Victims and Prisoners Bill

Debate between Alex Chalk and Jess Phillips

2nd reading
Monday 15th May 2023 Commons Chamber

[Alex Chalk]

I am very grateful to the hon. Lady for raising that important case on behalf of her constituent. I will develop those points in due course, but let me make a core point first. We have gone from creating the important victims’ entitlements in the code to wanting to ensure that they have a profile, a prominence and an accountability, so that if things go wrong—and from time to time things will go wrong; that happens in any system—people can be truly held to account, and where agencies are failing that is made plain for all to see.

We have also strengthened the system of special measures, completing a national roll-out of pre-recorded examination and cross-examination for victims of rape and sexual offences. That spares them the ordeal of giving evidence in a live trial and having to stand in the same room as their alleged attacker. Really importantly, there has been the introduction of more independent sexual and domestic abuse advisers. These are specialists trained to support vulnerable victims through the justice process. From just the odd pilot scheme pre-2010, there are now over 700 working up and down the country to support victims, and we are rolling out 300 more. It is all part of an unprecedented investment in victim and witness support services, quadrupling 2010 levels.

That is the context. The difference between a decade ago and now is stark. Following those crucial advances, we are now taking steps to secure the entitlements and raise yet further the standards we expect the criminal justice system to deliver for victims. First, the Bill will enshrine the key principles of the victims code in law and provide a framework for the code in regulations, centred around the 12 key entitlements that victims can expect. That will ensure that the good practice I mentioned earlier, which has taken root in many courts and CPS offices around the country, becomes standard practice. The Bill will give these entitlements the profile, the prominence and the weight they deserve and ensure that they cannot be watered down by future Governments. It will place agencies within the criminal justice system, including chief constables, the CPS, British Transport police and others, under a new duty to make victims aware of the code so that every victim knows what they are entitled to.

[Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman talks about what was enshrined in the code, which he said happened in 2020. In 2021—I have just checked the date on my phone—I found out that somebody had been convicted of harassing and threatening me. I found out about it in The Guardian, so the code was certainly not enshrined in that particular courtroom in Birmingham, which I mention as he is leaning on Birmingham courtrooms. What right would I have in this Bill to any recourse and what would happen to the people who failed to inform me?

[Alex Chalk]

The hon. Lady should not have found out in a newspaper. She should have been kept updated and informed. If she would like to come to speak to me about that, I will find out what went wrong in that case. On her specific point, what I think is exciting and heartening about the Bill is that it contains a duty on the Secretary of State and police and crime commissioners not just to promote awareness of the code—important though that is—but to promote compliance. If there is not compliance, there is also a duty, effectively, to publish that, so that it is plain for everyone to see. The local PCC will be publishing that, which means that the hon. Lady can get some accountability. I reiterate that if she wants to come to speak to me, she must not hesitate to do so. In fact, knowing her, I know that she would not hesitate to speak.

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[Jess Phillips]

I could not agree with the right hon. and learned Gentleman more. What I would also ask is that people in that situation, especially those who murder their wife and the mother of their children, should also have their parental rights taken away. Why is that not in the Bill?

[Alex Chalk]

As the hon. Lady knows, we have discussed these issues at some length in a different context, and she should know that I am ready to continue that conversation.

Domestic Abuse Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Debate between Alex Chalk and Jess Phillips

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 11th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 17th June 2020 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Chalk)]

This is the first of two debates on different aspects of the controlling or coercive behaviour offence in section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015. As the hon. Member for Hove has indicated, new clause 25 seeks to repeal the defence in section 76(8), which has been labelled by some as the “carers’ defence”.

Currently, the coercive or controlling behaviour offence allows for such a limited defence if the accused believes that they were acting in the best interests of the victim. It is important to note that the accused would also need to demonstrate to the court that in all the circumstances of the case their behaviour, while apparently controlling, was reasonable. This defence is intended to cover cases, for instance, in which the accused was the carer for a disabled spouse, and for medical reasons had to compel their partner to take medication or to stay at home for their own protection.

It is worth taking a moment to consider the sorts of circumstances in which that defence might apply. Imagine a situation in which neighbours walk past a home and see someone who wants to get out of the front garden and on to the road, and is in some distress at not being able to do so. That neighbour calls the police, and the police then investigate. It emerges that the person trying to get on to the road is, very sadly, suffering from dementia, and their partner is a person of unimpeachable integrity and good character—a decent, loving partner of many years’ standing who has shown nothing but care and compassion for that individual, but who is concerned that if they get out on to the road, they will be a danger to themselves and others. Is it seriously to be suggested that that person should be at risk of conviction, punishment and disgrace?

[Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)]

That is not what has been outlined. It has already been clearly stated that provisions in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 would allow for that exact defence. Also, can the Minister not imagine a situation in which if a victim in that exact circumstance says she is a victim of domestic abuse, that might be the case?

[Alex Chalk]

Of course it might be the case, but the important thing is that this defence allows a proper opportunity for a tribunal of fact to consider that, and I think it is absolutely right that it should do so. It is worth noting that under section 76 the burden is on the individual to advance that defence, and for a tribunal of fact to then consider whether it has been disproved. In other words, if that individual advances something that is utterly implausible, a jury—or indeed a bench of magistrates—would have little difficulty in exposing it as such.

[Alex Chalk]

We have to be very clear about this. If an individual does not have that defence, considering the elements of section 76, we would be left with a person who is apparently being caused some distress—as would be evident to the first responder, or indeed to a police officer, who might have to effect an arrest—and the distress would appear to have been caused by that person’s liberty having been restricted. In those circumstances, unless the individual has the defence that they were exercising proper control in the interests of the other person, they are at risk of being arrested and prosecuted. That would be a serious concern, would it not?

I should also add—I do not think this point is controversial—that there is an exemption within section 76 concerning under-16s. In other words, where people are in a position of responsibility for somebody who is under the age of 16 and may have to inhibit that person’s liberty, that is considered perfectly understandable and justified. The argument would therefore be this: why is it that in circumstances where, sadly, an individual is at risk and vulnerable, it should not be open to that carer—who everyone accepts is loving, decent and caring—to say that this was in the interests of the individual?

I accept the hon. Gentleman’s premise that it is possible that some people would seek to advance an unmeritorious defence. That is absolutely right, but I respectfully say to him that when he says, “The courts let them get away with it,” he is unfairly labelling the courts. In my opinion, the courts have shown themselves well able to see through a spurious defence. The carer who seeks to try it on and to abuse this proper defence will be given short shrift by a bench of magistrates, or indeed by a jury. We should trust juries and courts to do justice in each case.

[Jess Phillips]

Why does the Minister not think that the courts and juries can be trusted on the rough sex defence?

[Alex Chalk]

Because juries have to have a rough sex defence to consider. That is our job. Our job is to create the statute.

[Jess Phillips]

It is the same.

[Alex Chalk]

No, it is not the same at all. If the hon. Lady will listen for a moment, the point is that there is, on the face of a statute, a defence that the jury can consider. They get to consider it only if a judge is satisfied that there is a prima facie defence—in other words, if what the defendant is advancing is patently and transparently unmeritorious, it may well not even go to a jury. A judge might say, “This is such a load of old nonsense that it doesn’t even cross the threshold for a jury to decide.” It is simply where there is a prima facie case. We should trust juries to say, “Is there something in that, or is there not?” It is not for us to adjudicate in every single case. Trust juries; trust the people. It is different from the point that the hon. Lady was making about rough sex, because there was a lacuna in the law. Our job is to fill the lacuna and then leave it to juries, who have shown for many centuries that they are well placed to do justice in a specific case.

I will make a final point on this issue, because I do not want to dwell too long on it. If the policy were not in place, there is a danger that the same people that the hon. Member for Hove quite properly wants to stand up for, and who we want to stand up for—namely, people with disabilities—could be disadvantaged if people take the view of, “Hold on a moment. By doing what I think is genuinely and objectively in the best interests of an individual, I am at risk of conviction, punishment and disgrace. Do you know what? Why on earth should I be doing that? Why should I be putting myself at risk in that way.” We have to ensure that we do not inadvertently, and despite the best intentions, find ourselves making life more difficult for the people we want to support.

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[Jess Phillips]

I will discuss some of the potential foibles of the 2015 Act, which we have already mentioned. I say graciously before I start that Parliament does not always get everything right, and I loathe the culture in which we have to call something a U-turn, when actually evidence and other things change, different things come to light and people change their minds. That is okay, but we are not allowed to do that in politics without it being labelled a certain thing. I totally support the legislation but, specifically in the coercive control measures, there are some errors. In reality, only time and test ever measure these things.

In discussing the new clause, I will focus on post-separation abuse, but I will first talk briefly about economic abuse by way of context, as they are closely linked in this instance. I welcome the inclusion of economic abuse in the definition of domestic abuse in the Bill, recognising how that is often hidden but incredibly destructive as a form of abuse. The Bill now acknowledges and names the experience of the victims and their families, supporting them to find justice by holding a perpetrator to account across a full range of abusive behaviours.

That move has been hugely welcomed, particularly by organisations that work with victims and see day in, day out how perpetrators use economic abuse to exert control, whether to trap the victim so that they cannot afford to leave, or to force them into destitution after they have left, so that they are unable to move on and rebuild their lives. One of those organisations is the UK charity Surviving Economic Abuse, which exists solely to raise awareness of economic abuse and to transform the responses to it.

The term “economic abuse” may be new to domestic abuse legislation, but that form of abuse is certainly not new. One in five women in the UK report having experienced economic abuse from a current or former intimate partner, and 95% of domestic abuse victims report that they have suffered economic abuse. It is widespread.

Economic abuse makes the victim dependent on the perpetrator and limits their choices and their ability to leave. The behaviour is insidious and might not be recognised by the victim. The perpetrator might introduce it as an offer to help, or to take away the worry and burden of dealing with finances, seemingly in a caring way, or they might have simply assumed control through force, threats and coercion.

Through economic exploitation, the perpetrator looks to benefit from the victim’s economic resources and, in so doing, sabotages their economic independence. That exploitation may consist of things such as demanding that the victim alone pays the household bills, while the perpetrator spends their own money on whatever they like. The perpetrator may also build up debt in the victim’s name, through coercion or fraud, or steal or damage the victim’s property, which then has to be replaced. In my experience, the thing that is seen the most is the build-up of debt in someone’s name; certainly that is the thing that people struggle to live with thereafter.

This all has a hugely destabilising impact on the victim’s economic wellbeing and, again, limits their choices and ability to leave. Economic abuse can leave victims trapped and destitute, either while in a relationship with the perpetrator or post separation as they navigate life with inescapable debt, insecure housing and financial hardship. Economic safety underpins physical safety. Building an independent life can, for many victims of economic abuse, feel impossible.

Why is the new clause vital? To answer that question, I want to talk about economic abuse following the end of intimate partner relationships. Economic abuse does not simply stop when the relationship ends. Control continues through joint resources, and in fact the perpetrator can still sabotage the victim’s resources even if they do not know where the victim is. An abuser might wipe out money in a joint account that a victim relies on, or refuse to pay an overdraft so that penalties build up and the victim cannot afford to continue paying it. The end of a relationship does not prevent the abuser from taking away a victim’s home, interfering with their ability to work and earn money, or constantly taking the victim to court in connection with their children. It also does not mean that the abuser suddenly forgets the victim’s personal information, which can be used to apply for credit in their name.

In reality, economic abuse can continue, escalate or even start after separation. Research has shown that economic abuse is actually more prevalent post separation. It is clear why: when other forms of control may have been removed, controlling an ex-partner’s access to economic resources, such as by refusing to pay child maintenance, which we heard about yesterday, or refusing to sell a jointly owned home to free up much-needed money, may be the only way in which the abuser can continue to control the victim—and what powerful and destructive control that can be.

Victims can be left with such significant debts and poor credit ratings that they are unable to move on or rebuild their lives, yet at present legislation does not afford victims the protection that they need. The link between economic abuse and controlling and coercive behaviour is stark. Analysis by Surviving Economic Abuse of successful prosecutions for the controlling or coercive behaviour offence shows that six in 10 involve economic abuse, yet limitations within the controlling or coercive behaviour offence mean that, at present, victims of economic abuse post separation are unable to seek justice.

As a result, the perpetrator can continue to control their ex-partner for years and even decades. That is because, for the abuser’s actions to fall within the controlling or coercive behaviour offence, perpetrator and victim must have been “personally connected”, as defined in the Serious Crime Act, and that definition differs from what we have in the Domestic Abuse Bill, which clearly states that someone has been in a relationship or is no longer. That is clearly outlined in this new and better definition.

Under the Serious Crime Act, two people will be considered as personally connected if they are in an intimate relationship with each other, or they live together and either are family members or have previously been in an intimate relationship with each other. The result is that where a couple are no longer in an intimate relationship and they do not live together, behaviour by one of them towards the other cannot fall within the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour.

That is why the new clause is vital. We know from research and what we have heard throughout the progress of the Bill that coercive control continues after the victim’s relationship with the perpetrator has ended and they are no longer living together. That is particularly true of forms of abuse that do not rely on physical proximity or the continuation of intimate relationships with the perpetrator, economic abuse being the key example.

Surviving Economic Abuse has shared the story of a woman in this position, and I want to share it with Members. Layla—not her real name—was married for more than 20 years to her abuser and has three children. Throughout the marriage, her husband was controlling and coercive, both economically and emotionally. He would do things such as pressure her to transfer money into his bank account and force her to let him use her credit card. He ran up debt on her credit card and, after separation, forced her to release hundreds of thousands of pounds of equity from the mortgage. Layla continues to pay the debts that he has put in her name, including bank loans of £70,000. He continues to use her contact details rather than his own, so she is being regularly chased by creditors for money. She has also been regularly visited by bailiffs demanding payment of the abuser’s debts, which she has to pay.

Layla has been to the police, but they said that

“the continuing economic abuse cannot be considered under the coercive control offence as the perpetrator had left her.”

Where is the justice in that? We must change that and bring the definition of “personally connected” as it is defined in the Serious Crime Act in line with what we have in the Bill, so that victims such as Layla no longer face the possibility of being a victim of economic abuse going unchallenged for the rest of their lives.

The Bill recognises that abuse can continue post separation and that it does not require the abuser and victim to be in an ongoing relationship or living together. Through the new clause, which has been called for by Surviving Economic Abuse and which has support from SafeLives and many other organisations in the violence against women and girls sector, we can bring those definitions in line with each other so that the intentions of the Bill are not undermined by other legislation, and victims are protected by law and can seek justice. The new clause does that by removing the requirement for intimate partners or family members to be living together for the abuser’s actions to fall under the controlling and coercive behaviour offence.

[Alex Chalk]

I thank the hon. Lady for her excellent and helpful representations. The context is that I entirely agree with the premise of her point. If I can crystallise it, she is in effect saying, “Look, one of the most pernicious ways you can abuse another individual is through economic abuse.” It is worth stepping back for a second to say that, although we recognise that in this room, if we went back as little as 15 years ago, that might have been a moot point. People have come to realise that this is a particularly potent and cruel weapon to use, and that acknowledgement is a thread that is increasingly starting to run through the law.

The hon. Lady rightly points out that the Serious Crime Act 2015 creates the offence of coercive control, but the definition of domestic abuse in this Bill is one reason why it is it such an important piece of legislation. If someone had been asked what domestic abuse was 15 years ago, they would probably have said, “Domestic abuse is domestic violence, isn’t it?” No, because clause 1(3) says:

“Behaviour is “abusive” if it consists of any of the following—

(a) physical or sexual abuse;

(b) violent or threatening behaviour;

(c) controlling or coercive behaviour;

(d) economic abuse (see subsection (4));”

When we turn to subsection (4), it says:

“‘Economic abuse’ means any behaviour that has a substantial adverse effect

on B’s ability to—

(a) acquire, use or maintain money or other property, or

(b) obtain goods or services.”

I wanted to take stock of where we have come to, because that will inform some of the points that I make in response.

The final thing that I will say by way of context is that the Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill, which I am taking through the Committee of the whole House this afternoon, considers precisely this issue. When we say that a minimum of six months is the appropriate period for people to move on from a relationship, where some have said that it should be longer, one of the important rebuttal points is, “Hold on a minute. If someone needs to move on with their lives, potentially from an abusive relationship, they need to make sure that it can happen within a reasonable period so that the economic abuse cannot be perpetuated.” We absolutely get that point, and I would say—I hope not immodestly—that we have spearheaded it.

I entirely agree with the Surviving Economic Abuse charity raising the issue, and it has done an important public service in doing so. To turn to the specific point, as we have heard, the new clause seeks to address another aspect of controlling or coercive behaviour. As the hon. Lady indicated, there have been calls from Surviving Economic Abuse and other domestic abuse charities and victims to expand the offence under section 76 of the 2015 Act by removing the living together requirement for former partners. As the offence stands, it applies only to controlling or coercive behaviour between intimate partners or former partners and family members who are living together.

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[Alex Chalk]

I am sure that hon. Gentleman does look at it.

The 1997 Act was amended to include section 2A, which deals with the “Offence of stalking”. Section 2A says:

“A person is guilty of an offence if… the person pursues a course of conduct… and… the course of conduct amounts to stalking.”

Then, however—this is what I think is brilliant—the 2012 Act goes on to look at the sorts of behaviour that might constitute stalking. Subsection (3) says:

“The following are examples of acts or omissions which, in particular circumstances, are ones associated with stalking… following a person… contacting, or attempting to contact, a person by any means… publishing any statement”

relating to that person. It continues:

“monitoring the use… of the internet… loitering in any place… interfering with any property in the possession of a person… watching or spying on a person.”

The reason why that is important is that it sets out the sorts of behaviour that could be stalking, but it is not exhaustive.

The reason why I say of all that is that if someone at the end of a relationship, when the two people are no longer living together, engages in a course of conduct that, to the man or woman on the Clapham omnibus, is a bit like stalking—whether or not that means trying to exert economic control—there is the potential for offences there, and I will come on to them while I am still sympathetic to the point made by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley.

I am particularly mindful of that because in my own county of Gloucestershire—the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle has already mentioned this—Hollie Gazzard was brutally murdered. Those who have been victims of stalking say that it is like murder in slow motion, because of so much of what precedes it in terms of stalking behaviour. My point is that that can include economic abuse as well.

However, Surviving Economic Abuse argues further that stalking and harassment offences, although relevant, are not designed specifically to prosecute the sort of behaviour we are discussing. I accept that, but it is also fair to point out that, because of the way that stalking offences are drafted, it is not beyond the wit of man or woman to conceive of how they could be included, based on the facts of a specific case.

In addition, the new statutory definition of domestic abuse includes ex-partners among those defined as “personally connected” and does not have a “living together” requirement. Therefore, an amendment to the controlling or coercive behaviour offence could be seen as conforming within the definition in clause 1.

However, the case is not clearcut, given that the offence is still relatively new, and there is currently limited data available in support of a change. Because the case is not clearcut, the Government committed, in response to our 2018 consultation on domestic abuse, to conduct a review of the offence, as the hon. Lady is aware.

[Jess Phillips]

I love a review.

[Alex Chalk]

The hon. Lady loves a review, she says sotto voce.

Although Home Office officials have made good progress with the review, I am afraid that it has been one of the casualties of the covid-19 pandemic, which has meant that focus has had to be reapplied to supporting victims of domestic abuse at this time. However, the review is in place, and I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her acknowledgement and understanding of the situation.

We hope to conclude the review by the early autumn, because it is important that we have a sound evidence base for any changes to the offence, but we have heard what the hon. Lady says; the points she made are not improper or unmeritorious, and we invite her to await the outcome of the review. I hope that, in the light of my explanation, and on the understanding that we aim to complete the review by early autumn, the hon. Lady will see her way to withdrawing the new clause.

[Jess Phillips]

Absolutely, and I feel that I have the ear of the Minister in this particular regard. The case is quite clear to me; in the circumstances he has outlined, he is absolutely right. If he thinks that people do not read the statute here, I should say that they certainly do not in Stechford Police Station.

The reality is, what would the charge be? I find it difficult to think that the copper, in reality, on the ground, is going to say, “Actually, I think this will be a stalking charge.”

[Alex Chalk]

I grappled with this as a Back Bencher when we wanted to increase the maximum sentence, and for precisely that reason—would a police officer, or the CPS, think it was worth the powder and shot to charge someone with stalking when the maximum sentence was only five years? It is now 10 years, because of the private Member’s Bill. If someone engages in a course of conduct that seriously damages an individual, be it by economic abuse, or by hanging around outside the school gates or whatever, the courts have the power to impose what lawyers pompously refer to as “condign punishment”. That provides a powerful incentive for police officers, who want to do justice in the case, to reach for the lever available to them.

[Jess Phillips]

I appreciate that, and I hope that that would happen in these cases. However, the cases that I am sure will inform the review that the Minister talks about show people often left without an option, rather than with a plethora of different statutory instruments that they could use. The reality is that lots of people simply get sent away with no further action. However, I take on board what the Minister has said about the review. As everyone knows, I absolutely love a review—for the benefit of Hansard readers, I am being sarcastic. I will await the autumn. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 29

Domestic Abuse: immigration and nationality legal aid

“(1) The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 is amended as follows: in Part 1 of Schedule 1, delete paragraphs 28 and 29 and insert—

‘Immigration and nationality: victims of domestic abuse

27A (1) Civil legal services provided to a victim of domestic abuse in relation to rights to enter, and to remain in, the United Kingdom and to British citizenship, but only in circumstances arising from that abuse.

27B (2) Sub-paragraph (1) is subject to the exclusions in Parts 2 and 3 of this Schedule.

27B (3) The services described in sub-paragraph (1) do not include attendance at an interview conducted on behalf of the Secretary of State with a view to reaching a decision on an application.

27B (4) In this paragraph—

“domestic abuse” has the same meaning as in section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2020;

“victim” includes the dependent child of a person who is a victim of domestic abuse.’” —(Jess Phillips.)

This new clause would provide for legal aid for survivors of domestic abuse (and their dependent children) in relation to their immigration or nationality status or rights insofar as the need for legal aid arises from the abuse’

Brought up, and read the First time.

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[Alex Chalk]

Hear, hear.

[Jess Phillips]

I am not wholly sure that we will be hearing from all the immigration solicitors that I have come across in my life. I think there is a definite problem in the system with regard to some immigration advice that I get to see being charged for and paid for.

[Alex Chalk]

I thank the hon. Lady for making that incredibly important point. When somebody is prosecuted by the Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner, it is a serious issue of unscrupulous, unqualified, unethical individuals giving legal advice, and that is a particularly shabby thing to do when know the impact on the victim is known.

[Jess Phillips]

It certainly is. In these circumstances, people turning up to my office, having forked out £5,000 for a form that they could definitely have filled in by themselves, even if English is not their first language, is a phenomenon. I am afraid to say, I even have some come to my office and ask me to refer people directly to them, as if, like a quid pro quo, they will give free legal advice if we send people. It is a wild west situation.

That brings me to new clause 29, which seeks to provide migrant survivors with legal aid. Often, the cases are complex and it cannot be left to specialist BAME organisations to provide that legal advice. As I mentioned, there is already a deficit in specialist BAME services. Failure to protect all migrant women from abuse has wide-ranging financial and societal consequences —consequences that exceed the cost of extending eligibility of the DV rule and the DDVC.

The economic cost of supporting migrant women with NRPF is often borne out. We might not be paying for it at the Home Office, but it is often borne out by local children’s services, local councils, health and education services, the police and the criminal justice system, as well as by non-statutory agencies. Many women rely on section 17 support under the Children’s Act 1989, which would not be the case if they were eligible for the DV rule and the DDVC. We end up somehow paying for it with either lives lost or some other scheme somewhere along the line.

In its briefing paper on migrant women, Southall Black Sisters highlighted that London boroughs in 2017-18 supported 2,881 households with no recourse to public funds, at a cost of £53.7 million. That was primarily linked to the discharge of their duties under the Children’s Act 1989. The average duration of local authority support is under two and half years, with 30% of families being made dependent for 1,000 days or longer, often because of Home Office delays in resolving immigration claims. One of the primary groups referred to local authorities with NRPF is single mothers who are subject to domestic abuse. The majority of households no longer require local authority support when they are granted leave to remain, because they go on to find work. Surely that is what we all want to see happening.

What assessment have the Government made of how much it would cost to extend the domestic violence rule to all migrant victims? I guess it would cost less than the millions run up by the statutory and non-statutory services to support migrant women. It would be cheaper, and it would certainly be kinder. Although it would perhaps not be so ideologically pure, it would be the right thing to do. Furthermore, by hindering access to life-saving support, there are wider implications for the Government’s international human rights commitments and obligations to combat violence against women and girls.

In their October 2019 report on the ratification of the Istanbul convention, the Government amended the status of their progress on article 4.3, which is the non-discriminatory section, and on article 59, which includes measures to protect victims whose residency status is dependent on a partner, from “compliant” to “under review”—going backwards. As a consequence of their inadequate response to migrant victims of domestic abuse, the Government must now use the opportunity provided by the Bill to ensure meaningful protection for all women.

I am nearly done—worry not—because I want the Minister to have plenty of time to respond. In the evidence session, the hon. Member for Louth and Horncastle talked about the national referral mechanism after it was raised by another Member. In fact, a victim of domestic violence was asked during the evidence session whether she had been referred to the national referral mechanism. As somebody who used to be one of the people administering the national referral mechanism and who ran one of the trafficking services for many years—in fact, I helped to set it up with the Salvation Army as one of the sub-contractors—I want to express, for the benefit of the Committee, some concerns about the cross-over with the national referral mechanism in such cases.

The national referral mechanism has never been used to deal with cases of domestic abuse; that was never its intention. I read the guidance during the weekend after the evidence session. The only mention of domestic abuse in the thousands of pages of guidance suggests that when people identify a victim, they should use some of their experiences with victims of domestic abuse, because victims might react similarly and might not want to talk. That is literally the only mention.

There is some mention of forced marriage and sham marriage in the guidance. However, I have been speaking to the providers this week and have been asking them about how many cases they have seen where those are factors. It is vanishingly rare. Lots of the providers offer both domestic violence services and trafficking services. There is Ashiana Sheffield and Black Country Women’s Aid, where I used to work. They provide both domestic violence services and trafficking services, which are completely distinct. There has never been any suggestion that migrant victims with no recourse to public funds would be able to get through the NRM. As someone who has taken referrals through the NRM, I can tell Members that if a person tried to take these cases through that mechanism—probably with some immigration lawyer helping them to do so—it would count against them. It would look as if they were gaming the system, because these cases inevitably would not get through the NRM. Almost no migrant women on non-spousal visas would be able to access the NRM: it is not for them. They have not been exploited, there are not means, and there are not the three main things that are needed to make a trafficking referral.

However, well over five days ago, I tabled some named day questions to the Home Office. I have not had a response, but I have chased them again this morning; maybe the Minister can answer some of those questions. I asked whether the Secretary of State for the Home Department would

“publish all correspondence between her Department and the contract provider for the Modern Slavery Victim Care Contract on the inclusion within that contract of support services for victims of domestic abuse with no recourse to public funds.”

I also asked the Secretary of State

“how many applications to the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) made reference to forced marriage in the last full reporting year; of those how many people were (a) accepted into the NRM and (b) had their application declined.”

Southall Black Sisters, working with a number of other agencies, has circulated a pretty comprehensive guide to why these particular victims would not qualify. That is not to say that the NRM is not a good system; these victims just would not qualify for it, and it is quite laborious to try to put them through it, so I am not sure why we are currently wagering on the NRM.

Domestic Abuse Bill (Tenth sitting)

Debate between Alex Chalk and Jess Phillips

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 10th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 16th June 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Jess Phillips]

I deeply respect that the Minister is reading out exactly what should happen, but has he ever tried to get money out of the CMS for one of his constituents?

[Alex Chalk]

I have. I am perfectly prepared to accept that no organisation always works precisely as one might like. That is inevitably the case, but I am not suggesting that that is my usual experience. By and large, we have been able to deliver for my constituents in Cheltenham, while recognising, as I do, that there is always room for improvement. Perhaps we shall leave it there.

The Government have gone further and extended the powers to cover joint and certain business accounts, removing the opportunity for paying parents to put their money beyond reach. Where appropriate, the Child Maintenance Service will use enforcement agents to seize goods, forcing the sale of the paying parent’s property. The Child Maintenance Service may also apply to a court to have the paying parent committed to prison or disqualified from driving. In addition, we have introduced the ability to disqualify non-compliant parents from holding or obtaining a British passport, which we believe will act as a strong deterrent.

The impact of all that is important, and this goes to the point made by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley. Of course, we have our anecdotal experience—mine, by and large, has been pretty good, but I accept that other colleagues will have had different experiences—but it is important to look at the data. Compliance with the CMS Collect and Pay statutory scheme has increased from approximately 57% in the quarter ending December 2017 to 68% in the quarter ending December 2019, according to Child Maintenance Service statistics to December 2019. In addition, 723,500 children are covered by Child Maintenance Service arrangements, reflecting an increase of 158,300—almost 30%—since the quarter ending December 2017. That is from the same statistics source.

Given all those measures, the central point is that, while the new clause seeks guidance, what is already in place is guidance and training, and that training is informed by Women’s Aid, as I said. In the circumstances, our view is that no new clause is necessary at this stage, because the Child Maintenance Service already has sufficient enforcement powers and has further strengthened its procedures, training and processes to support customers who suffer domestic abuse.

We will, however, continue to monitor the impact of Child Maintenance Service enforcement powers, as well as the support provided to help domestic abuse victims to use the service safely. The hon. Member for Edinburgh West, who clearly takes a close and principled interest in this matter, will watch that closely but, with that assurance, I hope she feels able to withdraw her new clause.

Domestic Abuse Bill (Ninth sitting)

Debate between Alex Chalk and Jess Phillips

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 9th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 16th June 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Chalk]

I hear what the hon. Gentleman has said, and I leave it where it stands. I understand and I agree. I turn to new clauses 6 and 7. Those who have argued passionately in respect of the so-called rough sex defence will acknowledge that perhaps this point is contingent on that. There are also real practical difficulties with new clauses 6 and 7. Let me develop them briefly.

New clause 6 requires the personal consent of the personal Director of Public Prosecutions where a charge or plea less than murder, for example manslaughter, is applied or accepted in cases of domestic homicide. That sounds unobjectionable. It would be perfectly sensible if the DPP was readily able or had the capacity to give that kind of personal consent. However, there are practical problems with it. Let me set out the context. A statutory requirement of this nature is, and should be, extremely rare. It should only be imposed where a prosecution touches on sensitive issues of public policy, not simply sensitive issues, which are legion in the criminal justice system. The only recent example of this consent function applies to offences under the Bribery Act 2010, and last year, a Select Committee undertaking post-legislative review of the 2010 Act recommended that the requirement for personal DPP consent be reconsidered.

We have to acknowledge that the Crown Prosecution Service handles a high volume of serious and complex casework nationwide, and it is important that prosecutors have the confidence to take their own legal decisions. Introducing requirements for personal DPP consent could serve to undermine or frustrate this approach. It would also, I am bound to say, potentially sit uneasily alongside other very difficult decisions that prosecutors have to make. Suppose, for example, in the context of a terrorist prosecution, that because of the way the evidence emerged, or because of new lines of enquiry, a decision was made to take the defendant off the indictment in respect of a bomb plot, but the prosecution said, “We are going to continue to prosecute him in respect of possession of materials that might be of assistance to a person planning an act of terrorism.” These are immensely difficult and sensitive decisions. However, there is neither the capacity nor the wherewithal for the DPP to make those personal decisions all the time.

It is sad to note that there is a high volume of cases involving domestic homicide, as the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley well understands. It means that charging decisions need to be made urgently, and sometimes at a speed, where no personal DPP involvement is possible.

These considerations apply equally to cases in which a lesser plea may be accepted. If pleas are offered in court, prosecutors are required to make a decision in an incredibly short period of time after speaking with the victim’s family, and the DPP could not be involved in that level of decision making. I invite the Committee to consider the circumstances, supposing it is in court: because of the way that the evidence has come out, there is the consideration of whether a lesser plea should be accepted. The hon. Lady pointed out that this does not always happen, but if the family have been properly consulted, it is no kindness to that family to say, ‘Do you know what? We’re not going to make a decision on this, which would let you begin to heal and put this behind you. We’re going to put this off for two or three weeks while the DPP has to consider it.’ Court proceedings will be suspended awkwardly, and the poor family will be left hanging.

Forgive me for stating the obvious, but it bears emphasising that the real remedy is for good prosecutors––the overwhelming majority are good and do their duty with diligence, conspicuous ability and conscientiousness– –to liaise with the family in a compassionate and inclusive way. I understand the desire for additional scrutiny in such significant and sensitive cases, but I assure the Committee that the Crown Prosecution Service already has systems in place to check and challenge decision making in these circumstances. Internal CPS policies require that chief crown prosecutors are notified of any and all homicide cases. It is likely as well that domestic homicides would be subject to a case management panel with a lead lawyer and either the deputy chief crown prosecutor or the chief crown prosecutor, so there is senior oversight.

The point that I really want to underscore is that because cases of domestic homicide inevitably have a lasting and dreadful impact on victims’ families, people deserve support and compassion, particularly as criminal proceedings can be upsetting and difficult to follow. Procedures are in place to ensure that is given. Where there is an allegation of murder, the police very often appoint a family liaison officer as a matter of course to assist with the process. I speak as someone who has prosecuted several murder cases. The role that liaison officers play is absolutely fantastic. Otherwise, the poor family turn up in court with no idea what an indictment is, wondering “What on earth is this examination-in-chief stuff? What is this plea and trial preparation hearing?”. The liaison officer role is invaluable, and needs to be supported by prosecutors speaking to family members, as they increasingly do.

[Jess Phillips]

Like the hon. Gentleman, I have been involved in a number of murder cases, and he is right that family liaison officers are worth their weight in gold. Does he think that there needs to be a more formalised link between the prosecutor and the family liaison officer—a referral pathway, or standard of practice that had to be met in each case? It could help us work towards having a less patchy approach if we had a formalised target.

[Alex Chalk]

There are, in fact, formal arrangements in both spheres. Family liaison officers have to operate within certain guidance, and in my experience, by and large, they do so extremely well. At the risk of stating the obvious, it comes down to the calibre, kindness and empathy of the individual. In my experience, they are very good at their job and play an invaluable role.

As for the prosecution, as little as 20 years ago, there used to be almost a benign disdain for witnesses. Prosecutors simply did not engage with them. That does not happen now; they meet witnesses and family members before the trial begins. Very often, they will speak to them at the end of the day to explain what has happened. The relationship between prosecutors and family liaison officers tends to dovetail extremely effectively. I do not think that there is a need for further guidance. The key is to ensure that both parts of the criminal justice system—the police and the prosecution—do their job. In my experience, people are increasingly extremely conscientious in that regard. That is important, because people’s sense of whether they have got justice will often depend on the conversations they have at the end of the day, when the matter has been explained to them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Chalk]

The hon. Lady is absolutely right that of course it is not open to a journalist to seek to displace the reporting restrictions that have been imposed by force of statute. I was seeking to make the point, which I do not think she disagrees with, that it is not uncommon for the press to suggest that a court, in imposing reporting restrictions in an individual case, has overreached itself, gone beyond the bounds, and misapplied the balance. Sometimes, by the way, those applications are upheld at first instance or on appeal.

There is a judgment to make, and we have to recognise that there is a particular public interest, when the allegation is of sexual violence, in taking the step of exceptional interference. That justification exists in relation to sexual offences. However, we have to take great care before extending it further, not least because—of course, domestic violence and domestic abuse are incredibly serious, for all the reasons that we have expressed—women, and it is usually women, can be victims of all sorts of other offences. Then it becomes a question of how far we go—where do we draw the line? That is something that requires careful thought.

I apologise to members of the Committee for taking so long to explain the Government’s position on the new clauses. As I have sought to explain, we fully understand the anguish and hurt felt by the family of Natalie Connolly and many others, and, as lawmakers, we will and should do what we can to minimise such anguish on the part of bereaved families in the future. For the reasons that I have set out, the Government cannot support a number of the new clauses, but as I have indicated before, we expect to set out the Government’s approach in respect of the rough sex issue in time for Report. In those circumstances, I respectfully invite the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley to withdraw the new clause.

[Jess Phillips]

I will withdraw the new clause. I am very pleased to hear that there is an intention to deal with the matter on Report, and I speak entirely for the hon. Member for Wyre Forest and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Camberwell and Peckham in that regard. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Domestic Abuse Bill (Eighth sitting)

Debate between Alex Chalk and Jess Phillips

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 8th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 11th June 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Jess Phillips]

The Minister says that the report will be published in the coming weeks. Does he expect that we will see it prior to Report stage of the Bill, or potentially prior to Committee stage in the Lords, as he has leaned on for one particular review? I ask only because I am seeking to understand what will be given to me as I consider whether to push new clause 45 to a Division.

[Alex Chalk]

I invite the hon. Lady to listen to the end of my remarks. If I can put it in these terms, the words I will use at the end are carefully phrased. I invite her to listen to those and then decide. A huge amount of work has gone into this panel, and getting to a place where we are ready to publish is the stuff of enormous effort. We are moving as quickly as we can, and it will be published as quickly as possible.

On the civil courts, there are no specific provisions in the civil procedure rules that deal with vulnerable parties or witnesses. However, judges have an inherent power, where the court is alerted to vulnerability, to make a number of directions or take steps to facilitate the progression or defending of a claim or the giving of evidence by a vulnerable party.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jess Phillips]

I welcome what the Minister is saying, but on the specific instances he is outlining of who exactly would be able to assess this, does he foresee an element of the judge’s discretion also allowing them to go to central funds where they believe enough that cross-examination would cause distress, regardless of whether there may previously have been a conviction or an order in place? As we all know, there is a disparity between conviction and order rates on the one hand, and domestic violence rates on the other.

[Alex Chalk]

Courts have a common law discretion to manage their own proceedings, but it will be important for us to assist the them as much as possible by setting out the categories that should trigger the exemption. Although courts can act of their own motion, it is none the less important to prescribe to an extent that the provision applies in circumstances where somebody has been convicted, charged or cautioned. I will develop that point in the following passage.

In the light of the recommendation from the Joint Committee on the Draft Domestic Abuse Bill, the clause now makes provision that the automatic ban will also apply in other cases where a witness has adduced specified evidence of domestic abuse. The evidence will be specified in regulations and, as recommended by the Joint Committee, we intend for this evidence to broadly replicate that which is used to access civil legal aid. That is probably the point that the hon. Lady was driving at.

The prohibitions also apply reciprocally, to prevent a victim from having to cross-examine their abuser in person. Where the automatic ban does not apply, the clause also gives the court a discretion to prohibit cross-examination in person where it would be likely to diminish the quality of the witness’s evidence or cause significant distress to the witness or the party. That is the point about a court’s discretion: the judge has the individuals in front of them, can hear from them and can make a decision based on that.

In any case where cross-examination in person is prohibited, either under the automatic prohibition or at the discretion of the court, the judge must consider whether there is a satisfactory alternative means by which the witness can be cross-examined or the evidence can be obtained. That would include means that already fall under the judge’s general case management powers, such as putting the questions to the witness themselves or via a legal adviser, or by accepting pre-recorded cross-examination. I suppose one might imagine cases where the things that need to be cross-examined on are so narrow in scope that it would not be worth the aggravation of instructing independent counsel if the judge can do it and do justice in that way. It is important that the court can act of its own motion and flexibly, and the clause retains that flexibility.

If there are no satisfactory alternative means, the court must invite the prohibited party to appoint a legal representative to carry out cross-examination on their behalf. If they choose not to, or are unable to, the clause gives the court the power to appoint a legal representative—an advocate—for the sole purpose of conducting the cross-examination in the interests of the prohibited party. The court must appoint an advocate where it considers this to be necessary in the interests of justice.

There could be circumstances where it is not possible to protect the prohibited party’s rights to access to justice and/or a family life without the appointment of such an advocate. This might be in circumstances, for example, where the evidence that needs to be tested by cross-examination is complicated, because it is complex medical or other expert evidence, or because it is complex or confused factual evidence, say from a vulnerable witness. The clause also confers power on the Secretary of State to issue statutory guidance in connection with the role of that advocate.

The clause also confers power on the Secretary of State to make regulations about the fees and costs of a court-appointed advocate to be met from central funds. We understand the particular skill and care that is needed to carry out cross-examination of a vulnerable witness effectively. We will be designing a full fee scheme to support these provisions, in consultation with the sector and interested parties, prior to the implementation of the Bill.

This clause seeks to ensure that, in future, no victim of domestic abuse has to endure the trauma of being questioned in person by their abuser as part of ongoing family proceedings. It makes a big difference, and I commend it to the Committee.

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[Alex Chalk]

The clause simply reintroduces schedule 2, which contains amendments relating to offences committed outside the UK. As with clauses 60 and 61, the amendments are necessary to ensure compliance with article 44 of the Istanbul convention. Part 1 of schedule 2 contains amendments to provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction over certain offences other than those set out in clause 60 under the law of England and Wales. Part 2 of schedule 2 contains amendments to provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction over certain offences under the law of Scotland. Part 3 of schedule 2 contains amendments to provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction over certain offences not including those set out in clause 61 under the law of Northern Ireland.

Schedule 2 contains amendments to a number of enactments to provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction over certain offences under the law of England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Together with clauses 60 and 61 and provisions in the Domestic Abuse and Family Proceedings Bill currently before the Northern Ireland Assembly that give extraterritorial effect to the new domestic abuse offence in Northern Ireland, schedule 2 will ensure that the UK complies with the jurisdiction requirements of article 44 of the Istanbul convention.

Part 1 of the schedule covers England and Wales and gives effect to the UK’s obligations under article 44 as it applies to article 33, which covers psychological violence, article 34, which covers stalking, and article 36, which covers sexual violence, including rape. It does so by extending extraterritorial jurisdiction to offences under sections 4 and 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, sections 1 to 4 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 where the victim of the offence is aged 18 or over, and section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, which is about coercive control. It will mean that a UK national or a person habitually resident in England and Wales who commits one of these offences outside the UK can, exceptionally, stand trial for the offence in England and Wales. Where the offence involves a course of conduct, the offence may be committed wholly or partly outside the UK.

Part 2 of the schedule covers Scotland and gives effect to the UK’s obligations under article 44 as it applies to articles 33 to 36 and article 39. It does so by extending extraterritorial jurisdiction to the common law offence of assault, to offences under sections 1 to 4 of the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 where the victim of the offence is aged 18 or over, and to the offence of stalking under section 39 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010.

That will mean that a UK national or person habitually resident in Scotland who commits one of these offences outside the UK can, exceptionally, stand trial for the offence in Scotland. Where the offence involves a course of conduct, the offence may be committed wholly or partly outside the UK.

Part 3 of the schedule, as the Committee will be cottoning on to by now, covers Northern Ireland and gives effect to the UK’s obligations under article 44 as it applies to article 34 and 36. It does so by extending extraterritorial jurisdiction to offences under article 6 of the Protection from Harassment (Northern Ireland) Order 1997 and part 2 of the Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008, again where the victim of the offence is aged 18 or over. It will mean that a UK national or person habitually resident in Northern Ireland who commits one of these offences outside the UK can, exceptionally, stand trial for the offence in Northern Ireland. Where the offence involves a course of conduct, the offence may be committed wholly or partly outside the UK.

[Jess Phillips]

I simply want to welcome specifically the terminology of “habitual resident” within the UK. The Minister and I have met a number of different families over the years who have suffered violence, and I am afraid to say that those cases we get to see usually involve murder in a different country. Where the perpetrator of the crime was back here in Britain and was not a British citizen but was habitually resident in this country, the authorities had found that their hands were tied. While the measures seem perfunctory and were a lot of words for the Minister to say, to families they mean a huge amount, so I welcome them.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 62 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 2 agreed to.

Clause 63

Polygraph conditions for offenders released on licence

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Alex Chalk]

This clause is about polygraph conditions. It is an important clause that relates to conditions for offenders released on licence. It is one of a number of measures in the Bill directed at strengthening the effective management of domestic abuse perpetrators. It allows the Secretary of State for Justice to introduce mandatory polygraph examinations as a licence condition for offenders convicted of a relevant domestic abuse-related offence. The relevant offences include murder, specified violent offences and the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour under the Serious Crime Act 2015. Necessarily, this is a new departure to some extent, but it is kept within tight limits, as members of the Committee would expect.

Domestic Abuse Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Alex Chalk and Jess Phillips

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 10th June 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Chalk]

Clause 28 makes provision for the court to make a domestic abuse protection order of its own volition during other ongoing proceedings that do not have to be domestic abuse-related. It is an important provision that shows the flexibility of the legislation.

The family court will have the power to do so in cases where both the victim and the alleged abuser are parties to the proceedings, which means that the family court will be able to make an order in other ongoing proceedings where the court becomes aware that an order would be beneficial. For example, if an issue of domestic abuse is raised during ongoing child contact proceedings, the victim would not have to make a separate application to the court to obtain an order. Instead, the court can make an order of its own volition as it sees necessary. That is an important element of flexibility, and indeed robustness, built into the legislation.

In criminal courts—I am conscious that we have expertise here in the form of a former magistrate, which is excellent—as with the current restraining order, the court will be able to make a domestic abuse protection order on either conviction or acquittal. To that extent it is similar to a restraining order, which can also apply in the event of an acquittal. Importantly, however, the DAPO is an improvement on the current restraining order because it can impose positive requirements as well as prohibitions on the perpetrator. All Committee members will recognise that, although we of course want to protect victims first and foremost, we also want to stop further abuse happening, so anything that can be done to ensure that people are rehabilitated and see the error of their ways is a positive thing for society as well as, of course, for the victim.

In the case of a conviction, that will allow the court to, for example, set an order with a longer duration than the sentence passed, to ensure that the victim receives the protection they need beyond the length of their sentence. In the case of an acquittal, it will ensure that the victim still receives protection if the court thinks that is necessary.

The court will also be able to make a DAPO of its own volition during other ongoing civil proceedings where both the victim and the alleged abuser are parties to the proceedings.

We will specify the type of civil proceedings in regulations, but initially we expect it to cover civil proceedings in which issues of domestic abuse are most likely to be raised or revealed in evidence, such as housing-related proceedings.

[Jess Phillips]

I feel that, now Minister Chalk is on his feet, I should have some things to say; I do not want to leave him out.

I cannot say how important the idea that the court can put in place an order on acquittal in these circumstances is to somebody like me, who has watched many cases fall apart over the years. I am always slightly jealous of the Scottish system of not proven, because in too many cases in the area of violence against women and girls, it may well be that the balance of evidence needed cannot be provided either at the magistrates court or at the Crown court in these circumstances, but there is still gross fear among all involved that the fact that it is not proven does not mean that it did not happen.

The idea that, on acquittal, courts could put these orders in place is a huge step forward, ideologically and politically speaking. My concern—I am almost doing myself an injustice on what I am going to say about some of the amendments later—is what the Ministry of Justice foresees as a review mechanism to ensure where this is going, how it is working and how regularly the family courts are dishing out such orders.

If everybody was like Essex police force, I would be jumping for joy. I do not hope for this, but maybe one day somebody will perpetrate a crime against me in Essex and I will see how brilliant the force is at orders, as we heard from the evidence earlier. What worries me is whose responsibility it will be, after a year or two years—even after the pilot scheme—between the Ministry of Justice, the head of the family courts structure and the chief prosecutor at the head of the Crown Prosecution Service, to see how readily these orders are being used in our courts.

I have already said this once today, but often people like me put in annoying questions to people like the Minister, such as, “Can you tell me how many times this has been used in these circumstances?”, and very often the answer that we receive back is, “We do not collect this data nationally”, or, “We do not hold this data in the Department.” I want a sense of how we are going to monitor this, because while I know this just looks like words on paper, to people like me it is deeply, deeply important that the courts could take this role.

However, I have seen too many times that, even the powers that the courts have—certainly the family courts, which no doubt we will come on to tomorrow—are not always used wisely and well, so I want an understanding of how specifically we are going to monitor the use of the courts giving out the orders, which is new in this instance. How are we going to test that it is working and try to improve its use? I would be very interested in even just a basic data gathering each year of how many were done on acquittal, how many were done on conviction and how many were done in family court proceedings where both parties were part of proceedings.

With regard to the family court, and in fact in all these circumstances—whether it is a notice or an order; whether a police officer has to make a decision there on the doorstep or we are talking about orders—how are we going to deal with some of the “he said, she said”? I have seen an awful lot of counter-claims in the family courts. Often somebody will talk about being victimised as part of domestic abuse, and it becomes: “Well, actually, she was domestically abusing me,” or, “He was domestically abusing me.” I wonder whether any thought has been given to how, in giving out DAPOs in a family court, we do not end up with potentially two people, both with an order against each other—or maybe that could happen.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Chalk]

This clause concerns matters to be considered before making an order. Similar to the provisions at clause 21 in relation to a notice, clause 30 sets up particular matters, which the court must consider before making a domestic abuse protection order.

First, the court must consider the welfare of any person under the age of 18, whose interests the court considers relevant, in order to ensure that any safeguarding concerns can be appropriately addressed. The person does not have to be personally connected to the perpetrator and could, therefore, for example, be the victim’s child from a previous relationship.

The court must also consider the opinion of the victim as to whether the order should be made. As set out, however, in subsection (3), the court does not have to obtain the victim’s consent in order to make an order. We have already discussed why that is desirable. It enables the court to protect victims who may be coerced into withholding their consent, or who are fearful of the consequences should they appear to be supporting action against the perpetrator.

Where the order includes conditions in relation to premises lived in by the victim, the court must consider the opinion of any other person who lives in the premises and is personally connected to the victim or, if the perpetrator also lives in the premises, to the perpetrator. For example, if the perpetrator has caring responsibilities for a family member, the court would need to consider the family member’s opinion on the making of an order excluding the perpetrator from the premises.

[Jess Phillips]

I wonder whether the Government foresee a child being included in that instance. If it was an elderly relative, that is reasonable. But are we saying here—or perhaps it will be in the much-awaited guidance—that if a child was living in the house, their opinion might be sought?

[Alex Chalk]

Yes, I think it would be and I think that is appropriate. One thing that certainly the criminal law has done over the last 20 years is start to recognise that people under the age of 18 have views that are sometimes worth hearing. In the past, they were almost kept out of court, but now of course we try to facilitate their giving evidence. I would imagine that that would be the case in these circumstances and that a court would want to hear that.

It will be for the court to weigh up the different factors to come to its decision on whether a DAPO is necessary and proportionate in order to protect the victim from domestic abuse or the risk of it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 30 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 31

Making of orders without notice

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Alex Chalk]

Clause 32 concerns provision that may be made by orders. The Committee will recall that we heard earlier about provision that may be made by notices. This is the twin in respect of orders.

Clause 32 provides courts with the flexibility to impose in respect of a DAPO not only restrictions but positive requirements, depending on what is necessary in each case to protect the victim from all forms of abusive behaviour. Subsections (4) to (6) provide examples of the kinds of conditions that could be imposed by a DAPO, but subsection (3) expressly provides that those are not exhaustive.

It is up to the court carefully to tailor the conditions of the DAPO to meet the needs of the individual victim and take into account the behaviour of the perpetrator. The reason is that circumstances are varied and it is important to ensure that the court considers each case on its merits, and the circumstances as they apply, and ensures that the conditions are tailored accordingly.

[Jess Phillips]

Specifically with regard to what we were discussing earlier in relation to workplaces, does the Minister foresee that that could be one of those issues that could be discussed in the court—that there would be an allowance for the workplace to be included, with leave of the court?

[Alex Chalk]

Absolutely; I do not see why not at all. In fact, when the hon. Lady was making those points in respect of notices, I did fast-forward to clause 32, and it is deliberately broadly cast. Clause 32(2) says:

“The court must, in particular, consider what requirements (if any) may be necessary to protect the person for whose protection the order is made from different kinds of abusive behaviour.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Jess Phillips]

It is very pleasing to hear that—it is reassuring. I urge that the point is made explicitly in the guidance that will go along with all the orders. I wanted that on the public record.

[Alex Chalk]

It may be in the guidance but, I respectfully suggest, does not necessarily need to be in it. When a court comes to consider what it will or will not do, it may look at this measure and say, “Are we precluded from banning him from her workplace? If the answer to that is no, we will go ahead and do it, regardless of what is in the guidance.” It may be that it will be in there anyway, but I am confident that, as the Bill is set out, it is drafted sufficiently widely—deliberately so—for the courts to see their way to do justice and impose protections as they see fit.

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[Alex Chalk]

May I gently push back on that? I understand the hon. Gentleman’s observations about the need to ensure that one modernises and so on, but if we think for a second about the sorts of conditions that the court is likely to impose, those will be along the lines of conditions routinely imposed in respect of bail, for example—not to contact an individual, not to go within a certain a postcode, not to go to a school, not to visit the home or not to contact relatives directly or indirectly.

I am confident that the courts will be well able to impose those conditions without requiring any particular leap of imagination. They will welcome and embrace these powers, which are deliberately drawn widely, so that the courts may apply their everyday experience of the world to understanding what is required to do justice and to provide protection in an individual case.

On the issue of keeping an eye on this, there are data and statistics, which will be published in due course. It will be open to hon. Members, the domestic abuse commissioner and the Victims’ Commissioner to keep a close weather eye on that. I know that the hon. Member for Hove will do precisely that.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 32 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 33

Further provision about requirements that may be imposed by orders

[Jess Phillips]

I beg to move amendment 51, in clause 33, page 21, line 3, leave out subsection (2) and insert—

“(2) A domestic abuse protection order that imposes a requirement to do something on a person (“P”) must—

(a) specify the person who is to be responsible for supervising compliance with that requirement; and

(b) meet the standard published by the Home Secretary for domestic abuse behaviour interventions, if the requirement is to attend an intervention specifically designed to address the use of abusive behaviour.”

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[Alex Chalk]

It is important to note that clause 66 contains important provisions that allow for exactly what we want to achieve.

Turning to new clause 27 on the perpetrator strategy, I reassure the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley that we have heard the call to action for a perpetrator strategy. We commend the work of the Drive partnership of Respect, SafeLifes and Social Finance, who have done so much to change the narrative and to shift the focus from, “Why doesn’t she leave?”, to, “Why doesn’t he stop?”.

I want to be absolutely clear that we fully recognise the need for increased focus on perpetrators and are ambitious in our aim to transform the response to those who have caused this appalling harm, but to have an increased focus on tackling perpetrators, we do not need to make inflexible provision in the Bill for a one-off strategy. We have made clear our commitment to this work through our allocation of £10 million in this year’s Budget for preventive work with perpetrators. Over the past three years, we have funded a range of innovative approaches to working with perpetrators and we are beginning to build a solid evidence base on what works through some of the programmes I have mentioned: Drive, a whole-system approach to tackling domestic abuse, and “Make a Change”.

We have undertaken work to improve the response to the perpetrators through the criminal justice system. As was set out in the consultation response published alongside the draft Bill, we are taking action to improve the identification and risk assessment of perpetrators. The College of Policing has published key principles for police on the management of serial and dangerous domestic abuse perpetrators, and we are expanding the range of interventions available to offenders serving community sentences.

We recognise the concerns; that is why we want to ensure that we develop and properly test a whole-system approach, in particular through the piloting of DAPOs. It might well prove counterproductive to develop a new strategy without awaiting the learning from those pilots. I hope that, in the light of our intention to work towards that fully comprehensive package of perpetrator programmes and our wider programme of work to confront and change perpetrator behaviours, the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley will see her way to withdrawing the amendment.

[Jess Phillips]

I recognise what the Minister says about the fact that perpetrator programmes are used elsewhere. Very often in children’s services, I have seen people sent on perpetrator programmes that, I am afraid to say, are useless. If only everything was as perfect as it is in Westminster.

[Jess Phillips]

I apologise if I did not cover all the boroughs in London. I did not come up with the amendments all by myself; the specialist sector is working with us to ask for these things, and the reality is that, as sometimes happens in this place, we will say how something is on the ground and we will be told that that is not the case. We will be told, “Actually, no; it’s going to be fine because we are going to have a whole-system approach.”

What the Minister says about a whole-system approach is needed wherever perpetrator programmes are issued, rather than just in DAPOs. I could not agree with him more on that point. I shall allow him as many interventions as he likes, and I will speak for as long as it takes for him to get the answer. If he is saying to me that, at the other end of this very notable approach and funding that the Home Office and the Government are putting in place, we will end up with an accredited system that stops the bad practice and the poor commissioning of services, of course I will withdraw the amendment.

Is the Minister saying that we will work towards a standard that will have to be met and that will be compelled—not dissimilar to the standard that we will hopefully come on to tomorrow, where we compel local authorities with a duty? There, I believe, we will be writing a set of standards that the local authority in its commissioning process has to live by, so that it cannot just say, “We’re doing any old domestic abuse services.” There has long been talk at MHCLG about having standards to go with any duty. Is the Minister telling me that we will end up with an accreditation system, which is essentially what I seek?

[Alex Chalk]

The whole point of the approach we are taking is to seek standardisation across the piece. Words like “accreditation” can mean all sorts of things, but certainly it is the case that our absolute aim is to draw on the best practice that we have referred to and combine it with the experience we glean from the pilots to work out what we think is best practice, to clarify what that best practice is and to do everything we can to promulgate that best practice. One can use words like “accreditation” or “standardisation”, but we want to use the mechanisms within the Bill—pilot and guidance—to do precisely what the hon. Lady is aiming for. We recognise that clarity, consistency and credibility are the hallmarks of an effective order, and that is precisely what we want to achieve.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jess Phillips]

I welcome what the Minister says. I suppose the reality is that if that does not happen, I have no recourse beyond changing this Bill. Actually, I can just stand in this building and say, “Things aren’t working and we don’t have good perpetrator systems,” but it will largely fall on deaf ears. It might not—we cannot know which ears it will fall on—but, largely, when people come and say that things are not working in whatever we are talking about, it is very hard.

I have a Bill in front of me, and I can attempt to compel this to happen. However, on this occasion—because I would never describe the Minister as having deaf ears, and I am quite confident in my own ability to keep on raising the issue until the right thing happens—I accept and welcome what the Minister has outlined, and I look forward to working on it with him, the commissioner and the sector. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 33 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 34

Further provision about electronic monitoring requirements

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Alex Chalk]

Clause 34 sets out the circumstances in which a court can impose electronic monitoring requirements on a person as part of an order, and the nature of such requirements. The clause specifies that the electronic monitoring requirements may not be imposed if the person is not present at the hearing. The clause also specifies that, if there is a person other than the perpetrator who will need to co-operate with the monitoring requirements in order for them to be practicable, they will need to give their consent before the requirements can be imposed. That may include, for example, the occupier of the premises where the perpetrator lives. The court must also have been notified by the Secretary of State that electronic monitoring requirements are available in the area, and it must be satisfied that the provision can be made under the arrangements available. Any order that imposes electronic monitoring requirements must also specify the person who will be responsible for their monitoring.

Where electronic monitoring requirements are imposed, the person must submit to being fitted with the necessary apparatus and to the installation of any associated equipment, and they must co-operate with any inspection or repair that is required. They must not interfere with the apparatus, and they must keep it in working order—for example, by keeping it charged. I trust that the Committee will agree that proper procedures should be in place when a decision is made by the court that electronic monitoring is required.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 34 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 35 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 36

Breach of order

Domestic Abuse Bill (Third sitting)

Debate between Alex Chalk and Jess Phillips

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 3rd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 9th June 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Jess Phillips]

We are now moving on from the definition to talk about exactly who we mean by “connected parties”. The amendment is a response to calls from people with disabilities and organisations within the disability rights sector that have been in touch with us to express their concerns about whether they are seen in the Bill.

As we said in the debate about whether children should be in the Bill, we recognise that there is a need for much more detailed and in-depth guidance. In relation to domestic abuse, we are potentially missing some real opportunities that genuinely need to be responded to with law—the courts of our land—but are currently not covered by the area of “connected parties”. The issue is those whose connection to a person is that they are their carer. We are not necessarily talking about paid carers.

Carers UK announced yesterday that 4.5 million people have become unpaid carers during the coronavirus crisis, so it is not a minority issue or something that happens only in certain areas. People who very much rely on others for their care might not currently be covered by what is outlined in the Bill as a connected party. They might never have been married or had a civil partnership. They might never have been divorced, which got a bit easier yesterday, and they might not be related. I should tell my husband that it got easier to get divorced yesterday—

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Chalk)]

He has been in touch already. [Laughter.]

[Jess Phillips]

The reality is that for lots of people a connected party to their wellbeing, their life, or what people would call their family, is a bit like in working class communities, although I am sure it happens in others: a woman lives down the road and her husband borrows somebody’s dad’s ladder, so they call her auntie, even though she is absolutely no relation whatever. We have to understand that in lots of people’s lives, connected people might not be what we would naturally recognise.

On the definition of “personally connected”, I want the Bill to reflect the realities of all domestic abuse victims. I want all victims to be able to access services, justice and support when needed. I think we would all agree that no victim should be left behind. We are taking our time—my gosh, it is quite a lot of time—to get the Bill right and see it through. It will never be perfect, but we should make every effort to make it as perfect as it can be.

Clause 2 defines what it means to be personally connected. In other words, the clause sets out the relationship between a victim and a perpetrator that comes under the definition of domestic abuse. The list includes what we would typically expect: as I have already laid out, those in intimate personal relationships with each other. However, my concern is that the clause, as it stands, fails to recognise the lived experiences of disabled victims of domestic abuse, who are among the most vulnerable. Their abuse often goes unnoticed.

The crime survey for England and Wales found that individuals with long-term illness or disability were more likely to be victims of domestic abuse. A 2016 report on intimate personal violence by the Office for National Statistics found that 16% of women with long-term illness or disability had experienced domestic abuse. Disabled victims are also more likely to experience domestic abuse for a longer period of time: 3.3 years, on average, compared with 2.3 years for non-disabled victims. With that in mind, I want the Bill to make it easier for disabled victims of domestic abuse to be recognised. To do that, we have to accept the reality of disabled people’s lives, where significant relationships are perhaps different from those of a non-disabled person with an unpaid carer.

Ruth Bashall, the chief executive of Stay Safe East, said that disabled people

“have emotionally intimate relationships with the people who, in very large inverted commas, ‘care’ for us, and the experience of abuse by those people is exactly the same as domestic abuse: the coercive control, the violence, the financial abuse and so on.”

It is important that we recognise, based on the evidence presented to the Committee, that a large number of disabled people will have no relationship with anyone except for the people who “care” for them. This type of close relationship can easily take on a problematic power dynamic that closely mirrors familial or intimate partner violence. As I have said, we can see how that might occur. I have been doing shopping and taking money from people who needed me to go to the shops for them. It would, if I were that way inclined, not be particularly difficult to build a relationship, a rapport and a need from me in that person that I could then exploit over a number of years. I would not do that, obviously.

In response to the Joint Committee’s report, the Government said that they did not propose to review the personally connected clause at the current time. Paragraph 60 of the their response states:

“If they are personally connected to their carer, this will be covered by our definition of domestic abuse. Otherwise, abuse of disabled people by their carers is already covered by existing legislation.”

What we heard from Saliha in the evidence session last Thursday was that, as a disabled victim of domestic abuse, she often finds that she is not understood by one or the other. As I have said this morning, her experience as a victim of gender-based violence or domestic abuse is often not expected, dealt with or understood by disability agencies, and vice versa: as a disabled person, she finds getting access to mainstream domestic violence services difficult.

We have to be very careful, when writing this Bill, not to ignore those intersecting groups of people and just say, “Well, there’s already existing legislation that would cover it.” It would not cover it from the point of view of domestic abuse because, as we all know, that has been lacking from our laws, and that is what we are here to try to improve.

I urge the Government to rethink their position for a number of reasons. First, it is not appropriate to say that abuse of disabled people by their carers is already covered by different legislation. This is a Domestic Abuse Bill for all victims. Therefore, if the abuse of a disabled person meets the definition of domestic abuse—if it is financially controlling, or if it involves sexual, economic or psychological abuse—but it is not by somebody in one of the connected party groups, that disabled person would not be left with many places to turn to take the case of domestic abuse to court or wherever.

If a disabled person meets the definition, that ought to be recognised and covered by this legislation, not something else. We cannot just keep saying, “Well, if you’re in this group you’re covered by this, and if you’re in this group you’re covered by this.” I would have thought that we would want to make a Domestic Abuse Bill that covers everybody.

I would go even further, and suggest that the Government’s response is a bit dismissive and fails to recognise the gender-based nature of domestic abuse solely because the victim is disabled. We cannot have domestic abuse covered by other legislation just because the person is disabled.

Secondly, while I appreciate that section 42 of the Care Act 2014 places a duty on local authorities to carry out safeguarding inquiries if they suspect abuse, that is no reason why disabled victims should not be represented in this Bill. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that local authorities are failing even to identify victims, even those who are at highest risk. Between 2015 and 2016, none of the 925 referrals of disabled victims to domestic abuse services were from adult safeguarding—zero.

I would be so bold as to bet that every piece of single adult safeguarding guidance in every adult safeguarding group that exists in every single local authority has domestic abuse written within it somewhere, and says that the vulnerable adults can be victims of domestic abuse. In all my years, I have literally never once referred a victim of domestic abuse to adult social care, because that is not what adult social care is for.

If I were to ring up my local authority or, I would even wager, Westminster City Council and say, “I’ve got this woman and she’s a victim of domestic abuse, and I see that that’s written into your adult social care board, so can I get a social worker out to see her later? She’s suffered some violence over the years and a bit of emotional abuse recently, the kids are getting a bit—”, the idea that an adult social worker would go out and see that victim is for the birds. The fact that zero referrals —none—to domestic abuse services of disabled women came from adult social care speaks to the evidence.

That is why we are proposing to amend the Bill to include carers in the definition of “personally connected”. Including carers will raise awareness and, I hope, help the police and local authorities to adopt better practices—for example, on something as simple as questioning a victim separately from the carer, which I imagine happens quite rarely. It is vital that those sorts of policies are put in place. The amendment provides an opportunity for us to tackle the profound inequalities faced by disabled survivors.

Stay Safe East sent a number of case studies, such as this one:

“A disabled woman was targeted by a man who was homeless. He gradually gained her trust and over a period of months, she began to see him as her friend, then as ‘better family than my own’. He assisted her first with shopping (while taking her money), then with household tasks and eventually with personal care. His controlling and intimidating behaviour towards the woman’s carers led them to withdraw the support, leaving him in complete control of the disabled woman’s life.”

To anyone who has ever worked in domestic abuse services, that sounds exactly like what a domestic violence perpetrator does—isolate, control and ensure there is no one else there to turn to. The quote continues:

“There was physical, sexual, emotional and financial abuse. The man then brought his friends into the woman’s home; they further intimidated her. When she was eventually able to seek help, her health had deteriorated due to neglect. Whilst the actions of the man and his friends could be described as ‘cuckooing’ (a term used by the police to describe taking over a person’s home for criminal or other purposes), they also constitute domestic abuse: the woman had a ‘close personal connection’ with the abuser which left her dependent on him and open to abuse.”

I am sure the Minister would say that the woman would have been able to get support from this service or that service, but why should she not be able to access direct support from domestic abuse services? Why would we not want to compel councils, for example, to commission services specifically for victims of domestic abuse who are disabled? Should the police take that case, on different grounds, using different legislation from a different law —[Interruption.] The very polite Member for Cheltenham is leaving; take care. It is a lovely constituency.

It is not fair to say that the woman had not been a victim of domestic abuse. It is not fair that she would not then be entered into the system that would allow her to access the specialist support that comes with understanding control, power and her own sense of worth in the world.

Another case study notes:

“A neighbour befriended a woman with learning disabilities, became her carer and provided her with support. He then demanded sex and verbally abused her because she would not have sex with him.”

These women experienced abuse by people who had in effect become their family, and with whom they had a close personal connection. They experienced this abuse as domestic abuse. In lots of the cases that Stay Safe East sent, when these women sought help, they were often refused services as victims of domestic abuse—they did not fit the current definition, and they suffered for months before being able to access the right, more specialist support.

Disabled people face huge barriers in getting support from the services that are available today and that we all hope to see improved. They still find it very difficult to access domestic abuse services; by and large, only one or two beds available in an area will be accessible.

With regard to specialism in learning disability support, for example: with the greatest will in the world, people like me and the women who work in the refuge where I worked are not specialists in dealing with people with learning disabilities. We did not have specialist training. With 19 women and 28 kids in the building each night, and people coming and going because of housing emergencies, where is the level of specialism that might be needed in our refuge for somebody with severe autism? Everybody does their best, but the specialism that can be found for disabled victims is often provided only by disabled voluntary sector providers, who do not deal with the manifest issue of recovering from the trauma of domestic abuse. We have to find a way to make sure that if a disabled person is the victim of domestic abuse, they get the same service as they would if they were not disabled—I am not saying that it is perfect for everyone, by any means.

Again, I cannot help but go back to the evidence from the victim Sal. She told the Committee that that was exactly what had happened to her: her parents had abused her, stating that she would never be able to do anything or go anywhere, and she had to allow them to control her because as a disabled woman in society she would not be able to cope. We have to hear her voice and make sure that we make the Bill as inclusive as possible, so that it can help as many people as possible.

Domestic Abuse Bill (Second sitting)

Debate between Alex Chalk and Jess Phillips

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 4th June 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Jess Phillips]

Q Would it necessarily be gender-specific?

Andrea Simon: No.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Chalk)]

Q We all want public money to go as far as possible, and to go where it will be most helpful. As a result of covid, some £76 million or so is going into the sector to support victims of domestic abuse and sexual violence. How can this Bill ensure that that money goes where it is most needed, and that we, as a society, get the most bang for our buck and the most justice for the money that we are spending?

Lucy Hadley: Just to be clear, it was £27 million for domestic abuse and a further £13 million for sexual violence; I think the other funding pots were for vulnerable children and for other vulnerabilities during this time. That money is absolutely essential; it is really welcome. As I mentioned before, covid-19 has hit this sector at a time when it was already really vulnerable. It has been experiencing a funding crisis for a very long time, so it is vital that the money reaches the services that are protecting and supporting some of the most vulnerable people during this period.

What our member services tell us is that one-off funding pots provide them with no security and no ability to plan ahead or retain and recruit staff for the long term. What we would really like to see underpin the Bill’s very important statutory duty on local authorities to fund support in accommodation-based services is a commitment to long-term funding, so that year on year, services or local authorities do not have to competitively bid into different funding pots. That would provide us with a framework, so that services could plan ahead, get on with doing what they do best, which is supporting vulnerable women and children, and not spend significant amounts of time on tendering processes or bids for different funding pots.

We have estimated that fully funding the Government’s statutory duty would cost £173 million a year in England; that would ensure that the national network of refuges could meet demand. As we know, we are 30% below the recommended number of bed spaces in England, and 64% of referrals to refuges are turned away, so we would like a long-term funding commitment underpin the duty.