National Security Bill

Alistair Carmichael Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 16th November 2022 Commons Chamber

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

I welcome the Minister to his post. He is very much a round peg in a round hole—despite my historic critique of the Home Office, that is meant as a compliment. I thank him for seeing me and my colleague, the hon. Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis), on the amendment the other day. He will be unsurprised that he did not persuade me, but I thank him for the time in any event. In view of the short time, I will focus mostly on amendment 14, which I hope we will press to a vote. It is in my name and that of the hon. and gallant Member for Bromley—not Bromley, but Barnsley Central; not quite Bromley. That amendment strikes out clause 27.

A decade and a half ago, the British public were shocked to hear stories of British complicity in American and other countries’ acts of kidnap, rendition, torture and assassination, typically but not always by drone strikes, with the collateral damage that that entailed. Collateral damage in this context is a euphemism for the deaths of innocent women and children who happen to be standing near the original target. I use this stark language to make plain the potential consequences of what might seem like bland legalistic language in the Bill.

The legal basis of those actions—I almost said atrocities, but of those actions—was the Intelligence Services Act 1994, when we first recognised the operation of the Secret Intelligence Service. Most notably, it inserted the melodramatically named “007 clause”—section 7—which empowered Ministers to authorise criminal behaviour overseas. I was one of the Ministers who took that Bill through the House. We Ministers were briefed very firmly that, in practice, that section would authorise bugging, burglary and blackmail—the normal behaviour of intelligence agencies seeking to penetrate enemy states and organisations—not kidnap, not torture and most certainly not a licence to kill.

We the Ministers on that Bill gave our word to the House that that was what it was for, but a decade later section 7 was used to authorise the enabling of rendition, torture and quite possibly assassination as well. We know the names of several victims of UK complicity: Binyam Mohamed, Abdel Hakim Belhaj, Fatima Boudchar, his wife, and Rangzieb Ahmed, to name just a few.

[Mr Alistair Carmichael (Orkney and Shetland) (LD)]

It is worth reflecting and placing back on the record that we know the names of Belhaj and Boudchar only because somebody happened to find the papers unattended after the fall of Gaddafi. That was the only way that the truth about their cases came into the public domain.

[Mr Davis]

The right hon. Gentleman is right, and it is also true that we found out about Binyam Mohamed only because of extended legal cases in the courts, which were resisted by the agencies at every turn. We know about Rangzieb Ahmed only because I got access to the in-camera papers. So this is a general problem and I will come back to that. A most recent example is Jagtar Singh Johal, who alleges that he was tortured by Indian authorities and was detained, we believe, as a result of British intelligence. Again, we know about that only because we could spot the case inside one of the commissioner’s reports. Accordingly, exactly because of that, this is literally the tip of the iceberg.

The Intelligence and Security Committee report on detainee mistreatment found 232 cases where UK personnel

“continued to supply questions or intelligence”

to other intelligence services, after they

“knew or suspected that the detainee had been or was being mistreated.”

As I said, I have seen in-camera evidence that showed quite how deliberate some of those decisions were—absolutely in the knowledge that they would be used in the process of torture. That was done rather more broadly, even when the intelligence services did not know at all where the detainee was being held, or even whether they were being held legally or not. Those are the consequences of vague legislation that awarded too much power to the authorities.

We might therefore expect clause 27 to tighten up over-loose legislation to make Ministers, officials and agents more conscious of their responsibilities, not less. Instead, it does the exact opposite. Clause 27 would provide an exemption to schedule 4 of the Serious Crime Act 2007. Schedule 4 sets out the circumstances in which assisting and encouraging a crime that occurs overseas is still a criminal offence. Clause 27 means that it would no longer be an offence to assist a crime overseas where someone’s behaviour is necessary for

“the proper exercise of any function of the Security Service, Secret Intelligence Service or GCHQ or...the armed forces.”

In plain English, that would effectively insulate Ministers and officials from responsibility for assisting or encouraging heinous overseas crimes.

To see the potential impact of that, consider the case of Abdel Hakim Belhaj. Mr Belhaj, a Libyan dissident living in exile, was detained and subsequently tortured in both Thailand and Libya. It later emerged that UK information sharing had contributed to his detention and rendition. After years of litigation and wrangling, the Prime Minister wrote a letter of apology to Mr Belhaj, and the Government admitted responsibility for the role that UK intelligence played in his rendition. That was a civil rather than a criminal case, but if officials are certain that they will not face any criminal liability for assisting torture and other serious crimes abroad, reckless information sharing of the kind seen in Mr Belhaj’s case will occur more frequently and with more impunity.

I understand that one reason for the change in the clause is apparently to allow the easier transfer of bulk data. That is an especially risky activity to which to give legal cover. The transfer of bulk data is a euphemism for saying that we give the Americans—principally—so much data that we do not have time to check it all. That is it in a nutshell. As Edward Snowden revealed, that has historically amounted to unimaginably vast quantities of data, of course about suspects, but also about innocent people. Because of the high level of secrecy that applies to current bulk data issues, I have no current UK example to hand, but I can exemplify this by outlining the behaviour of our closest ally, and the principal recipient of bulk data, the United States.

The greatly respected President of the USA, Mr Barack Obama, used to go to the White House Situation Room on a Tuesday once a month to authorise a kill list—20 people who were going to be assassinated by the United States and who were perceived to be its enemies; typically, al-Qaeda officials and the like. President Obama talked proudly of how the best technology—artificial intelligence, algorithms and, crucially, bulk data—was being used to identify targets.

However, that comes with enormous risks, most plainly shown by the case of Ahmad Zaidan, who was selected for targeting by the US National Security Agency based on algorithms using bulk data. Fortunately, he was not assassinated. I say “fortunately” because there had been analysis of his telephone contacts and he had talked to Osama bin Laden and all the al-Qaeda high command, but, before the drone strike was organised, it was suddenly realised that he was the Pakistan office head of Al Jazeera. The analysis had thrown up an innocent man who could have been assassinated.

That is why we must be careful about what is handed over without knowledge of the bulk data. If we give greater legal cover to officials sending bulk data to other countries, cases of bulk data being used in the commission of serious crimes abroad—even against innocent people—will happen more frequently.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

I hope my right hon. Friend is wrong, but the Government have to consider it for exactly those reasons. It would be not only wrong but profoundly embarrassing if the United Kingdom were to find itself in that position.

I hope the Minister can clearly explain the difference I outlined, because the only difference I can see is that it could be argued that “acting reasonably” may be applicable to more circumstances and, therefore, offer arguably broader protection than “acting in the proper exercise of a function.” We have heard it argued that the current defence is not sufficiently legally certain but, from experience, legal certainty is an elusive quarry. The concept of reasonableness is very familiar to the courts in a variety of contexts. Anyone looking for absolute certainty in every case will not find it, because all cases are different and must be considered on their merits.

The second area I want to mention is amendments 8 to 12, in my right hon. Friend’s name, dealing with the potential reduction of damages in national security proceedings where a successful claimant has committed wrongdoing related to terrorism. It is worth noting in passing that such wrongdoing is not limited to convictions for criminal offences, and we need to understand from the Minister what level of wrongdoing in this context would suffice to put someone’s damages in jeopardy.

The operative measure is clause 58(3), which says

“the court must decide whether, in light of its consideration of the national security factors, it is appropriate for it to reduce the amount of damages”.

So we need to know what “appropriate” means—or should mean. Surely it should mean appropriate in all the circumstances of the case and in the interests of justice overall—it would be helpful if the Minister could confirm that—and that there is no presumption in favour of reduction, nor is there an instruction to reduce damages where the factors set out are present. That is how I understand the clause, but I would be grateful if he could confirm it.

Lastly, I wish to discuss amendment 38, which would remove clause 84 and stands in the name of the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry). That clause provides that, save for in very limited circumstances, civil legal aid would not be available in any case where it otherwise would be to those previously convicted of terrorism offences. My concern is that this is a very significant shift in the principles applicable to legal aid. At the moment, we award legal aid on the basis of the merits of the case and the financial circumstances of the individual applying, never before doing so on the basis of their previous character. This change would be very significant and it would need significant discussion, which, by definition, given the clock in front of me, it is not going to get today.

We need to be clear about what we would be saying if we made that change. We would be saying that whatever happens to that individual—however blatantly their rights may be infringed, in cases wholly unrelated to their previous conduct—the state will not assist them to defend their rights as it otherwise would, because of a previous criminal conviction. I am not sure that would be right and I am not sure that if it is, it makes any sense to specify only terrorism offences, rather than any other serious criminal offending. But whether it is right or wrong, we need to discuss it properly and not have it tacked on to this Bill, which is about something completely different, with very limited time to discuss it.

[Mr Carmichael]

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), who did the House a great service in bringing to us in four minutes what could have been the subject matter of a whole afternoon’s debate in itself, thus highlighting the total inadequacy of today’s proceedings for proper scrutiny of this Bill. I fear it will be filleted when it goes to the other place, and it deserves to be.

I added my name to new clause 8, but it is not available to debate and discuss. So much of what is in the Bill risks offering protection to people who do the wrong thing in the service of our country, while those who seek to expose that wrongdoing are to be left completely unprotected. Others have said it before, and I say it again now: this was the perfect opportunity to provide protection of that sort. If not now, when are going to see it?

It is a matter of significant regret that in an area of public policy where there is a substantial and natural consensus across the political parties, we have come to this stage in the proceedings of the Bill with so much division and disagreement, albeit a disagreement between those on the Treasury Bench and the Government Back Benches, not just between the parties. I do not think anybody in this House would not want to promote the security of our nation, and we all understand the complex and difficult situations in which pursuing that work often places people.

We also know, because it is human nature as much as anything else, that in these difficult and complex situations it is often possible to persuade oneself of just about anything. When that happens, it is necessary that somebody, somewhere, can be held accountable for it, because we are a country that believes, still, in the rule of law, and these things matter. That is why my colleagues on the Liberal Democrat Benches and I are so concerned about the content of clause 27 and clauses 79 to 83.

As I mentioned in my intervention on the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis), the cases about which we know and are rightly shocked, we know about only because these matters came into the public domain by mere happenstance. It is eminently possible that the circumstances of Belhaj and Boudchar would not be known to us today but for the fact somebody who happened to be walking around Gaddafi’s palace during the fall of his Government found the papers that revealed the extent to which rights had been deliberately traduced. It is surely wrong that there should be protection for people who behave far outside British standards, notwithstanding Government policy and indeed the law.

The same is true in relation to clauses 79 to 83, which remain the subject of massive controversy. I am certain that they will be revisited, hopefully with more detail and vigour than we have been able to give them today, because they do not belong in a Bill of this sort. I hope that, when the Bill eventually comes back to this House, it comes back without them.

[Ben Everitt (Milton Keynes North) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael) and to see so many members of the Bill Committee in the House on Report. It was a very constructive Committee, and I am pleased that we are all still vaguely getting on.

As the Minister said in his opening remarks, a number of clauses in the Bill update espionage legislation that goes back to world war one. Obviously we do not have time to go through all of them, but after putting the Bill into context, I will spend some time talking about clauses 13, 14, 20 and 21. The context is important. In my lifetime, and since the end of the cold war, we have lived through an era of what could be considered unprecedented global peace. In many ways, in the ‘90s, we took our eye off the ball. Once the Berlin wall came down, we took our eye off the ball on state-based threats. When things got hot in 2001, after 9/11, our national security legislation and our activity were focused much more on counter-terrorism, so now is the time to update our espionage legislation to counter state-based threats as well as counter-terrorist threats.

It is clear that state-based threats have not gone away. There are more Russian spies in London now than there ever were at the height of the cold war.

National Security Bill

Alistair Carmichael Excerpts

Consideration of Lords amendments
Wednesday 3rd May 2023 Commons Chamber

We have a real problem of the ISC remit’s being out of date. If the Government argue that the solution that amendment 122 proposes to that problem is imperfect, I might be prepared to agree with them, but it will become increasingly difficult to resist imperfect solutions to this problem if the Government continue to resist and to refuse finding a more perfect one.

[Mr Alistair Carmichael (Orkney and Shetland) (LD)]

I will speak to amendment (c) in my name and in those of the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) and—though it came too late to be printed on the amendment paper—the hon. Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis) . Amendment (c) would, as it states, disapply subsection (2) of proposed new section 50A of the Serious Crime Act 2007,

“in relation to an alleged offence that relates to conduct involving—

(a) torture or inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment or punishment, or

(b) the violation of a person’s sexual integrity.”

It is worth saying that the Bill that has come back from the other place is significantly improved on that which was sent to it. I posit the thought that, had the Bill started out as it stands today, an amendment such as mine would probably feature. It sits more logically with the structure of the Bill now, and it would avoid some of the unintended consequences. That is the disadvantage of starting a piece of legislation—a Bill of this nature should always have the maximum cross-party agreement and political consensus behind it—in a way that was, in the early days, quite divisive. The issues could perhaps have been better interrogated further upstream before the legislation came to the House.

The points that I wish to pray in aid of the amendment relate to the way in which clause 31, as it stands, would have effect. There are a number of points, which I will cover as briefly as possible because I do not want to filibuster the opportunity to put my own amendment to a vote; I have seen that done too many times in the past.

One concern, on which I would be interested to hear the Minister’s view, is that the International Criminal Court has warned that clause 31 as it stands would open the jurisdiction of the court to look at the actions of UK personnel. To the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden, the ICC’s chief prosecutor wrote that cases could now be

“potentially admissible before the ICC”—

a fairly strong statement in these circumstances—citing the risk of creating gaps in the domestic prosecution mechanisms for war crimes and crimes against humanity under the Rome statute. The prosecutor said that the Bill would be clear if it clearly excluded serious human rights abuses from its remit. I do not know if it is the Government’s wish and intention that the International Criminal Court be given jurisdiction in that way, but should that ultimately turn out to be the case, neither the Minister nor his successors will be able to say that they were not warned.

Clause 31 could also give Ministers and officials a statutory defence for involvement in crimes such as targeted killing and torture. That could include sending information from the UK overseas to be used in a torture interrogation, assisting the offense of torture under section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. Under the clause, a statutory defence would be available if the action were deemed necessary for the proper exercise of a function of an intelligence service or for the proper exercise of a function of the armed forces. In the Lords, that point was interrogated at length in Committee. The Minister in the Lords said that he would revert to Lord Pannick, but he never did. Instead, the Government chose to proceed in the way that is presented to the House today.

Clause 31 almost appears designed to protect politicians and officials in the UK rather than British personnel operating overseas. The clause would provide a legal defence for encouraging or assisting crimes overseas, such as giving a tip-off that leads to someone’s torture, as opposed to the direct commission of the crime itself. This is not fanciful; we know what was done by Jack Straw and senior officials of the day in relation to the Belhaj and Boudchar cases. Although we have never really seen a proper conclusion to those cases, such an operational defence would put that comprehensively beyond reach.

The clause could also discourage the Crown Prosecution Service, the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, and the Director of Public Prosecutions or the Lord Advocate from bringing cases. Where decisions are made about bringing prosecutions on individual cases, including those against Ministers and officials, the availability of a statutory defence for any conduct deemed “necessary” would likely discourage the prosecution authority from bringing a prosecution relating to criminal activities—or what would otherwise be criminal activities—that Ministers and officials assist or encourage others to do overseas.

In its simplest form, the Bill would still undermine an important and long-standing legal prohibition in this country on torture and related abuses. We have a long and distinguished history in this area. Conservative Members will be aware of the landmark changes made under the Government of the late Baroness Thatcher to create a specific criminal offence of torture. If the Government seek to undermine Baroness Thatcher’s legacy, I am quite prepared, on this one limited occasion, to take up cudgels and defend it.

The Bill also raises the question of our country’s moral authority. What right do we have to criticise other countries—for example, Saudi Arabia for the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, or Vladimir Putin’s Russia for its extraterritorial offences—if we authorise the conduct of our own Ministers, politicians and personnel in relation to such activities? This is about our moral authority. I would like to think that the Government will look kindly on the amendments, if not today, then perhaps when the Bill returns to the other place.