National Security (State Threats) Bill

Debate between Alicia Kearns and Judith Cummins

Committee of the whole House
Wednesday 17th June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Alicia Kearns (Rutland and Stamford) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment 16, page 2, line 12, at end insert—

“33AA Conduct relevant to designation

(1) For the purposes of section 33A, a body is to be regarded as involved in foreign power threat activity if the Secretary of State reasonably believes that the body is, or has been, involved in—

(a) transnational repression;

(b) abusive lawfare;

(c) sanctions evasion connected to a foreign power, a designated body or foreign power threat activity;

(d) the concealment, movement or control of assets for or on behalf of a foreign power or a body acting for or on behalf of a foreign power; or

(e) conduct which enables, facilitates, assists or conceals any activity falling within paragraphs (a) to (d).

(2) For the purposes of this section, “transnational repression” means conduct carried out by, for, or on behalf of, or with the intention of benefiting, a foreign power, where the conduct has the purpose, or effect, of intimidating, coercing, punishing, silencing, controlling or retaliating against—

(a) a person in the United Kingdom;

(b) a United Kingdom national;

(c) a person resident in the United Kingdom;

(d) a person with a substantial connection to the United Kingdom; or

(e) a family member, associate or representative of a person falling within paragraphs (a) to (d).

(3) Conduct falling within subsection (2) includes, but is not limited to—

(a) surveillance, harassment, intimidation, threats or coercion;

(b) threats or reprisals against family members or associates overseas;

(c) forced return, attempted forced return, abduction or attempted abduction;

(d) misuse of criminal, civil, immigration, extradition or administrative processes;

(e) misuse of Interpol notices or other international police cooperation mechanisms;

(f) targeting of journalists, activists, human rights defenders, lawyers, political opponents, dissidents, whistleblowers or members of diaspora communities; and

(g) conduct intended to conceal, enable or facilitate any activity falling within paragraphs (a) to (f).

(4) For the purposes of this section, “abusive lawfare” means the use, or threatened use, of legal, regulatory, administrative, criminal, civil, immigration, extradition or other proceedings where the predominant purpose, or one of the predominant purposes, is to—

(a) intimidate, silence, punish or deter a person from engaging in public interest speech, journalism, advocacy, democratic participation or human rights work;

(b) deter investigation or scrutiny of corruption, human rights abuses, sanctions evasion, hostile state activity or foreign power threat activity;

(c) impose disproportionate cost, delay, pressure or reputational harm on the target; or

(d) protect, conceal or advance the interests of a foreign power or a body acting for or on behalf of a foreign power.

(5) Proceedings, or threatened proceedings, are not abusive merely because they are brought by, or on behalf of, a foreign power, or a person connected to a foreign power.

(6) For the purposes of this section, “sanctions evasion” means conduct which has the purpose, or effect, of enabling or facilitating the evasion, circumvention or frustration of—

(a) sanctions imposed under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018;

(b) asset-freezing measures;

(c) trade sanctions;

(d) export controls;

(e) immigration restrictions;

(f) public procurement restrictions; or

(g) any other restrictive measure imposed by or under an enactment for the purpose of protecting the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.

(7) Nothing in this section is to be read as preventing legal advice, representation or advocacy, provided that such activity is not undertaken for the purpose of facilitating foreign power threat activity, transnational repression, sanctions evasion, abusive lawfare or the concealment of assets connected to a designated body.”

This amendment would specify categories of conduct that may be regarded as involvement in foreign power threat activity for the purposes of designation.

[The First Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Judith Cummins)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 15, page 2, line 42, at end insert—

“33C Mandatory review following designation

(1) Where regulations are made under section 33A designating a body, the Secretary of State must, within 30 days of the regulations being made, conduct a review of whether further action should be taken in relation to—

(a) the designated body;

(b) any person who owns or controls the designated body;

(c) any person owned or controlled by the designated body;

(d) any officer, employee, agent, member or representative of the designated body;

(e) any person acting for or on behalf of the designated body;

(f) any person who materially assists the designated body; and

(g) any person who provides funds, economic resources, professional services, goods, technology or other material support to the designated body.

(2) The review under subsection (1) must consider whether it is appropriate to take, recommend or request action including—

(a) designation under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018;

(b) asset-freezing measures;

(c) travel bans or other immigration restrictions;

(d) director disqualification;

(e) public procurement exclusion;

(f) civil recovery, restraint, freezing or forfeiture action;

(g) referral to Companies House, the National Crime Agency, the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, the Financial Conduct Authority, the Solicitors Regulation Authority, the Bar Standards Board, HM Revenue and Customs, the Charity Commission, the Electoral Commission or any other relevant authority;

(h) enhanced beneficial ownership checks;

(i) enhanced reporting requirements; and

(j) any other action necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.

(3) In conducting a review under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) the Treasury;

(b) the Secretary of State responsible for foreign, Commonwealth and development affairs;

(c) the National Crime Agency; and

(d) any other Minister of the Crown or public authority as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(4) Within 30 days of a body being designated under section 33A, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a statement confirming—

(a) that the review required by this section has been conducted;

(b) what categories of action listed in subsection (2) have been considered;

(c) whether any such action has been taken, recommended or requested; and

(d) where no such action has been taken, recommended or requested, the reasons for that decision.

(5) A statement under subsection (4) may omit information where the Secretary of State considers that publication of that information would be contrary to the interests of national security, international relations, the prevention or detection of serious crime, or the protection of ongoing legal proceedings.

(6) The Secretary of State must keep under review whether further action under subsection (2) is required in relation to a designated body and persons connected to it.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State, within 30 days of designating a body, to review whether further action should be taken against the body and persons connected to it, and to lay a statement of the outcome before Parliament.

Clause stand part.

Amendment 3, in clause 2, page 3, line 8, leave out from “body” until end of line 9.

This amendment and Amendments 4 to 6 would remove the additional defence of supporting a designated body for a non-prohibited purpose.

Amendment 4, page 3, line 16, leave out from “body” until end of line 17.

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 3.

Amendment 5, page 3, line 21, leave out from “body” until end of line 22.

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 3.

Amendment 6, page 3, leave out lines 23 to 25.

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 3.

Amendment 1, page 4, line 23, at end insert—

“(3A) The conduct specified in subsection (3) includes establishing, administering or maintaining a company, trust, partnership or similar arrangement which conceals, or is intended to conceal, the beneficial ownership of assets connected with a designated body.”

Amendment 8, page 4, line 27, after “United Kingdom” insert

“or are conducted outside, but were planned from within, the United Kingdom”.

Amendment 7, page 5, line 15, leave out “14” and insert “25”.

This amendment would increase the maximum sentence for assisting a designated body from 14 years to 25 years imprisonment.

Amendment 11, page 6, leave out lines 21 to 23.

This amendment would remove the defence of reasonable excuse for retaining a material benefit provided by or on behalf of a designated body.

Amendment 12, page 6, line 38, leave out “(7) or”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 11.

Amendment 9, page 7, line 8, at end insert—

“17D Uniform and publication of images in relation to a designated body

(1) A person in a public place commits an offence if he—

(a) wears an item of clothing, or

(b) wears, carries or displays an article

in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a supporter of a designated body.

(2) A person commits an offence if the person publishes an image of—

(a) an item of clothing, or

(b) any other article,

in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a supporter of a designated body.

(3) In subsection (2) the reference to an image is a reference to a still or moving image (produced by any means).

(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale (or both).

(5) A constable may seize an item of clothing or any other article if the constable—

(a) reasonably suspects that it is evidence in relation to an offence under subsection (1), and

(b) is satisfied that it is necessary to seize it in order to prevent the evidence being concealed, lost, altered or destroyed.

(6) In connection with exercising the power in subsection (5), a constable may require a person to remove the item of clothing or other article if the person is wearing it.

(7) But the powers conferred by subsections (5) and (6) may not be exercised so as to seize, or require a person to remove, an item of clothing being worn next to the skin or immediately over a garment being worn as underwear.”

This amendment would create an offence of wearing or displaying in public, or publishing an image of, an article in a way that arouses reasonable suspicion that a person is a supporter of a designated body.

Amendment 10, page 7, line 8, at end insert—

“17D Preparation of acts relating to a designated body

(1) A person commits an offence if, with the intention of—

(a) committing an offence under section 17A, 17B or 17C, or

(b) assisting another to commit such an offence,

the person engages in any conduct in preparation for giving effect to the intention.

(2) It is irrelevant for the purposes of subsection (1) whether the intention and preparations relate to one or more particular offences, offences of a particular description, or such offences generally.

(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or a fine (or both).”

This amendment would create an offence of engaging in conduct in preparation for committing, or assisting another to commit, an offence relating to a designated body.

Amendment 13, page 7, line 8, at end insert—

“17D Self-directing acts in support of a designated body

(1) A person commits an offence if the person engages in conduct of any kind which is—

(a) inspired by the ideology, actions, and self-promotion of a designated body, and

(b) prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.

(2) A person commits an offence if the person—

(a) engages in UK-related activities that are likely to assist the stated, or assumed, aims of a designated body, and

(b) knows, or having regard to other matters known to them ought to reasonably to know, that their activities are likely to assist the stated, or assumed, aims of a designated body.

(3) UK-related activities” means—

(a) activities taking place in the United Kingdom;

(b) activities taking place outside the United Kingdom which are prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.

(4) Subsections (1) and (2) apply to conduct outside the United Kingdom, but apply to conduct taking place wholly outside the United Kingdom only if the person engaging in the conduct—

(ab) is a UK person, or

(b) acts for or on behalf of, or holds office under, the Crown, or is in Crown employment (whether or not they engage in the conduct in that capacity).

(5) In proceedings for an offence under this section it is a defence to show that the person engaged in the conduct in question—

(a) in compliance with a legal obligation under the law of the United Kingdom which is not a legal obligation under private law,

(b) in the case of a person having functions of a public nature under the law of the United Kingdom, for the purposes of those functions,

(c) as a lawyer carrying on a legal activity, or

(d) in accordance with, or in relation to Uk-related activities carried out in accordance with, an agreement or arrangement to which—

(i) the United Kingdom was a party, or

(ii) any person acting for, or on behalf of, or holding office under, the Crown was (in that capacity) a party.

(6) A person is taken to have shown a matter mentioned in subsection (5) if—

(a) sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and

(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(7) A person who commits an office under this section is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or a fine (or both).

(8) The following terms have the same meaning as in section 3—

“Crown employment” ;

“financial benefit” ;

The “law of the United Kingdom”;

“lawyer” ;

“legal activity” ;

“UK person” .”

This amendment creates a new offence of undertaking conduct harmful or prejudicial to UK interests that is inspired by a designated body, rather than actively commissioned on behalf of a designated body.

Amendment 14, page 7, line 8, at end insert—

“17D Dissemination of publications relating to a designated body

(1) A person commits an offence if the person engages in conduct falling within subsection (2) and, at the time of doing so—

(a) intends an effect of the conduct to be a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to support, or to provide assistance to, a designated body, or

(b) is reckless as to whether the conduct has that effect.

(2) A person engages in conduct falling within this subsection if the person—

(a) distributes or circulates a publication relating to a designated body;

(b) gives, sells or lends such a publication;

(c) offers such a publication for sale or loan;

(d) provides a service to others that enables them to obtain, read, listen to or look at such a publication, or to acquire it by means of a gift, sale or loan;

(e) transmits the contents of such a publication electronically; or

(f) has such a publication in the person's possession with a view to its becoming the subject of conduct falling within any of paragraphs (a) to (e).

(3) For the purposes of this section a publication relates to a designated body if matter contained in it is likely to be understood by a reasonable person as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to support, or to provide assistance to, a designated body.

(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to show that—

(a) the matter by reference to which the publication was treated as relating to a designated body neither expressed the person's views nor had the person's endorsement, and

(b) it was clear, in all the circumstances of the conduct, that the matter did not express the person's views and did not have the person's endorsement.

(5) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or a fine (or both).”

This amendment would create an offence of disseminating, or possessing with a view to disseminating, a publication that encourages support for or assistance to a designated body.

Clause 2 stand part.

Amendment 2, in clause 3, page 7, line 27, at end insert—

“(5) Regulations under subsection (3) may not be made unless a draft of the statutory instrument containing them has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.”

This amendment ensures that any regulation under section 33C made by the Secretary of State to remove a designation is subject to the draft affirmative procedure.

Clauses 3 to 8 stand part.

New clause 3—Designation of the IRGC—

“(1) The Secretary of State must take reasonable steps to lay before Parliament regulations under the provisions of this Act to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a body involved in foreign power threat activity.

(2) Before laying such regulations, the Secretary of State must be satisfied that the IRGC fulfils the conditions set out in Section 1 of this Act.

(3) The regulations specified in subsection (1) should be laid before Parliament within a month of this Act coming into force.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to take reasonable steps to bring forward regulations designating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) within a month of this Act coming into force.

New clause 4—Assessment of the adequacy of the powers contained in the Act—

“(1) Within twelve months of passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must commission the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation or another such person performing a similar function to produce a report on the adequacy of the powers contained in this Act.

(2) The report specified in subsection (1) must consider the effectiveness of the Act’s powers in tackling the threat posed by state-backed and state-linked actors to the security of the United Kingdom.

(3) The report specified in subsection (1) must include any proposals for legislative changes to the provisions of the Act as are considered necessary by the Independent Reviewer.

(4) As soon as receiving the report, and no later than three months after receiving it, the Secretary of State must lay the report before both Houses of Parliament.

(5) Within three months of laying the report before Parliament, the Secretary of State must publish a response to the report and to any recommendations made by the Independent Reviewer.”

This new clause would require the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation to assess the adequacy of the powers introduced by this Act twelve months after its passing.

New clause 5—Seizure of Passports etc from Person Suspected of Assisting a Designated Body—

“(1) This section applies in the case of a person at a port in Great Britain, Northern Ireland, or in the border area, if a constable has reasonable grounds to suspect that the person—

(a) is there with the intention of leaving Great Britain or Northern Ireland for the purpose of assisting a designated body outside the United Kingdom; or

(b) has arrived in Great Britain or Northern Ireland with the intention of leaving it soon for that purpose.

(2) The constable may—

(a) exercise any of the powers in sub-paragraph (4) in the case of the person, or

(b) direct a qualified officer to do so.

(3) A qualified officer must (if able to do so) comply with any direction given by a constable under sub-paragraph (2)(b).

(4) The powers are—

(a) to require the person to hand over all travel documents in the person’s possession to the constable or (as the case may be) the qualified officer;

(b) to search for travel documents relating to the person and to take possession of any that the constable or officer finds;

(c) to inspect any travel document relating to the person; and

(d) to retain any travel document relating to the person that is lawfully in the possession of the constable or officer.

(5) The power in sub-paragraph (4)(b) is a power to search—

(a) the person;

(b) anything that the person has with him or her; and

(c) any vehicle in which the officer believes the person to have been travelling or to be about to travel.

(6) A constable or qualified officer—

(a) may stop a person or vehicle for the purpose of exercising a power in sub-paragraph (4)(a) or (b);

(b) may if necessary use reasonable force for the purpose of exercising a power in sub-paragraph (4)(a) or (b); and

(c) may authorise a person to carry out on the constable's or officer's behalf a search under sub-paragraph (4)(b).

(7) A constable or qualified officer exercising a power in sub-paragraph (4)(a) or (b) must tell the person that—

(a) the person is suspected of intending to leave Great Britain or (as the case may be) the United Kingdom for the purpose of assisting a designated body, and

(b) the constable or officer is therefore entitled under this Schedule to exercise the power.

(8) Where a travel document relating to the person is in the possession of an immigration officer or customs official (whether a qualified officer or not), the constable may direct the officer or official—

(a) to pass the document to a constable as soon as practicable, and

(b) in the meantime to retain it,

the officer or official must comply with any such direction.”

This new clause would replicate existing powers to seize travel documents from individuals suspected of terrorism, applying those powers in relation to individuals suspected of assisting a designated body

New clause 6—Police powers to apply for serious crime prevention orders in designation cases—

“(1) The Serious Crime Act 2007 is amended as follows.

(2) In Section 8, after subsection (2)(a) insert—

“(ab) it is an application for an order under section 1 that is related to an offence committed under section 2 of the National Security (State Threats) Act 2026.””

This new clause allows police to apply for serious crime prevention orders in relation to offences committed under this Act.

New clause 7—Sanctions—

“(1) The Secretary of State may make regulations under the provisions of Section 1 of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 to subject any—

(a) body designated under the National Security (State Threats) Act 2026, or

(b) a person who commits an offence under section (2) of that Act

to any available sanction within that Act.”

This new clause would ensure that any body designated under this Act, or any person who commits an offence under this Act, may be subject to the sanctions regime set out in the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018.

The schedule.

[Alicia Kearns]

We have tabled 13 amendments, not to frustrate the Bill but to give it the necessary teeth. This Bill is soft where it should be hard, silent where it should speak, and blind where it should see. It is soft because, as drafted, it sets a higher bar to prosecute a person who supports the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps than a person who supports the terrorists whom the IRGC funds and commands; it is silent because whole categories of hostile conduct that our terrorism laws have criminalised for 20 years are simply missing; and it is blind because it has been written for one organisation on one timetable, with almost no provision for future designations. Good will is not enough, and we must close the holes that our enemies will exploit.

The Government have lifted much of this legislation from section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000, yet they have added something that does not appear in the terrorism offence: a requirement that support was given for a prohibited purpose that was prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United Kingdom. Let me ask the Minister the simple question that this Bill invites: what level of support for the IRGC do the Government consider beneficial to the United Kingdom? The IRGC is the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism, and if she agrees that there is no level of support for it that is beneficial to the UK, we can simply remove the prohibited purpose. She has just said from the Dispatch Box that she agrees that there is absolutely none, so let us act and amend the Bill.

Under the Bill as drafted, to convict someone who supports the IRGC the prosecution must prove that their support was prejudicial to the safety or interest of the UK—an additional threshold—but that requirement does not exist in terrorism law. To convict someone who supports Hamas, Hezbollah or the Houthis—the proxies that the IRGC arms and funds—there is no such hurdle, so the body that inspires, organises arms and funds the terrorists is handed a protection in law that the terrorist himself is denied. That is the difference between a prosecution that succeeds and one that never gets off the ground, and I know something about prosecutions that fail at the last moment. Our amendment 3 simply removes the extra defence and brings this offence into line with the terrorism law from which it is drawn.

I recognise that the Government may seek to argue that state entities enjoy protections in international law that terrorists do not, that we must set a higher bar than in equivalent terrorism legislation and that acting prejudicially to the UK’s interests is a reasonable test. However, state immunity protects the Iranian state from being sued or prosecuted in our courts, and it has nothing to do with the British resident who chooses to fund or promote the IRGC. We are not prosecuting Tehran; we are prosecuting the person here who does its work. The proposition that the Minister is left defending is that supporting the world’s biggest sponsor of terrorism should be harder to prosecute than supporting the groups it sponsors. That is not a higher bar; it is international lawyers tying the hands of Ministers who are meant to be keeping us safe.

On amendments 11 and 12, the same instinct to protect where we should prosecute runs through subsection (7) of proposed new section 17C, which makes a reasonable excuse a defence for accepting and keeping a material benefit from a designated body. That is not necessary, because there are already protections in the Bill for, for example, a lawyer or somebody who has no ability to know that funds were being taken. I recognise that such a provision is in the National Security Act 2023, but that is not a reason to repeat a weakness, and we have an opportunity to fix it. There is no excuse for keeping a hostile state’s money—not in this Bill and not in the Act it leans on.

The sentencing gets the gravity backwards. As drafted, supporting a designated body and actively assisting one carries the same maximum sentence of 14 years or a fine.

Proposed Chinese Embassy

Debate between Alicia Kearns and Judith Cummins

Monday 19th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)]

I call the shadow Minister.

[Alicia Kearns (Rutland and Stamford) (Con)]

I congratulate the hon. Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion) on her question. One could be excused for feeling that this is groundhog day, because once again the House has gathered to share our collective concern about plans to approve the Chinese Communist party’s mega-embassy and once again the Home Office has declined to answer. I did consider rereading my speech from last week, but as I hope we will get some answers, I have gone back to the drawing board.

The Chinese Communist party’s plans are not normal diplomatic renovations, and it would be laughable to suggest that they are, given the location. Did the Minister see the unredacted plans before their publication, and can she genuinely say that she would have no concerns about her Government approving this shadowy network of 208 secret rooms? Given the claims that the Government and Ministers had not seen these plans until last week, surely the Government need time to review them. Would the Minister confirm that there will be a delay to the decision, which is due tomorrow? No one would seriously suggest that, in the week that has passed, the Government have identified all the mitigations needed to protect our cables and militate against these secret rooms.

The Government have so far shielded themselves behind the mundane language of planning policy, but this is not a normal application. Can the Minister confirm whether our allies have been consulted on the unredacted plans, and if so, who? Can she confirm whether UK Government officials previously denied the existence of these cables to the United States in discussions?

Last week, I asked whether the Chinese Communist party’s ambassador had been démarched and forced to explain his party’s duplicity in the application. The Minister declined to answer. It has now been a week. Has the Minister—not officials—finally found time to prioritise national security and haul in the Chinese ambassador? If not, why not, and what message does that send to China? Not once have this Labour Government démarched the Chinese ambassador since they came to power, despite cyber-attacks, spies in this place and bounties on the heads of Hongkongers. What does the Chinese Communist party have to do for this Government to defend us and act to deter future hostile acts? The Government tell us that security concerns have been addressed, including ones that they only knew about a week ago. Tell us how.

Finally, the Prime Minister has not yet publicly confirmed his vanity visit to Beijing. Has the Chinese Communist party made approval of the new embassy contingent on the visit going ahead? The Government have a duty to protect our country. Without national security, there is no economic security. This House clearly speaks with one voice on this issue and that voice says no, so will the Government join us or will they choose a dereliction of their duties?

Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and International Committee of the Red Cross (Status) Bill [Lords]

Debate between Alicia Kearns and Judith Cummins

2nd reading
Tuesday 22nd October 2024 Commons Chamber

[Alicia Kearns]

I thank my hon. Friend. It is so rare for us to celebrate the positive in this House, but the Bill does exactly that. We should be proud of how His Majesty has championed the Commonwealth, both before he became our monarch and since. I look forward to his arrival in Samoa in the coming days.

The Conservative Government proudly ran multiple projects with the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association to strengthen the democratic nature of legislatures and how decisions are approached and made. Ultimately, the Bill will amend the legal environment to ensure that the CPA remains headquartered in the UK; again, we can all agree that that is unambiguously positive. In an increasingly dark world, it is worth fighting for those small shoots of light that offer a glimpse of a path to a better future. This is one.

I will turn to the International Committee of the Red Cross. The ICRC has a unique legitimacy to engage all parties to conflicts and unparalleled access to vulnerable people in conflict zones. Frequently, it is the only agency operating at scale in conflicts. For example, it is currently operating in Ukraine, Afghanistan and Syria—I declare an interest, as I have previously worked with the organisation in some of those zones.

In 2023 alone the ICRC’s 18,000 staff supported over 730 hospitals, mainly in conflict zones, and provided food assistance to more than 2.7 million people. I am proud that the previous Conservative Government committed £1 million to the ICRC to provide life-saving care and essential supplies to people affected by the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The Bill will guarantee to the ICRC that the sensitive information that it must be able to share with the Government will be protected. We do not want the ICRC to have to restrict the information that it shares with the UK because of the risk of disclosure, so the Bill makes an important step, particularly when it comes to hostages. Given that there is so much suffering globally, we need to take every possible step to ensure that our humanitarian efforts are effective. I am pleased that there will be, I hope, cross-party agreement on that.

The Bill will mean that the UK extends the privileges and immunities to both organisations in a manner comparable to that of an international organisation of which we are a member. The measure may be a little novel, but it is a neat legal solution that addresses both central challenges around which the Bill is centred. Although the changes provide a firm footing for the future work of both the CPA and the ICRC, they also offer the opportunity for the fulfilment of foreign policy objectives. If they are to be a success, the Government must seize the opportunities presented by the Bill.

Once our relationship with the ICRC is secured, how do the Government plan on improving collaboration and, most importantly, results? What shared areas of interest will the Government focus on and how will those manifest in tangible outcomes? Has the Minister assessed which specific parts of the Bill will facilitate that work? If so, will he share that assessment with the House?

On the CPA, has the Minister scoped any additional support that the Government could provide to both the delegation and the institution as a whole to bolster its work? Will he commit to building on the good work of the Conservative Government to help strengthen institutions in Commonwealth countries, using a whole-ecosystem approach? Finally, when we were in government we committed that the Foreign Secretary would consult the chair of the UK branch and the secretary-general of the CPA and the president and director-general of the ICRC respectively, before finalising secondary legislation. Can the Minister confirm that that has taken place?

If democracy is to thrive, there needs to be equilibrium across a range of areas—from justice and the application of the rule of law, to the protection of human rights, freedom of speech, safeguards against corruption, effective efforts to counter extremism, integrity in the public sector, and the capability to face down external threats and protect our people. At a time when the world is more insecure and more dangerous, we are faced by authoritarian states bent on undermining the open international order on which so much of our security and prosperity rest.

The Commonwealth is more important than ever, and we must not allow any insinuation otherwise to undermine our efforts on its behalf. The organisation accounts for more than quarter of the membership of the United Nations, and more needs to be done with it. Crucially, through the Commonwealth charter, it is a champion of the sound values and principles that must prevail in the future if we are to build a better world. The Government must not forgo the opportunity to deepen that co-operation with Commonwealth partners and enhance the benefits of membership.

Membership of the Commonwealth can and must be seen as a route to a better future, fundamentally rooted in the noble values set out in the Commonwealth charter. We must strengthen intra-Commonwealth trade, build up the economies of countries struggling to attract inward investment, boost resilience, particularly when it comes to small island developing states, and do what is central to today’s debate: promote democracy and good governance through respectful understanding and collaboration.

For every tyrant sacrificing innocent lives in pursuit of unbridled power, there are thousands of hard-working, conscientious people working to make their contribution for a better future. The CPA and the ICRC embody that noble tradition, and the changes today will secure their continued success. We support the Bill, as we did in the last Parliament. We will encourage the Government to make the most of every opportunity that it confers.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)]

I call the Chair of the International Development Committee.

Point of Order

Debate between Alicia Kearns and Judith Cummins

Tuesday 30th July 2024 Commons Chamber

[Alicia Kearns (Rutland and Stamford) (Con)]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. May I seek your guidance? I wish to place on record my severe concerns about the Government’s failure to come formally before the House on their decision to impose VAT on independent schools. Not only have they imposed this policy through a written ministerial statement, but they have now said that they will charge VAT on any fees that are paid in advance. A WMS is insufficient and purposely prevents the House from debating a policy that affects rural economies—I have 10 independent schools in my constituency—but also military and special educational needs families and both comprehensive and independent schools. Madam Deputy Speaker, how can you help us to resolve this issue, which is incredibly important for so many in the House?

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)]

The hon. Lady has placed her concerns on the record, and I am sure Members on the Treasury Bench will have heard them.