Debates between Baroness Altmann and Lord Young of Cookham during the 2015-2017 Parliament

Mon 21st Nov 2016
Pension Schemes Bill [HL]
Lords Chamber

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords

Class 4 National Insurance Contributions

Debate between Baroness Altmann and Lord Young of Cookham
Wednesday 15th March 2017

(7 years, 3 months ago)

Lords Chamber
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Lord Young of Cookham Portrait Lord Young of Cookham
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I assume those measures have already been approved by both Houses of Parliament, if they are going to come into effect next month.

Baroness Altmann Portrait Baroness Altmann (Con)
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My Lords, I too add my congratulations to the Chancellor on his very sensible and timely decision. The idea that self-employed and employed people have opportunities for arbitrage, and that that needs to be corrected, is absolutely right. However, the Chancellor should be applauded for concluding that we should wait until the Matthew Taylor review and a more thorough analysis can be carried out, and then come back in the autumn with perhaps different proposals that will achieve the desired impact without breaking manifesto commitments and recognise the huge importance to our economy of encouraging self-employment, risk-taking and the establishment of new businesses.

Lord Young of Cookham Portrait Lord Young of Cookham
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I am grateful to my noble friend for what she has just said and for her contribution to yesterday’s debate on the Budget. I am sure she is right in what she says about the Taylor review and about finding the right way through the dilemma of continuing to encourage enterprise and self-employment where it is legitimate while, on the other hand, removing the opportunity for arbitrage and abuse, which in some cases is taking place at the moment. I am grateful for her support.

Pension Schemes Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Altmann and Lord Young of Cookham
Monday 21st November 2016

(7 years, 6 months ago)

Lords Chamber
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Baroness Altmann Portrait Baroness Altmann
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My Lords, I echo the comments made by my noble friend Lord Flight. Why do the draftsmen of the Bill think that having a separate legal entity is definitely a good thing? What are the risks that this approach tries to close down? Perhaps if we could understand those risks better, we might be able to address the issue in a slightly different way. Is the aim somehow to ring-fence the DC covenant of the scheme funder and prevent them from having other financial obligations that might take away from the support for this master trust, or to minimise the burden on checking accounts? Obviously, it is easier to review the accounts of a stand-alone entity than of a much broader group. Hopefully, if we could better understand what the rationale is, it might be possible to address some of the very important concerns that have been expressed by some of our major insurance companies.

Lord Young of Cookham Portrait Lord Young of Cookham
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I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, for his amendment. I gently point out that there is a spelling mistake in it, but there are other reasons for resisting it.

Amendments 19 and 20, tabled by the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, deal with Clause 10, which sets out the requirements that a scheme funder must meet in order for a master trust to be authorised. I hope to explain to noble Lords, particularly my noble friend, the thinking behind insisting that there is a separate legal entity behind each scheme. A scheme funder by definition is key to the master trust’s financial sustainability. By “scheme funder” we mean a person who is liable to provide funds in relation to the scheme when the administration charges paid by and in respect of members are not sufficient to cover the scheme’s costs, or someone who is entitled to receive profits when the scheme’s charges exceed its costs.

Amendment 19 would remove the requirement for the scheme funder to be a separate legal entity that carries on business activities only directly related to the master trust, and would replace it with a requirement for the scheme funder to be approved by the Pensions Regulator. I listened with interest to the points that noble Lords made in respect of that amendment. Amendment 20 would similarly remove the requirement for a master trust’s scheme funder to be a separate legal entity that carries on only the master trust business. The effect of both amendments would be to allow the same legal entity that acts as scheme funder to engage in business activities not directly related to the master trust, making it more difficult for the Pensions Regulator to identify matters relevant to the master trust and therefore to assess the financial sustainability of the scheme.

To enable the regulator to assess the financial position of the scheme with certainty when deciding whether the master trust should be authorised or remain authorised, the scheme funder must be set up as a separate legal entity. This is defined in the Bill as meaning, in effect, a legal person whose only business activities are in relation to the master trust. Requiring scheme funders to be separate legal entities will make their financial position, and the financial arrangements between them and the master trust, more transparent to the regulator and provide greater clarity regarding the assets, liabilities, costs and income in relation to the master trust business. This will greatly assist the regulator in carrying out its assessment of schemes’ financial sustainability.

There will be greater transparency regarding any additional funding streams coming into the scheme funder entity, and the level of commitment of those funds for the purposes of running the master trust, should the scheme funder be in receipt of income generated from other lines of business carried on by connected entities. The amendments would remove that transparency by making it possible for the scheme funder to carry on business activities not related to the master trust under the same corporate entity. It would therefore be difficult for the regulator to identify the financial sustainability or otherwise of the master trust.

One of the other authorisation criteria of which the regulator needs to be satisfied is that the people involved in the master trust scheme are fit and proper. Clause 7 specifies people that the regulator must assess for this purpose, including the scheme funder. It is not clear to what extent Amendment 19, requiring the scheme funder to be approved by the regulator, would differ from the assessment that the regulator is already required to carry out under Clause 7. Requiring the regulator to approve the scheme funder in general terms, rather than setting out requirements in the primary legislation requiring the scheme funder to be set up as a separate legal entity, would not only potentially make the financial sustainability of the scheme less clear to the regulator but would also give master trusts and scheme funders less certainty about the conditions that must be met for authorisation.

To turn back to the requirement for the scheme funder to be set up as a separate legal entity, I am aware that a number of concerns have been raised about the impact that this will have on existing businesses, such as the removal of protection and cross-subsidy through diversified lines of business supporting the master trust, restrictions on the use of shared services and the disruption of existing business. I shall come to each of these in turn, but I reassure the House that this authorisation criterion is not designed to prevent funds from flowing from one business to another, nor is it our intention to disrupt existing arrangements unnecessarily. The overarching aim of the requirements is transparency in the cash flows to and from the master trust business, and the assets and liabilities related to it, so that the regulator can readily ascertain the financial position of the scheme funder and the financial arrangements between the funder and the scheme. I think that paragraph answers the question asked by my noble friend Lady Altmann.

The requirements in Clause 10 do not prevent the master trust benefiting from the support of other businesses. Support can be offered from the scheme funder’s wider group explicitly through the provision of a legally enforceable guarantee or other formal arrangement from another group company of sufficient financial strength. Where the scheme funder currently conducts other businesses, a degree of cross-subsidy may already take place, and there is no intention to prevent this.

Pension Schemes Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Altmann and Lord Young of Cookham
Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 21st November 2016

(7 years, 6 months ago)

Lords Chamber
Read Full debate Pension Schemes Act 2017 View all Pension Schemes Act 2017 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 65-I(Rev) Revised marshalled list for Committee (PDF, 113KB) - (18 Nov 2016)
Baroness Altmann Portrait Baroness Altmann (Con)
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My Lords, I want to raise an issue which is very relevant to this point. As the Bill will, rightly, require continuity strategies for the event of failing master trusts, I ask the Minister to consider introducing measures that will facilitate bulk defined contribution pension transfers. At the moment, the bulk transfers are governed in a way that would be suitable for defined benefit schemes rather than defined contribution schemes. It seems that we have an opportunity to disapply Regulation 12 of the 1991 preservation regulations and to introduce measures in this Bill to directly facilitate defined contribution pension transfers, which could also cut the costs of transferring across.

Lord Young of Cookham Portrait Lord Young of Cookham (Con)
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My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, for proposing his amendment. I am afraid that I am back in the default mode of resisting.

Before I address the amendments, I say to my noble friend Lady Altmann that I would like to reflect on what she said about the transferability of defined contribution pots and perhaps write to her, because I am not sure that it directly arises from the two amendments before us.

Clause 24, and the regulations to be made under it, sets out the detail of continuity option 1 and the requirements relating to it—where a master trust chooses or is required to transfer out its members and wind up. This option would be pursued where a master trust scheme could no longer satisfy the regulator that it met the authorisation criteria and had its authorisation withdrawn or refused, or where, for any other reason, it could no longer continue to operate and the trustees chose to pursue continuity option 1 rather than resolve the triggering event and keep the scheme running.

To protect the rights that members have accrued in the scheme, it is necessary that these rights be transferred to alternative schemes or pension arrangements. Clause 24 therefore requires that under option 1, the trustees of the scheme must identify a master trust to which members’ rights and benefits can be transferred. Then the trustees have to notify members and employers of the transfer, as well as of other information that will be set out in regulations.

The aim of Clause 24 and the related clauses is that members will continue to save in a pension despite the master trust of which they are a member experiencing a triggering event that results in the scheme having to wind up. In this situation members should be transferred out to an authorised master trust and continue to save with as little disruption as possible. We want to encourage and facilitate the continuity of pension saving. Therefore, when a master trust is going to close, the provisions in the Bill will mean that members have the reassurance that, if they do not make an active decision to go elsewhere, they will become a member of an alternative master trust that has been authorised by the Pensions Regulator.

Amendment 37 provides that where the trustees have the choice, and have decided to pursue continuity option 1, they can do so, except where the Pensions Regulator decides that continuity of saving for members would be best achieved by the substitution of a new scheme funder. I think that the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, was seeking to give the regulator some sort of power to require the trustees to follow continuity option 2 instead of continuity option 1, where the trustees had chosen the latter. However, in effect the amendment would give the regulator the power to exempt a scheme from fulfilling the requirements under continuity option 1 where the trustees have decided or are required to pursue this option and where the regulator is satisfied that continuity is best achieved by the substitution of a new scheme funder. I see real difficulties in what the noble Lord has proposed.

Trustees are responsible for running and managing their scheme and making decisions in relation to it. They have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the members of their scheme—a point that the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood, made during our discussions. This amendment would effectively allow the regulator to second-guess and overrule trustees and to make a decision about a pension scheme. This would be a fundamental change to the principle that trustees have responsibility for managing their scheme. We do not think such an intervention by the regulator would be appropriate.

The option of finding a new scheme funder, as proposed by the noble Lord, is already open to trustees as a means of resolving the triggering event and continuing. Depending on what triggering event the scheme experienced, there could be a variety of ways of resolving it. We consider it important not to limit these, but to give trustees the freedom to resolve the event and the regulator the power to decide whether it is satisfied that the triggering event has been resolved. Where the sourcing of a new scheme funder is the most appropriate resolution of a triggering event, as suggested by the noble Lord, it should be up to the trustees to identify this funder. It should not be the Pensions Regulator’s responsibility to decide what the resolution method should be, for example, that the method should be a new scheme funder, or to source that funder. That is not the regulator’s role and it would be overruling the trustees, who rightly have ultimate responsibility for the scheme and its members.

We consider it important that any resolution of the triggering event and continuation of the scheme be subject to the full requirements of option 2. These requirements include the preparation of a comprehensive and detailed implementation strategy by the trustees, having certain safeguards in place for members and employers, additional support and assistance for them, and greater protection for members. Further, there is oversight of the adequacy of the strategy by the regulator.

We agree that where a master trust has experienced a triggering event, a new scheme funder could be identified and could be the most appropriate resolution of a triggering event. However, the Government believe that it is the trustees’ responsibility to make decisions for the scheme, and that if they want to resolve the triggering event by finding a new scheme funder, they should go down the route of continuity option 2.

Amendment 38 makes two additions to what will be covered by the regulations. The first part of the amendment would require the regulations made under this clause to set out what happens where the trustees have not been able to identify a master trust into which their members will be transferred. As the Bill makes clear, there will be a comprehensive set of regulations under Clause 24 that will cover many areas. These regulations will cover members’ right to transfer to a scheme of their own choosing, if they do not wish to transfer to the trustees’ choice of scheme. Members could also take up other pension options open to them, where relevant. Where a member is in receipt of a pension from the failing master trust, they will have the right to transfer their benefits to an alternative appropriate arrangement. For example, this could include a draw-down arrangement or the purchase of an annuity.

High-Cost Credit and Debt Management

Debate between Baroness Altmann and Lord Young of Cookham
Monday 10th October 2016

(7 years, 8 months ago)

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Lord Young of Cookham Portrait Lord Young of Cookham
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The noble Baroness has put her finger on the problem: many of these so-called cold calls are not cold calls at all. They are called warm calls in that, perhaps inadvertently, people have ticked a box on a website which has enabled that site to contact them at a later date or, even worse, to share their details with other providers. I hope that the FCA can pick up on this as it goes through the authorisation process. As I said in response to the initial Question, the FCA is reviewing the consumer credit rules in relation to cold calling at the moment and I will ensure that it takes on the very valid point that the noble Baroness has just made.

Baroness Altmann Portrait Baroness Altmann (Con)
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My Lords, I am delighted to hear that the Government are reviewing cold calling. I would be grateful if my noble friend could confirm that that review will also consider banning cold calling for pensions, in light of the recently introduced freedoms.

Lord Young of Cookham Portrait Lord Young of Cookham
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I take this opportunity to thank my noble friend for her services at the Department for Work and Pensions up to last July—services which are missed by nobody more than myself as I now have to do some of her work. So far as cold calling for pensions is concerned, I note that my noble friend has taken this up since people have been able to switch their pot out of their providers and into something else. I cannot say whether this will be swept up in the review of high-cost credit and debt management but I will certainly see that the point is taken on board elsewhere.