Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill

Baroness Hoey Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 24th January 2023 Lords Chamber

Other amendments would require greater levels of transparency and accountability from those required to give information. In particular, I refer to Amendment 147 in the name of my noble friend Lord Hain, which is really about Operation Denton, which he will deal with in quite a detailed way. The amendment refers to the fact that Operation Denton, which is dealing with the Glenanne murders, is so well progressed, and has developed such strong levels of trust and confidence from the families, that it will cause undue stress for those families and unnecessary delays to the findings being released for this inquiry to be passed to the ICRIR. It is therefore important that Operation Denton be allowed to complete its work. Will the Minister go back and explore further the need to keep Operation Denton? Its work will conclude in 2024 and it has already done vital work in the whole area of review by Jon Boutcher, supported by all of those families and victims who are involved in it—I am aware of that from having talked to some of them.

[Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, first, I have a quick comment on the previous debate. Many noble Lords—in fact, nearly all—talked about the consensus in Northern Ireland opposing this legacy Bill. I just remind them that there may be consensus, but it is from very different points of view.

My Amendment 63, which is also in the name of the noble Lords, Lord Bew, Lord Godson and Lord Empey, is designed to narrow the criteria for a reinvestigation being started by the ICRIR. If the previous investigations listed in my amendment, such as by the HET or the PSNI’s Legacy Investigation Branch, and the stated need for the provision of “compelling new evidence”—a phrase that I remind noble Lords was thought necessary and appropriate for the overseas operation Act—are not added to the Bill, I have a very depressing prediction to make to your Lordships’ House. I think the ICRIR will end up reinvestigating many—indeed, every one—of the nearly 4,000 deaths. The cost will be billions of pounds, not the budgeted £250 million, and the process will last not for five years but for a decade or more, because this is where judicially led enquiries go, especially when internationalised. If the ICRIR, as suggested in the Minister’s letter to noble Lords on 17 January, is obliged to act simply on allegations, that can be the only consequence.

Legacy practitioners—which is the new force in Northern Ireland, not the victims’ relatives as the Bill believes, I believe, naively—using the concept of collusion, or “collusive behaviours”, the version relied on now by the Police Ombudsman, can design a case to investigate every death. Collusion can be alleged in relation to all loyalist killings and, indeed, all republican ones, by virtue of the use of security force agents in both paramilitary groups, let alone alleged investigatory failings that Strasbourg complains of.

When I spoke at Second Reading of the overseas operations Bill, almost exactly two years ago on 20 January 2021, I said:

“Let us not forget that the only cases now involving veterans are ones pending in Northern Ireland, which concern events of 50 years ago or more. For that reason, we need to get on with a Northern Ireland equivalent law”.—[Official Report, 20/1/21; col. 1236.]


Of course, extending that Act to cover Operation Banner, as I suggested then, and others, would have dealt with the issue in hand, rather than this increasingly complex confection of ICRIR.

No murder case in England would ever see this level of reinvestigation, and certainly not of funding. Have we learned no lessons from the Iraq historical allegations, and solicitor Phil Shiner? Let us remember, as was mentioned earlier, that it is good to remind people of who actually died in the three decades of the Northern Ireland terrorist campaign. Nearly 4,000 persons died violently; 60% of the deaths were caused by republicans and 30% by loyalists. The state—police officers and soldiers—was responsible for approximately 10% of the killings. Very few of those state killings were unlawful, as the force used was not unreasonable, but all the republican and loyalist murders were most certainly unlawful.

The rewriting of history is about the complexity of the Troubles being distorted into a single concern with state killings, which of course republicans and their allies then use, slowly, case by case, to construct the narrative of the IRA being somehow a popular resistance force that had no alternative to killing. The Committee of Ministers at the Council of Europe, when enforcing the ECHR judgments on the so-called McKerr line of cases, refers only to killings

“either during security force operations or in circumstances giving rise to suspicion of collusion in their deaths by security force personnel.”

So Strasbourg has effectively accepted a nationalist perspective on the matter for the past 20 years, and there has been no public challenge by our Government. Some 90% of victims’ families are thus being told by the human rights court that they do not really matter. They are not wanted in the world of lawfare; they are an embarrassment.

When ICRIR opens for business, I believe the following will happen: there will be a smattering of requests for reviews from very distressed relatives; the IRA Army Council will almost certainly not be tempted by the immunity opportunity; and loyalists may not know how to respond. The vast majority of requests will be from legacy practitioners, once again, who will demand rigorous reviews—in fact, new criminal investigations—of hundreds of cases on the flimsiest of allegations, unless curbed by our amendment. The Northern Ireland Office has to brace itself for the judicial reviews and civil suits that will keep on coming.

Legacy has been a poisoned chalice since the Belfast agreement, and it is worth remembering that the 1998 document never envisaged what has since happened. About victims it said simply:

“The achievement of a peaceful and just society would be the true memorial to the victims of violence.”


The United Kingdom failed to deal with legacy, although we now have something close to peace. There has been no substitution; nobody has brought forward a real legacy plan since the Eames-Bradley report of 2009, which did have some elements of legacy. The only credible initiative was from former Chief Constable Sir Hugh Orde’s Historical Enquiries Team within the PSNI. But that was closed down because a radical academic, given access, misconstrued what was happening, and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary joined in the unwarranted criticism of the PSNI and HET—I believe to the anger of Sir Hugh.

This amendment is designed to stop mission creep by the ICRIR. It needs to be accepted because, without a statutory mention that narrows access and prohibits repeat applications, the commission’s remit will grow, just as the police ombudsman’s did. We need finality and I hope that the Minister will respond in detail to my speech and those of other noble Lords on this very important issue.

[Lord Eames (CB)]

My Lords, in his response to the previous debate on the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, I fear that the Minister may have misunderstood some of the phrases I used in my own remarks. I do not in the slightest attach any personal criticism to him for the failure of the amendments we asked for from the Government on a previous occasion. I hold him in the highest possible regard personally for all he has done for Northern Ireland, and I hope that that respect is, despite the remarks, mutual.

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There is a process that is working for families and is a model for how to deal with the legacy issue, and that is Operation Kenova. I and other noble Lords will be speaking at greater length on Kenova when further amendments are debated, notably in the next group. Many victims and survivors will be very suspicious of a process that seems have as its starting point mechanisms to shut down evidence finding and information gathering, and I am afraid that this Amendment 63 is badly flawed for that reason.

[Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)]

I accept part of what the noble Lord is saying about how the victims feel about what has happened in the past and the need to understand more. However, does he not agree that the reality is that for the people from the terrorist organisations who perpetrated these acts, there are no records, as was said earlier, and there is nothing that at this stage will ever lead to anyone ending up in court and being found guilty? Indeed, many of those people who were involved with some of these killings have in fact been given letters of freedom and have been given immunity.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

The point I am making is that there were files, and Operation Kenova has had access to those files. They are held principally by the security services but, under very strict conditions and with trust, the investigation has been able to retrieve information on a sensible basis without compromising the work of the security services, and that has been of great comfort for victims. That is my point and my concern about the noble Baroness’s amendment.

I turn to my Amendment 147. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Blair, both distinguished former Metropolitan Police Commissioners, together with the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, a distinguished former Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, for adding their names. The amendment is designed to ensure, as my noble friend Lady Ritchie has already argued, that the Bill does not prevent the continuation of the review into the Glenanne gang series, known as Operation Denton, which is expected to conclude and report in spring 2024—that is, after the Bill could have received Royal Assent.

What is known as the Glenanne gang series includes a significant number of murders and other terrorist offences committed in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland during the Troubles between around 1972 and 1978. The cases within the Glenanne gang series are connected by common features, such as individuals, weapons, areas or targets involved. In some of these cases, direct evidence has already demonstrated the collusion of police or security force personnel.

Various parties, including families, have significant concerns about the rigour and professionalism of previous investigations into these cases and have for many years sought a comprehensive, overarching, thematic analysis of the Glenanne series and the extent of any state collusion. On 5 July 2019, the Barnard judgment set out the requirement for an independent review of the activities of the Glenanne gang, a statutory requirement in accordance with Section 35(5) of the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002 and Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The chief constable of the PSNI requested that the former chief constable of Bedfordshire Police, Jon Boutcher, carry out this review. It was named Operation Denton, commenced in February 2020 and is part of the cases being conducted under the umbrella of Operation Kenova.

To date, Operation Denton has identified 127 murders resulting from 93 separate incidents connected to this series. It has met and is supporting families of the victims. It has had success in securing the release of material from the Republic of Ireland through lobbying for and securing the introduction of secondary legislation by the Irish Government to ensure access to records held by the Garda to assist the review. It is anticipated that Operation Denton will conclude and report publicly and to families no later than spring 2024.

Operation Denton is so well progressed and has developed such strong levels of trust and confidence with the families that it would cause unnecessary delay to the review—and, crucially, undue stress to families, who have suffered grievously already—for this inquiry to be passed to the ICRIR. It is important therefore that Operation Denton be allowed to complete its work. I hope that the Minister, who I see is nodding, will confirm that in his reply to this group of amendments. The lawyers and NGOs supporting the Glenanne series’ victims and families have indicated that they will legally challenge any decision to stop Operation Denton and will not co-operate with the ICRIR, such is their confidence in the work currently being done.

In conclusion, it is almost certain that Operation Denton’s work will be completed and families informed of its findings before the ICRIR is open for referrals. I therefore very much hope that the Minister will give the Committee the assurance that I seek and the absolute assurance that the victims desire.

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[Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 34 about human rights, to which the noble Lords, Lord Godson, Lord Empey and Lord Bew, have added their names.

Human rights are usually invoked by people in support of their political position, without actually admitting or understanding that there is always a conflict of rights in most situations. This could not be more true of legacy in Northern Ireland. One right is always mentioned—Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights on the right to life—but of course there are other ECHR rights that should arise in a legacy debate. Article 6 is the right to a fair trial, which has implications for those whom the ICRIR will consider in its reinvestigations and public reports. Article 8 is the right to respect for private and family life, which applies to an even wider range of people caught up in every Troubles death, especially those who served in our Armed Forces and the police. Article 10 concerns freedom of expression and the right to a reputation, and this applies to another group, including those who are critical of lawfare for different reasons but who fail to get much reported by our state broadcaster in Northern Ireland, BBC Northern Ireland.

For over 20 years, following the McKerr judgment of the European Court in May 2001, the slogan “Not Article 2 Compliant” has been thrown around, not just by the advocates of lawfare but by too many figures in the criminal justice system. In the McKerr case—he was a member of the IRA killed on active service in November 1982 by members of the RUC—Strasbourg invented a new right. The court did not say that the UK had violated McKerr’s substantive Article 2 right to life, but the seven human rights judges said that a new right had been violated due to an alleged inadequate investigation. That right became known as “Article 2 procedural”. The UK was required to continue to investigate and to ensure that

“the next-of-kin of the victim must be involved in the procedure”.

I am sorry to say that, in the context of Northern Ireland and terrorism, there are some relatives who might have an interest greater than justice, such as discrediting the way police officers and soldiers resisted republican and loyalist terrorism during the decades of the Troubles—and Strasbourg does not deign to notice that.

There is a second McKerr line of cases in the House of Lords, and later the Supreme Court, which the Committee on the Administration of Justice and academics never mention. On 2 October 2000, the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force. The House of Lords, in another McKerr judgment in 2004, said that Article 2 compliant investigations did not apply to deaths before that October 2000 date. This position was left in place in domestic law by our judges in the McCaughey case in 2011, the Keyu case, a Malaysian case, in 2015, and the Finucane case in 2019. Then, in December 2021, in a key Northern Ireland case called McQuillan, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule of no Human Rights Act requirement for such investigations —which, essentially, were reinvestigations—before October 2000, with a qualification, based on some controversial Strasbourg jurisprudence, that a 10-year pushback was permissible. The helpful headline in the Times Law Report read, “Northern Irish police are not required to re-investigate incidents from the Troubles”.

Solicitor Patrick Finucane was murdered by loyalists in February 1989, some 12 years before the human rights commencement date. His killers have been convicted but the need for reinvestigation—a public inquiry, as Strasbourg and his family demand—remains an open question. Some human rights lawyers query whether Strasbourg’s 10-year rule is even arguable under the Human Rights Act 1998. If the Supreme Court judgments are relied on to turn down a Finucane public inquiry, and the Supreme Court said that the Government, for various other reasons, were not obliged to have one, the matter should be over and we would save up to £100 million. For this reason, I believe that the Government need to beef up their responses at Strasbourg —I note what the Minister said in answer to the previous debate about the Northern Ireland Office making overtures; it would be helpful if we could see some of those—because they have to start ignoring what is seen as an international lynch mob currently baying at the Northern Ireland Office over the Bill.

I look forward to the Minister explaining how, given the McQuillan judgment, much of Article 2 procedure now applies to the nearly 4,000 Troubles killings. In 2021, in a PSNI statement just after the judgment, Assistant Chief Constable Jonathan Roberts, who well understood the import of McQuillan, wrote:

“The Police Service welcome the clear legal ruling that there are no legal obligations arising from Article 2 ECHR to investigate these cases”,


including McQuillan. He continued:

“We will now carefully consider the judgments and their impact on the legacy caseload.”


Sadly, nothing visible has happened since that.

I am sure that, in answer to my amendment, the Minister will say that Section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 means that all ECHR articles would apply to the ICRIR’s work. If the Government are being pushed by the CAJ and Strasbourg into Article 2 procedure—as they have been in Northern Ireland Amendment 76, which the Government will move—by adding criminal investigations to the review process, why can they not also say in the Bill, using the Minister’s phrase, that other ECHR articles, particularly Articles 6, 8 and 10, will be in play?

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to support the amendments. First, I was struck during the debate by this distinction between investigations and reviews. Everyone agrees that investigations should follow but the question is whether there should be prosecutions. There are arguments around whether a review is really an investigation—do the families really get the facts? If we could agree that an investigation was not always followed by a prosecution, this may be something that we could start to agree on.

Secondly, it seems that there is a broad consensus that, as an approach, Kenova is good. The standards of connection to the families and of investigation have been supported by the people who most need this—namely, those who have lost family members.

Finally, there is a bit of a definitional issue around the difference between a review and an investigation, and we will have to address that at some point. One of the things about an investigation is that, obviously, there is always an interview with the suspect. It has to be conducted by the rules of evidence and there is the potential for a charge at the end. One of the dilemmas with any review, including Kenova, is that a review can consider material that is not evidence. I will make two broad points in that area.

First, as we have heard, Kenova is looking at intelligence material from other countries as well as from within the UK. It may be able to look at such material but it will not be able to quote it or quote it in a court. Secondly, it is impossible to use intercept material—intercepted communications, usually by telephone—as evidence in the UK unless it has been obtained in a jurisdiction in which it is legally possible to use it as evidence. It is ironic, but that is our system. Reviews are able to consider telephone communications that may be indicative of, but not evidence of, certain actions or charges. That dilemma has to be resolved at some point because although the reviewer may be led by such communications to conclude that one particular person was responsible or a crime was committed in a certain way, they cannot quote it in a court of law—it regularly now has to be held back in serious and organised crime and terrorism cases. The only information that can be quoted in a court is the fact that the telephone call occurred, the time it occurred, who was at either end of the communication, and, more recently, where they were when they made the call, because there is information on mobiles. I raise this not because it is an easy answer for the Minister to give but because it is fair to put that dilemma in this domain.