UK Civil Nuclear Trade Policy (India)

Alistair Burt Excerpts

Monday 29th November 2010 Written Statements

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Alistair Burt)]

On 6 September 2008, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) granted India an exception to its guidelines to permit exports to Indian civil nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. The UK was a long-standing and strong supporter of the need for such an exception to allow India to develop its civil nuclear power sector for peaceful purposes.

Following this announcement, the UK has developed a strong civil nuclear relationship with India, in line with our non-proliferation commitments and international obligations. The UK-India civil nuclear co-operation declaration, signed on 11 February this year, was a joint statement of our intent in this area. In light of our enhanced relationship following the recent high-level visit, the UK Government would like to restate their policy towards nuclear-related exports to India, the details of which are as follows.

The UK is committed to allow the promotion and facilitation of trade and other commercial activities between India and the UK relating to the peaceful civil use of nuclear energy to help India meet its energy needs, taking into full account both India and the UK’s respective international commitments and obligations. At the UK-India summit in New Delhi on 29 July 2010, the Prime Minister and Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh welcomed the opportunities that had opened up for co-operation in the civil nuclear power sector, including with regard to nuclear trade and exchanges between scientific institutions.

The UK’s position is a reflection of the positive approach that India is taking in addressing the issue of nuclear proliferation, which is of mutual concern to both countries. It is also a reflection of the agreements and commitments India has made; in particular, India’s move towards separating its military and civil nuclear programmes and implementing IAEA safeguards at its civil nuclear facilities.

Prior to the Nuclear Suppliers Group exception, the UK’s policy was to refuse export licences for all NSG trigger list items to India.

In November 2008, the UK revised this policy, and has since assessed all export licence applications on a case-by-case basis against the NSG guidelines for nuclear transfers as applied to India, as well as our wider nuclear non-proliferation treaty obligations. In line with the NSG guidelines, the UK will authorise the transfer of NSG trigger list exports to IAEA safeguarded civil nuclear facilities when satisfied that the transfers will not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosives activities, or be diverted to acts of terrorism.

The UK will continue this policy. As set out in the NSG guidelines:

for an NSG trigger list export, we will continue to take into account whether its export is for peaceful purposes, whether it is destined for a nuclear facility safeguarded by the IAEA and whether there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to an unsafeguarded facility. To this end, the UK will seek assurances from the Indian Government that the export will be used only for safeguarded nuclear activities which are not related to nuclear explosive activities; and

for an NSG dual-use list export, we will continue to take into account whether its export is for a nuclear-related end use, whether it is destined for a nuclear facility safeguarded by the IAEA and whether there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity.

The UK will therefore only license the export of NSG controlled goods to nuclear fuel cycle activities safeguarded by the IAEA, or for non-nuclear related end uses where we do not assess there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity.

We will also favourably consider applications to export licensable items other than those controlled by the NSG to India for a nuclear-related end use, including those assessed as licensable under the WMD end-use control, unless there are specific proliferation concerns related to the export. In particular, such assessment will take into account:

the utility of the items for export to a nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activity;

the legitimacy and credibility of the stated end use;

the nature and business of the stated end-user (including whether they are linked to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity or nuclear explosive activity); and

any diversionary concerns.

In line with our international obligations, the UK is committed actively to encourage the UK’s nuclear scientific institutions and universities to establish greater links with Indian institutions, and to develop co-operation in nuclear research and development of the civil uses of nuclear energy technology. Where an export licence is required for such co-operation, the UK will continue to assess applications on a case-by-case basis in line with the NSG guidelines. Such assessment will take into account whether the transfer is of information already in the public domain or is assessed as basic scientific research, as well as the standard provisions of UK export control legislation.