UK Strategy Towards the Arctic (International Relations and Defence Committee Report) Debate

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Department: Leader of the House

UK Strategy Towards the Arctic (International Relations and Defence Committee Report)

Baroness Helic Excerpts
Thursday 9th January 2025

(1 day, 14 hours ago)

Lords Chamber
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Baroness Helic Portrait Baroness Helic (Con)
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My Lords, I welcome this excellent and timely report. It confirms an urgent reality: the Arctic is no longer a frozen wilderness; it is the new frontier where climate change meets great power competition. Melting ice is reshaping trade routes, exposing vast reserves of oil, gas and rare earth metals essential to modern industry.

According to scientists, in 1987, planet earth experienced a global climate shift of unprecedented scale—a major step change or regime shift in earth’s biophysical systems, from the upper atmosphere to the depths of the ocean and from the Arctic to Antarctica. That very year, and with this unbeknown to him, Mikhail Gorbachev, speaking in Murmansk, envisioned the Arctic as a

“zone of peace and co-operation”.

Yet, under Vladimir Putin, the Arctic has become central to Russia’s quest to reclaim superpower status.

Today, Russia dominates the region, with its fleet of icebreakers, military bases and infrastructure along the Northern Sea Route. This route is not only economically vital to Moscow but geopolitically significant, enabling the rapid movement of its naval fleets and offering a platform for cyberattacks, disinformation and sabotage. We were recently made aware and reminded of Russian efforts and continuous attempts to sow discord across Europe, which is a stark warning of the risks posed by Russia’s Arctic pre-eminence.

Equally concerning is China’s growing interest in the Arctic. Although over 800 nautical miles from the Arctic Circle, Beijing now calls itself a “near-Arctic state”. By this logic, half of Europe, including the United Kingdom, could claim the same title, but China is far more than a passive observer. Between January 2022 and June 2023, 234 Chinese-owned firms registered in the Russian-controlled Arctic. China has built docks, railway lines and infrastructure in key Arctic ports, working hand in hand with Russia to consolidate control over energy supplies and resources. This partnership underscores the deepening Sino-Russian alignment in the Arctic—a development that we cannot ignore.

I will not comment on the US President-elect’s aspirations when it comes to Canada or Greenland, but we can be grateful that what Mr Trump is saying is not being uttered by Mr Putin, as I imagine there would be much chatter about Article 5 today. The strategic significance of the Arctic is clear; our collective response ought to be too. Although the UK is geographically distant, it is strategically intertwined with the High North. Securing NATO’s northern flank, ensuring freedom of navigation and maintaining vital energy imports from Norway all depend on our active engagement in this region.

I therefore welcome the report’s recommendations, in particular on partnering with businesses managing critical infrastructure, such as subsea cables and pipelines, to protect against emerging threats; on preventing unregulated fishing and supporting the creation of marine protected areas; and on its call to appoint an Arctic envoy or ambassador, and strengthen co-operation with other observer states on the Arctic Council while respecting the leadership of Arctic nations. The rules-based international order must shape the future of the Arctic, and I also welcome calls for a new international polar code to establish clear guidelines.

I also note the recommendation to engage with China on scientific research and climate change. Although it is important to engage with China on these issues, we must approach this cautiously, with a clear-eyed understanding of the challenges posed by the evolving partnership between Russia and China.

Part of this is a matter of our military capability. While our Armed Forces are not short of tasks, they are short of capability. They rely on a single polar-capable vessel, HMS “Protector”, which is regularly deployed between the Arctic and the Antarctic and has faced technical challenges. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, will be aware of this, and I hope the Minister agrees that we must make sure that his recommendations, made in the SDR, are not constrained by defence spending commitments or the lack of them. Defence spending is not a luxury; it is a necessity. Without investment, in this case in polar assets, we cannot safeguard our interests or support our allies.

As we rightly focus on the Arctic, we must do everything to strengthen existing transit routes, ensuring their stability and security, as the best way of improving the stability and security of global shipping. It is astonishing that a non-state terrorist group can disrupt global shipping in the Red Sea, and the same can be said about piracy off the Horn of Africa and in the Strait of Malacca. Moreover, closer to home, shifting global shipping from the Suez Canal to the Northern Sea Route would carry serious geopolitical risks. Increased reliance on this route could deepen Europe’s dependence on Russia, in the same way that gas dependence has, limiting our collective ability to counter Moscow’s choices.

The Arctic is not someone else’s problem; it is ours too. Climate change, great power competition and emerging threats in this region will define global security in the years to come. The United Kingdom must remain not only present but relevant, to safeguard NATO’s northern flank and to protect our own national security. This demands proactive engagement, investment in polar capabilities and support for our allies.