Social Security (Up-rating of Benefits) Bill

Baroness Drake Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 13th October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Drake (Lab)]

My Lords, I recognise that while the 8.3% increase in earnings figure will reflect the exceptional pandemic impact on labour markets, it will not account for all of that increase. I have two real concerns flowing from this Bill and the public debate surrounding it: first, the growing assertion that pensioners have been excessively benefiting over recent years; and, secondly, that the removal of the earnings uplift for this year may be a Trojan horse for removing earnings on a permanent basis.

The state pension provides both an income for existing pensioners and a firm foundation on which workers can save and build for their income in retirement. Providing such a foundation was an integral part of pension policy reforms, which included increasing savings through auto-enrolment and raising the state pension age. It was the stated premise for the new state pension introduced in 2016. The Government presented it to Parliament as supporting pension savings so that current generations of workers had a decent foundation on which to build for retirement.

A fall in the value of the state pension against average incomes impacts existing pensioners but makes future pensioners poorer as their private pension savings would go to replacing the fall in the state pension, rather than improving their overall retirement income. Earnings are an essential part of the uprating formula to avoid future generations becoming poorer relative to average or median incomes and because of the spread of means testing.

Figures published by the DWP and the ONS reveal that in 2020 benefit income, including state pension, was the largest component of total gross income for both pensioner couples and single pensioners. It was 57% for single pensioners, and nearly two-thirds of the total income for single female pensioners was benefit income.

Pensioner poverty, when measured against median disposable income, has risen from 13% to 18%. That dominance of the role of state pension income will persist long into the future and may well increase. Although income from occupational pensions was 32% of total gross income for pensioner couples and 27% for single pensioners, those figures are likely to fall as future generations have declining access to more generous occupational pensions.

Looked at from a regional perspective, in the majority of regions in England, pensioner couples have average weekly incomes below the UK pensioner couple average. This includes the north-east, the north-west, the east Midlands, the West Midlands, Yorkshire and Humber, and London.

Pensioner incomes have been stable for 10 years. In 2020

“pensioners had similar average incomes after housing costs … to … 2010”—

a statement I lifted from the DWP’s own figures and statements. Pensioner average income did increase significantly between 1995 and 2010, which also saw the introduction of the pension credit minimum income guarantee for the most impoverished pensioners.

Although it is clearly beneficial, we should be measured about the extent of the impact of the triple lock, particularly given that most current pensioners reached state pension age before the new state pension was introduced in 2016. For them, the triple lock does not apply to all of their state pension. It does not apply to the state second pension element and yet this accounts for 20% of state expenditure.

The triple lock has also operated at a time of significant cuts to health and social care spending, on which older people are so very dependent. These cuts will have contributed to the slowing down of improvements in life expectancy. We have yet to see how the NHS backlog aggravates that trend. A just-published Imperial College report now reveals falling life expectancy in urban areas such as Leeds, Newcastle, Manchester, Liverpool and others.

Pension credit, the means-tested, minimum income guarantee for the poorest pensioners—for which nearly 2.5 million are eligible but only 1.5 million claim—is not covered by the triple lock. The Government mitigated that omission by an underpin of a cash increase, but not by extending the triple lock. Pension credit is also a passport to other benefits such as reduced council tax and a free TV licence, which some 1 million of the poorest pensioners are missing out on. In the other place, the Minister advised that the department was engaged in a publicity campaign to raise awareness, but there are no figures available on any increase in pension credit claims occurring as a result. That underclaiming will be contributing to the rise in pensioner poverty.

Of course, the state pension has to be sustainable, and there are two key levers for controlling expenditure. One is making the state pension less generous over time, the other is increasing the state pension age. We risk losing sight of the significant accelerated rises in the state pension age already introduced, with more to follow. The number of pensioners has seen a fall. The full basic state pension is 10.3% higher than if it had been earnings-linked since 2011, but some of that gain will be clawed back through benefits and not applying an earnings uplift for this year.

We need to see this in total. Successive Governments allowed the value of the basis state pension to decline relative to earnings, from 26% in 1979 to around 16% by 2008. The Labour Government agreed to restore the earnings link, and the triple lock has resulted in the basic state pension rising from 17% of average earnings in 2011 to 19% in 2020. However, the new state pension has now replaced the basic state pension and the second state pension, and it applies to those reaching state pension age from 2016. It was set, as reported by the Government and the DWP, at a value just above the pension credit guaranteed income for the poorest pensioners, indexed by earnings, which the Government stated was sustainable and reduced pensioner benefit expenditure over the long term as a percentage of GDP, even taking into account the triple lock.

There is a cohort of retired people who are clearly better off, with access to generous occupational pensions, but that should not affect the perceptions of the financial position of pensioners as a whole. For the top fifth of pensioners, the largest source of income was their occupational pension, and they received a larger percentage of their income from earnings. Legitimate intergenerational fairness concerns, when looking at the most well-off pensioners, may be better addressed through the tax regime and national insurance rules for those working over the state pension age. Indeed, the Government have taken such a step in applying the 1.25% national insurance levy to the earnings of those over the state pension age. Weakening the state pension would be regressive, hurting those pensioners who most depend on it, and having the least impact on those who have a larger alternative source of income.

Turning to my second concern: the removal of the earnings uplift provision, even for a year, may be a Trojan horse for its permanent removal. When at the meeting that the Minister referred to, I asked whether there was a guarantee that it would be restored. I had the rather ambiguous answer that that will have to be argued next year.

The OECD figures reveal that in the UK, the average earner receives a replacement rate of income of 28.4% at retirement from the state pension, well below the OECD average of 58.6% and the EU average of 63.5%. However, in the UK, when workplace pensions are included, the net replacement rises to 61% compared to OECD and EU averages of 65.4% and 67% respectively. That tells us that the UK pension system relies heavily on private pension saving to fill the gap. Auto-enrolment is intended to maintain such a reliance, but it can do so only if the state pension is maintained as a firm foundation for those savings, at least holding its value over the long term against earnings. Otherwise, the savings of younger workers will be covering the fall in their state pension rather than improving their retirement income, and they cannot fill that gap.

Private pension contributions above the statutory minimum will be impacted by the rise in national insurance contributions. There will be a substitution effect, particularly in the private sector where, prior to the pandemic, some 60% or more of workers were in SMEs and a very significant proportion of them in small and micros. Therefore, it is very important that this combination of the firm foundation and private savings is protected.

Can the Minister tell us—for the record and on the record, unequivocally—whether the Government are committed to maintaining the state pension as a firm foundation, holding its value against average earnings over the long term as a minimum upon which future workers, including young workers, can build for their retirement? Can the Minister also confirm that this Government will not reduce the value of the basic state pension relative to average earnings?

Social Security (Up-rating of Benefits) Bill

Baroness Drake Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 26th October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Drake (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to probing Amendments 2 and 3 in this group. The triple lock is not legislated for; it rests on a commitment given by successive Governments since 2011. However, indexing pensions at least in line with earnings is legislated for. Through this Bill, the Government are neither applying the triple lock nor the underpin of earnings indexation. Both have gone as a consequence of this Bill—albeit that the Government say that they will not do it next year.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the removal of both is causing concerns that the Bill is trailing the Government’s consideration of lowering the value of the state pension going forward. While recognising the anomaly in the data behind the 8.3% earnings figure, the pandemic will not account for all of that increase. The decision to raise the state pension by the consumer price index in response to the anomaly comes without any analysis of how that change might impact the value of the state pension in relation to actual earnings.

In fact, the Pension Policy Institute has done such an analysis and, assuming that the CPI increase is of the order of 3%, which it is, the PPI’s recent analysis stated:

“Increasing the State Pension by CPI means that overall, State Pensions will rise by less than the real increase in earnings over the past two years. An alternative approach would have been to consider the rise in earnings over two years to give a more realistic estimation of real wage increases without the artificial impact of the pandemic impact in the year on year earnings statistics. This would need a pension increase of 5.3% in 2022 to match the increase in earnings since the setting of the State Pension level in 2020. Increasing the State Pension by this amount would save £3.1bn in 2022”.


So, increases in pensions will not reflect the real rise in hourly wages over that two-year period—which rows against the clear intention of the underpin of earnings indexation that is in the legislation.

The PPI approach of considering earnings over two years would reduce much of the methodology challenge in establishing an adjusted earnings index for one year, which the Minister refers to as the Government’s main defence for the approach they are taking. In fact, we have not heard a proper explanation from the Government as to why they could not consider different approaches. Several could have been taken, such as looking at earnings over the two-year period. So can the Minister give a fuller explanation of why they cannot take a different approach to that contained in this Bill? How do the Government intend to address the fall in the value of pensions against earnings over the last two years?

The triple lock was intended to address the extended fall in the value of the basic state pension. As the Minister states in her letter of 25 October, following Second Reading,

“the triple lock was introduced in order to boost the value of the basic state pension”.

It was to recover from those years of decline against earnings—a sort of accelerator, to get back to a reasonable comparative position.

With the Library’s help, I looked at the hypothetical value of the basic state pension and the pension credit as if they had been uprated in line with earnings, rather than the triple lock, since 2011. Currently, that triple-lock boost delivered a basic state pension of approximately £18 higher a week than it would have been if it had been indexed by earnings alone. When the Bill passes, in 2023 the basic state pension boost will fall to approximately £12 a week higher than if uprated by earnings alone. The pension credit minimum income guarantee, targeted on the poorest pensioners, is approximately £14 a week higher currently than it would have been if uprated by earnings alone. In 2022-23, it will be only £6.79 a week higher.

I am sure that the Government will produce more precise figures than mine, because their ability to do so is greater than mine, but what I am absolutely confident that they will not be able to contradict is that there will be a clawback from the cash value of the current triple-lock boost. The pension credit minimum income guarantee is targeted on the poorest pensioners and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, said, it is not uprated by the triple lock, although earnings uprating is legislated for. The Government have mitigated that omission by applying the underpin of a cash increase, to give what they feel is a fair increase, rather than conceding the full principle of the triple lock.

However, many older pensioners still face declining incomes, and women are particularly sensitive to changes in the state pension indexation. On average, women are more likely than men to have lower incomes at older ages: 60% of those in relative poverty over the age of 65 are women; and women are more likely to be eligible for pension credit—so there will be a direct gender impact if one starts to tamper with less generous indexation, and there is nothing about future accrual of pensions that suggests that that gender bias would not persist.

Pensioner poverty is rising, and we are now seeing falling life expectancy in areas with the greatest incidence of pensioner poverty. We have accelerated the state pension age; pensioner poverty is rising; and in those areas, life expectancy is falling. That trend was emerging before the pandemic—before anybody says, “Well, it’s the product of the pandemic”, no, that trend was there. I am sure it has been accelerated, but it was there before.

So why are the Government not taking a different approach to the uprating of pension credit targeted on the poorest pensioners and applying a cash increase greater than the value of the uprating by CPI? There need be no complicating legal or methodological issues in doing so. There is a clear precedent for the Government choosing to apply a cash increase.

Some argue that the triple lock unfairly advantages older people and should be scrapped for reasons of intergenerational fairness. But not all older people are experiencing a higher standard of living—older pensioners even less so. In 2020, benefit income was the largest component of income for both pensioner couples and single pensioners, and nearly two-thirds of the total income for single female pensioners.

In fact, younger people arguably have more to gain from the triple lock than older people because, when the state second pension was replaced by the new state pension in 2016, which will apply to future pensioners, its full value then was set at around 24% of average earnings—and that is low in comparison with any other advanced economy. But that is the base on which one is looking to make private savings work. To achieve a replacement income in retirement of 45% for the average earner, privately saving 8% under auto enrolment, the new state pension needs to be nearer 30% of average earnings. The Government argued when they introduced the new state pension that it was set because it was part of a package, together with the triple lock and the accelerated increases in the state pension age, which have been banked.

Again, research by the Pensions Policy Institute indicates that, without the triple lock, it will be harder, at least until the new state pension rises above a certain level, for young workers to achieve an adequate income in retirement, because it is the base on which their private savings will assist in securing them an income in retirement, and the dominance of the role of the state pension in pensioner income will persist long into the future.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, these amendments raise important issues about the impact of the Bill on poverty. I simply want to raise a point about the measure of poverty that should be used.

At Second Reading, in her response to the debate the Minister referred to a fall in pensioner poverty since 2009-10 as measured by the so-called absolute poverty measure, and she did so again earlier this evening. In fact, it is not a measure of absolute poverty as such but is better described as an anchored measure which measures any change by adjusting the 2010-11 poverty line for inflation. In contrast, the House of Commons Library briefing, using the relative poverty measure, recorded an increase in pensioner poverty from an historic low of 13% in 2011-12 to 18% in 2019-20, as my noble friend Lady Sherlock said. With reference to Amendment 8, single female poverty is higher than the overall figure—a point already made.

However, the Minister was dismissive of the use of a relative measure, stating:

“The Government believe that absolute poverty is a better measure of living standards than relative poverty, which can provide counterintuitive results”.—[Official Report, 13/10/21; col. 1885.]


Criticisms of the relative poverty measure as potentially counterintuitive have tended to focus on when it is used for short-term, year-on-year comparisons, but, in this case, we are talking about a rise in relative poverty over a period of eight years, which surely should have triggered some alarm bells in the department.

Relevant here is a recent Work and Pensions Committee report. Although its focus was on measuring child poverty, what it has to say is relevant also to pensioner poverty. It states:

“The Secretary of State is of course right to say that a relative measure can, in the short term, produce counter-intuitive results—but it has great value for assessing long term trends. We are concerned to see Ministers focusing on a single measure, rather than drawing on the rich information offered by DWP’s own set of income-based measures, which combines relative, ‘absolute’ and broader material deprivation statistics … Ministers should reaffirm their commitment to measuring poverty through all four measures”.


Similarly, I have a Written Answer from the Minister’s predecessor, dated May 2018, which states:

“No one measure of poverty is able to fully capture the concept of a low standard of living in all economic circumstances.”


Yet increasingly, Ministers use the so-called absolute measure, as if it is the only appropriate measure. Will the Minister reaffirm that commitment as called for by the Work and Pensions Committee? After all, I remind her that, when he was leader of the Conservative Party, David Cameron explained:

“We need to think of poverty in relative terms—the fact that some people lack those things that others in society take for granted. So I want this message to go out loud and clear: the Conservative Party recognises, will measure and will act on relative poverty.”


Can the Minister explain why that is no longer the case? What has changed, other than that the Government’s record on poverty looks worse using the relative poverty measure that Mr Cameron championed?

[Baroness Drake (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 3. To quote from a publication by the Institute for Fiscal Studies,

“We’ll know we are on the way to levelling up when differences in health and life expectancy across the country start to drop. Sadly, that’s one measure of inequality that has clearly been moving in the wrong direction over the past decade.”


Associated with those growing inequalities is pensioner poverty, which, as we have heard, has risen from 13% to 18% and is likely to rise even further. For older pensioners, the rise is even higher. With the rising energy and food costs that we can all see coming down the track, there will be a lot of old people this winter with very little money, sitting in cold houses, fearing that they will not get any help when they fall ill. That will be the reality for many thousands of people in the coming winter months.

We know that there is a major problem generally of households on low incomes with rising debt who will not be able to weather the storm of the growing cost-of-living problems that we are beginning to see. Then again, looked at from a regional perspective, in the majority of regions in England pensioner couples have average weekly incomes below the pensioner couple average, and we are seeing this problem in particular regions: in the north-east, the north-west, east Midlands, West Midlands, Yorkshire and indeed in London, which now has the highest relative level of pensioner poverty. As Imperial College research now shows us, life expectancy is falling in urban areas in these regions—in Leeds, Newcastle, Manchester, Liverpool and other areas. Cuts to health and social spending will have contributed to that trend, and we have not yet experienced a winter with the backlog that the NHS is dealing with.

Pensioners with low incomes are more sensitive to indexation changes because they are more dependent for their income on those benefits. Yet we have seen no assessment of the impact of suspending the triple lock, or indeed what could be the implications of decisions the Government will take next year or the year after, given that through the Bill they have suspended both the triple lock and the legislative underpin of earnings. We know that projected levels of pensioner poverty will vary according to the uprating provisions applied to the state pension, given its dominance in pensioner income. If you play negatively with pensioner income, pensioner poverty will go up. That sensitivity to indexation will continue to increase, as fewer and fewer pensioners reach state pension age without the generous defined benefits or defined contribution pensions which, in the past, cushioned the fall in the state pension that occurred under successive Governments.

Pensioner poverty is not a legacy issue. State pension is and remains a dominant source of income for the majority of both current and future pensioners. Research by the Pensions Policy Institute—your Lordships can tell that I am a governor—reveals that the UK is currently on course for a quarter of people approaching retirement being unlikely to receive even a minimum income. Of the 11 million people in the UK between the age of 50 and state pension age, around 3 million will not receive a minimum income.