China: Human Rights and Security

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Thursday 19th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness D'Souza (CB)]

My Lords, I am delighted to follow the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. I too thank my noble friend Lord Alton for never letting up on China. All of us are very grateful, and this being the last debate of this year is very fitting.

This House is becoming louder in its warnings about the threat that the People’s Republic of China poses to the UK’s security and economy. The actual and perceived threats help to shape UK foreign policy with regard to China, yet many commentators argue that the UK, despite some welcome announcements from the Government, still does not have a viable political strategy on China and therefore remains vulnerable to events as they occur. As so many have said, what is urgently needed is a clear statement of red lines with regard to PRC suppression of minorities and a policy incorporating concerns about and action on cyber and other attacks, and the aggressive threatening of international shipping lanes and trading relations in the event of severe tariffs imposed by the USA.

The question of Chinese technology and its inroads into the UK has been very ably covered by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, but I would like to underline that the PRC, as we know, is intent on achieving a world monopoly of electronic communications technology. As we have heard, cellular modules of the “internet of things” are crucial to almost all aspects of infrastructure, such as logistics, power grids, water supplies or the ability to paralyse financial payment systems.

Chinese companies currently own about 70% of the world market in cellular modules, as we have heard. Other countries struggle to compete with subsidised Chinese manufacture, which has a protected domestic market and seeks to gain a monopoly by means of supply of parts, favourable regulation, financing at competitive rates, access to key materials and products such as semiconductors at below cost. And let us not forget that the PRC is ever vigilant in taking over potentially failing companies around the world. The consequences of anything approaching a monopoly of PRC-supplied parts, and the access to data that this would facilitate, are severe, and would for example bring the UK defence forces to a standstill.

My predominant interest remains the democratic independence of Taiwan, a country of great strategic importance to China and expressly targeted by President Xi as ripe for integration with the mainland of China. This intention has been repeated too often to be ignored. Although expert opinion doubts that there is an imminent possibility of invasion, the so-called “grey attacks” are increasing in number and severity. Frequent military exercises are intended to disrupt and intimidate the Taiwanese, as are efforts to undermine Taiwan’s economy and democratic institutions.

Taiwan, as we all know, is the world’s largest producer of superior semiconductors. Despite competition from China and the USA to build semiconductor facilities, the technological skills and environment required are considerable and unlikely to surpass Taiwanese production rates. Although this is a great strength for Taiwan, it is also a liability, making integration with China all the more desirable for the PRC. Any interruption to the supply of raw materials, clean water or labour would have an immediate effect on production and compromise the global market for consumer electronics, currently valued at $1 trillion. The top 20 clients of the semiconductor manufacturing companies are worth in excess of $7 trillion.

Why does Taiwan’s continued existence as a separate entity matter? Apart from the democratic view that freedom is preferable to repression, the possibility of a China-controlled region encompassing international shipping lanes is ominous. China is intent not only on returning to an imperial grandness but on surpassing the USA as the world’s dominant political and economic force. The ability to control world shipping trade would represent a major step towards its grand plan.

The Government have committed to a thorough audit of PRC efforts to destabilise UK defence and security, which is eagerly awaited. Meanwhile, several suggestions for further protection have been put forward by China experts. These include ensuring that the FCDO maintains Mandarin-speaking specialists on China, and establishing a China-focused expert committee, preferably at Cabinet level, with a range of Ministers, particularly in the technological field, to monitor relations with the PRC. Such a committee would assess the national security risks offered by imported technology; arrive at a clear definition of national security for all government departments; set out priorities for defending critical national infrastructure; build up lists of trusted suppliers of electronic modules and chips, and other electronic manufacturers; and identify opportunities to work with international partners and allies to counter Chinese imperialism.

I suggest that our thinking and actions on China should not be dictated by the PRC. With the PRC’s largest military build-up since the end of the Second World War, deepening relations with Russia and increasing incursions into Taiwan and surrounding territories, it is clear that China is laying the ground for future domination beyond the south and south-east Asian regions. We ignore this at our peril.