Serious and Organised Crime: Prüm Convention

Debate between Andy Burnham and William Cash

Tuesday 8th December 2015 Commons Chamber

[Andy Burnham (Leigh) (Lab)]

Way back in what seem like the mists of time—in May 2005, to be precise—I was appointed to the Home Office and given ministerial responsibility for the development of the European arrest warrant, and today I think back to the discussions that I used to have with the hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) on that very issue. I remember that it was something of a hot potato, and I also remember that the nature of that debate changed very quickly in the aftermath of the 7/7 bombings and, subsequently, the failed bombing at Shepherd’s Bush on 21 July. It was found that one of the bombers, Hussain Osman, had taken the Eurostar to Paris in the immediate aftermath of that failed bombing, and had then travelled on to Rome, where he was finally arrested on 29 July. A European arrest warrant was issued by the British police, and was agreed by the Italian courts on 17 August. Following the rejection of an appeal, Osman was flown back to the United Kingdom on 22 September, just two months after the failed bombing.

That case proved the value of the European arrest warrant, took the heat out of the political debate about it, and illustrated how the security of people here in the UK is, in fact, better served by ever closer co-operation between European law enforcement agencies.

[Sir William Cash]

As the right hon. Gentleman referred to me a moment ago, may I point out that in Staffordshire there was a case under the European arrest warrant in which a person was actually convicted of murder and was subject to penalties, although it was clear from subsequent evidence that he had not even been in Italy at the time, but had actually been in Staffordshire? There are many similar examples.

[Andy Burnham]

In any judicial process, there is the potential for mistakes and a miscarriage of justice. Is the hon. Gentleman honestly saying that he was right about the European arrest warrant all that time ago, and that it has been a bad thing and should be scrapped? If so, I think that he is in a small minority in the House, because people have seen the benefits that have come to UK law enforcement following its introduction.

I mentioned that case at the beginning of my speech because I see a parallel between the debate that took place then and the debate that we are having today. Ten years on, as the Home Secretary said, we find ourselves in the aftermath of an horrific attack in one member state that was conceived and planned in another—and I note the letter that the Home Secretary received from Minister Cazeneuve encouraging our full participation in Prüm.

In these difficult times, we—all of us in the House—have an obligation to consider every possible measure to protect the public. It seems to me that the case for greater data sharing and access to data that are held across Europe is now unanswerable, and that we have an obligation to support that case. It is no exaggeration to say that our national security depends on it. That is why, as the Home Secretary said, the last Labour Government made the original decision to sign up to the Prüm decisions in 2007, recognising their potential for our law enforcement agencies. It is also why, back in July 2013, we explicitly warned the Government against opting out of a whole range of EU justice and home affairs measures including Prüm. As I understand it, the Government received warnings from other senior figures in UK law enforcement, and they should have listened to them because, as was pointed out back then, that decision seemed to be driven less by an objective assessment of the impact on crime prevention and detection, and more by a political desire to appease the never-satisfied forces of Euroscepticism on the Conservative Benches. Tempting as it is to say, “We told you so” to the Home Secretary today, we will try and resist that and instead congratulate her on eventually arriving at the right decision and encourage her to resist the blandishments of the forces of darkness who are again rearing their head today.

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[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

In these troubling times, this debate raises troubling questions about vital matters of policy and principle, not only for the United Kingdom as a whole and our Parliament but for our civil liberties and our common law.

First, before reaching a decision on our participation in Prüm, we should consider very carefully the implications for our parliamentary sovereignty, from which all law should ultimately derive. If we opt into Prüm, in which areas would the UK be accepting exclusive EU competence? The Government must be clear on that, because only the EU could act in those areas, which would mean taking the decision away from Parliament.

I have to ask the Home Secretary this: how assiduously have the Government considered alternative means of securing the benefits that Prüm offers in a way that would be less damaging to our parliamentary sovereignty? Furthermore, what is so special about the European Union when it comes to security, terrorism, organised crime and all those things that we deplore and want to control as compared with matters that arise in other parts of the world? What is the real distinction to be drawn as we seek to protect our citizens in the EU or any other country in the world?

Secondly, by participating in Prüm, the United Kingdom would be compelled to accept the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. The extension of that Court’s jurisdiction under the Lisbon treaty to sensitive areas of policing and criminal law was the key factor in the previous Government’s decision to opt out.

[Andy Burnham]

I have listened carefully to what the hon. Gentleman said. He asked what was so special about national security that it required a European dimension, if I heard him correctly. Does he agree that the fact that the Paris attacks were exclusively planned in another member state answers his question?

[Sir William Cash]

It does not. The reasons why that terrible carnage took place have a great deal to do with insecurity and instability as a result of the failures of border controls and the manner in which people made their way to Paris. We do not have time to go into all those matters, and they are not the subject of this debate, but I question whether national security for United Kingdom citizens, which is our prime concern, will be advanced by surrendering these powers to the European Court of Justice.

The Government concede that accepting the Court’s jurisdiction is not risk-free. They should have explained what practical impact they expected the extension of the Court’s jurisdiction in relation to the UK to have, and they have not done so.

Thirdly, the Government say that they intend to put into place extra safeguards to ensure that Prüm would operate in a way that

“respects fully the civil liberties of British citizens.”

Liberty gave evidence to the House of Lords on a number of matters in this respect.

In the report of the European Scrutiny Committee that was published the other day, we make it clear that there is an important balance to strike between law enforcement co-operation, especially when it involves the exchange of personal data, and the need to protect individuals against the risk of false incrimination and unwarranted interference with their right to privacy. The Government’s business and implementation case can provide only anecdotal evidence of cases in which Prüm has been instrumental in advancing an investigation or securing a conviction. The paucity of evidence that we have been given on the value and impact of Prüm in respect of law enforcement makes it difficult to measure its added value and to ensure that an appropriate balance is being struck. We find that lack of transparency and accountability troubling.

Francis Report

Debate between Andy Burnham and William Cash

Wednesday 5th March 2014 Commons Chamber

[Andy Burnham]

It is interesting that Government Members do not like it, but this is the reality in the NHS right now, 12 months after the Francis report. Patient care is being compromised in the mental health care system. If the hon. Member for Mid Norfolk (George Freeman) does not think that that is relevant, let me quote Professor Sue Bailey, the President of the Royal College of Psychiatrists. She said that mental health units are

“heading for a Mid Staffs scandal”.

If that is not relevant, what is?

[Mr Cash]

Just to put the record straight and to give the shadow Secretary of State the opportunity to rectify something he was responsible for at the time, I accept that there was a Francis report before the inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005 took place. In the light of the fact that he has himself acknowledged many of the recommendations of the Francis report, will he now accept that it was a grave mistake not to have a public inquiry under the 2005 Act on his watch that of his predecessors as Secretaries of State?

[Andy Burnham]

I am pleased that the hon. Gentleman has acknowledged that it was I who appointed Robert Francis to begin the process of an independent inquiry into what went wrong. I shall say more in a moment about what I did, why I did it, and why I stand by what I did, because in my view what I did was help to get to the truth while also helping Stafford hospital to recover.

Accountability and Transparency in the NHS

Debate between Andy Burnham and William Cash

Thursday 14th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[Andy Burnham]

No, I will not. I was copied into an e-mail by Professor Brian Jarman in mid-March 2010 and, having asked the CQC to investigate what he had said, I wrote back to him on 31 March 2010. That was literally my last duty as Secretary of State for Health after the general election was called. I was not able to respond further to inquiries. It is important to provide some balance to the hon. Gentleman’s comments.

Changing the culture in the NHS requires vigilance and persistence. As Robert Francis says, we have all been too remote from the front line.

The foundation trust reform was a serious attempt to end the top-down culture in the NHS, bringing more accountability and transparency. If we look back, however, we will see that, when the centre stood back, there were places where an unhealthy local culture became even more firmly established. In some trusts a national top-down style was replaced with a local top-down, bullying style, which can be even worse. I can remember the shock I felt on reading the first Francis report’s finding that, on receiving FT status, one of the first things that the Mid Staffs board did was to resolve to hold more meetings in private. That was an audacious breach of the spirit of the legislation passed by this House.

[Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

The shadow Secretary of State and I have been engaged on this issue for a very long time. Will he admit that it was totally unacceptable for him and his predecessor to refuse to have a public inquiry, which I demanded relentlessly, under the Inquiries Act 2005? Does he agree that it was wrong to give foundation trust status when it clearly should not have been given, and does he accept that I raised the issue of gagging orders and confidentiality in a health debate in 2009, not 2010?

[Andy Burnham]

Foundation trust status was not a matter for Ministers. It was a job for Monitor, so it has to answer that concern. The hon. Gentleman is right that we had many discussions about a public inquiry. He will remember that in July 2009, two months after I was appointed Secretary of State, I brought in Robert Francis QC to conduct an independent inquiry into what happened. I did not order a full public inquiry and I will explain the reason why later.

The difficult thing about the fact that the Mid Staffs board was holding more meetings in private was that we in this House had passed up our powers to intervene to stop it. That is another lesson we must learn: that the FT reform was naive in thinking that local autonomy would lead to improvement in all cases. In a national health service, there are areas where national direction is needed, and when things go wrong, there must be immediate powers of intervention, which, on my arrival in the Department in June 2009, I found I did not have. Foundation trust policy needs to be reviewed and adjusted to mitigate those dangers, including through a reconsideration of the power to de-authorise a failing foundation trust, which was recommended by the first Francis report, but repealed by the Health and Social Care Act 2012.

We also need to consider targets and how they are used. Targets helped to deliver the lowest waiting times in history and that must not be forgotten. However, in places, they reinforced negative management practices. In focusing on only part of the patient experience, there was not sufficient focus on the overall patient experience and the whole person—a particular problem when it comes to caring for very elderly people whose needs are a blur of the physical, mental and social.

Robert Francis is right to call for a fundamental rethink of the way in which we care for older people, and I have put his recommendations at the heart of Labour’s policy review. However, there are more immediate things that we can do and I will spend the rest of my time on five substantive points.

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[Mr Cash]

We all have lessons to learn about all matters relating to these questions, but the guidelines also talk about the necessity of chasing and following up in the Department. It is probably a question of the correspondence unit in the Department and the private office. There was a failure and the Francis report made it absolutely clear that the guidelines were not complied with and were not operated effectively. I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman, on reflection, will recall that that was what the report said.

I referred to these matters in my witness statement, and Una O’Brien, the permanent secretary at the Department of Health, also made it clear in her evidence that if such letters were received now, they would receive an immediate response, irrespective of whether the hospital was a foundation trust or not. The bottom line is that there was a failure within the Department and by successive Secretaries of State. The shadow Secretary of State acknowledged in his evidence that he looked at these letters. I will not dispute that. However, not only were the matters not dealt with satisfactorily, but I cannot absolve the Secretaries of State from their failure to agree to the 2005 Act inquiry.

I do not need to rehearse the history of the case. I asked not once, not twice, but repeatedly, and I had to urge and persuade the shadow Secretary of State at the time and also—I am glad that, to his great credit, he decided to do so—the present Prime Minister who, as Leader of the Opposition, decided in the light of my representations and no doubt those of others to have the 2005 Act inquiry. Without that we would not be discussing the Francis inquiry—the present one, not the previous one, important though that was—and the others. They were Government inquiries, but they did not do the job in the way the present inquiry did.

[Andy Burnham]

I am listening carefully to what the hon. Gentleman is saying. It is not strictly true to say that that was a Government inquiry. I brought in Robert Francis—will he acknowledge that?—in July 2009 to conduct an independent inquiry. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle (Alan Johnson) said, in presenting his findings Robert Francis said that he felt that more people had come forward because of the nature of that inquiry.

[Mr Cash]

I will let the matter rest at that point for the present purpose.

I move on to the next question of accountability, with respect to Sir David Nicholson. I referred to Sir David in a number of debates way back as far as 2009. I also referred to him in my evidence to the Health Committee, in my witness statement and in correspondence with the Francis inquiry. In my judgment, for the reasons that I have already given, there was a systems failure with respect to this whole terrible tragedy, not only in relation to Mid Staffordshire, but more generally.

We need to turn a new page. I am not saying that Sir David should receive a P45 now. What I am saying is that, sooner rather than later, it is essential that he departs his post. I disagree with the Secretary of State and therefore also, I admit, with the Prime Minister on this matter, and so do many others. Accountability must mean what it says, and in this context it means carrying the can. The whole saga took place on Sir David’s watch, even though he was not at West Midlands for more than a certain time, and the problems that have arisen carry with them issues of accountability.

I acknowledge that Robert Francis referred to scapegoats. It is not, as has been said before and I repeat, a question of blaming scapegoats. It is a question of responsibility and where it lies at the time. In my judgment it did not lie only with the Secretaries of State of the time. In fairness, they have apologised.

I conclude with a statement made by David Nicholson at a conference that took place a few months ago. He made it clear in that statement that he took personal responsibility for what had happened. It is very important that we recognise that he has apologised and that he has made a statement that is clearly an admission that he lost the plot when, as he put it, ward 10 in Mid Staffs was under severe stress. That is the problem and I believe he has to go.