, with these and other amendments today, can be a question for discussion—as indeed the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, indicated. But, essentially, the role of the common frameworks undoubtedly needs a statutory basis. The consensual mode of working that we have seen via the common frameworks surely has to take priority over other modes of rule setting, and a failure-to-agree process—which must be exhausted before other action is taken—needs to be in the Bill, as it is in the common frameworks mechanism.

Like other Members of your Lordships’ House, I was involved in the work of the European Parliament. I was a party functionary rather than an elected Member. Through that I witnessed the discussions, arguments, concessions, joint working, co-determination, consultation, redrafting and mutual respect that went into the emergence of EU regulations. There was no simple imposition by one all-powerful body. Negotiation and agreement were needed between the European Council, the Commission and the European Parliament for action to be taken. As the noble Lord, Lord Inglewood, mentioned, some really big decisions were referred to the IGC—the Intergovernmental Conference. It was a way of working that produced outcomes to which everyone could sign up. Now, consensus building might have taken time; there was the odd time when clocks were stopped at midnight, which we may have to do again today, but the position reached each time meant that all the parties involved could live with the resulting decision.

My view—and I think the view of all of us—is that the internal market process ought to be replicating, albeit on a smaller and much easier scale, those sorts of international and intranational methods that allow for joint working and consensus building as the prime route for decision-making. Of course, some issues will prove not to be amenable to consensus—this too was mentioned earlier—in which case there has to be an agreed adjudication and decision-making mechanism in place, but with the common frameworks procedures exhausted before any of that has to be set in train.

I turn to Clause 51, which has just been mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. This is understandably of major concern to the devolved legislatures and their Governments. In three quite simple, short subsections it amends the Scotland Act 1988, the Government of Wales Act 2006 and the Northern Ireland Act 1998—and all without a word of warning, far less the agreement of any of those elected authorities whose established settlements it undermines. Few of us expected to read a clause like that, dropped into a Bill on a quite different subject, which would blatantly amend these long-developed settlements.

We heard from the noble Lord, Lord Dunlop, in the previous group and we will hear from him shortly in this group. I hope he will not mind if I quote from what he said at Second Reading. He said:

“Devolution is now integral to the UK’s constitutional arrangements. At a time … when it has never been more important for central and devolved Governments to work together … to risk destabilising those arrangements seems careless, to say the least.”


He went on to ask whether

“we want our country’s future to be all about endless intergovernmental competition and conflict or about co-operation and confidence”.

His preference, of course, was for

“a modern, thriving, forward-thinking and inclusive UK union … to look and feel like a joint endeavour”.—[Official Report, 19/10/20; col. 1336.]

That is what this group of amendments is seeking to achieve, but it is not where the Government are going at present. They seem to be thinking of asking us to pass this Bill without legislative consent from the very authorities whose powers are being diminished. I cannot believe that the Minister wants such an outcome, but how seriously does he take this? Is he really happy to completely override the Sewel convention, set aside the success of the common frameworks process and challenge the devolution settlements that have served us so well for so long?

[Baroness Humphreys (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I will speak to the amendment to Clause 51 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, to which I have added my name. The amendment opposes this clause standing part of the Bill. In a Bill that stands accused of breaching international law and impacting on devolution settlements, this clause is probably one of the most harmful, in the power that it hands to Ministers, and through them the Executive, to make regulations.

As the Explanatory Memorandum explains, regulations made by Ministers under these powers are to be made by statutory instrument and may be used to amend, repeal or modify the effect of legislation, including Acts of Parliament, which of course include the Government of Wales Act 2006—and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, has just pointed out, all without consultation with the devolved Administrations.

However, the prime function of this clause, and the whole of Part 7, is to ensure that all clauses of this Bill become protected enactments. It neuters the powers of the devolved legislatures, ensuring that they are unable to put forward Acts in their own Parliaments, in their own areas of devolved competence, to modify this Bill if or when it becomes an Act. This is almost unprecedented. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has already told us that, since devolution, the only other examples of protected enactments covering all sections of an Act are the Human Rights Act and the Civil Contingencies Act.

Even in the case of the withdrawal agreement Bill, which was initially intended as a protected enactment, the UK Government produced a clause-by-clause analysis justifying protected enactment status, which eventually resulted in only a few clauses being protected. Why is this approach not applicable to this Bill? The Welsh Government have asked for a clause-by-clause discussion of why each clause should be protected. I would be grateful if the Minister could outline the Government’s response to this request.

Up to now, the Government have not produced any detailed justification of why protected enactment status is necessary, which exemplifies their cavalier attitude to devolution in general. In Wales this is seen as an assault on our devolution settlement, heralding the return of direct rule from England.

We are faced here with another example, as with the Covid-19 response in England, of Whitehall insisting on managing from the centre rather than understanding and empowering local decision-making. The powers of our devolved legislatures and regional mayors, although limited, seem to be resented and distrusted by the Government, and the automatic response seems to be to claw back control to the centre. My fear is that this Government’s unthinking, knee-jerk reactions all add to the perception that the union is not working for the devolved nations and, as I have said in previous contributions, this is encouraging an increasing percentage of people in Wales to conclude that the future lies in independence.

My colleagues and I on these Liberal Democrat Benches want to see true devolution of power to all four nations, including England, in a federal UK where each nation is equal to the other and treated with equal respect. For our party, the union is important because, as federalists we know, that without a union, federalism cannot exist, but we also know, that without federalism, this union will not exist into the future.

Clause 51 is truly indicative of the UK Government’s attitude towards the devolved parliaments and their powers and the desperate need they seem to have to curtail those powers by a show of strength. It is vital to the devolved nations that this clause does not stand part of this Bill, and if the noble Baroness is minded to reintroduce a similar amendment on Report, she will again have my support.

Parliamentary Constituencies Bill

Debate between Baroness Humphreys and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 10th September 2020 Grand Committee

[Baroness Humphreys (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I begin by apologising for not being able to take part at Second Reading. I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, for tabling this important amendment. As the Committee heard in debates on other amendments on Tuesday, the Bill removes the present power of Parliament to approve the Boundary Commission’s proposals at the end of the process of reviewing boundaries in the UK. As it stands, the process allows MPs only to ratify or block the commission’s proposals, not to amend them. Even this can still be viewed as politicians being able to influence the final decision, as happened in, for example, 1969 and 2001. However much we deplore these situations and others like them, that is what current legislation allows. However, the removal of this power from parliamentarians and, therefore, the introduction of automatic review implementations, has been described by MPs as a “power grab” by the Executive from the legislature and a constitutional outrage. It is seen by many as another attempt to silence or sideline Parliament.

The UK’s four Boundary Commissions pride themselves on the impartiality of their reviews, as they work within the parameters set by various Acts of Parliament. However, up to now that impartiality has ended when the review arrives in Parliament for approval, as history has shown. It is therefore probably right that the UK follow in the footsteps of countries such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand in removing politicians from the process. After all, during the process of a review, politicians and political parties have the ability to express their views in the submissions they make to the commissions, and those submissions are given due regard.

However, this is the most unequal of changes. The Bill takes away the rights of parliamentarians, but the right of the Executive to appoint members to the Boundary Commission remains intact, leaving the impartiality balance skewed in favour of the Government. This is a situation I do not wish to see in Wales—a future Welsh Boundary Commission, influenced by the UK Executive, could hardly claim to be impartial. If the system is to be seen as fair and impartial, all political influence must be avoided. The noble and learned Lord’s amendment achieves just that. If the Government are reluctant to accept it, the accusations of a power grab by the Executive over the legislature will be seen to have substance. On these Benches, we support measures to ensure the independence and impartiality of the Boundary Commission.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab) [V]]

Diolch yn fawr. It is very nice to have so many Welsh people speaking in this debate. I think it would be a brave Minister who rejected the advice contained in this amendment from a former and very eminent Lord Chief Justice—and one, I might add, whose term of office coincided, I think, with that of Chris Grayling as the Secretary of State for Justice, although why I should make that particular point I cannot think at the moment .

It is clear that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, knows a thing or two about the relationship between a Secretary of State and our independent judiciary and legal system. He has no doubt seen at close quarters how decisions are made or influenced and is able to draw on this experience in his advice to the Committee and in the amendment that he has moved today.

The amendment covers two points. First, and crucially, it effectively takes the appointment of commission members out of the hands of an elected politician—indeed, a member of the Cabinet—and places oversight in the hands of the Speaker and the Lord Chief Justice. Secondly, it makes the appointments non-renewable to ensure that Boundary Commission members can carry out their function with absolutely no glance over their shoulder at the possible renewal of their mandate. As the noble and learned Lord says, this fits in well with the Constitution Committee’s view that if we are to move to automatic implementation of Boundary Commission recommendations, this will protect against undue political influence only if the commissioners themselves are genuinely impartial and completely independent of political influence, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, also said .

In particular, the Constitution Committee recommended that commissioners should be appointed for a single, non-renewable term; the Secretary of State should appoint only from names recommended by the selection panel; and the deputy chair of each commission should sit on the selection panel.

The issue of independence was similarly stressed in a useful briefing note by Dr Alan Renwick and Professor Robert Hazell of the UCL Constitution Unit in their submission to the Commons Bill Committee, where they stressed the need to:

“Protect the Boundary Commissions from Government Interference”—


where, as they say,

“automatic implementation is clearly appropriate only if the review process itself is genuinely independent of any improper interference. If that condition is not met—if, for example, government ministers can unduly influence the appointment of Boundary Commission members or the conduct of reviews—then the independence requirement is violated again.”

The view of those two eminent academics is also that this amendment meets their benchmark for independence.

I would have hoped that we would not need to write such obvious safeguards into the law, but the recent effective removal of those whose advice does not gel with the Government gives one cause for concern. As was discussed earlier in the Chamber today, Tuesday’s news, on the very day of Sir Mark Sedwill’s departure, of the resignation of the head of the Government’s legal department, Sir Jonathan Jones, over his concerns about a threatened breach of the Northern Ireland Protocol, makes him the sixth senior Whitehall civil servant to resign this year. It sounds as if, “If you don’t say the right thing, you don’t stay.”

In a similar manner, recent appointments suggest that a certain push from No. 10 has magically seen Conservatives appointed to a range of positions: the aforementioned Chris Grayling to the National Portrait Gallery; and our own noble Baroness, Lady Harding, appointed as the effective chair of the National Institute for Health Protection, without any advertisement or selection process, and despite being neither a doctor nor a public health professional.

Angela Bray, a former Conservative MP, was suddenly appointed to VisitBritain as a board member. Sir Patrick McLoughlin, a former Conservative Party chair, is now to chair the British Tourist Authority. Nick de Bois will chair VisitEngland and David Ross, a major donor to the Conservative Party and to Boris Johnson’s leadership campaign, is now chair of the Royal Opera House. Political friends have been recently appointed to so-called independent departmental non-executive directorships.

It may well be that all these Conservatives were simply the absolute best, most experienced, most dynamic applicants for these various posts, and that such skills can never be found among Labour or Lib Dem activists, but it does feel as if appointments to important positions may be being handed out on a less than non-political basis. It is therefore crucial, if the Boundary Commission is to have the final say—unchallengeable in Parliament—that we have absolute confidence in the integrity and independence of its members and recommendations and in the appointment of those members.

I say again that I regret that we feel the need to legislate for this. I would have thought that our way of doing government would normally not need this to be written into legislation, but I believe we have to do it. I look forward, therefore, to the Minister’s response to this particular suggestion, and I hope very much that the Government will adopt the amendment and put it forward themselves on Report.

European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Debate between Baroness Humphreys and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued) & Report stage & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Tuesday 21st January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Humphreys (LD)]

My Lords, I have not added my name to this amendment but would like to register my support for it. Twelve months ago, to this week, Vaughan Gething, the Welsh Cabinet Secretary for Health and Social Services was asked: if the Senedd refused to grant consent to an Act of Parliament, could it be overruled by Westminster? His reply was interesting. He said that the ability of the UK Parliament to override a measure made in any part of the UK is one of the mischiefs in the UK’s constitution that needs fixing. I do not for a moment suggest that we begin the fixing process today, but I cite his words merely as a fairly accurate summing up of the situation in which we find ourselves today.

The exclusion of a reference to the status of the devolved Administrations from Clause 38 appears deliberate. It seems designed to ensure that the devolved Administrations have no role to play in the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. It enshrines, by this omission, the inequality of the power between the nations of the UK. The inclusion of Amendment 20 in Clause 38 would go some way to redress the balance and ensure that the devolved Administrations could represent the views of their respective nations in this massively important process.

I am a passionate advocate for the Senedd. I strongly believe in the principles of devolution, as do my colleagues on these Benches. The Senedd has given Wales a voice and a feeling of nationhood. The exclusion of this amendment could lead to the perception of both being taken away. Accepting this amendment would go some way to preventing those losses.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

I know it is not normal for me to speak at this moment, but I thought the Minister might want to reflect on this: having heard and followed this debate, the Welsh parliament has just voted not to give consent to the Bill.