Treaty Scrutiny: Working Practices (EUC Report)

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Monday 7th September 2020 Grand Committee

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)]

If we cannot reach the noble Baroness, Lady Goudie, we will go to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) (V)]

My Lords, the three reports we are considering today—

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)]

Baroness Bowles, I do apologise. Can we can just pause for a moment while we try to reconnect with the previous speaker?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted [V]]

My Lords, I will start again. The three reports we are considering today provide a wealth of wisdom and background, as the excellent spoken contributions have done; most things have been said.

My own knowledge is derived more from practical experience in the EU than from UK legislative history and procedure. But I cannot help but think that we have not moved very far when we are left clinging to a 1924 precedent as a best hope, in this age of complex compound treaties and 24-hour international media. If a weak deal is negotiated by the Government, everyone will know. If Parliament has not been informed over time on tricky play-offs, that is when Parliament becomes difficult rather than an ally, and reasonable choices can end up misunderstood and publicly criticised.

The reports emphasise scrutiny and holding the Government to account, which of course is a primary purpose of Parliament. The Government’s approach is overly biased towards maximising their secretive freedom, believing that that always enables playing their best hand. That is not my experience. The Government can be in a stronger negotiating position if Parliament is on their side on the journey.

I first joined the European Parliament before the Lisbon treaty—before the Parliament’s veto came into force. I recall admissions that the Commission found itself weakened because countries would play the “Parliament/Congress won’t agree” card, to which it had no answer. No matter how tough you think you are in negotiations, just saying no—“Because I don’t want it, because it’s not my policy”—is hard. The reply comes back: “We’re blocked and you’re not. You’re the one that has to move.” The backing of a democratic mandate is strong in the pecking order.

When the Lisbon treaty came into force, the first parliament vetoes were on passenger name recognition and banking data transfers via SWIFT, which did result in better data protection standards. As well as holding Governments to account, parliaments provide equality of arms and can assist in discussions with other parliaments—which does not happen so much if there is no power.

I became involved in various public and private meetings on trade in financial services—a trade sector still not well developed. At a conference in the US Congress on one of my visits, I was spontaneously asked by a Senator on the banking committee to explain how the EU’s TTIP proposals on financial services would work in the US legal system. It was not a trick question, and Commission officials present confessed afterwards that they wished they could explain it as well as I had done. They noted that I had the advantage not only of being more specialist but of being in tune with the concerns of US parliamentarians, with whom I already had a working relationship.

We have a long way to go to harness the benefits of parliamentary involvement and grow our own modern method, and I commend the pragmatic proposals in the Treaty Scrutiny: Working Practices report. The Government should not waste the benefits of Parliament as an ally and on the interparliamentary front—both externally and within the devolved UK.