Pension Schemes Bill

Debate between Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted and Baroness Altmann

Committee stage
Thursday 5th February 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

I understand the point that the noble Lord is making. I am just not convinced that one would want to put this type of responsibility on the Government. Of course, judgments in international law change from time to time, and trustees are investing for the very long term. I recall the example of Myanmar given by the noble Lord, Lord Pitt-Watson. There are difficult issues that I understand the Government might regulate for. How pension trustees then build that into their asset allocation is another layer of complexity that I have concerns about, but I certainly have every sympathy with the intentions of the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, and the noble Baroness, Lady Janke. It is a difficult one. I just caution that getting to that level of prescription could be the thin end of the wedge for pension trustees, who already have so many responsibilities upon their shoulders.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I welcome the noble Lord, Lord Pitt-Watson, to the Committee. His comments have inspired me to make a very small intervention. It is true that there is a lot of index investment, and inevitably that will capture things inadvertently, but there are now many more indices that will be socially responsible or environmentally responsible, and trustees can choose to use them.

If pension trustees collectively and pension funds made a little more noise and made more approaches to the index providers, we may well get indices that are more pushy in what they do for social and environmental protection. Ultimately, most of the time they are paid to invent an index or they are doing it for their own platforms, but I see an open door there to apply pressure.

Pension Schemes Bill

Debate between Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted and Baroness Altmann

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd January 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, those noble Lords who have examined the Marshalled List will know that Amendment 46A constitutes what was in Amendment 46 but with an extra paragraph (e) in the proposed new subsection; that is the difference. The amendment proposes a small number of matters that value for money “must”, rather than merely “may”, take into account. The Bill ultimately leads to schemes being graded as performing or non-performing, so the framework must be sophisticated enough to reflect long-term investment reality, not just short-term metrics.

Value for money is a judgment about appropriateness, risk, purpose and fairness. Paragraph (a) of the proposed new subsection is based on long-term assets requiring a long-term view. I suggest assessments over three, five and 10 years, but that is to illustrate the point, rather than being a fixation. Private assets often show negative early returns and we need a way of understanding valuations through the cycle, especially where valuations drive fees. As more investments are moved into private assets, especially if back books have to be adjusted to meet authorisation percentages, there will be cluster effects. I worry about that and its effect on value for money.

How can we check valuations in the private equity context as well? There is a lot of literature around how it is useful to have a market price comparator for what is an otherwise opaque and infrequent exercise. Listed investment companies are routinely used in institutional analysis as a valuation cross-check for private assets because they provide daily pricing for similar underlying exposures and frequent net asset value valuations. For example, the ICAEW’s 2020 report, Fair Value Measurement by Listed Private Equity Funds, notes that listed funds provide observable market prices for benchmarking unlisted investments. The Bank of England has noted in several financial stability reports that market price vehicles, including listed funds, provide useful information about liquidity conditions and valuation dynamics in private markets, particularly when model-based valuations adjust slowly. These valuation and transparency credentials make it all the more extraordinary—and, I dare say, suspicious—that the Bill shuts them out.

My second point—paragraph (b)—is that value must be assessed in the context of the nature, spread and purpose of the assets. Long-term infrastructure behaves differently from assets for liquidity or inflation protection. The question is whether the assets are good value for what they are meant to do. Some assets, or the way in which they are packaged, serve hybrid purposes—as listed investment companies have long done—combining private asset exposure with market liquidity. Directly held assets have fewer fees, but selection and achieving wide diversity are more challenging. LTAFs will package a mix of illiquid and liquid assets and it will be interesting to see how it works over time.

My third point—paragraph (c)—is that value must be seen in the context of the characteristics of members. Those on lower incomes cannot afford excessive risk or prolonged losses; they are more likely to remain in default funds, and trustees will be mindful of that. A more cautious strategy in lower returns may be entirely legitimate for value for money. Trustees must retain the ability to choose strategies that are appropriate for their members, not strategies that score well on a narrow template. This is particularly relevant because assessments created for the DC default funds may well be adopted more widely.

My fourth point—paragraph (d)—concerns the risk of herding. Too much measurement, comparison and advisory consensus can drive correlated strategy. The Bank of England has repeatedly warned about pro-cyclical behaviour and systemic vulnerabilities. A value-for-money framework must not unintentionally reinforce those behaviours; not going with the crowd is sometimes the value-preserving strategy. If we reduce value for money to consensual metrics, we will distort behaviour and risk repeating the mistakes of the charge cap era.

My final point—this is the new one, paragraph (e)—concerns fairness between cohorts. Private assets, especially private equity, typically follow a J-curve: early losses or flat value followed by rising value and, often, high late gains. Gaming or late realisation of value scores high in performance fees. That can be emphasised deliberately or just through the valuation timetable. Thus early cohorts end up bearing the set-up losses while later cohorts—these are long-term assets, so it may be 10 or 20 years later—are the ones that benefit from the late-stage gains. This will be exaggerated, too, if there is back-book adjustment. Performance fees and valuation-linked fees distort fairness over time. If value for money is to be fair, these effects need to be managed—as, indeed, they do for the payment of the pensions.

Additionally, as funds scale, investment will shift from external vehicles to internal management—the models used in Australia and Canada and, increasingly, by Nest and USS in our own pension funds. It will be important to observe how that affects fees and performance.

I strongly support the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, on member services, which I would have added to my essential list if I had thought of it first—but I did not steal it. I have added my name to the amendment of the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, on fee transparency, with the caution, again, that we must not repeat the mistakes of the current cost disclosure regimes, which do not properly recognise where costs are borne. I note that it will take more ingenuity than fee percentage transparency to get the full picture out of private equity. I beg to move.

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I strongly support Amendment 46A from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, to which I have added my name and which she so eloquently explained. I will speak to my own Amendment 47, which she referred to and which looks at the value-for-money ratings from the point of view of members. For me, that is an extremely important element that is often overlooked when concentrating on the investment side alone—not that that is not important.

I draw the Committee’s attention to some of the specifications that I have made in my Amendment 47, which I think are crucial to understand when one is choosing a pension scheme for one’s workforce. The quality of service for members can be extremely important and can indeed drive adequacy in ways that are not recognised by the investment side. The investment side is of course important, but if quality of service and the education, guidance and support provided to members are working well, that can be a driver to encourage members to increase their contributions. Ultimately, that can be at least on a par in importance with investment performance over time. If members gradually build up their contribution levels to, say, twice what they were before by adding 1% a year every time they get a bonus, that combined with the investment performance can be an extremely powerful driver for value for money over the long run, which is of course where we are meant to be examining and assessing the schemes.

On communications with members, I have specifically included in that what I call “jargon-light” communications, because I have not yet seen a communication with members about pensions that does not include baffling or off-putting terms, including—I will come to this later—the very term “default funds”. We all know what this refers to, but if you are talking to a young worker or someone in later life who is not on a high salary and does not know a lot about pensions and you tell them that what they are supposed to do with their money is to put it into a default fund, that may not sound terribly attractive to them. The last thing that most people want to do with their money is default.

The Minister is looking somewhat askance at my remarks, but this is just one example. I apologise—perhaps she is just looking at something in her notes. Certainly, those are the kind of looks that one sometimes gets from the pensions industry, which does not tend to understand that the ordinary person has never heard of a default fund and it does not sound particularly attractive. If we can include, in communications, words in plain English that may sound more enticing than the usual pension jargon, I think it could be helpful. I would argue that that is potentially a measure of the value offered in a workplace scheme, which is what the ratings are going to be looking at. I hope that the Committee will understand the aims of my specifications in Amendment 47 and, perhaps as we go through, Members of the Committee may suggest other elements.

Pension Schemes Bill

Debate between Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted and Baroness Altmann

Committee stage
Monday 12th January 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 12 in this group. I hate to disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Davies, but he will have to wait a while before we get to Amendment 10.

As I mentioned earlier, a few years ago I had engagement with local authority pension funds concerning investment opportunities that could be tailored to their own areas. I discovered that they did not want it only in their own areas. They wanted to look at wider areas that included nearby local authorities, in some instances, as well as those further away where the economic responses to recession had fared better. There were some that wished that they had not just invested in some shopping centres in their own area but also in some in London and the south-east that had not lost so much money. That is not what I was trying to involve them in at the time, but these were the examples that came to me.

Those that were in more rural areas wanted some action from the cities. They viewed local investment through a broader lens of meaning things that help localities generally. They wanted to invest in local-sized infrastructure, but not necessarily only in their own areas—especially where some of these things could serve their areas from the outside. There is an example of waste management in Milton Keynes that goes beyond its area. Another example is that of a local waste management facility that recycles all the waste from kitchens. Normally, because there is quite a lot of toxic stuff in it, that waste will go to landfill, but this facility deals with all the nasties and converts it into energy. That facility is not just of interest to the local authority area in which it sits but to other ones too.

There is no suggestion that I wish to compel this in any way; I just want to draw attention to the fact that my personal experience brought this, which I was quite surprised about at the time. There was a focus on saying, “Do good in your own area”, but there was also a desire for the diversity to do good in other areas as well. Maybe you need it under a separate heading, but I just thought I would table this amendment to draw attention to this point and to make sure that, when it comes to regulations, maybe it is in the mind of the Minister and others that there should be some wriggle room around what is defined as local.

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I added my name to the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and I endorse his remarks. There is a clear need for social housing and I would be grateful if the Minister could explain to the Committee the impact of asset pooling and whether it perhaps interferes with funds from local authority pension schemes being invested in social housing.

There is a clear need across the country for improvements in the housing stock. Local areas can know what the need for build-to-rent might be or the need for social housing that is disability friendly or friendly for an ageing population. These areas are not necessarily the focus of some of the private sector housebuilders. Using this resource to improve the lives of local residents—perhaps it would improve the futures of pension scheme members themselves—as well as areas around the country, would be important and I would be grateful to hear the Minister’s views.

I also support Amendment 12, which was so well introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. It is essential that the resources in both local and national pension schemes are invested to benefit local and national growth. The diversification benefits of investing in areas much wider than just the local area are clear in terms of using pension fund assets to boost long-term growth, which is an aim the Government rightly have.

I know the Government want to use pension fund assets to benefit Britain, and it seems that local authority pension schemes offer an ideal opportunity for that. If these asset pools can invest more broadly than just the local area, and local authority pension schemes are encouraged to have a diversification spread across the country, I hope that would be a significant improvement and a tangible benefit from the funding that goes into these schemes and from the strong position they have built.

Packaged Retail and Insurance-based Investment Products (Retail Disclosure) (Amendment) Regulations 2024

Debate between Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted and Baroness Altmann

Wednesday 13th November 2024 Grand Committee

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak mainly to the instruments on listed investment companies. I first raised this issue in the House on 6 June last year, attempting to make an amendment during the passage of the Financial Services and Markets Bill. Perhaps history is now catching up with me. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Livermore, then on the Labour Front Bench, for grasping the economic importance of the matter, which he will appreciate even more as Financial Secretary, given the perhaps as much as £40 billion of lost investment in infrastructure, green energy and social buildings.

On one hand, I am pleased with the PRIIPs statutory instrument that was introduced in September, removing investment trusts from PRIIPs, and the cost disclosures part of the MiFID Org regulation and the accompanying FCA forbearance statements. Before I go further, I must flag that this was never about not reporting costs or not providing investors with a full suite of information on fees or all other corporate costs and charges. Investment trusts are listed companies and as such must provide all the transparency for investors that listing requires, including publishing full information in annual reports.

Unfortunately, after the September actions by the Government and FCA, the competitor industry to investment trusts, the open-ended funds and their organisation—the Investment Association—held a members’ meeting and agreed not to do what HMT expected, which has just been iterated by the Minister. They agreed that they would not accept that, at the share level—the investor-holding level—of investment trusts there are zero deductions from investment value.

Convening the meeting, and seeking member agreement, was confirmed by the CEO of the IA, Chris Cummings, at the Lords Financial Services Regulation Committee last Wednesday. Today, Ashley Alder, chair of the FCA, confirmed to the committee that there was no deduction to make from share value —I hope that everyone listened keenly. Chris Cummings further said last week that they did not want any changes to the current practice—the practice that has caused all the problems—until the FCA has completed its consultation and done all the new rules. They do not want any of the interim provisions. In another slide presented to the members’ meeting, it was shown that this could take until 2027. That is plenty of time for the misinformation to continue and to destroy the sector with which they compete.

There are other players assisting them in this anti-competitive effort, including the majority of large retail investment platforms, with the laudable exception of ii, although there may be others. Hargreaves Lansdown, which is the largest and also a member of the Investment Association as it is also a fund manager, spoke at the IA members’ meeting to explain how they—meaning itself and other platforms—would block retail investors from purchasing the shares of investment trusts that put “zero” in the costs to be deducted field of the European MiFID template, or EMT, which also generates the deduction from investment illustrations on platforms. After the meeting, Hargreaves Lansdown, Fidelity, and possibly others that I have not seen, sent out emails to fund managers and investment trust boards and commenced blocking operations for those investment trusts that dared to enter “zero”. Not surprisingly, many investment trust boards capitulated out of fear of being disconnected from the marketplace.

What happens as a result is a continuation of the bogus practice of telling investors they will lose large amounts off the share value of their investment—and guess what? They might buy an open-ended fund instead. For example, if, on the Hargreaves Lansdown site, you click on “How much will it cost?”, there are computations showing—wrongly—that on, say, a £5,000 investment over five years there will be management fee deductions, in some instances of well over £1,000, and even some causing losses. But that is not the case, because those costs are already reflected in the share price. It is very nice to force your competitors into a corner and keep them there until 2027 or longer, if you can continue to use your might, being 45 times larger than the competing sector you are colluding against.

That brings me on to the second pair of the SIs which, regrettably, have done nothing to address the shenanigans that have gone on for the last few years, or to prevent this vast open-ended fund sector using its size and might to continue to gaslight and bully investors—and even regulators—about the role that market share price plays in absorbing and reflecting the internal company costs, just as does the share price of any listed company. You buy the share; you sell the share—there are no deductions from your share price by the company. In fact, I would like to know what mechanism people think that could be done by.

The second SI continues to classify investment trusts as consumer collective investments, despite market-wide concerns expressed in consultation responses by some 340 respondents. The Treasury says that there will be special treatment, but it is not in the statutory instrument. All it has done is amend the old definition of a CCI in an admission that previously, investment trusts were not properly within the definition—all part of the old misinterpretation of “value”.

There has been no clarification of the circumstances in the market. It needs to be clear that investment trusts are financial instruments, like other shares. They should not be confused with savings products, and they are not covered by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. They must be given all the recognition that derives from being a listed company, with market-set share price which is the value. Is that in the SI? No. Can you guarantee that the FCA will get it right? No. The CEO has made incorrect statements that investment trusts are savings products and muddled that costs are not zero, clearly referencing net asset value, which is not what you hold.

I am sorry to say that this SI is a poor example of what we expected when the future financial framework was proposed and consulted upon. We were promised policy guidance in the statutory instruments, and it is not here, even when there have been the direst circumstances that require it and a massive consultation response in favour of it. All that has been set aside, with nothing to show in the legislation. The only policy is saying they are still a CCI, which, after all that has gone before, is not adequate policy guidance. If you want to know what the right kind of guidance might look like, I suggest referring to my own Private Member’s Bill, which we will be discussing on Friday. I am afraid that the job is not yet done.

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I too would like to address the statutory instruments relating to the PRIIPs and to the consumer composite investments. I am very grateful to the Government for laying these statutory instruments. I would also like to thank the Treasury and the Financial Conduct Authority for the statements they issued in September, and the FCA for its first set of forbearance and its subsequent additional emergency forbearance.

However, like the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, it appears to me that, despite the clear intentions of the Government and the Financial Conduct Authority, as expressed particularly in the PRIIPs statutory instrument, some parts of the industry are not willing to accept what the Government believe and the FCA have clearly indicated is the right position. That is a particular concern to me.

The Minister rightly pointed out that the aim is to improve transparency and enable comparison between products for investors. The whole point of cost disclosures has always been to help consumers and investors—whether they are retailers, small institutions or others—understand what they are going to be paying for any investment product they buy. We know that, in the past, many of these costs were hidden. As the Minister said, investors need to better understand what they are paying for the product they buy. It needs to be accurately reflected to them, so they know the actual cost of the investments they are considering making or that they are holding.