Ebola

Andy Burnham Excerpts

Monday 13th October 2014 Commons Chamber

[Andy Burnham (Leigh) (Lab)]

I thank the Secretary of State for the advance copy of his statement and commend him for making it at the first opportunity.

We have all been horrified by the devastating scenes from west Africa and our hearts go out to the communities that are confronting this threat on a daily basis. Public concern about Ebola is rising here and it is important that people have reliable facts and regular updates.

There are parallels between the current situation and the 2009 swine flu pandemic with which I dealt. I was grateful for the helpful approach of the then Opposition, particularly the right hon. Member for South Cambridgeshire (Mr Lansley), and I aim to provide the Secretary of State with the same approach. However, we do have a role in scrutinising the Government’s approach and I will do that today in a constructive spirit.

I echo the Secretary of State’s tribute to the many NHS staff, Public Health England staff and members of the armed forces who have helped on the ground in west Africa. We have a duty to protect them in any way we can. I want to start with the advice that is given to those who are treating people with the disease. People will be worried by the reports of a second case of Ebola in a health worker, this time in Dallas. We have seen protests in Spain by clinical staff who feel that a colleague has been unfairly exposed to infection. In the light of that, will the Secretary of State say whether he has confidence in the official advice that is being given to those who are treating the disease, and whether it needs to be reviewed?

Let me turn to the risk to the public here. The Secretary of State says that it remains low and the chief medical officer predicts a handful of cases. A handful is not a very scientific term. Will he be more precise and give the House the full range of figures that the advisory group has considered, including the worst case scenario? I recall agonising over whether to publish the official predictions for swine flu and about the risk of worrying the public unnecessarily. However, I think that the public interest lies in openness. Will the Secretary of State confirm that he is planning for the worst case scenario, so that there is no sense of complacency?

Let me turn to our preparedness to deal with an outbreak. There has been confusion about screening at point of entry. Last Thursday, the Department of Health said:

“Entry screening in the UK is not recommended by the World Health Organization, and there are no plans to introduce entry screening for Ebola in the UK.”

Screening was also ruled out by the Secretary of State for Defence. However, just 24 hours later, we were told that screening was to be introduced. Will the right hon. Gentleman say what prompted that about-turn? What official advice has he received from the chief medical officer and Public Health England on entry screening? Based on the science, do they think that it is necessary? Do the arrangements he has announced for temperature checks fully comply with that advice?

As there are currently no direct flights from the affected countries, will the Secretary of State say exactly who will be screened? Will it be all arrivals from those countries? How many people a day or week do we expect that to be, and how will they be identified? Have front-line Border Force staff been properly briefed about what is expected of them, and are they being trained in what to look for and in screening procedures? Why is there only partial coverage of ports of entry? What about sea ports and other UK airports? Will he say where the checks will take place on Eurostar, given that it stops at a number of places en route to London?

On the exercise this weekend, as the Secretary of State will know, a patient was transferred from Newcastle where there are beds in negative pressure isolation units to the Royal Free hospital, which has Trexler isolators. Do the Government believe that Ebola is better handled in Trexler beds, and is the Secretary of State satisfied that the two NHS beds—both at the Royal Free—are sufficient? Given that in addition to the two Trexler beds there are already 24 negative pressure isolation beds, which make up the 26 beds he referred to, will he say what he means by “surge Ebola bed capacity”? If it becomes necessary to treat Ebola cases more widely in isolation beds, is he satisfied that there is adequate provision across England? Is he satisfied that all relevant NHS staff, including GPs, ambulance and 111 staff, know how to identify Ebola, the precautions to take in any potential presentation, and the protocols for handling it? He mentioned symptoms a few times in his statement. For the public watching this statement, will he tell the House simply what those symptoms are?

On treatment, the British nurse who was successfully treated here was offered and took an experimental medication called ZMapp. Will it be standard practice to offer all affected patients ZMapp, and if so, are there sufficient supplies in the NHS to do that? The Secretary of State rightly focused on a vaccine, which would of course be the best reassurance we could give the public. During the swine flu pandemic, huge effort went into compressing the timetable for the development of a vaccine. Is he confident that everything that can be done is being done to speed that up?

Finally, as the Secretary of State said, the best way to protect people here is to stop Ebola at source. The UK has rightly pledged £125 million to assist Sierra Leone, but with cases doubling every three to four weeks there is wide agreement that the response of the wider international community has been slow and inadequate. The window to halt Ebola before it runs out of control altogether is closing fast. What assessment has been made of the resilience of neighbouring countries such as Guinea and Liberia, and what help is being offered to them? The International Development Committee report was clear that the lack of proper health coverage allowed the outbreak to grow unchecked for so long. Does the right hon. Gentleman accept that improving global health systems is the best way to prevent these outbreaks, or at least ensure that they are caught before they get out of control? Many countries support placing universal health coverage at the centre of global development, yet the UK is currently opposing such plans at the UN. Will he say a little more about the Government’s position on that, and whether they are prepared to reconsider it in the light of recent events? Knowing from my experience how difficult these situations are, I assure the Secretary of State that the offer of help is genuine, but on behalf of the House I ask him for regular updates and maximum openness in the weeks and months to come.

[Mr Hunt]

I thank the shadow Health Secretary for the constructive tone of his comments. That is totally appropriate and I am grateful. I will start with the point on which he finished, because the most crucial thing we can do to protect the UK population is deal with the disease at source and contain it in west Africa. That is why I am working extremely closely with the International Development Secretary, and she is working closely with me because the role of NHS volunteers is important. The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right: the initial international response has focused on taking the three worst affected countries and giving them a partner country in the developed world to help them—we are helping Sierra Leone, America is helping Liberia, and France is helping Guinea.

That has worked up to a point, but we need more help from the rest of the international community. I had a conversation earlier today with US Health Secretary Burwell. We talked about a co-ordinated international response for the whole of west Africa, because we will not defeat this disease if we operate in silos. We need to recognise that this disease does not recognise international boundaries; the right hon. Gentleman was absolutely right to make that point.

Let me try to give the right hon. Gentleman some of the information he requested. First, he is absolutely right to raise the issue of the protection of health workers. That has to be our No. 1 priority both here in the UK and abroad. That is why we are building a dedicated 12-bed facility in Sierra Leone that will give the highest standards of care, equivalent to NHS standards of care, for health care workers taking part in the international effort to contain the disease there. That is also very relevant to health care workers here: events in both Spain and the US will have caused great concern.

I am satisfied that the official advice to health care workers is correct. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in the US, the US equivalent of Public Health England, believes that breaches in protocol led to the infection of the US nurse—the case we have seen in the media recently—but it is investigating that. The advice is always kept under review and if that advice changes we would, of course, respect that. It is important that we follow the scientific advice we have, but that the scientists themselves keep an open mind on the basis of new evidence as it emerges. I know that they are doing that.

The right hon. Gentleman talked about the full range of figures. He is absolutely right to say that we will maintain public confidence in the handling of this by being totally open about what we know. The reason we have stuck carefully to the formula of “a handful of cases” is because it is genuinely very difficult to predict an accurate exact number. Let me say this: we would not have used the formula of “a handful of cases” if we thought that the number of cases over the next three months would reach double figures. However, it is also important to say that that was a current assessment. That assessment may change on the basis of the evidence. I will, of course, keep the House informed if it does change.

The right hon. Gentleman talked about screening. It is important to deal with a misunderstanding. Why did the policy change on Thursday? The answer is that it changed because the clinical advice from the chief medical officer changed on Thursday. Her advice changed not on the basis that the risk level in the UK had changed—she still considers it to be low—but because she said that we should prepare for the risk level going up. That is why we started to put in place measures, but they are not measures primarily intended to pick up people arriving in the UK who are displaying symptoms of Ebola. We think that most of those people should be prevented from flying in the first place. The measures are designed to identify people who may be at risk within the incubation period of developing the disease, so that we can track them and make sure they get access to the right medical care quickly.

As I mentioned, we think we will reach 89% of people arriving in the UK from the affected countries. We will continue to review that. If the numbers increase and the risk level justifies it, we have contingency plans to expand the screening, for example to Birmingham and Manchester. The reason we have included Eurostar at this early stage is because there are direct flights from those three countries to Paris and Brussels, from where it is easy to connect to Eurostar. We will use the tracking system for people who are ticketed directly through to the UK in order to identify, where we can, people who then independently get a Eurostar ticket. It is important to say that because they are changing the mode of transport in Paris and Brussels, tracking is not as robust as it would be for people taking a direct flight to the UK. We will not be able to identify everyone, which is why we need to win the support of people arriving in the UK from those countries, so that they self-present, in their own interest, to give us the best possible chance of helping them if they start contracting symptoms.

I am satisfied that the Trexler beds and the negative isolation rooms are safe both for health care workers and in preventing onward transmission. They use different systems—one of them is a tented system and the other is based on people wearing personal protective equipment —but I am satisfied that both of them are safe. I will continue to take advice on that. It is very important that ambulance staff know that someone is a potential Ebola case, so that they wear the PP equipment.

As we will not be able to identify everyone who comes from the affected countries, it is important that the 111 service knows to ask people exhibiting the symptoms of Ebola whether they have travelled to those affected areas. The right hon. Gentleman asked what those symptoms are. They are essentially flu-like symptoms, but they are not dissimilar to the symptoms someone might exhibit if they had, for example, malaria. That is why it is important to ask for people’s travel history and whether they have had or may have had contact with people who have had Ebola, in order to identify the risk level.

We would like to continue using ZMapp for people in the UK who contract the disease, but that is subject to international availability. It might not be possible to get it for everyone, because there is such high international demand, but we will certainly try.

In terms of the development of a vaccine, we are doing everything we can to work with GSK to bring forward the date when a vaccine is available. Indeed, we are considering potentially giving indemnities if the full clinical trials have not been conducted.