Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (First sitting)

Debate between Allison Gardner and Bradley Thomas

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd February 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Gardner]

Q But do you think there should be a statutory duty to have a board member responsible?

Jill Broom: Some of our members have pointed out that the number of organisations under cyber-regulations is very small, and it is only going to increase a small amount with the advent of this particular Bill. Similarly, in the different jurisdictions there are duties at the board level. There is an argument for it. The key thing is that we need to be mindful of it being risk-based, and also that there are organisations that could be disproportionately affected by this. I think it needs a little more testing, particularly with our members, as to whether a statutory requirement is needed.

[Bradley Thomas]

Q Two questions: first, for a bit of context, could the witnesses give us an idea of the objectives of cyber-attacks? Are we seeing objectives based around disruption or around extortion, either monetary or for intellectual property? Perhaps we could have a perspective on whether that differs depending on the origin of the organisation conducting the cyber-attack. Secondly, around the reporting model, is there a view on whether the model proposed in the Bill is beneficial, and whether it risks a fragmented approach, particularly if companies operate in a sector that is regulated under the jurisdiction of two regulators? Do you think that a more universal, singular reporting model would be beneficial in ensuring as strong a response as possible?

Dr Sanjana Mehta: May I weigh in on the second question first? It is good to note that the definition of reportable incident has expanded in the current legislation. One of the concerns that the post-implementation reviews had from the previous regulatory regime was that the regulated entities were under-reporting. We note that the Bill has now expanded the definition to include incidents that could have an adverse impact on the security and operations of network and information systems, in addition to those incidents that are having or have had a negative impact.

While that is clear on the one hand—some factors have been provided, such as the number of customers affected, the geographical reach and the duration of the incident—what is not clear at the moment is the thresholds linked with those factors. In the absence of those thresholds, our concern is that regulated entities may be tempted to over-report rather than under-report, thereby creating more demand on the efforts of the regulators.

We must think about regulatory capacity to deal with all the reports that come through to them, and to understand what might be the trade-offs on the regulated entities, particularly if an entity is regulated by more than one competent authority. For those entities, it would mean reporting to multiple authorities. For organisations that are small or medium-sized enterprises, there is a real concern that the trade-offs may result in procedural compliance over genuine cyber-security and resilience. We call on the Government for immediate clarification of the thresholds linked to those factors.

Jill Broom: I would like to come in on that point. Our members would agree with it. Companies need to be clear about what needs to be reported, when it needs to be reported and where they need to report it. A bit of clarity is required on that, certainly around definitions. As Sanjana said, it is good to see that the definition is expanding, but definitions such as “capable of having” a significant impact remain unclear for industry. Therefore, we need a bit more clarity, because again, it means that we could risk capturing absolutely everything that is out there, and we really want to focus on: what is most important that we need to be aware of? Determining materiality is essential before making any report.

In terms of the where and the how, we are also in favour of a single reporting platform, because that reduces friction around the process, and it allows businesses, ultimately, to know exactly where they are going. They do not need to report here for one regulator and there for another. It is a streamlined process, and it makes the regime as easy as possible to deal with, so it helps incentivise people to act upon it.

I have another point to add about the sequencing of alignment with other potential regulation. We know that, for example, the Government’s ransomware proposals include incident-reporting requirements, and they are expected to come via a different legislative vehicle. We need to be careful not to add any additional layers of complexity or other user journeys into an already complex landscape.

Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting)

Debate between Allison Gardner and Bradley Thomas

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd February 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Allison Gardner (Stoke-on-Trent South) (Lab)]

Q I should point out that I once worked for the NHS AI and Digital Regulations Service and have also worked for a number of different regulators, including the ICO, so I have experience of the joys and frustrations of cross-regulatory working. We have heard evidence of the challenges experienced by businesses when they have to go to different regulators—I think it is as many as 14—and deal with the conflicting guidance they are often given and the skillset within each regulator. There were calls for one portal for incident reporting.

The ICO is a horizontal regulator working across all sectors. In your experience, would a single cyber regulator be a good idea? What would be the benefits and the challenges? I will allow Ofcom and Ofgem to jump in and defend themselves.

Ian Hulme: I suppose the challenge with having a single regulator is that—like ourselves, as a whole-economy regulator—it will have to prioritise and direct its resources at the issues of highest harm and risk. One benefit of a sectoral approach is that we understand our sectors at a deeper level; we certainly work together quite closely on a whole range of issues, and my teams have been working with Natalie and Stuart’s teams on the Bill over the last 18 months, and thinking about how we can collaborate better and co-ordinate our activities. It is really pleasing to see that that has been recognised in the Bill with the provisions for information sharing. That is going to be key, because the lack of information-sharing provisions in the current regs has been a bit of a hindrance. There are pros and cons, but a single regulator will need to prioritise its resources, so you may not get the coverage you might with a sectoral approach.

Natalie Black: Having worked in this area for quite some time, I would add that the challenge with a single regulator is that you end up with a race to the bottom, and minimum standards you can apply everywhere. However, with a tailored approach, you can recognise the complexity of the cyber risk and the opportunity to target specific issues—for example, prepositioning and ransomware. That said, we absolutely recognise the challenge for operators and companies in having to bounce between regulators. We hear it all the time, and you will see a real commitment from us to do something about it.

Some of that needs to sit with the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, which is getting a lot of feedback from all of us about how we need it to co-ordinate and make things as easy as possible for companies—many of which are important investors in our economy, and we absolutely recognise that. We are also doing our bit through the UK Regulators Network and the Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum to find the low-hanging fruit where we can make a difference. To give a tangible example, we think there should be a way to do single reporting of incidents. We do not have the answer for that yet, but that is something we are exploring to try and make companies’ lives easier. To be honest, it will make our lives easier as well, because it wastes our time having to co-ordinate across multiple operators.

[Bradley Thomas (Bromsgrove) (Con)]

Q What additional resources will you need in order to implement and enforce the requirements of the Bill?

Ian Hulme: Again, to contrast the ICO’s position with that of other colleagues, we have a much larger sector, as it currently exists, and we will have a massively larger sector again in the future. We are also funded slightly differently. The ICO is grant in aid funded from Government, so we are dependent on Government support.

To move from a reactive footing, which is our position at the moment—that is the Government’s guidance to competent authorities and to the ICO specifically—to a proactive footing with a much expanded sector, will need significant uplift in our skills and capability, as well as system development in order to register and ingest intelligence from MSPs and relevant digital service providers in the future.

From our perspective at the ICO, we need significant support from DSIT so that we can transition into the new regulatory regime. It will ultimately be self-funding—it is a sustainable model—but we need continued support during the transition period.