Markets in Financial Instruments (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018 Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Bowles of Berkhamsted
Main Page: Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted's debates with the Department for International Development
(6 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the Government are planning for all eventualities, including the UK leaving the EU without an implementation period, and changes made in this statutory instrument might not take effect on 29 March 2019 if the UK enters an implementation period. None the less, statutory instruments intended to deal with all eventualities, even though they might not happen, should not set precedents and practices in the use of SIs that are undesirable.
As the Minister said, MiFID II is the EU legislation that introduces a transparency and disclosure regime into financial markets, particularly by requiring firms to provide trade data to give transparency on the best-execution obligation and transaction reporting requirements, which are used by regulators to detect market abuse. The intended outcome of this regime is to improve protections for investors, increase confidence in financial markets and maintain financial stability.
The functions under MiFID II are carried out by EU authorities, so if the UK leaves in a no-deal scenario this legislation needs to continue to work, and these regulations transfer responsibilities to the FCA, the PRA and the Bank of England, with overall responsibility reserved to the Treasury. In particular, it gives the FCA a set of temporary powers to operate the MiFID II transparency regime with flexibility during a four-year transitional period—with the intention, it states, of preserving the existing outcomes of the transparency regime as far as possible: that is, improving protections for investors, increasing confidence in financial markets and ensuring financial stability.
The FCA has to issue a statement of policy on its use of these temporary powers but, as the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee observed in its report of 1 November, and as the Minister has acknowledged, that policy statement is not available to consider alongside these draft regulations. That is not helpful, given that the FCA is taking responsibility for complex legislation which governs the buying, selling and trading of financial instruments.
It will take four years for the FCA to become operationally ready to carry out its functions relating to transparency and disclosure, and these regulations could result in significant policy changes. Yes, this SI addresses a deficiency by transferring the functions of the European Securities and Markets Authority to the relevant UK regulator and the functions of the Commission to the Treasury, but it also gives the FCA a set of temporary powers that allow it the scope to operate the transparency regime in a stand-alone UK context.
It is clear from reading the Explanatory Memorandum that these temporary powers go beyond the narrower issue of correcting deficiencies into making policy. For example, as the Explanatory Memorandum confirms, waivers and thresholds for disclosure contained in the current transparency and disclosure regime are calculated on the basis of EU-wide market data. An abrupt move to using UK-only data will pose operational challenges for the FCA and could result in outcomes that do not enhance investor protection and market confidence.
The Explanatory Memorandum further confirms that the FCA is given powers that include amending and freezing obligations on firms where it is considered appropriate. Certain transparency conditions could be suspended during the four-year transition period. In effect, there could be a weakening of the transparency regime, with implications for investor protection. These are important matters which necessitate the FCA statement of policy on how these temporary powers will be used being in place before exit day if there is no implementation period.
There is also a time-sensitive issue. Firms will need to review their contracts, and contracts on derivative trades may need to be agreed some time in advance. So I ask the Minister for an assurance that an FCA policy statement will be in place before exit day and that Parliament will have the opportunity to consider that statement, as the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee flagged. In his opening speech the Minister acknowledged the need for the FCA to have the necessary resources. But it is not simply a matter of saying that it needs extra FTE of 200, 500 or whatever; it is about whether the Government are confident that there is the supply of staff with the necessary expertise to carry out what is going to be a hugely complex challenge for the FCA.
As the Treasury made clear in response to a question from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, it can refuse to approve the FCA policy statement on the use of its temporary powers if the department considers that the statement would prejudice an international agreement it hoped to reach. That again prompts a series of questions. Can the Minister confirm that, in the event of the Treasury refusing such approval, its reasons will be made known to Parliament, and Parliament will be able to consider them? If the Treasury vetoes an FCA policy statement, what policy will apply in its stead? These temporary powers are given to the FCA to maintain a transparency and disclosure regime intended to protect investors and maintain confidence in financial markets, so could the Minister give an illustrative example of when potential prejudice to concluding an international agreement could justify vetoing an FCA policy statement and possibly weakening the transparency regime?
My Lords, once again I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bates, for his introduction and declare my interest as a director of the London Stock Exchange plc. I will speak on many of the things that the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, has just mentioned. I too echo the feelings of Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee (Sub-Committee B) about being asked to approve this legislation in the absence of the FCA policy. Even if it is not completed, we could have been given more clues about its shape and type of content.
In its reply to the sub-committee, the Treasury says the response to the FCA consultation is needed first. I think that refers to the FCA consultation that came out last Friday, and I wonder whether it was timed to come out after we would have, under the normal scheme of things, approved this the previous Wednesday. So was it actually being kept away from our beady eyes? I could not get around to looking at it until today; in fact, I could not even find it when I looked earlier. In fact, it just repeats that the policy is yet to come. It is 986 pages long, but on pages 39-41 I found some useful information. It says:
“We will issue a statement of policy on how the temporary powers will be used”.
That refers to the transparency regime. Everything else in there just details the powers it has been given.
I found a little more useful information around page 770, but only about the new Article 17A of the relevant BTS, which appears to say how it will operate those waivers that will remain, such as “large in scale”, and how it will operate deferred publication on venues—but these are not actually among the main things that the FCA has been given the power to suspend.
The only firm policy we have been given is that the FCA does not have the necessary resources and that some of the most controversial, industry-disliked parts of MiFID II and publication on waiver volumes are to be suspended by up to four years. It is a major policy change to go from mandatory measures to suspension for such a long period and yet the Government say that they aim to preserve existing outcomes of the transparency regime as far as possible.
I shall go on to test that statement in a moment but, before I do, I should mention that the Treasury, in reply to the Secondary Legislation Committee, in Appendix 1, states:
“A properly considered statement of policy on the use of the temporary powers would need to be informed by”,
the FCA consultations. However, there is nothing in the FCA consultations that informs how the policy of suspension will be used. In another reply, it states:
“HM Treasury received no objections from any of the industry stakeholders on the way these powers would be used by the FCA”.
So it seems that industry has been consulted. However, it was not a public consultation—I have looked for that too. Industry has been spoken to and has some knowledge of what is going on but we, who have to approve this legislation, are the ones most kept in the dark. This is a decision in search of a policy and that is not the way properly to treat Parliament.
I shall go on to test the statement about preserving existing outcomes of the transparency regime as far as possible. With equities, the double-volume cap is suspended because the FCA does not have all the information, but here there is a mitigating measure in that the FCA can suspend two of the transparency waivers for six months at a time. The formulation used for the suspension of those waivers is,
“if the FCA considers that it is necessary to do so to advance the FCA’s integrity objective under section 1D of FSMA”.
I have asked the Minister to confirm whether the policy intention of the double-volume cap—which, broadly speaking, is to limit the amount of dark trading—is fully encompassed in that integrity objective, taken together with the additional conditions of having reference to consumer protection, competition and the pre-Brexit thresholds.
I ask this question about the integrity objective because the FCA objectives as defined in FSMA are not coupled to MiFID II, and historically UK regulators have gone to less-strict standards. For example, on best execution, the UK regulators always went with “all reasonable efforts”—indeed, I remember the fight to get that wording into MiFID I—rather than the strict “best endeavours” that the EU finally went out with as the standard of MiFID II. So if we fall back on FSMA objectives, my concern is that they are not as strict as the requirements of MiFID II.
There is a mechanism here for the FCA to address the dark-trading policy, but it is thrown into doubt by the statement that there will be no publication of trading under waivers and that the FCA will not have sufficient data. Does this mean that there will be no way of checking whether the FCA has done its job? I do not understand why the FCA will not have data, because it collects UK data. What lack of data is preventing information under the equity waivers when they are used?
There are other things that the FCA could also do. Under MiFID I, venues had the task to monitor waivers and impose restrictions under conduct of business rules. My next question is: is the FCA empowered to revert to such a mechanism should they wish and are there any plans to do so? I certainly have not seen any in the consultation because it was all silent about how these powers would be used. Concerning equities, my conclusion is that there is, possibly, the ability to live up to the statement about preserving the outcomes of the transparency regime because there is a substitute regime, but there is still no way for observers to know that if there is no information about the use of waivers.
My Lords, at this hour a letter is an attractive proposition. I counted some 27 questions, which is a pretty respectable ratio from the three distinguished speakers in this debate. I will try to deal with as many as I can in the time available. Clearly, I will have to read the Official Report with officials to see if there are any points we need to write on; I suspect there will be. Therefore, if we run out of time, I will include other answers in that communication.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asked why the amended thresholds which appear in Article 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b) of the Commission of Delegated Regulation 2017/567—thresholds for determining which equity instruments are liquid—have not been changed. However, replacing references to Union data with UK market data in the legislation would change which instruments were classed as being liquid for UK market participants.
On the FCA not having the data, it needs sufficient time to build systems to analyse market data independently from ESMA. It estimates that this will take four years. As noted, the Treasury can end this period earlier if the transparency regime cannot operate earlier. The FCA does not have all the data relating to firms in the UK, as EU firms currently report back to their own competent authority and not to the FCA.
Does not this very regulation enable that, within the transition period, the FCA will collect that data? That is one of the other provisions. Although it might not have it now, after Brexit, as soon as we are into the transition period, it will have it.
Of course, in the event of a deal, that would be the case, and that is what we would expect to happen. On the transitional period that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asked about, it took approximately four years to develop the detail of the current transparency system and put it in place. On her point about the FCA being held accountable, and what parliamentary oversight of the FCA’s decisions there would be—a point also raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, and the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe—the powers being granted to the FCA are necessary to uphold market stability. These powers will generally be constrained to situations where their use is necessary for the advancements of the FCA’s integrity objectives. The FCA will be held accountable in two ways. First, it will be required to publish a statement of policy explaining its approach; the policy statement could come into effect only if the Treasury did not raise objections. Secondly, Parliament will be able to further scrutinise and question Treasury Ministers; if the Treasury objected, the FCA would need to revise its statement.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asked about the transitional powers. Without these powers—
I am sorry to interrupt again, but I think that the noble Lord just said that Treasury officials would interrogate the FCA about its policy and that it would have to change it if they did not like it. However, my understanding of the regulation is that they can do that only with regard to either international standards or if it would interfere with some international negotiation. The provision does not appear to have been put into the legislation as an all-round general policy; indeed, I think that the whole idea is that the Treasury is not supposed to interfere with what the FCA does. So I am not sure that this line from the Treasury—“We’re going to make sure it’s all right”—fully stands up.