NHS Risk Register

Alan Johnson Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Alan Johnson (Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle) (Lab)]

The last time we saw the Government circling the wagons like this, it was in defence of the poll tax. Those present at the time will remember the fanaticism of the Conservative Back Benchers supporting a policy that was ultimately doomed. It is impossible not to feel sorry for the Secretary of State for Health. Nobody has ever coveted the position of Health Secretary for so long and then failed in it so quickly. The publication of the transition risk register will, I am sure, make his position even more untenable, but I doubt whether it will change anybody’s mind about this Bill.

For Government Members, I am afraid that the die is cast. They have a millstone around their neck called the Health and Social Care Bill, and they have to decide whether to carry on with the millstone or to take the difficult decision of unburdening themselves of it. As my former right hon. Friend, Alan Milburn, said in possibly the best description of this Bill, it is

“a patchwork quilt of complexity, compromise and confusion”.

Conservative Members will, I am sure, have deep concerns about how this issue has been handled. Some of them might agree with the Tory matinee idol, Daniel Hannan, who said that the NHS was a 60-year mistake, but I doubt whether that is the view of the majority of them. Indeed, I think they would have signed up to the principles set out in the coalition agreement. There is not much wrong with those principles, including that of no further top-down reorganisations. Now, however, they are forced by the political incompetence of their Secretary of State to turn this argument into a touchstone issue—if someone is in favour of the Bill, they are in favour of reform in the NHS; if someone is against the Bill, they are against reform of the NHS. Nothing could be further from the truth. [Interruption.] I see the nodding dogs on the Parliamentary Private Secretary Bench agreeing with that proposition.

I do not oppose this Bill because it aids reform. I do not oppose it because it will make no difference. I oppose it because it will hamper the reforms that the NHS badly needs at this stage of its development, and I suspect that the risk register will reinforce that belief.

[Charlie Elphicke]

On 31 July 2008 and on 17 September 2008, the right hon. Gentleman decided not to release risk registers or risk assessments. Why was he right then and the Secretary of State wrong now?

[Alan Johnson]

I see that the Whips’ brief dragged up something I did in a previous life. [Interruption.] The risk register is, with respect, a second-order issue. I cannot understand why the Health Secretary does not publish it. He is in enough trouble already, and the Government are in enough trouble already without adding an issue of transparency that simply makes the situation worse.

[Sajid Javid (Bromsgrove) (Con)]

rose—

[Richard Graham (Gloucester) (Con)]

rose—

[Alan Johnson]

I will give way again later.

The most important reforms that are necessary now are to integrate health and social care, to improve care for people with long-term conditions and to move from a hospital-based service that was designed for a different age. All three reforms—

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

May I advise all Members that they should not resort to a device such as this, as it is an argument in continuation of the debate. Many Back Benchers want to get into the debate, so Members should not misuse points of order. That was not a point of order for the Chair.

[Alan Johnson]

Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker.

I believe I heard the Secretary of State say that he did not really want to talk about the risk register, and neither do I, but I think it is important to the Government’s basic problem and the threat to the national health service.

Three important and interlinked reforms can be summed up in five words: “better outcomes for lower costs”. Does the private sector have a role? Of course it does.

Let me say a word about the introduction of independent treatment centres, which seem to have been used by some in this debate to suggest that this Bill simply carries forward policies pursued by the Labour Government. ITCs were introduced to deal with the perennial problem in the NHS—long waiting lists. We should remember that in the late 1990s about one in 25 people on the cardiac waiting list died before they were operated on. Rudolf Klein, in his seminal history of the NHS, said that ever since it was created, there has been a tail of around 600,000 people on waiting lists. He said that the captain shouted his order from the bridge and the crew carried on regardless.

In 1995, after 16 years in power, the Government before the last one decided to reduce the guaranteed in-patient waiting time under the citizens charter from two years to 18 months. That was the best they could do after being so long in power. For us, it was an absolute priority. Let me say to Members of all parties that independent treatment centres transformed behaviour in the NHS. Suddenly, it became possible for surgeons to operate on Fridays and on Saturday mornings as hospitals reacted to the threat of competition.

[Hugh Bayley (York Central) (Lab)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that performance in the NHS was transformed only because the NHS published clear data on the costs and outcomes of procedures in independent treatment centres, compared with those in other NHS hospitals? If the present Government do not publish comparable information from all providers, including private providers, we will get chaos, confusion, declining standards of care and rising costs.

[Alan Johnson]

My hon. Friend makes an important point.

As Health Secretary, I cancelled ITC contracts where there was sufficient NHS capacity, and I approved them where there was not. I recall a visit to the Derwent centre in Bournemouth, where the NHS had taken over a hospital from BUPA and was doing knee and hip replacements more quickly than the private sector. That transformed elective surgery, but although competition is good for elective surgery it is far less important than collaboration in managing chronic disease. I agree with the NHS Future Forum, which said in a report last year:

“The place of competition should be as a tool for supporting choice, promoting integration and improving quality. It should never be… an end in itself.”

The NHS is not a collection of separate and autonomous units of varying degrees of independence, responding to the invisible hand of the market. It is, above all, an integrated health care system. The fear of the vast majority of clinicians is that the Bill will damage that crucial principle.

[Richard Graham]

rose—

[Alan Johnson]

I shall not be taking an intervention from the hon. Gentleman.

When it comes to integrating social care with health, people want an adult social care system that resembles the NHS, not an NHS that resembles the current adult social care system. The very real fears about the Bill, particularly in respect of commissioning, were highlighted recently by the Health Committee. If the necessary economies are to be made, the provision of health and social care must be planned together, and, despite its title, the Bill is hindering that process. Yes, it includes the word “integration”, at a late stage, but the word just sits there doing nothing more than suggest that this is the spirit that the Bill will introduce, and it is not.

The one sensible decision made by the Health Secretary was the one to retain the services of Sir David Nicholson as chief executive of the NHS. The goal of achieving efficiency savings of 4% a year to reinvest in patient services is a noble one, but its achievement will be particularly difficult for the acute sector. What seems to be happening at present is that hospitals are cutting services to save money. What needs to happen, and what the Nicholson challenge envisaged, is the transformation of services to eliminate waste by, for instance, reducing readmissions and bringing care much closer to the patient. Of the £80 billion spent by PCTs in 2009-10, nearly half went to hospitals, the most expensive form of care, while primary care received only a quarter.

When I asked the distinguished colorectal surgeon Ara Darzi to lead 2,000 clinicians in moving the NHS to the next stage of its development by focusing remorselessly on quality, he produced a report that was radical in its concept if a little boring in its detail. Government Members could do with a bit of “dull and boring” on the NHS at the moment. The proposals required no reorganisation and very little legislation.

At that time, the Conservative party was promising a bare-knuckle fight to defend the district general hospital, and siding with the British Medical Association to stop patients accessing GP surgeries later in the day and on Saturday mornings. If the Nicholson challenge is to work, it must be accepted that the vision of the district general hospital as all-singing, all-dancing, and capable of providing all clinical procedures must change. There is no political leadership on that, there is no leadership from the Government—

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

Order. I call Mike Freer.