Health and Social Care Bill

Baroness Finlay of Llandaff Excerpts

Wednesday 21st December 2011 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I shall speak also to the other government amendments in this group, Amendments 348BA, 348BB, 348BC, 348BD, 348BE and 348BF.

The first of these amendments enables the Information Centre to charge the Commissioning Board where the board has directed it to collect information. The next four amendments are drafting amendments to improve and clarify the drafting in Part 9 of the Bill. Government Amendment 348BE is a consequential amendment to ensure that the CQC can continue to be able to require information from the Information Centre to support the CQC’s regulatory functions. Government Amendment 348BF removes a consequential provision from Schedule 20 following a request from the Welsh Assembly Government. I hope that that brief explanation will be enough to persuade noble Lords that these amendments should be accepted and I beg to move.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

My Lords, I have Amendment 348C in this group, which relates to the National Information Governance Board being disbanded and a national information governance committee being formed and being part of the CQC. There is concern over the way that that will happen.

The National Information Governance Board currently advises the Secretary of State on access to confidential patient information without patient consent when it is for medical purposes, under the Health Service (Control of Patient Information) Regulations. These are made under Section 251 of the National Health Service Act 2006 and give rise to applications from researchers for access to confidential patient information. The Patient Information Advisory Group, or PIAG, was established and later became the Ethics and Confidentiality Committee of the National Information Governance Board. This provides advice when people who are not the doctors or professionals involved in the care of a patient wish to access information from medical records that are potentially identifiable without the knowledge or consent of those people. It is permitted legally through the exercise of discretionary powers of the Secretary of State. The Ethics and Confidentiality Committee of the National Information Governance Board has an advisory function. It is not a regulator and has no powers to stop disclosure. It helps disclosers of information to know the risks and whether to seek statutory protection. If they are given that protection, they are protected from liability under the common law duty of confidentiality.

Clause 274 abolishes the National Information Governance Board but also omits Sections 250A to 250D of the 2006 Act. In those sections, one of the functions established for the National Information Governance Board is to advise the Secretary of State on particular matters relating to the processing of patient information by any person. This advisory function will not transfer to the Care Quality Commission under Clause 274(3). The Care Quality Commission might be regarded as not being the ideal home for the governance board for reasons concerning its own expertise and current performance.

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Debate on whether Clause 285 should stand part of the Bill.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Committee for allowing this question of whether Clause 285 should stand part of the Bill to be taken today. Previous commitments from the Minister have outlined that the Secretary of State’s annual report is an important mechanism through which he will account for the system, and the Bill sets out extensive powers of intervention in the case of failure, which are essential if Ministers are able to retain ultimate accountability for the health service. However, the Secretary of State’s duty of keeping performance under review applies only to national arm’s-length bodies, although we are also debating—and will be, I am sure, on Report—how it might also refer to the clinical commissioning groups.

The aim of this debate is to explore what will happen if Monitor and the CQC do not co-operate. I am simply seeking some clarification from the Minister in response to certain questions. The Bill sets out a formal duty of co-operation between these two bodies—but what practical actions will be taken if this does not happen? On 7 December, the noble Earl, Lord Howe, stated at the Dispatch Box that the Secretary of State would be able to write formally and publicly to organisations if the duty to co-operate is being breached. How will the Secretary of State monitor how effectively Monitor and the CQC are working together? Will they report on how well they have worked together and where they seek to improve their working relationships in the future? What will trigger the Secretary of State to intervene? Can the Secretary of State take responsibility for any services that have been responsible for triggering a dispute?

The Minister also stated that:

“If the breach is significant, sustained and having a detrimental effect on the NHS, the Secretary of State will have a further ability to lay an order specifying that the organisation should take certain actions only with the approval of another specified body, other than the Secretary of State himself”.—[Official Report, 7/12/11; col. 747.]

Will the Government please give a definition of the meaning of,

“significant, sustained and having a detrimental effect on the NHS”,

and explain what this will mean in practice? In subsection (7) there is mention of arbitration, but who will the arbitrator be in the event of a dispute? Is that the Secretary of State?

There may be examples of work between CQC and Monitor that may not be considered significant breaches of their duty to co-operate but may not be best practice in integrated working. This is a particular risk for complex work such as setting the tariff, especially for care pathways for complex conditions that take into account multiple providers. How will the Government ensure that these two bodies do not meet just bare minimum standards but continue to improve the quality of their integrated working, innovate to find new ways of co-operating and share good practice throughout their organisations, so that integrated working is strategically built in at their every level?

There is a particular concern about the effect on long-term conditions if Monitor and the CQC do not work seamlessly together. We have had debates already about the importance of care being integrated to treat patients with long-term conditions. The Secretary of State must be proactive in ensuring that both Monitor and the CQC themselves work proactively to facilitate such integrated working. I would be grateful for some further elaboration on how this will be achieved. I hope that the Minister will be able to assure the Committee that Monitor and the CQC will be required to report to the Secretary of State on how they have collaborated, including an evaluation of how they have co-operated, and that they will be given goals by the Department of Health on how to improve continuously in such working.

When considering potential failure that is recognised by one party but not the other, who will have the power to intervene? This becomes particularly important as Monitor has powers to intervene in failure but not, as I understand it, at the point when an organisation is at risk of working in a way that may result in failure—in other words, in a pre-failure state. At that point, Monitor does not have powers to intervene. I would be grateful if the Minister were able to answer at least some of my questions today. I realise that I have posed a lot of questions, and that some may come better in writing later.

[Baroness Williams of Crosby]

My Lords, I follow the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and very much share her questions—not least about who will be the arbiter in a situation where co-operation cannot be reached between two of the major bodies involved in responsibilities for the health service. I would add just a couple of things. I very much apologise to the Committee for the fact that, when Amendments 350 and 351 were reached—we were already going through at a rattling pace—I was out of the Chamber so did not move those two amendments. I will not refer back to them or move them now; it would obviously be inappropriate to do so. However, I stress the concern that I have about Clause 285.

The trouble is that there is a very long and elaborate procedure under which, if co-operation fails between the board and Monitor, they have then to exchange views with one another and tell each other what their opinions are, and so forth. They and the Secretary of State then have to make statements of their opinions. This seems most unfortunate, because co-operation and integration are at the very heart of what all of us have been saying in Committee are absolutely crucial elements in the attempt to deal with the problems that confront the NHS, and the health service more generally, at the moment. Therefore, to have a procedure which is as elaborate and which has as many stages in it as this one—with, in many ways, the chances to fuel rather than heal any difference between them—seems not to be a sensible clause at all.

Our amendments simply suggested that it would be much better, at a certain point when we were in what the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, described as the pre-failure period, to allow the Secretary of State to come into the picture. This goes back to what the noble Lord, Lord Mawhinney, was talking about earlier. We are not talking about an immediate intervention. We understand the need to try to get agreement and to decentralise decision-making but in the end, if they cannot agree on how to co-operate and resolve that, either there has to be an arbiter whose voice is such that he or she carries real authority or, since we do not know who that arbiter is, in our view the proper arbiter is indeed the Secretary of State, responsible as he is to Parliament and to the public. Therefore I strongly support the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. I am very grateful for what she has said. I hope we can hear from the Minister who will be the arbiter, and whether there might be a more rapid and effective way of dealing with a failure of co-operation. I put on record that I think this is absolutely crucial to what this is all about. We need to be able to deal with it reasonably urgently and quickly.

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Moved by

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

351A: Clause 294, page 264, line 43, leave out “transfer” and insert “occupation”

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

My Lords, I really am not trying to prevent Christmas starting for Members of this Committee. I feel as though most of today’s amendments have concerned me. These are probing amendments, which relate to NHS capital assets. They are designed to explore what happens to the current offices and clinical premises of an NHS body at the time of transition and afterwards. If these premises are occupied by a clinical commissioning group or a company that is advising a clinical commissioning group on its commissioning, who will become the owner of the property?

This is important because GPs are themselves independent contractors, not NHS employees. For many—not all but a significant number—the premises from which they work are owned by their practice. They, not the NHS, jointly own them, even though the building will usually have been subject to a range of capital improvement schemes from the NHS over many years. Such schemes allow a GP to purchase a practice and invest in it over the years. The capital gained then forms a significant additional pension pot for that GP.

My question for the Government concerns whether the deeds of the property will be transferred to the general practitioners of the clinical commissioning group. Will they be able to sell it for profit that would then be their personal profit? Will the profit revert to the NHS and, if so, to which pot? If property is transferred, will the new owner be liable to put capital gained into the capital part of the commissioning pot to develop service premises and equipment for the health service itself, rather than be able to take whatever capital gain there is on that property? I beg to move.

[Baroness Thornton]

My Lords, I just wish to add two questions of my own to the list that the noble Baroness asked. Has the Department of Health now resolved the issues around future asset ownership in respect of PCT and SHA estates? Within that, does that include LIFT schemes and PFI?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I hope I can answer the question of the noble Baroness very quickly. Clinical commissioning groups will be statutory bodies. They will be legally and operationally separate from GP practices. As such, if a clinical commissioning group occupies property that is under the ownership of that group, it will be under statutory ownership. It will not be open to GPs to sell such property at a cut price, or at any other price, to GP practices to enable such practices to pocket the profits. What the noble Baroness outlined sounded to me very much like embezzlement from the state. It will be no more possible for what she envisages to happen than for a primary care trust to sell a property and have its officers pocket the proceeds. I am a little mystified by the scenario that she has painted.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

May I make it clear that I am not suggesting that general practitioners will embezzle funds from the NHS? I am just concerned about who will hold the deeds of such property at the time of transfer. Once the ownership is transferred, the disposal of those assets rests with the new owner. We have seen foundation trusts that have, in rationalising their services, quite rightly sold off sometimes large pieces of estate that have been very valuable and become housing land and so on. That money has then gone back into NHS services. I wanted clarification that the same thing would occur.

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[Earl Howe]

I suspect that the example the noble Lord has in mind involved GP practice premises rather than property owned by an NHS body such as a primary care trust. I suggest that the two cases are rather different. However, I take the noble Lord’s point that integration of services at a delivery level can often be very advantageous to patient communities. Some of the most successful examples that I have seen are of practices where many facilities are available on site for the patient. We are seeing more and more of these being created around the country. We should encourage that.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

I am most grateful to the Minister for that response. This has been a short but very useful debate. I have an anxiety that we may need to refer back to it in the future, although I hope that I am proved wrong. On that note, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 351A withdrawn.