Baroness Altmann
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Domestic Abuse Bill
Baroness Altmann ExcerptsMonday 25th January 2021
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Domestic Abuse Bill 2019-21 View all Domestic Abuse Bill 2019-21 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 124-II(Rev) Revised second marshalled list for Committee - (25 Jan 2021)
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB) [V]
My Lords, first, I want to apologise for my intervention on Amendment 1, which was quite inappropriate. I stupidly misunderstood, and I apologise.
I support Amendments 2 and 4. False allegations, of the severity of which the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, has spoken, are abusive to the other parent, who is the victim—and, of course, they have extremely adverse effects on the children. As a former family judge, I found those cases not only very serious but distressing. In some, it was impossible to achieve an outcome of a relationship between the child and the parent whom the child had been taught to loathe, despise and have nothing to do with. It was very distressing.
It is important, however, to recognise that these are a minority of cases. It is equally important to recognise, as the noble Baroness said, that they can be used as a defence against genuine allegations of domestic abuse. I got an email this morning setting out how a woman had clearly been abused but the man kept telling the court that it was parental alienation and he was not prepared to accept that he had been guilty of abuse.
In the majority of cases, the reason for non-contact or limited contact between a parent and their child should be the implications of domestic abuse. It is important, however, to leave discretion over contact and looking at parental alienation to the judges. The judicial college might consider whether for some judges, at some levels—not the High Court—there is adequate judicial training in this complicated subject. A little more time might be spent teaching magistrates, district judges and circuit judges a little more about it.
Baroness Altmann (Con) [V]
My Lords, I congratulate the Government on introducing the Bill, which is designed to help victims of domestic abuse across the country with comprehensive measures that introduce enhanced protections against, and recognition of the suffering of victims of, many forms of abusive behaviour. I support the aims of the Bill and, alongside many victims, eagerly await its introduction.
I rise to speak to Amendments 2 and 4, to which I have added my name. It is a pleasure to follow the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and I thank my noble friends on the Front Bench for engaging with us on this issue. I hope we may continue discussions before Report.
The Bill’s first four clauses provide a broad definition of domestic abuse and concentrate on behaviour rather than definitions or syndromes. These amendments were excellently introduced by my noble friend Lady Meyer. The whole Committee must have been moved by her explanation of the way this issue has impacted on her. Clause 1(3) identifies psychological, emotional and other abuse but does not mention the behaviour described in these amendments, which we call alienation or, specifically here, parental alienation. If children are used as a weapon by an abusive parent against another parent and the wider family, this is surely domestic abuse and belongs in the Bill.
A network of leading international and UK experts in several professional fields, after consultation with other professionals and stakeholders involved with parental alienation and child psychological abuse, have produced a paper which we are happy to share with interested noble Lords. It concludes that parental alienation is most readily described as a range of behaviours and is not a syndrome, as some people like to call it. It is both child abuse and domestic abuse, but not a diagnostic label, which supports our aims of identifying it in the Bill.
Parental alienation has been confirmed by Cafcass as being both child abuse and domestic abuse, involving clear coercing and controlling behaviour. Fathers, mothers and other family members can be perpetrators and victims, but the children are always the victims. In its helpful briefing to Peers, Cafcass explains that parental alienation is a description of an array of behaviours, processes and outcomes when a child’s resistance or hostility towards one parent is not justified and is the result of psychological manipulation through a range of abusive behaviours by the other parent.
I recognise that there is controversy surrounding this issue, which saddens me. My noble friend Lady Meyer dealt with a number of the issues that have concerned us, including what appears rather a one-sided assessment of the case against parental alienation. Of course, it is possible that abusive fathers will use this in the context of family courts to commit further abuse against a mother trying to protect her children, but the Bill is about domestic abuse; fears of allegations being falsely made are inherent in much legislation yet surely cannot be a reason to decline to legislate.
Responsible legislators must not be biased in favour of one group or another but should be mindful of the broad sweep of issues that need to be considered. Even if there are egregious examples of women being abused by this kind of alienation, there are many men, and children and wider families, who also need protection against this abuse. It is important that each allegation is carefully examined by the court at an early stage. Sometimes, there is both psychological abuse by alienation and physical or sexual abuse in the same family. But there is a lack of reliable evidence—as opposed to anecdotes by parents who may regard court decisions wrong—that men or women are more likely to raise false allegations, or that courts systemically prefer fathers or mothers. Therefore, what is relevant, and beneficial to the Bill, is to require proper exploration of alienating behaviours, so that these can be observed by mental health professionals, together with family judges and lawyers across the UK in identifying cases where parental alienation or alienating behaviours have occurred.
I agree with the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, that it would be helpful to have enhanced judicial training to identify and understand these behaviours, but it is essential that qualified professionals assist the court with assessing whether there is this type of abuse and identifying problems of alienation at an early stage, before the psychological impact becomes ingrained in children and does dreadful long-term damage, which has been described as being associated with this issue. I hope we may discuss this further with other noble Lords and the ministerial team to make progress on this matter for Report.
Baroness Altmann
“(f) unreasonable prevention or threat of prevention of dissolution of a religious Jewish marriage via a religious bill of divorce (a “get”);”Member’s explanatory statement
This specifically itemises one spouse unreasonably preventing the dissolution of a Jewish religious marriage with a ‘get’ as being within the scope of the Bill by bringing it under the definition of abusive behaviour.
Baroness Altmann (Con) [V]
My Lords, I shall speak also to my other amendments in this group—Amendments 5, 168, 169 and 170, which all relate to the same issue.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, and the noble Lords, Lord Mendelsohn and Lord Palmer, who have added their names to the amendments, providing cross-party support. I also thank my noble friends the Ministers, who have been so generous with their time in meeting Peers to discuss the amendments and other issues relating to the Bill, and indeed for their passion for, and dedication to, improving the support and recognition of victims of domestic abuse.
This set of amendments is designed to address a specific type of abuse that mostly affects religious Jewish women, and I declare an interest as one. This issue has long been of concern to me and to many other religious Jews in this country and worldwide. Our aim with the amendments is to help victims who are unable to leave a failed marriage because their spouse unreasonably decides to prevent them moving on with their life in accordance with Jewish religious law.
I stress at the outset that the amendments are specifically designed to refer only to Jewish religious divorce, with no intention of impacting on procedures relevant to any other religion. Jewish law, of course, governs Judaism, and there is no intention to undermine the role of the Jewish courts. The amendments are intended to offer a means of helping those impacted by a particular type of abuse that can arise in some cases in this country under Jewish laws of divorce.
I also stress that the majority of Jewish divorces proceed smoothly and British Jewish wives can move on with their lives once their civil divorce is finalised. However, sadly, there are some instances where a husband, sometimes demanding money to improve a divorce settlement agreed in the civil courts, sometimes driven by a desire to punish or control their ex-wife and sometimes to continue emotional abuse that existed in the marriage, unreasonably refuses to grant the get—the Jewish bill of divorce—leaving the wife married to him in the eyes of Jewish law, even if she wishes to be free.
The amendments seek to protect and support Jewish women—it is, I am afraid, usually women—whose husbands do not willingly sign the Jewish divorce document, the get. A get can be secured only if a man initiates it and the woman agrees—it cannot be initiated by the woman—so it is intrinsically biased in favour of the husband and is, sadly, open to abuse. This is a Jewish legal document that must be approved by the rabbinical court, known as the beth din, which literally means “House of Judgment”, and it allows a couple to divorce by mutual consent. However, a get is legally valid in Jewish religious law only if approved by the beth din, and this normally requires the rabbinical judges to be satisfied that it has been agreed voluntarily.
Those worst affected by an unreasonable refusal to grant a Jewish religious divorce can effectively be kept chained in the marriage for decades as their husbands prevent them being able to marry anyone else or have children accepted under Jewish religious law. As noble Lords can imagine, this situation causes immense distress to the women, who are known as agunot, which can be translated as “chained wives”.
Of course, ultimately, it is up to the religious authorities to make decisions about religious Jewish divorce, and there is an entire legal framework governing all aspects of Jewish life which dates back to biblical law. These amendments cannot interfere with the rulings of the religious courts. Nevertheless, with this Bill being such a huge advance for our country and offering our citizens better protection and support against abuse, I hope that my noble friends on the Front Bench will agree that these victims should also be entitled to the protection that will be available. The amendments specifically aim to address the plight of the abuse victims in such circumstances so that these citizens, who are subjected to such unreasonable, coercive and controlling behaviour, can access practical and emotional support, as provided under the Bill.
Baroness Altmann (Con) [V]
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this brief debate, and I appreciate the excellent contributions from across the House and the very thoughtful way in which this issue is being dealt with. I also thank my noble friend the Minister for her excellent response and my noble friend who is not responding for what appears to be an excellent briefing provided to my noble friend on the Front Bench.
I respect the Minister’s concerns about the inclusion of these provisions, and I thank her for her offer to continue discussion and consideration of how this important issue could be included in the statutory guidance at the very least. I take the point that it concerns a small number of people, but it has a dreadful effect on them. I also welcome her confirmation that the review of coercive and controlling behaviour, associated with the Serious Crime Act 2015, will be published before Report. Obviously, I will study that when it is released, and perhaps we can build on it in some way going forward.
Of course, I have sympathy with, and am sensitive to, my noble friend Lord Moylan rightly pointing out the potential dangers of reading across from these amendments to other religious reasons for objecting to a divorce. That is why the amendments consistently specify “religious Jewish” divorce and “unreasonable” refusal to agree to the dissolution of a Jewish marriage.
Most of the most difficult cases are instances of an individual wilfully refusing, or threatening to refuse, a get on the grounds of seeking to abuse their wife by continuing to control her life—or even to coerce her to fulfil unreasonable or extortionate demands, as highlighted by the noble Lord, Lord Mendelsohn. Jewish law specifically facilitates divorce, but it puts the power in husbands’ hands. However, if objections are reasonable, rather than abusive, they would not be covered by these amendments, which were specifically designed for the problem of women in this country not being able to move on with their life due to religious Jewish hold-ups.
I thank everyone—all colleagues across the House, my noble friends and the department—who has respectfully and carefully considered these amendments. I hope that we may continue the discussion because it is such an important issue to many noble Lords, it seems. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 3.
Baroness Altmann (Con) [V]
My Lords, I congratulate the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, on the way she introduced her group of amendments. I fully support Amendments 6, 8, 9, 10 and 14, relating to forced marriages and people in domestic service. Her highlighting of the gap in Clause 3 relating to people who are personally connected in this way is a really important contribution to this debate and, potentially, to the Bill.
I have added my name to Amendments 7 and 12, so excellently explained by the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox. I would also like to support the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, in her Amendment 11. Each of these amendments relates to including the providers of care in the Bill, be it for disabled people or for elderly people who need care.
The definition of domestic abuse could be widened to consider abuse perpetrated by those who are in trusted positions providing either paid or unpaid care. We have heard terrible examples of people being abused by those in positions of trust, whether friends or neighbours, though it can also be family members, and it can also relate to financial abuse. I ask the Minister to ensure that the particular position of disabled people and the elderly who rely on carers is fully taken into account in the Bill.
I wonder whether independent domestic violence advocates might be funded to reach out to more patients in hospitals or in other settings who are over a certain age or disabled in some way. I also wonder whether there could be better training for healthcare practitioners to be able to identify domestic abuse when they are involved with, assessing or looking after older or disabled people in hospital or other settings who might be suffering silently from various forms of abuse.
I welcome the expansion of the definition of domestic abuse in the Bill and the specific inclusion of statutory inquiries into suspected financial abuse, as set out in the Care Act 2014. I hope that my noble friend will be able to reassure us about the intention to include these groups and I look forward to her reply. Once again, I congratulate those who have laid these amendments, which are important for us to discuss in Committee.
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
My Lords, Amendment 13, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Paddick, does not seek to broaden or narrow the amendment to which the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox, has spoken, but rather to understand what is meant by “live independently” in the context of carers. The term “independent living” is a familiar one, but I do not know whether that is quite what is intended here. Needing support to live in one’s home, which I regard as hugely important, does not to me feel like independence. The relationship is very much about dependence, or trust, which was the term used by the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson. That is the extent of the reason for Amendment 13, but I am glad to be able to comment on some of the other amendments in this group.
The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Lord, Lord Randall, have identified a number of significant situations. The noble and learned Baroness described situations, in the plural, as she carefully explained, relating to forced marriage, which came over vividly. She has an amendment about guardians, a term that has expanded beyond its original technical meaning. She and I have often been involved in discussions about the needs of children who have been trafficked where guardianship has featured. I would never challenge the noble and learned Baroness and I have not done my homework, so I hope that she will forgive me, but I wonder whether a guardian has parental responsibility and, if so, whether that would cover the situation.
The noble and learned Baroness and I have also been involved in many debates about domestic servitude and I would be interested to know what is sought to be achieved by, and the consequences of, Amendment 9 beyond identifying behaviour already criminalised under the Modern Slavery Act. Is it something about protection or prevention?
In Amendment 14, the noble and learned Baroness points out a lifestyle that may not be covered. Its significance lies in Clause 3, which relates to children as what I wrote down as “collateral damage”, a term that I am slightly embarrassed to use, but noble Lords will understand what I mean. I had at one point wondered about lodgers who are in the same household, but I decided not to pursue that. I was going to ask the noble and learned Baroness what she envisaged as a consequence of that amendment, but I think that she has explained it. It is certainly partly the need for greater awareness on the part of the authorities to the situation of those in domestic servitude to whom she has referred.