Baroness Altmann
Main Page: Baroness Altmann (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Altmann's debates with the Home Office
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will also speak to the other amendments in this group in my name and those of the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, and the noble Lords, Lord Mendelsohn and Lord Palmer. I am grateful for their cross-party support.
These amendments relate to a particular form of abuse which has long been of concern to me as a British citizen of Jewish faith, whereby a spouse—usually the husband—unreasonably prevents the dissolution of his Jewish religious marriage and denies his wife the freedom to move on with her life. We seek to ensure that such behaviour is recognised as a defined form of abuse under this Bill, so that the wife can receive the support and help provided for victims.
I should stress that the majority of Jewish divorces proceed in accordance with religious laws, especially once the civil divorce settlement is agreed, but there are instances in which a husband deliberately refuses. Sometimes this is to extort money from the wife or her family; sometimes it is to wield power and control out of bitterness or spite; sometimes it is out of a vengeful desire to inflict long-term suffering on the ex-wife. The objective here is to support the victim, who is being treated as a chattel rather than as a person and denied her basic rights. There are cases where a woman has been civilly divorced from her husband for more than 20 years, yet the husband has consistently refused to engage with the religious authorities and to grant her a get. She is unable to remarry or to have further children. She is a prisoner in the marriage.
There is no intention here to undermine the role of the Jewish courts, which govern Jewish religious laws and which require the husband to voluntarily sign an official Jewish bill of divorce document, called a get. This can only be initiated by the husband in order to dissolve their Jewish marriage.
There is an entire legal framework governing all aspects of Jewish life, dating back to Biblical times. Although the present-day Jewish courts, known as batte din, and the judges, or dayanim, have been seeking ways to facilitate a process that can free the woman by means of persuasion or negotiation, this process is clearly open to abuse. The wife remains chained in the marriage and, if she wishes to stand by her faith, she cannot date or remarry another man unless she has been given the get. If she were to do so, any children would be considered illegitimate and would not be fully accepted under Jewish religious law.
We hope that these changes will assist rabbinic courts, so that fewer men will play these kinds of cruel games. Sadly, these have been used by men as leverage to control their ex-wives or demand a ransom for their freedom. We recognise that civil divorce is not a substitute for a get, without which, no matter how long the couple have been separated, they are still not considered religiously divorced. This legislation hopes to provide—and these amendments seek to achieve—a wake-up call for Jewish husbands, so that they recognise that it is socially unacceptable to refuse to religiously divorce their wives. Extortionate demands are not acceptable. It should be done in a timely way. It should be as inappropriate in this day and age for a Jewish man to refuse his wife a get as it is for a man to inappropriately fondle a woman or make lewd comments about her looks. We are seeking mindset change.
I hugely regret that this remains an issue for the rabbinic authorities, who have been unable sufficiently to overcome the problem that this causes for women. I understand and fully respect that these are difficult points of Torah, Talmudic and Mishnaic law, which I do not claim to have detailed legal knowledge of. I bow to the legislators in this country on Jewish matters, but I believe that we have a duty to ensure that these Jewish women are protected. They are entitled to the same protections as other victims of abuse.
Fantastic charities such as Jewish Women’s Aid and GETToutUK have been helpful, and many legal and other experts have pleaded for change. I hope that these amendments will further encourage recalcitrant husbands to free their former wives and that society will recognise their victimhood. Such behaviour is not only unreasonable and abusive; it is immoral. These amendments seek to establish that decent behaviour cannot encompass this type of abuse. Legislation cannot force a man to give a get. The religious courts want men voluntarily to attend and grant it. We are sensitive to concerns that a coerced get may be considered invalid, leaving the wife permanently held hostage in the unwanted marriage. We hope that this mindset change in the national community will be forthcoming as we move forward with this legislation.
The later amendments in this group, Amendments 74, 79 and 80, are designed to clarify that the Serious Crime Act 2015 definition of controlling or coercive behaviour covers a situation where a Jewish couple is separated or divorced under secular law and no longer cohabiting, but the religious marriage is not yet dissolved and the husband persistently refuses to give a get. The amendments seek to confirm the previous belief, not yet tested in court, that such a husband could be prosecuted for the crime of controlling or coercive behaviour and face criminal sanctions, even if the couple are no longer living together. However, I am pleased to tell the House that I will not need to move these amendments as Amendment 45 in a later group, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, has the support of the Minister and of my noble friends Lady Bertin and Lady Sanderson. That amendment would explicitly establish that post-separation abuse is covered by the 2015 Act, and that an unreasonable get refusal would potentially be a serious crime.
Since this issue was raised in Committee, I have been hugely grateful to my noble friends the Ministers who have continued to engage with us. I thank them and their departmental officials, and also the domestic abuse commissioner and her team, who have been so supportive and understanding of this situation. Indeed, perhaps I may put on record how grateful I am to be living in a country where issues of this nature, which affect a particular religion, can be engaged with so seriously and sensitively by our Government, the Civil Service and other officials.
The domestic abuse commissioner has stated that she welcomes these proposed amendments to the Bill and that she recognises that this would be a form of coercive behaviour on the grounds of psychological or economic abuse or coercion. She has requested and recommended that this issue be included in statutory guidance under the heading of “wider spiritual abuse”.
Since this issue was raised in Committee, we have listened carefully to the debate and we would like to thank again the domestic abuse commissioner and the Ministers. Although I stressed clearly that these amendments are designed to relate solely to Jewish religious divorces, with no intention to impact on any other religious groups, we understand that there were concerns of a read-across to other religions.
Having listened carefully to the debate in Committee, I have also been grateful for ministerial assurances that unreasonable and persistent refusal to give a wife a get is already covered by the broad definitions of abuse in the Bill, and I have received assurances that this will be explicitly mentioned in the statutory guidance. I would be grateful if my noble friend would confirm this and, on that basis, I would therefore accept that this issue need not be in the Bill and I do not intend to press the amendment to a vote. I beg to move Amendment 1.
My Lords, I have signed all the amendments in this group, which have been signed by noble Lords from the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties and the Cross Benches—not very usual. As the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, said so very clearly, all these amendments relate to a spouse—usually the husband—unreasonably preventing the dissolution of a Jewish religious marriage.
My thanks go to Government Ministers for engaging with us and for seeking a UK legal solution to this medieval enigma. I would have preferred for these amendments, clear as they are, to be in the Bill. However, I have to accept, as has the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, for the moment, that the problem lies with current interpretations of the rules of Jewish marriage, and not with a parliamentary solution. There is no doubt that chained women and their children, after a civil divorce, are being unreasonably discriminated against for life. I accept that the Government have been sympathetic and have sought by practical means of guidance issued to help those affected, such as with Amendment 45, which I understand will be supported by the Government.
I am grateful for this assistance, but it is not enough. Even if we do not vote on these amendments today, as suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, I will continue to call for a more sympathetic approach from the Beth Din religious authorities. They rely on the Catch-22 absurdity that a Jewish divorce is not recognised if the recalcitrant husband is seen to be “coerced” into giving a get, resulting in the divorce not being recognised in Jewish law. Thus the agunah, or chained woman, is prohibited from having intimate relations with a man other than her husband and cannot remarry in an orthodox ceremony. In a really unacceptable denial of rights, the children will have severe restrictions placed upon them. Children should not suffer in this way, whatever the reason. This is unacceptable in 2021.
However, these same restrictions on coercion do not stop coercion of the wife being blackmailed, as suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, into giving a get, be it by payment of money, loss of family home or access to the children of the marriage. All the amendments in this group seek to provide a remedy and I welcome the moves in the Bill and in the guidance. However, what we do not want is to worsen the situation by creating the very perceived coercion which these despicable men rely on.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his remarks, and am truly humbled by the widespread support across the House for the sentiments and intent of these amendments. Every noble Lord who spoke supported this group of amendments. I hope that, on International Women’s Day, this will help promote a mindset change among Jewish men, or men of any faith, that the position of power they may find themselves in should not be exercised against the interests of their wives. I accept that the broad definitions do cover get refusal, and I appreciate my noble friend’s unambiguous statements to that effect. On the basis of the assurances that I have most gratefully received, I will not be moving my Amendments 3, 74, 79 and 80, and I thank my noble friend and the department for all their engagement. I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment 1.
My Lords, I support this amendment in the name of noble Baroness, Lady Meyer. I thank her for all the work she has done to try to minimise the amount of involvement in the Bill necessary to make us all aware of this important issue. The amendment is designed to explicitly ensure that parental alienation is properly defined in the Bill. We have, of course, had indications today that it may be in statutory guidance, and that may be sufficient to ensure that the rights of children to see parents when it is appropriate to do so are adhered to. The amendment is not gender biased. It recognises that either parent, mother or father, may deliberately behave in such a way as to damage the relationship between a child and the other parent.
Parental Alienation UK has outlined a range of behaviours from one parent to another and I want to focus on one: when a parent makes false allegations of abuse, fitness to parent, substance abuse or mental health problems. I have worked with people with severe, enduring mental health problems where, when they have been severely ill and psychotic, it has been inappropriate for them to see their children. However, it is absolutely clear that, with modern treatment and access to supervised contact, most parents at some point should be able to see their children. That is not because of the rights of the parents. It is about the child’s right to know that the parent loves them and wants to see them, even if they are not in a position to look after them on a permanent basis. I believe that, as soon as is practicable, supervised access should be organised for children if they want to see the parent—the one they do not live with—if that parent is well enough to see them.
It is important that children know that both their parents want to stay in contact. If this is the case, the child is in a position, when they become an adult, to decide for themselves how much contact to maintain with each parent. I have heard other noble Lords oppose the amendment and I equally believe that no child should be made to see a parent without supervision if the court has decided that this would be inappropriate. I completely agree that we should recognise the vital role of Cafcass in this situation, but it is demeaning if the other parent of your child destroys letters, mementoes and gifts that you have sent, perhaps while you are too ill to see the child. These kinds of behaviour should be deliberately excluded and parents should be encouraged to try to work together through mediation. It should obviously be for the courts to decide and to determine whether parental alienation is occurring and to make decisions for access between a child and a parent, based always on the best interests of the child.
I believe that those who do not agree with this amendment have the same focus as I and others who are supporting it: to try to ensure that children grow up knowing that they have been loved, where this is so, and that they have been able, where it is safe to do so, to be in contact with both parents. I understand that the amendment may be better written within the statutory guidance and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s opinion on this matter.
My Lords, I have added my name to this amendment and I pay tribute to my noble friend Lady Meyer for the work that she has done and, as my noble friend Lord Cormack said, the effort that she has put in to trying to make sure that the suffering that she has been through is not repeated or, should it be, that the victims have proper protection under the law.
I would be grateful if my noble friend the Minister could confirm what my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay asserted: that the deliberately broad definitions in the Bill, which I know my noble friend has explained to the House, are ground-breaking and deliberately so and provide the widest possible access to justice for victims by having broad definitions under which others can fall. Will “controlling or coercive behaviour” in Clause 1(3)(c),
“psychological, emotional or other abuse”
in Clause 1(3)(e), and “conduct directed” at their child in Clause 1(5) cover situations where a parent deliberately damages the relationship between their child and the other parent in order to alienate that child?
For example, a father of African origin wrote to me about his partner, who had been turning their four year-old child against him since they had decided to divorce. The child, previously loving, suddenly did not wish to spend time with him. He said: “My ex made several unfounded allegations of domestic abuse to stop me from seeing my child. Not a single allegation was proven, or true, but she constantly and unjustifiably obstructed my contact with my child. I recall that a year ago my child refused to have a bath that I had run for him. He said his mother told him, ‘Daddy puts witchcraft in the tub’.” He said that the alienation built up over time so that the child now refuses to see him. Can my noble friend confirm that that father would have protection under the Bill?
I have personal experience of other situations where parents were cut out from the lives of their children. The children were being manipulated or weaponised and the wider family cut off from grandchildren and nieces and nephews. I would never want a child to be forced to be with an abusive parent. However, the ex-partner of a friend of mine, who met a new partner from Australia and wanted to move there, decided to try to break the children away from their parent. In that instance, they were told: “Daddy does not love you, because you look like me and Daddy hates me. If you see Daddy, I will get sad. If you see Daddy, he will kidnap you, because he does not want me to be with you any more. If you say that you hate Daddy and you don’t want to see him, I will buy you a bike or take you on holiday.” This is something that has really happened. I hope that my noble friend will confirm that victims of such alienation will automatically be covered under the broad definitions, so that we will not need to press this amendment to a vote.
I hope that the controversy that seems to have been caused by the term “parental alienation”, which has driven the different wording of this amendment, can be settled by being tested in court. I fully agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, when she says that the child needs to be listened to and assessed by professionals. The key is for the courts to be aware that alienation such as in these examples may happen and, sadly, is not a rare occurrence. As my noble friend Lady Meyer said, we have had well over a thousand signatures in a short space of time from parents who themselves have suffered this form of abuse. If the courts are looking for this situation and can bring in experts to assess whether what the child is saying has been driven by fear instilled in them by the other parent unnecessarily, unreasonably, or deliberately to rupture the relationship with that parent, the justice system will be able to differentiate between the genuine cases, where a domestic abuser or abuser of children should not have unsupervised contact with their own child, and cases such as have been described.
Cases have been clearly identified in academic studies and evidence where parents who would otherwise be able to enjoy a relationship with their child are denied that opportunity and the child is denied access to that parent and their family. That can cause lifelong mental and emotional damage to the child and, indeed, to the parent. In some cases, the distress of being broken away from one’s children or grandchildren has caused suicide. I hope that my noble friend the Minister will be able to confirm that this is indeed covered by the Bill and I look forward to hearing what she has to say.
It is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. That speech was so well articulated, passionate and thought-provoking. I also echo and “Hear, hear” her comments on the exemplary work of the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, on this issue.
I have previously expressed concern that the Bill expands the definition of domestic abuse too widely because I worry that some categorisations of abuse, such as emotional and psychological, are too subjective and broad to guarantee justice. Every time I look, a new category of abuse has been added. We have just heard from the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, that we now have “spiritual” abuse. Even the focus on domestic abuse is endangered as we stretch what constitutes “domestic” far wider than I think is helpful. My concern is that too much is being thrown at the Bill, meaning agencies and the police will not be able to see the wood for the trees.
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins. I declare an interest as vice-president of Livability.
I very much support the intent in this group of amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell of Surbiton, who presented the case so ably at the beginning of this debate. As the parent of a child with a severe learning and physical disability, I know from personal experience the potential risks associated with those who are responsible for the care of disabled persons. In addition, having established a charity responsible for providing care for adults with learning disabilities in the north-east of England called At Home in the Community, I know how sensitive and tense the relationships can be between parents and a disabled son or daughter, between carers and the disabled person and between carers and parents. The frustrations of providing care for a disabled person whose behaviour can be immensely challenging and demanding can boil over, no matter how much they are loved. They can become the innocent third party in abusive relationships and suffer abuse themselves as a consequence.
Sadly, multiple reports over the years have shown that disabled people are much more likely to suffer abuse for longer periods of time. Many individuals are unable to communicate verbally, so identifying abuse can be difficult. Often unable to protect themselves, they can become very isolated and introverted. The vulnerability of their situation can lead to reliance and dependency on the very person being abusive. We had a case within a managed care home of abuse by a hitherto trusted member of staff who manipulated residents over a number of months before detection.
For many residents of care homes, the home they live in is their home. We had cases of individuals whose parents had both sadly died, so their carers and fellow residents were their family. Support in the care sector, whether in a family home or residential care home, relies on the dedication and integrity of mostly—one has to say sadly—low-paid care staff, most of whom are brilliant and support their vulnerable people marvellously. Sadly, however, some do abuse. Drawing attention to this and making provision for it in the Bill is an important step in mitigating it and preventing it from continuing. I hope that the Minister supports this amendment.
My Lords, I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell, and other noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Shinkwin and the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, who have spoken in favour of these amendments. They seek to ensure that domestic abuse, as defined in Clause 2(1), covers those people who are disabled—and often, perhaps, elderly—as well as all other groups.
Such citizens can be in a deeply intimate yet non-sexual relationship, due to their need for someone to care for them, perhaps in their home. They need someone to care for them just to survive, and so that they can live their life as independently as possible. If these people are abused by someone who helps them in their own home, why would they not be covered in exactly the same way as other groups, including spouses, friends, partners and their children, who currently meet the definition in the Bill?
In this country, there is sometimes a cultural disinclination to talk about or engage closely with the issue of people who need care or who live with disabilities. This may even explain why social care reform is constantly pushed into the proverbial long grass. Yes, this can be a complex subject, and not everybody wants to discuss it, but why would someone who is cared for by another, who may be paid or unpaid, not be entitled to the same protection as a spouse who is abused by their partner? If the Government wish to support people who live in their own home, especially as we have an ageing population, and to be in the community, which disabled or elderly people usually want, developing a strong system of protection for cases of abuse is essential. This landmark Bill is an ideal place to start.
The vast majority of carers are angels. They are heroes, who carry out their demanding and often draining role with compassion, dedication and sensitivity. However, as other noble Lords have explained, there are distressing examples of when they have abused highly vulnerable adults in their care.
I support the rights of disabled people, as I know the Minister does. I know that she cares passionately about this group of wonderful individuals in our society, but I find it difficult to understand why the Government are resisting the inclusion of disabled people within the protections of a Domestic Abuse Bill. Such situations should be placed squarely in the remit covered by this ground-breaking Bill. Is it not time to tackle all cultures of domestic abuse and offer widespread remedies to all citizens? Surely this group should be part of that.
My Lords, I know from my personal family and professional experience of people with learning disabilities that domestic violence can involve both paid and informal carers, including family members. I will not repeat the excellent points made by the noble Lord, Lord Curry. I am very pleased to support my noble friend Lady Campbell and to follow such powerful speeches.
The weakness in the Government’s position is that it underestimates the important similarities between carer relationships and those already in the Bill. It perhaps assumes that local authorities or the CQC will have sight of all carer arrangements, particularly for informal care, but this is just not true. I quote the January Stay Safe East report on discrimination, which says:
“The current definition of domestic abuse has a discriminatory impact on disabled victims of domestic abuse by non-family carers, who have no access to an Independent Domestic Violence Adviser, refuges or other domestic abuse services or to the network of therapeutic and other services open to other domestic abuse victims.”
The exclusion of carers from the definition of “personally connected” not only is blind to the reality of the closeness and complexity of carer relationships but would be discriminatory to disabled people on the receiving end of domestic abuse from carers, because they would be excluded from services. The exclusion fails to recognise that the significant relationships of disabled people may be different from those of non-disabled people. This also applies to people with learning disabilities.
My remaining point has already been made, so I will not take up time with it.