Afghanistan: Girls and Women

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Monday 23rd January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Johnson of Marylebone (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend the Minister mentioned that the Taliban might be open to workarounds—

[Baroness D’Souza (CB)]

I thank the noble Lord. First, is the Taliban group that undertook negotiations in Doha still intact, does it still have any power, and are the Government in touch with it? Secondly, would the Minister say whether the FCDO is prepared to increase the number and amount of cash transfers to those most in need, given through the various NGOs, local and otherwise?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, on the noble Baroness’s second point, I also reflect on the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. We must ensure that any money or support we provide, particularly when it comes to cash transfers, gets through to the people who need it. The systems and structures in Afghanistan at the moment are extremely fragile. We must look at innovative ways to ensure that we can get over some of these barriers. Technology provides an example, and perhaps that pre-empts the question of my noble friend Lord Johnson, who was going to come in. We need to look at innovative way of delivering both cash transfers and education as well. I think that may well be the way forward.

BBC World Service

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Thursday 1st December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness D’Souza (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to congratulate the noble Lord on a heartfelt, informative and inspiring maiden speech. I am honoured to be able to say a few words, but I have to confess there is precious little information publicly available on our new colleague. We know his full name is John Humphrey Arnott Pakington, 7th Baron Hampton, that he is a photographer and that he was born under the sign of Capricorn. Beyond that, we know almost nothing. I was fortunate enough to have a brief meeting with him yesterday. His conversion from photography to teaching followed a visit to Venice with his wife, during which he saw the light. Seriously, his story is a wonderful one. He clearly loves his job as a teacher in design and technology and as head of department at an academy in east London. Even a short conversation with him revealed his real commitment to young people, and to the role of education and the creative sector in empowering them and driving our economy forward. We are truly fortunate to have him as a colleague on our Benches. I hope he will forgive me for concluding with a word of advice. If at any time he finds himself assailed with shouts of “Order! Order!”, all he has to do is just sit down. In fact, in this House, when in doubt it is always best to sit down.

I begin by stating the obvious again about the vital role that access to information plays. In its absence, Governments cannot be held to account and citizens are demeaned with false information. This in turn can promote hatred, damage people’s health and undermine democracy. Bad information thrives in an information vacuum. The opposite can also be demonstrated. Countries with an independent media thrive better and prove to be more resilient in the face of attacks on democracy and civil liberties. We live in a world where disinformation is flourishing through social media channels.

I would like to give one or two examples of this dilatory impact. The NGO Full Fact is a growing organisation that focuses on tracking down the origins and impact of false information. Recent studies have included the worldwide circulation of untruths about Covid-19. Working with sister organisations in Europe, Full Fact established that the false belief that Muslim communities were somehow receiving preferential treatment was common to all certain European countries. In Spain, there were widespread claims that users’ WhatsApp activity would be monitored or censored. In the UK, people attempted to burn 5G towers in the mistaken belief that the network was somehow involved in the spread of depleted immunity to Covid. On a more political level, we know that whole nations can be persuaded to adopt dangerous attitudes towards minorities and enemy nations, entirely without foundation. Currently, this is seen in Russia, and the exponential rise in Russian subscribers to BBC World Service is testament to the yearning for clear, fact-based, impartial journalism in the face of systemic propaganda. During the first five days of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there were 77 million unique visitors to the BBC English online and almost 200 million views of the live page on Ukraine. Russian visitors to BBC.com increased by 252% in early March. The BBC World Service output was and is perhaps the most effective bulwark against the Kremlin’s disinformation, and may yet prove to be a factor in bringing the war to an end.

This is really at the heart of our debate today. The UK boasts a service of incomparable journalistic standards and reach. It is the jewel in the crown of overseas influence, knowledge and trust. As we know, the UK has suffered a crisis of political trust in recent times, which thankfully did not extend to BBC World Service. It is sobering to note that the BBC has a global weekly outreach of 492 million individuals. If ever a nation sought to increase its soft power role, it could do worse than attempt to create a broadcast service along the lines of the BBC, and yet in the past few years the Government have gradually limited the resources needed to maintain this service in its broadest spread and highest standards. The reliance on the licence fee, frozen until 2024 and in the midst of rising costs, created a serious emergency. The recent agreement of additional funds to meet the demands of the Ukrainian war, although hugely welcome, does not begin to restore services in some local languages, such as Chinese, Hindi, Farsi and Arabic.

It has taken many decades for the BBC to build the trust of its listenership, yet one or two relatively minor government actions can undermine that trust in minutes. Given the extraordinary influence of the BBC, this should be at the front of the Government’s mind when undertaking the difficult task of balancing a budget in times of deep scarcity. A final point has been made by William Moy, the chief executive of Full Fact, that the data show that where information sources are growing, there is different content for different consumers. Where information sources are shrinking, the opposite is true, resulting in the fragmentation of societies in terms of the information received. Since democracy relies to a very large extent on a shared reality, the Government, in their deliberations on further cuts, should note this trend.

Ukraine

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Tuesday 1st November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness D’Souza (CB)]

My Lords, does the Minister think that American support for Ukraine, particularly armaments, is likely to be reduced after the mid-term elections? If so, where would such support come from?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness is asking me to speculate on the outcome of the mid-term elections, but I will resist such temptation. Ultimately, whatever happens in the United States, it has shown itself to be a steadfast partner to Ukraine and it will make judgments and decisions on how it best supports Ukraine. What I can say is that we work very closely with the United States. It is our closest partner and ally, and when it comes to Ukraine, we stand firm and united in our response.

China: Security and Trade (IRDC Report)

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Thursday 20th October 2022 Grand Committee

[Baroness D'Souza (CB)]

My Lords, it is a privilege to follow the noble Lord, Lord Alton. There has been a marked diminution of trust between the US and UK and China and its leadership, and the resulting tensions are likely to continue and even to escalate. The committee’s report is therefore extremely timely and important.

As we have heard repeatedly this afternoon, the main lacuna in the UK’s approach to China includes the lack of a clear strategy on what values and interests the UK is trying to uphold. What follows is a number of actions and policies which amount to a series of tactics rather than a strategy—tactics which are weakened as a result.

The report calls on the Government to remedy this by developing and publishing a single coherent China strategy which details objectives and how they plan to achieve them. The standard response to this request is either that it is already in hand or just about to be completed. So far, however, the UK Government have declined to publish their plans. China experts lament this and continue to push for details on both the overall strategy and the mechanisms by which it could be achieved.

What is needed is a new politics of balance: a stated policy of “on the one hand and on the other” approach. That would entail co-operation and reaching out to the PRC on matters of trade, environment and civil affairs while protecting national security, economic prosperity, personal data and values. If there were to be an unambiguous and consistent approach in all UK dealings with China that was clear not only to the PRC but to all countries in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond, red lines would quickly become apparent.

The takeover of Hong Kong by the PRC, dismissing all previous treaties and agreements, sadly, did not seem to constitute a red line, and fears that similar inroads on Taiwan would not evoke unequivocal action from the UK are realistic. Nor, apparently, is the widespread view that China’s actions against the Uighurs amounts to genocide eliciting strong enough condemnation and action by the UK Government, as we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Alton.

The inconsistency of the UK approach to China’s aggression is itself a weakness that could be resolved in part with a strategic plan of action. Meanwhile, actions that are being taken or planned by the UK Government have a somewhat capricious, even unserious, flavour due to the lack of a stated strategy to which all tactical actions could and should be directed.

To put meat on the bones of tactics, the report and other contributions from China experts suggest a number of innovations. These include an in-depth study on the extent of the security threat posed by the PRC, to be carried out in consultation with scholars and other advisers. The current FCDO China department refers to the PRC only as a “systemic competitor”, which tends to downplay serious efforts to infringe the UK’s integrity. A programme of recruitment is needed to ensure that there is wide expertise available to the civil servants and to government departments. Given that the PRC’s ambitions, intentions and methods shift constantly, there needs to be ongoing research, consultation and policy adjustments by the China watchers as well as effective cross-government liaison and co-ordination. Interestingly, there is no reference in the Government’s response to co-ordination with European partners on trade and security policies.

The Government’s response on Taiwan is to “grow our relationship”. Once again, what is needed here is a detailed inventory of actions to support Taiwan with strong lobbying for its inclusion in relevant international organisations; a willingness to accede to requests from Taiwan for asymmetrical—or porcupine—defence weaponry; and to encourage further visits by senior ministerial, parliamentarians and other arms of government personnel.

As in other nations with questionable values and freedoms, the outreach activities tend to centre around institutional and capacity building and non-traditional security areas, such as training and joint exercises. The BBC and British Council are long established and greatly valued soft-power organisations and their role in bridging peoples across nations cannot and must not be diminished. In this context, the planned or proposed cuts to the BBC World Service are, to say the least, disheartening.

Above all, there seems to be a consensus that the UK’s China policy must avoid being dominated by profit alone.

The Government’s response to the committee’s report is, to my mind, rather too full of intentions in place of actions: for example,

“We … intend to increase our broader Defence Engagement including through capacity building and training, delivered by longer and more consistent military deployments”;


or, to give another example, the Government intend to overcome barriers to investment and point to the potential export opportunities in education, food and drink, pharmaceuticals and medical technology, without any concrete suggestions as to how this will be achieved.

Overall, the grandiose statement in the Government’s response that

“we will harness the UK’s strength as an outward-looking nation, confident in its ability to innovate, compete, lead and deliver for British businesses and the British people”,

is not always matched by diverse actions and intentions. If a coherent strategy can be agreed on which makes all the red lines clear and emphasises both the opportunities and constraints, there will be increased room for trade and soft power initiatives to achieve a much greater return.

Food Insecurity in Developing Countries due to Blockade of Ukrainian Ports

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Thursday 21st July 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness D'Souza (CB)]

My Lords, I begin by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for introducing this very important debate at the very last minute, giving us all the opportunity to express our compassion for what is going on in Ukraine and, indeed, the rest of the world. The crisis is extremely serious and is, as we have heard, likely to spread, affecting the most vulnerable countries in the world.

As if the war in Ukraine and its consequences were not enough, there is also conflict in many other vulnerable countries, with the possibility of violent riots in Egypt, for example. There are exceptional world weather patterns of drought and floods, the long-term and profound effect of Covid on economies and Russia’s theft of grain from Ukraine’s stores to sell at inflated prices around the world. If this is not a perfect storm, what is?

We know that money is needed—and lots of it—to counteract rising prices of all commodities, including food and energy as well as transport. The sinister words of the editor in chief of the pro-Kremlin channel RT should alert us to possible Russian intentions; she said:

“The famine will begin and they will lift the sanctions”,


Russia is clearly playing a long game with thousands upon thousands of lives while shoring up its own war economy through inflated food and oil export prices.

We are tiptoeing around this vast country and its corrupt government. It seems that the job of the world’s diplomats is to avoid a catastrophic escalation of hostilities. Perhaps there have even been a grisly calculation of the number likely to die from starvation compared to the possibility of deaths from nuclear attack. However, unanimous international condemnation of Russia’s actions together with ever more stringent sanctions might provoke Mr Putin to sacrifice his own people under the false banner of national pride.

War has been accompanied by severe food shortage and even famine—the two are different—for millennia. Widespread famine has also occurred as a result of the failure of democracy. Between 1959 and 1961, 20 million Chinese died following Mao Tse-Tung’s industrial experiment, where every landowner throughout the country was forced to produce steel. Food supplies disappeared overnight. No one surrounding the great leader had the courage to let Mao know that his experiment was failing and causing the death of millions on the streets of China.

The great Bengal famine of 1943, during which 3 million people died, was in part due to a strict censorship in which the spread and scale of food shortage was hidden. The arrival of a free press following the famine, including in the vernacular, has guaranteed government accountability and a more equitable distribution of grain, even during periods of severe drought. It is very unlikely that famine would ever occur there again.

The end of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan came about when the mothers of the slaughtered soldiers began to realise the extent of their sacrifice through local information networks that flatly contradicted the propaganda being put out by the Soviets at that time. Although it is unlikely that there will be an avalanche of democratic institutions in Russia in the near future, every possible effort must be made to ensure that ordinary people in Russia, regardless of their long-standing animosity towards Ukraine and its people, are reliably informed about the war and able to communicate deep concerns about the progress—or not—of the fighting.

The other alternative is some kind of political compromise—something we are all reluctant to talk about. At the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we had brave words from the UK Government insisting that Russia must fail and that no compromise was possible. Thirty years ago, a sad rump of Soviet soldiers and coffins departed Afghanistan for their homeland. The cost of this failed occupation over more than a decade, not to mention the longer-term consequences, appeared far from victory for anyone, as we now know. Certainly, the Soviets failed, but what does success look like and is it worth the price?

Bombing a nation into submission, together with life-affecting sanctions, does not work as a strategy for winning wars. Can the Minister tell the House whether longer-term plans, including compromises, are being tabled, discussed and refined? As we go into the Summer Recess, is there a glimmer of hope that the world is beginning to unite against Russia as the wider consequences of food shortages reveal imminent disaster? What actions have been taken internationally to curb the price of Russian exports of food and oil? Are there serious efforts to supply alternative staple foods, such as rice—mostly from south-east Asia and India, presumably—for Lebanon, Yemen, Egypt and some countries in north Africa? Are the UK Government in discussion with international partners to build adequate food reserves for the immediate future, because food shortages are likely to become an endemic problem? Finally, would Russia, or indeed Ukraine, accept the sequestration of the Donbass region in the interest of providing more food security for the world?

Sri Lanka

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Wednesday 13th July 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord’s point about Mr Putin would apply in many instances. I met with Foreign Minister Peiris while I was in Kigali, specifically regarding the current state of play. He remains in position, notwithstanding the appointment of the Prime Minister as the acting President.

As I said in response to the noble Lord, Lord Collins, we are looking at how we can best channel our support through agencies on the ground. The UN is present, and we are engaging with other key partners. As the noble Lord will acknowledge, the UK is also looking at what has caused this crisis, which is an economic crisis. When I was in Sri Lanka and I met with the then Administration, I implored them to consider the importance of not just talking to the IMF but working through a specific plan. I believe that we have the fifth-largest quota share when it comes to the IMF, and we are working very constructively. Sri Lanka needs political stability, but the underlying cause and problem remains the economics. We are working with the IMF on that programme.

[Baroness D’Souza (CB)]

My Lords, does the Minister have any evidence of increased tension between the Tamil and Sinhalese populations?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, we are certainly watching that space very closely. Communal tensions arise in any conflict where communities perhaps seek to assign blame to another community. We are also looking very carefully at pre-existing religious tensions. Although there have been raids into the presidential compound and the Prime Minister’s residence, we have not yet seen or monitored an increase in communal tension between the two major communities in Sri Lanka.

Commonwealth

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Thursday 30th June 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness D’Souza (CB)]

My Lords, the Commonwealth and its various associated organisations may sometimes be perceived as belonging to a colonial era. Its work goes largely unnoticed until CHOGM comes round every two years—then we have the usual debate about its relevance and effectiveness. The large umbrella of the Commonwealth Secretariat, with all its internal and external politics, tends to overshadow the work done by myriad Commonwealth network organisations. I have had close associations with many of them throughout my career: Commonwealth associations of lawyers and media practitioners, Speakers associations and, most of all, the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. The constant theme of these groups, so evident at their meetings, is friendship, understanding and an eagerness to share good practice and uphold government accountability.

I do not think that any of us should minimise the value of getting together and sharing views. We live in a world where, increasingly, electronic communication is king, but sitting around a table with our Commonwealth colleagues or together in working groups as well as the grander occasions of major conferences, with all the opportunities for bilateral exchange, is invaluable. For example, while a member state may have publicly expressed anger about a particular instance, such as the showing of a TV programme in the UK which has offended that state, subsequent meetings between parliamentarians continue as before, often without even mentioning the so-called offensive incident. The Commonwealth in all its dealing emphasises that there are official views and personal links, and that these do not necessarily have to coincide. This is a vital component of soft power.

As we all know, there are global and pressing issues at the moment that require a concerted approach. These now include food availability and distribution, economic recession, climate change, security and slavery. An organisation of 56 member states is a good place to begin the dialogue that will provide the basis for global agreements and action.

Despite the potential and actual advantages of the Commonwealth network, it is itself under severe strain, both economic and political. Like all mulitilateral bodies, it faces change and renewal. In which direction should it go, where can it be most effective and what kind of changes might be undertaken in the immediate future? By way of answer, I would like to refer to the work undertaken by the CPA.

A gradual change of emphasis championed by the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association towards more practical workshops, the prioritisation of women parliamentarians at all levels and modern slavery has resulted in tangible changes. I have participated in small workshops examining government accountability through the CPA programme on Public Accounts Committees. Almost all Commonwealth countries have such committees, but their effectiveness varies. What has become abundantly clear is how much our colleagues welcome such practical sessions where there can be learning from and between many different systems. The CPA has now produced an online course fashioned from lessons learned during these workshops. Similarly, the mechanisms to protect and promote women whether against violence, online abuse and/or slavery, and towards parliamentary involvement, are widely welcomed.

It is these smaller, less highly publicised networks that constantly meet and deliberate on how better to implement the Commonwealth charter on the democratic process, that should be fostered. The funds needed for these programmes are minimal in comparison to those of the umbrella Secretariat and the outcomes are impressive. Perhaps the essential changes should lie in the direction of increasing the work of these networks with the attendant opportunities for exchange, fostering friendships, sharing practical methodology, monitoring elections and providing guidelines for government policy and action. Inevitably, there is internal wrangling within each member state and sometimes between states, but the undercurrent of fellowship between members of the Commonwealth is sustained by the work of the networks as a whole, and this quietly provides the continuity that is the essence of the Commonwealth.

British Council Contractors: Afghanistan

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Monday 27th June 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I will certainly follow up with my noble friend Lord Harrington. I fully accept that there are undoubtedly cases; I am aware of several and am grateful to the noble Lord for identifying one. Let us see how quickly we can move through some of them. On the ARAP case he identified, that scheme remains open and will be open—of course, it is being administered directly by the MoD—but I will certainly follow up with my noble friend Lord Harrington. I am sure that one of us will be able to provide the noble Lord with an answer.

On contractors, the noble Lord is right that there is a time-limited window during which these expressions of interest can be taken forward. The window for this particular pathway will close because, on pathway 3, there is a limit for year 1 of settlement. Once we reach this, eligibility criteria will be applied on an objective basis. As I alluded to in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Collins, we are working directly with the three cohorts: the Chevening cohort—this is directly under the FCDO—GardaWorld and the British Council. We are doing so to identify, where we can, any information that we need.

Of course, when that window closes, another announcement will be made towards the end of this year for the following year’s scheme, when we will be able to identify an additional cohort based on the numbers we have identified. However, as my honourable friend Vicky Ford said, the number for this year is set at 1,500. Because of commitments that we have already made, priority will be given to those who are covered through the Chevening scholarships; those who are involved and engaged through GardaWorld; and, of course, those who were working with the British Council as contractors.

[Baroness D’Souza (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for answering this question. Can he say whether he has any further information on the extent to which the Taliban in Afghanistan, particularly around Kabul, are still pursuing those linked to the British administration—and indeed many others who are linked to foreign organisations? As far as I can tell from the media, that is not a huge problem at the moment but I may be entirely wrong.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her work in this area. The picture is different across Afghanistan. There are about eight or nine provinces where girls are being allowed to go to school and women are being allowed to work. However, there are certain places where the local commanders may be operating in a way that does not reflect the openness that we wish to see—even in a limited way—and that is being demonstrated in those eight or nine provinces.

On the specific issues around Kabul, I am sure I speak for the whole House when I say that our current focus is on supporting the direct victims of the tragic earthquake that took place in Afghanistan—and we are doing exactly that. However, the situation with some of the other priority issues, including girls’ education and the freedom of women to go out to work, are certainly among our priorities. As all noble Lords know, the situation is very difficult: we do not have a presence on the ground yet, but we are engaging with the Taliban at an official level. Have we seen co-operation? The short answer is yes. Indeed, I pay tribute to the officials in the FCDO who recently worked specifically, as noble Lords will be aware, on the release of British detainees. That was down to the fact that we worked in a very co-ordinated fashion and to the great courage and commitment of officials in the FCDO, who ensured the release of those detainees.

Ukraine

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Thursday 16th June 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park (Con)]

In reverse order, I am going to have to refer the noble Viscount to a previous answer—that it is not for the UK Government to be prescriptive. There are principles that we can stand for, and the principles are that Ukraine must be in the driving seat and that whatever solution there is has to reflect its sovereignty and right to self-determination. But it is for Ukraine to make those decisions.

I understand the point that the noble Viscount and a previous speaker made about Ukraine being pressured. We will not be, and we are not, part of that pressure. We do not know what is happening in the meeting that was just raised by a previous speaker; I do not know what is being discussed in that meeting. But the UK position will be exactly as it was a few months ago when the invasion began, and it will not change.

On military support, it is our view that the support that we are providing—as certainly seems to be the view of our friends and allies within Ukraine—has been exemplary and well targeted. I have to assume that that is the case as I have heard nothing to the contrary.

[Baroness D'Souza (CB)]

My Lords, many of my concerns have already been addressed by the noble Lords, Lord Collins and Lord Stoneham, and by the Minister, but might I go a little further? We are, unfortunately, getting used to and even inured to ever more dire predictions of catastrophic food shortages, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. I fear very much that, despite taking into account the rhetoric, the famines in Ethiopia of the 1970s, and certainly of 1984, will be but a pale reflection of what is likely to come. People will not sit around and wait until they and their children starve to death; they will move in very larger numbers to feeding centres, where many will die because of contagious and infectious disease, and others will move inexorably and relentlessly as refugees towards Europe and the West.

Are there any moves, and is there any wish on the part of the international community, to set up some kind of international movement that is not the UN, which is so beset with international politics and bureaucracy, to address what is going to affect the entire world? It is not just a question of finding out where there is food and shipping it in small quantities; it is about having massive political will to ensure that there is food distribution in those countries—again, I particularly mention sub-Saharan Africa—that are in most need.

[Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park (Con)]

The noble Baroness is absolutely right to highlight this. I mentioned earlier, as did the noble Lord, Lord Collins, that the scale of food production for which Ukraine is responsible is some 10% of world wheat exports. It is really hard to exaggerate how important that is and, therefore, how serious this situation is. We have been taking a leading role in G7 efforts to enable Ukraine to export that grain, ensuring that multilateral organisations deliver on their pledges—for example, the World Bank Group’s $30 billion package. We have been fully supportive of the G7 president-led Global Alliance for Food Security to scale up support for food production and for vulnerable peoples in developing countries in a needs-based, co-ordinated manner. We are targeting support for those countries in most acute need at the moment.

The noble Baroness is right to compare the current situation—or potentially where this current situation could end up—with the appalling famines in Ethiopia which traumatised and shook the world. She is also right to say that this is not just about getting food from A to B; there are bigger and longer-term issues. This is one of the reasons why it is our view—a view I am pleased to say was reflected in the international development strategy—that we must not allow these appalling crises with which we are dealing in relation to Ukraine and elsewhere to deter us in our efforts to tackle big global challenges which will dominate future generations, such as climate change and environmental degradation. The repercussions of these, in terms of hunger, will be even greater than anything we are seeing today.

Taiwan

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Thursday 3rd March 2022 Grand Committee

Asked by

[Baroness D’Souza]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking, if any, to support democracy in Taiwan.

[Baroness D’Souza (CB)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as vice-chair of the British-Taiwanese All-Party Parliamentary Group.

Taiwan is the Ukraine of the Far East, and it behoves us to note the threats that it endures daily from its neighbours across the strait and its commitment to the democratic process and its democratic institutions. In the last 15 months, there has been an increase of 150% in military intrusions from the PRC over those recorded in 2020. Both the UK Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, as well as G7 leaders, have emphasised the importance of peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region, with specific reference to Taiwan, as set out in the integrated review and in communiqués.

The Minister for Asia, Amanda Milling, answering to a recent debate in the other place, affirmed that

“The UK has a clear interest in ensuring peace and stability in the Taiwan strait. Without it, the prosperity and security interests of both the UK and our like-minded partners would … suffer.”—[Official Report, Commons, 10/2/22; col. 1150.]


These are welcome words, as are the many shared endeavours that the Minister went on to mention, including increased trade, action against climate change, bilingual education, digital health technology and cultural exchanges. However, today I press the Minister further on the Government’s commitments to Taiwan and its flourishing democracy in the face of increased threats and sabotage of its industry and trade relations.

Taiwan is one of the five semiconductor producing countries in the world and supplies over 50% of the world’s high-end chips, used in the aerospace, bioscience and defence industries. It is a world leader in renewable energy and especially in the development of electronic vehicles. It has joined in the international sanctions imposed on Russia. The world also has much to learn from the success that Taiwan enjoyed in stemming the spread of Covid. These are all promising industries and policies that continue to need further investment. The efforts by the PRC to undermine Taiwan’s production capacity, whether this be in tourism, electronics or agriculture, should prompt a more regional approach to such coercion through trade agreements. Furthermore, Taiwan has submitted its application to the CPTPP, which would be to the advantage of this trade bloc, which has high regulatory standards, as we know. Taiwan hopes for the support of the UK after the UK has itself become a member. In this context, I ask the Minister whether the Government will provide this support and when they will sign and begin meaningful discussions on the bilateral investment agreement.

The US Taiwan Relations Act 1979 guarantees the provision of adequate defence equipment, which is extremely important in maintaining Taiwan’s credible self-defence capability. What contributions is the UK making towards this credible capacity in, for example, bolstering Taiwan’s navy and missile defence systems?

Taiwan is developing its technology on an impressive scale, and this supports the idea of some kind of shared technology network with other countries in the region, such as the US, Japan and South Korea. On her appointment, the Foreign Secretary referred to the notion of such a grouping to deal with issues such as climate change and, importantly, protection against cybercrime—has this idea been taken further? The benefit during peacetime is obvious, but so too is the protection that this network might provide in the event of further imminent threats from the People’s Republic of China.

The UK Prime Minister has himself acknowledged the global impact of events in Ukraine, which may be particularly significant for Taiwan. Following the tragic fall of Hong Kong, Taiwan is now the front line in defending democracy against China’s expanding authoritarianism. While Taiwan’s economic resilience may not be enough to deter further intrusions from the PRC, it commits those nations that hold such investments in the country to protect them robustly. How does the FCDO see Taiwan’s future in the face of increased military threats, not only in the strait but in the region more generally? How does the UK see the protection and strengthening of Taiwan economically and militarily as a key instrument in the declared pivot to the Indo-Pacific?

Due to events in Ukraine, we may find soon that words of encouragement and support are simply not enough. If we are serious about deterring such actions, we need to make strong, definite commitments to those countries that face authoritarian expansion in the immediate future.