Antoinette Sandbach
Main Page: Antoinette Sandbach (Liberal Democrat - Eddisbury)Department Debates - View all Antoinette Sandbach's debates with the Home Office
(7 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a no, then.
Mick Beattie: For me, it is about financial investigation. In terms of policing plc, financial investigation is one capability. There are competing demands across the policing —or any law enforcement—landscape. By comparison and proportionately, I believe that we have a strong capability. Yes, we would like more financial investigators; yes, as the regime becomes more aware of the capacity and capability of financial investigation and what it can bring, there will always be requests within my organisation for more capabilities. In terms of an overall policing budget, though, that is not for me to respond to.
Q To pick up on that last matter, is it not correct to say that proceeds of crime seizures in effect go to central funds and can be used, and there is part that is returned to the agency bringing the prosecution? To a certain extent, therefore, it is self-financing.
Mick Beattie: Of the money confiscated, 50% goes back to the Treasury and the remaining 50% is split three ways between the prosecuting element, the law enforcement agency and the court services. It is called the incentivisation fund. So yes, it goes back directly into law enforcement.
Q So strengthening and broadening your powers will enable you potentially to seize more assets. Clearly, therefore, the aim of these measures is to deal with money laundering. How does the new criminal offence preventing the facilitation of tax evasion link in with that money laundering aspect of your investigations?
Mick Beattie: I am not a tax expert and do not represent Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. In terms of investigative capacity, as a senior investigating officer presented with an investigation, in determining your strategy you will look at what outcome you hope to achieve. It could be a criminal justice outcome, a disruption option or along those lines. You will look at all measures to achieve that. In some cases, the information, intelligence or evidence is such that a tax investigation may be more effective than a criminal investigation. We work with the National Crime Agency and HMRC colleagues in determining who should lead the investigation. In terms of legislation strengthening HMRC’s capability, it is clearly going to be advantageous to us in decision-making around the best strategy for a financial investigation.
Q One criticism often levelled at law enforcement agencies is that they do not take enough steps nationally to recover assets that are the proceeds of crime. Apart from the disclosure orders and the aspect of portable goods—for example, jewellery—that you have already spoken about, what particular powers will help you with that asset recovery, and is there anything that is not in the Bill that you think should be?
Mick Beattie: The Bill contains technical amendments that, though they are not specific in themselves, tighten things up. Some of the legislation was restrictive and stopped upon a conviction; money laundering investigation powers would often stop. The Bill will nudge some of those on, to allow those powers to remain while there is a confiscation investigation. The powers in previous Bills have strengthened the investigative capability into the confiscation process, where there was a gap before in terms of what we could and could not do in serving production orders on accounts, for example. That has definitely helped.
Q Is that the same, for example, with regard to extending the powers to revisiting orders under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, which was a gap that was not there previously?
Mick Beattie: The power to revisit the disparity between a benefit amount and a realisable amount is primarily the current role of the asset confiscation enforcement teams I mentioned earlier, which have been funded additionally by the Home Office directly from ARIS. The asset recovery incentivisation scheme has been top-sliced and a portion of that has been given to the three agencies to proactively do section 22 revisits.
Q Are you therefore satisfied that the current procedures in the Bill tackle the major challenges you face in your aspect of the investigations?
Mick Beattie: It definitely improves some of the operational difficulties we have highlighted. We have been privy to the formation of the Bill, we have been invited, we have been allowed to comment and we have contributed to the drafting of the Bill. You always want more. There is more we would have liked around information sharing. But there are definitely advantages to the Bill that will help criminal investigations.
Q Thank you for your evidence. You seem to be saying there is more that perhaps could be done, Mr Beattie. What additional things should we take the opportunity to look at in the Bill, to make sure you have the powers you need to do your job?
Mick Beattie: A lot of what we would have liked, we have got. Information sharing between the private and public sectors is done through the NCA UK Financial Intelligence Unit, which is under a lot of pressure. It is a unit that services the whole of UK law enforcement. The Bill allows communication between the banking sector and the UKFIU, which would then release that information to policing. If we had a particular interest, we may have to go back through the UKFIU back into that institution. We would have liked a little bit more direct access, but it is not a problem. It is something we can overcome.
In the early stages, I can understand the reticence from the banking sector. This is a new area of business for them, piloted through the joint money laundering taskforce very successfully. I can understand the small-steps mindset in relation to that—get some understanding, some evidence and some culture. So we are very supportive of what we have got in the Bill.
Donald Toon: From our perspective, the Bill takes us forward on a range of difficult issues, but it does that in a balanced and thought-through way. From law enforcement’s perspective it is always easy to want more power, but that has got to be balanced against the fact that, for example, the financial services sector has to continue to do business.
We are satisfied that this makes the changes and we have been able to set out a clear, operational, evidenced case for the change. Do we think this will stop and it will be the panacea for the future? No, because we are involved in an arms race here. There are people on the other side—whether professionals involved in providing money laundering services or serious criminals—who will always be looking for another opportunity. That is why the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 has had to be amended so many times since it was first introduced.
Do we think this will stop further amendment? No. Does it actually address the issues we can evidence now? Yes.
Detective Superintendent Harman: I echo that. The answer for us now lies not in more legislation. The Home Office consulted very closely with us. We are seeing the legislation in here that we asked for. The answer now for us is about co-operation with the financial sector, about sharing information. Just like we asked the public for information to help us to fight terrorism, now we are asking the regulated sector, and I think the Bill will help with that.
Q Perhaps this is for HMRC again then. How effective are we at supervising for anti-money laundering purposes all trust or company service providers that register UK companies?
Simon York: HMRC is the supervisor—TCSPs are not regulated in any other area. Our strategy is that we have teams that conduct anti-money laundering supervision, try to support that industry, particularly those that are susceptible or vulnerable to money laundering, and help them. My teams tend to get involved when we clearly suspect some of those organisations of facilitating crime, money laundering, tax fraud or whatever. Our strategy is to, again, use a combination of the money laundering supervisory regulatory powers and our tax powers. We have some really quite significant projects—I cannot go into too much detail—on the go at the moment in relation to TCSPs in particular.
Q I want to come back, Mr York, to attributing criminal liability to corporates. You felt that that would prompt good behaviour. For example, there have been some well publicised cases of licence payments where profit will be taken out of the UK because of some form of licensing agreement or other device that removes profits from the UK. How do you see the new advisory part 3 capability in tackling that? That is tax avoidance, rather than tax evasion, is it not?
Simon York: It could only be used to tackle that sort of behaviour if that, in itself, was a criminal offence. I think what you are describing is typically the sort of tax planning or avoidance that multinationals might engage in. If that was fully presented to us and it was completely upfront, this would not be the appropriate response to that. If, however, anything was misrepresented to us and it effectively became a fraud and a criminal offence, and that was being facilitated by someone else, it could. But this is not really aimed at that at all.
Q Can I perhaps take it to the other extreme, where, for example, single parents are trying to claim support from non-resident parents who are not declaring their income appropriately? That would be tax evasion. Would you see this offence as dealing with those people’s accountants and advisers? In other words, if professional accounts have been filed and there is then a tribunal finding that there has been an inappropriate amount declared for income tax, would you get involved?
Simon York: Our interest is in tax and tax evasion, so if we see tax evasion in whatever form, we will tackle it. We certainly could tackle scenarios like that. It is already a criminal offence for individuals to evade tax and for others to directly facilitate that evasion of tax. What is new here is that the Bill deals with a corporate body failing to take reasonable steps to prevent its representatives from facilitating the evasion of tax by someone else. It is that third stage; it is when you get to the corporate, which under current English law it is really quite difficult to attribute criminal liability to. That is what this offence is designed to address, so I do not think it would directly affect that sort of situation, but we would tackle that in other ways.
Q Could it, for example, affect a high street accountant that was providing advice on something that may be on one or the other side of the line?
Simon York: It could if that accountant was a corporate body and its representatives or employees were facilitating or enabling tax fraud. Yes, it could help there.
Q Mr Price, will unexplained wealth orders help the CPS make greater use of its existing civil recovery powers?
Nick Price: Unexplained wealth orders are interesting. We welcome that provision, and we have worked closely with partners in bringing it forward. The CPS is not an investigatory body, as you know. We think that these orders are likely to be used more by our partner agencies. Will it mean that we do more by way of civil recovery? As you know, the NCA already has its own capability to do that; it is likely that HMRC will get its own capability to do that as well—there are provisions in the Bill that would enable that—and the SFO likewise. We are likely to do a small additional amount of civil recovery work, and unexplained wealth orders may well be part of that, but I think the vast majority of that work is going to be done by the other agencies.
Q Will extending the moratorium period on SARs assist you in getting the material that you need to get cases to a point where you can charge?
Nick Price: This is a very significant and welcome change for us. There are cases that we have not been able to take forward for early restraint simply because the moratorium period was far too short and the investigation simply could not be completed in the time that we had. Why is early restraint important? It is, I suppose, a trite observation in this field, but if you are unable to restrain assets at an early stage in proceedings, the likelihood of them being available later on is pretty remote. The extension of the moratorium period is critically important to us. There is considerable judicial oversight of that provision—you will have seen that in the Bill—so we very much support that.
Q The Chartered Institute of Taxation has expressed some concern that the new corporate offence of failure to prevent the criminal facilitation of tax evasion may lead to a string of prosecutions in relatively small cases where current civil penalties already provide enough punishment. What is your view about that?
Simon York: That is probably unfounded. Our approach here, like it is with all our criminal investigation work, would be to focus on where the behaviour is at its worst and most fraudulent, and therefore on where it is having the most impact, particularly where a corporate is having a very wide impact on a wide group of taxpayers and where the amounts involved are large. That is typically our approach. We would be equally selective with this power.
Can I point out that four Members are still asking to get the floor and you have 10 minutes left?
Q Professor Murphy, I want to come back to your evidence that the new offence of corporate liability will effectively target small or mid-range companies. In relation to the “bad apple” point you made, do you accept there is still reputational damage for a company if one of its employees is charged, and that that in itself may make big companies’ compliance far more rigorous?
Professor Murphy: That is obviously true. No company wants to appear on the front page of a newspaper and no company wants to be prosecuted. I have spent quite a lot of time in the last year or two talking to large firms of accountants—names you will be familiar with—and large companies about their response to the sea change in public attitude towards tax, and I am reasonably convinced that they have noticed that there is reputational risk to them, and that they are changing their behaviour as a result. To that extent, I feel that this legislation is a little too late, in the sense that they are trying to steer clear of some of these activities as fast as they can. Again, that is a reason why I think the impact will be on smaller businesses. The largest ones will have learnt how to get rid of the risk.
Q If I can go back to the smaller business point, I do not know if you were here when I asked Simon York about the other end of the scale. Some tax evasion is not for the purposes of evading tax—the purpose is to evade other liabilities that follow on from declaring taxable income. That can be supported by small accountancy firms that may not apply regulations as rigorously as they should do. Do you think this offence will have a deterrent effect on the smaller and mid-range companies?
Professor Murphy: I think it will. The reason why is that it is a strict liability offence: the existence of evidence of tax evasion is sufficient to prove liability without motive being questioned. That could be important in certain cases. I can think of a very recent example—it has been in the press—where somebody has not paid tax quite deliberately, it seems, out of a company for which they were responsible. It would make it easier to prosecute in those cases. It will have a deterrent effect. I do not have a problem with strict liability offences for that reason. I know many in my profession do.
Q You both spoke earlier in giving evidence about the great opportunity to bring about behavioural change or improve compliance. Are there measures we ought to be looking at in this legislation that you would like to see us take the opportunity to put in?
Alex Cobham: I would say it is the reporting of it. If the Bill is seen as having made it on to the books without driving any serious change either in the way that HMRC operates and the extent to which it looks at enablers or in the ultimate prosecutions and revenue recovery, or if there is a perception of that even without that being the case, that is a missed opportunity in terms of how much impact it has. There needs to be a requirement for consistent reporting of the numbers of prosecutions, and of the transition between prosecution of evasion cases and, for each of them, whether there is a related prosecution of the enabler or not. If the second number is a very small fraction of the first number consistently, there needs to be space to come back and review, but at least having that will drive attention.
Professor Murphy: I would make the non-provision of accounts and a corporation tax return a strict liability offence for tax evasion under the terms of the Bill. I would also require a provision that is very similar to one we are demanding internationally, which is that banks simply report each year to HMRC which companies they provide services to.
We will next year be in the absurd position that HMRC will get more information on a company owned by a British person in the Cayman Islands than they will on a company owned by a British person in Stockport, because there is automatic information exchange from the Cayman Islands and there is not within the UK. If banks were required to provide information to HMRC on which companies they provide services to and the simple value of sums deposited in a bank account each year, we would know which companies were trading and therefore which were due to file accounts and which were due to submit a corporation tax return. Failure to submit would be a strict liability offence. Nothing would scare the accountancy profession or small company directors more than that. Make them personally liable for the tax not paid at the same time and you have solved the problem of tax evasion virtually overnight. It is simple.