Afghanistan Debate

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Department: Leader of the House
Wednesday 18th August 2021

(2 years, 8 months ago)

Lords Chamber
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Baroness Helic Portrait Baroness Helic (Con) [V]
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My Lords, I start by paying tribute to all those who served in Afghanistan, those who lost their lives and those who were injured. I agree that this is a disaster. The coalition’s withdrawal has created a long-term problem: a major humanitarian crisis with no end in sight and an ongoing risk of Afghanistan once again becoming a terrorists’ safe haven. I welcome the decision to receive 20,000 refugees, but, given the urgency of the situation, I fear that 5,000 is insufficient for the next year. When people face death, the prospect of asylum in a year’s time is not much hope. Most Afghans will stay in Afghanistan, and 20,000 is less than 0.1% of the population.

The world should open its doors to refugees with generosity, but we cannot empty the country. What is going to happen to the Afghans left behind? Humanitarian aid will be necessary. We cut our aid funding for Afghanistan by 78% this year. That has to be reversed fast. Supporting women and girls with education and healthcare will be more important now than ever, whether they are in refugee camps or in towns and villages throughout Afghanistan. This will be far harder than before, but we must find a way.

We must also ask how we ended up here. How did an army collapse overnight? The withdrawal of American troops was a severe blow to capability and morale. The importance of the 2,500 American soldiers far outweighed their number. Their presence was a sign of the weight of global backing behind the Afghans on the front line. They were a crucial buttress for the Afghan national army—a core part of its design. Their withdrawal left it unsupported, demoralised and ready to crash down.

Even more worrying than the effect of the withdrawal on the Afghan national army was its apparently similar effect on NATO and the international coalition. I understand that the MoD tried to rally international partners to take up America’s role. That that proved impossible does not reflect well on the strength of NATO and on our ability to act abroad or without the US by our side. Only five months after it was published, the integrated review is out of date. It said:

“We will continue to support stability in Afghanistan, as part of a wider coalition”


and that providing support to the Government of Afghanistan would be a key part of our counterterror strategy. The Government of Afghanistan are no more, the wider coalition has collapsed, and our influence in Washington seems alarmingly limited, as is our influence in Europe.

The past week has been the most extraordinary of the reversals. The Afghan Government were flawed but they were democratic. The direction of travel was right. Now they have been swept aside and all the gains of the past 20 years could go into reverse. As we approach the 20th anniversary of 9/11 next month, the Taliban control more of Afghanistan than they did when the Twin Towers fell. That leaves us with three urgent questions. How do we support the Afghans now stuck under the new rule? Where does this leave our allies and our foreign policy? Where does this leave global Britain? The Government must try to answer them.