Joint Committee on Human Rights

Alex Sobel Excerpts

Monday 1st September 2025 Commons Chamber

[Alex Sobel (Leeds Central and Headingley) (Lab/Co-op)]

I was thinking that I might have had a quiet first day back after recess, but I have now been in the Chamber for six hours and 20 minutes, so I am clearly working hard for my constituents yet again. I am also working hard on behalf of the Joint Committee on Human Rights for which I give this statement on the seventh report of the 2024-25 Session, “Transnational repression in the UK”.

The Committee believes that transnational repression is a serious and under-recognised threat. The report argues:

“Its impacts extend far beyond those directly targeted, creating a broader ‘chilling effect’ on entire communities and undermining fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, assembly, and association.”

The Committee received credible evidence that a number of states have engaged in acts of transnational repression on UK soil. The report highlights China, Russia and Iran as the three most flagrant transnational repression perpetrators in the United Kingdom. Transnational repression is generally understood to refer to certain state-directed crimes or actions against individuals that take place outside the territory of the perpetrating state. Transnational repression can take many forms: it could include harassment, online disinformation campaigns, surveillance, stalking and physical violence, in addition to threats to family members, attempts to force individuals to return to their country of origin and assassination attempts.

The Committee launched its inquiry into transnational repression in response to increasing reports of foreign Governments moving beyond their borders to persecute people here in the United Kingdom. In the last year, the number of state threat investigations run by MI5 has increased by 48%.

There have been several recent high-profile transnational repression cases, including the issuance of bounties against Hong Kong pro-democracy activists and Iran’s intimidation of UK-based journalists. MI5 and counter-terrorism police have dealt with more than 20 threat-to-life cases relating to Iran since the start of 2022. The Government have recently set out a strategic framework to address transnational repression following a review of the UK’s transnational repression approach by the defending democracy taskforce.

The Committee received 181 written evidence submissions, 91 of which we were able to publish. Many submissions were from people with personal experience of transnational repression. The Committee also held four oral evidence sessions, where we heard from legal experts, academics, human rights advocates, journalists and—most importantly—victims of transnational repression themselves. I express my gratitude to all those who contributed to the inquiry for their bravery in coming forward; in particular, those victims of transnational repression who put themselves at personal risk by coming and appearing in public before the Committee.

There is currently no universally accepted definition of transnational repression, and the UK Government have chosen not to adopt a formal definition, opting instead to describe it as

“certain foreign state-directed crimes against individuals.”

Without a clear definition of what constitutes transnational repression, it is difficult to collate reliable data on the scale and nature of transnational repression-related activities. It appears that the Home Office does not currently collect or require police forces to collect data on transnational repression incidents taking place in the UK. The report recommends that the Government adopt a formal definition of transnational repression and establish data collection and monitoring mechanisms.

The Committee report welcomes the introduction of the foreign influence registration scheme—FIRS—as a tool to help strengthen the UK’s ability to tackle transnational repression. The designation of Iran and Russia as countries listed on the enhanced tier of FIRS was consistent with the evidence presented to the Committee regarding the threat posed by transnational repression operating from these states. The report argues that China’s omission from the enhanced tier risks undermining the credibility and coherence of FIRS and recommends that China be specified under the enhanced tier of FIRS.

Looking to support for victims, transnational repression victims felt that the overall police response to transnational repression has been inconsistent. Many affected individuals described limited awareness of transnational repression among frontline officers and a lack of clear referral pathways. Some victims had even been advised to avoid political activity or to self-censor, while others had been incorrectly referred to hate crime or diversity and equality officers. Counter-terrorism policing and the College of Policing have launched guidance and awareness modules on foreign interference, and the powers introduced in the National Security Act 2023. This training is now available for all 45 territorial police forces in the UK. However, the training is mandatory only for counter-terrorism officers. The report recommends that serious consideration should be given to making transnational repression training mandatory for all police officers.

At present, victims of transnational repression are advised to report incidents through standard policing channels, for example by calling 999 or 101 or by attending their local police station. However, victims felt that early signs of transnational repression could be more effectively identified though a dedicated helpline, where those answering calls would have received training on how to recognise and respond to transnational repression threats appropriately. The report recommends that the Government establish a reporting hotline for transnational repression victims.

Regarding diplomatic policy, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office uses tools to target transnational repression that largely align with those used to address other foreign policy challenges. These include private engagement with foreign Governments, issuing a démarche and terminating privileges and immunities, in addition to reducing official or ministerial contact, denying diplomatic visas, imposing sanctions or asking for diplomats to be withdrawn or expelled.

The Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020 give the Secretary of State the power to designate individuals for the purpose of imposing sanctions on them. The Secretary of State has to consider that the designation is appropriate, and must have reasonable grounds to suspect that the person is or has been involved in an activity which, if carried out by a state, would amount to a serious violation of a person’s right to life, their right not to be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or their right to be free from slavery. Activities in the UK are covered if they are carried out by someone who is not a UK national.

Some transnational repression conduct may fall under the 2020 Regulations if it amounts to a serious violation of the right to life or the right not to be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. However, much transnational repression conduct, including even violence, intimidation, harassment, illegal deportations, abductions and Interpol and extradition abuse, would fall outside the scope of the regulations. Therefore, the Committee recommends that the Government review the scope of the UK’s sanctions framework to assess the feasibility of introducing specific transnational repression sanctions.

The UK should also adopt a more proactive approach to sanctions, particularly in cases where UK nationals and residents are directly affected. The report also recommends that the UK should ensure that diplomatic responses, such as the expulsion of officials, public démarches and the imposition of sanctions, are not only available in principle but actively and visibly deployed in response to serious incidents. With that, I recommend this report to the House.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

I call Jim Shannon.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Sobel]

I thank the hon. Member for his questions. I have worked with him, as he knows, on the APPG for international freedom of religion or belief. Religious belief is one of the reasons why we see transnational repression, and China is a particular example when it comes to subjecting citizens to it for their religious belief. We took evidence from a senior member of the Iranian diaspora, Mr Abedini, as part of the evidence, who was very nearly killed—not in the UK but in Turkey, which still is transnational repression because he was not in Iran. He was only saved because the gun jammed on the third shot when he was attacked. As I said, we know that Iran is increasing its attacks. Individual members—myself and the Chair, as the hon. Member referred to—work closely with many Iranian groups based here, in France and in other places. Much of our evidence was from those from the Iranian community.

[Peter Swallow (Bracknell) (Lab)]

I thank my fellow Committee member for representing our inquiry so well today and the Security Minister, who is in his place, for engaging with our inquiry. I recently hosted a meeting of the Bracknell Hong Kong community in my constituency. I was saddened but unfortunately not surprised to hear from them that some members of that community chose not to come to the meeting with their local MP because of their concerns about the political repercussions it may have for them and their families. That goes to show the chilling effect that transnational repression can have, not just on individuals when they are targeted by states but on whole communities. Does my hon. Friend agree, and is it not a central part of our report, that it cannot be right in our democratic system, in our democratic country, that any individual or community should ever feel they are not able to engage in that democracy? Fundamentally, that is at the heart of what makes our country so fantastic.

[Alex Sobel]

I thank my hon. Friend for his role in this inquiry and the great role he plays on the Committee. I will start by talking about the absolutely brilliant evidence we received from Chloe Cheung from Hong Kong, who is from Leeds. My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds South West and Morley (Mark Sewards), who represents her, was just here. She speaks to exactly that point. Because of her activities in Leeds—being visible, demonstrating, helping set up Hongkongers in Leeds—she had a million-dollar bounty put on her head at the age of 80. It is incumbent on us to ensure the safety of the Hong Kong community. One of the shortcomings we found in the evidence was the fact that Chloe was advised just to call 999 or 101 when she was threatened. She was even followed by two people who she suspects were either interested in the bounty or from the state authorities. We need to do much more to protect democracy activists and just ordinary Hongkongers who live here, going about their daily lives. I hope the Minister has heard that, and he will also have read our report and seen the evidence from Chloe. We look forward to the Met, West Yorkshire police and others in upscaling their support for people like Chloe.

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

It strikes me that this is an excellent report that has been presented to us by the joint Committee this evening. The report deals with SLAPPs—strategic lawsuits against public participation. I appreciate that the hon. Member was not able to get to that in his allotted 10 minutes, so I would like to ask a little more about anti-SLAPP legislation. During the last Government—I think it was in February 2024—a private Member’s Bill was brought forward to try to introduce anti-SLAPP legislation, but that legislation fell at the end of the last Government. I understand that some provisions were introduced as part of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023, but does he feel that more needs to be done on anti-SLAPP legislation and how soon should this House and the Government be doing it?

[Alex Sobel]

I thank the hon. Member for his question on SLAPPs. In our inquiry, we heard from those who were precluded from reporting on certain types of transnational repression through the use of SLAPPs, which were relevant to the inquiry and to exposing transnational repression in the United Kingdom. Although we have not put forward an amendment or a legislative mechanism, that is certainly in the scope of the report.