Arctic and High North

Debate between Angus MacDonald and Al Carns

Tuesday 13th January 2026 Westminster Hall

[The Minister for the Armed Forces (Al Carns)]

It is a delight to speak under your chairmanship, Ms Vaz. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie) for securing this debate and for all his work as chair of the Labour back-bench defence committee. In an article published last week, he stressed the critical importance, in these volatile times, of strengthening the UK’s armed forces, preparing for the possibility of war and showing that although we do not want conflict, we are ready to fight to defend our freedoms and indeed our prosperity. He is absolutely correct and is speaking about an area with which he is all too familiar.

Geography really matters. Some members of the SNP may not be interested in defence, but, given Scotland’s geographical position, our adversaries are interested in Scotland because of what it offers to the UK, Europe and NATO defence.

[Mr Angus MacDonald]

Given that one of the UK’s core NATO responsibilities is securing freedom of operation in the GIUK gap, can the Minister reflect on what an SNP-led independent Scotland would mean for that task? At a time when hostile states exploit political fragmentation, does he agree that a party that opposes the nuclear deterrent, has turned away defence-related industrial investment in the Clyde and has even restricted medical aid to Ukrainian soldiers by classifying it as military support would weaken rather than strengthen our collective resilience in the High North?

[Al Carns]

The reality is that this is not about politics. This is about sincerity around our national security decisions. An independent Scotland would weaken not just the security of the UK—of Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland—but the whole European security architecture and NATO as a whole. At this point in time, a worse decision could not possibly even be fathomed.

Some comments were made earlier about whether we have a frontline with Russia. The reality is that we do. As my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar mentioned, it sits in the north Atlantic. When it comes to being scared of Russia, last time I checked the military dictionary, that word definitely did not exist. If someone from industry sees a Russian frigate or submarine near the CNI, I can guarantee that there will be a Royal Navy, NATO or European submarine or frigate very close by.

Although much of the current attention is focused on Ukraine, being ready to fight means being alert to every danger. We must continue working ever more closely with our allies to address emerging threats wherever they may arise. Today’s debate is a welcome opportunity to discuss a part of the world that is becoming increasingly contested by the major powers.

Having been largely inaccessible to navies in the past, the High North and Arctic are changing at an unprecedented and accelerating rate. Global warming is transforming the Arctic from frozen expanses to a 21st-century geopolitical hotspot. As melting ice opens up new sea routes, the established security balance across the top of the world will be fundamentally reshaped forever. Routes between the Atlantic and Pacific will become increasingly navigable for more of the year, bringing the continents of Asia, Europe and North America closer than ever before.

Competition to exploit the region’s valuable natural resources is growing, too. China is extending its activity in the Arctic, having recently sent more icebreakers and research vessels to probe its expanses and declaring itself a near-Arctic state. We are under no illusion about how the changing Arctic environment poses new challenges, both commercially and militarily.

Russia remains the most acute danger to the security of the northern near Atlantic, and its operations within a more navigable Arctic are an increasing part of that threat. It is sobering to realise that Vladimir Putin controls more than half of the entire Arctic’s coastline. The increased militarisation of Russia’s Arctic territory, including investment in bases and air and coastal defence capabilities, is of increasing concern. For example, Russia has established a new northern joint strategic command, reopening cold war-era bases above the Arctic circle, including a fully operational base on Franz Josef island and another on Kotelny island.

In the north Atlantic, Russian submarine activity is nearing the highest levels since the cold war. Changes in the region directly impact us and our security here in the UK, as one of the Arctic’s nearest neighbours—whether it is from increasing threats or damage to subsea electricity or telecommunication cables in the Baltic sea or from the increase in Russian activity in the key Greenland-Iceland-UK gap involving surface and sub-surface vessels and aircraft.