China: Security and Trade (IRDC Report)

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Thursday 20th October 2022 Grand Committee

[Baroness D'Souza (CB)]

My Lords, it is a privilege to follow the noble Lord, Lord Alton. There has been a marked diminution of trust between the US and UK and China and its leadership, and the resulting tensions are likely to continue and even to escalate. The committee’s report is therefore extremely timely and important.

As we have heard repeatedly this afternoon, the main lacuna in the UK’s approach to China includes the lack of a clear strategy on what values and interests the UK is trying to uphold. What follows is a number of actions and policies which amount to a series of tactics rather than a strategy—tactics which are weakened as a result.

The report calls on the Government to remedy this by developing and publishing a single coherent China strategy which details objectives and how they plan to achieve them. The standard response to this request is either that it is already in hand or just about to be completed. So far, however, the UK Government have declined to publish their plans. China experts lament this and continue to push for details on both the overall strategy and the mechanisms by which it could be achieved.

What is needed is a new politics of balance: a stated policy of “on the one hand and on the other” approach. That would entail co-operation and reaching out to the PRC on matters of trade, environment and civil affairs while protecting national security, economic prosperity, personal data and values. If there were to be an unambiguous and consistent approach in all UK dealings with China that was clear not only to the PRC but to all countries in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond, red lines would quickly become apparent.

The takeover of Hong Kong by the PRC, dismissing all previous treaties and agreements, sadly, did not seem to constitute a red line, and fears that similar inroads on Taiwan would not evoke unequivocal action from the UK are realistic. Nor, apparently, is the widespread view that China’s actions against the Uighurs amounts to genocide eliciting strong enough condemnation and action by the UK Government, as we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Alton.

The inconsistency of the UK approach to China’s aggression is itself a weakness that could be resolved in part with a strategic plan of action. Meanwhile, actions that are being taken or planned by the UK Government have a somewhat capricious, even unserious, flavour due to the lack of a stated strategy to which all tactical actions could and should be directed.

To put meat on the bones of tactics, the report and other contributions from China experts suggest a number of innovations. These include an in-depth study on the extent of the security threat posed by the PRC, to be carried out in consultation with scholars and other advisers. The current FCDO China department refers to the PRC only as a “systemic competitor”, which tends to downplay serious efforts to infringe the UK’s integrity. A programme of recruitment is needed to ensure that there is wide expertise available to the civil servants and to government departments. Given that the PRC’s ambitions, intentions and methods shift constantly, there needs to be ongoing research, consultation and policy adjustments by the China watchers as well as effective cross-government liaison and co-ordination. Interestingly, there is no reference in the Government’s response to co-ordination with European partners on trade and security policies.

The Government’s response on Taiwan is to “grow our relationship”. Once again, what is needed here is a detailed inventory of actions to support Taiwan with strong lobbying for its inclusion in relevant international organisations; a willingness to accede to requests from Taiwan for asymmetrical—or porcupine—defence weaponry; and to encourage further visits by senior ministerial, parliamentarians and other arms of government personnel.

As in other nations with questionable values and freedoms, the outreach activities tend to centre around institutional and capacity building and non-traditional security areas, such as training and joint exercises. The BBC and British Council are long established and greatly valued soft-power organisations and their role in bridging peoples across nations cannot and must not be diminished. In this context, the planned or proposed cuts to the BBC World Service are, to say the least, disheartening.

Above all, there seems to be a consensus that the UK’s China policy must avoid being dominated by profit alone.

The Government’s response to the committee’s report is, to my mind, rather too full of intentions in place of actions: for example,

“We … intend to increase our broader Defence Engagement including through capacity building and training, delivered by longer and more consistent military deployments”;


or, to give another example, the Government intend to overcome barriers to investment and point to the potential export opportunities in education, food and drink, pharmaceuticals and medical technology, without any concrete suggestions as to how this will be achieved.

Overall, the grandiose statement in the Government’s response that

“we will harness the UK’s strength as an outward-looking nation, confident in its ability to innovate, compete, lead and deliver for British businesses and the British people”,

is not always matched by diverse actions and intentions. If a coherent strategy can be agreed on which makes all the red lines clear and emphasises both the opportunities and constraints, there will be increased room for trade and soft power initiatives to achieve a much greater return.