It is not the case that that would never happen but overall it may be of some reassurance to the noble Lord that much consultation has taken place on this. If there were clear indications that the examples he gave were to lead to a chilling effect, that would certainly have arisen during consultation. However, the noble Lord made a fair point and we will review the consultation. I will write to the noble Lord again if we can furnish him with some extra, new information. It is not the Government’s intention to criminalise businesses that use products based on copied designs incidentally in the course of their business but do not profit from any trade in those particular products.
The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, raised the issue of applying Bugs Bunny to various products and how the law would work. This is probably the first time that anybody has said that Bugs Bunny is a complex issue, but he is and it would be best if I wrote to the noble Lord on the details of that particular point. The noble Lord also asked why it is a proposed offence to copy “exactly or substantially”. It is our intention that very minor modifications—possibly imperceptible ones—should not excuse deliberate copying and the sanctions that would follow. The noble Lord asked if the offence was “appropriate and proportionate”—I think he used those words. We recognise the concerns about proportionality and that is why the defence has been carefully crafted. We do not believe that it will lead to countless people being placed in custody, as can be seen by my previous references to Germany in this particular debate.
In fear of pouring fuel on the fire of the points made on the last amendment by my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones, making comparisons between unregistered designs and copyright and its criminalisation, I will reiterate our position on this. A comparison to copyrighted material, which is also unregistered but attracts criminal sanctions, is unhelpful because the protection for copyright lasts 70 years plus the lifetime of the author. This makes it unlikely that copyright will have expired, and infringement is therefore much more likely to be the result of copying. The shorter period of protection for unregistered design, together with the difficulty of knowing when those design rights came into existence—a point that I made earlier—means that it is more difficult for third parties to be sure they are not infringing. The introduction of criminal sanctions for unregistered rights could lead to a negative effect on business and innovation.
Furthermore, copyright protection is denied to the shape and configuration of industrial designs by Section 51 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Applying criminal sanctions to an unregistered design right would criminalise some copying that would not be caught under the law of copyright. I am sure that the noble Lord will have some further points to make on this matter but I thought it wise to raise the subject again.
The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, asked whether the issue of criminalisation was too complicated for magistrates and juries. Provided that it is limited to registered designs, we believe that the criminal courts can decide whether a design has been copied exactly or substantially. Similar issues arise in copyright, as the noble Lord will be aware. The noble Lord also asked why new Section 35ZA includes community designs and asked whether this would cover designs from the European Union. It does, because EU designs have effective rights here in the UK.
The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, asked whether it is right that the use of a copied design is caught by the provision. The activities which constitute using a design under the offence reflect the definition for use of design contained in Section 7 of the Registered Designs Act 1949. Innocent acts are protected under the clause because it contains the test of knowing, or having reason to believe, that a design is copied.
The noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, was particularly concerned about those he described as “rich and powerful people” using the threat of criminal sanctions against small businesses. That is a fair point, but I draw on the UK’s experience in relation to other intellectual property rights, which have also been retrospectively subject to criminal sanctions. Although there is no quantitative evidence, the introduction of criminal sanctions for piracy and counterfeiting provides no indication of a chilling effect on creativity, copyright or brand development—trade marks—in the UK. They are generally acknowledged to be in robust health, with the number of trade mark applications at a historic high according to unpublished figures from the Intellectual Property Office.
Finally, I think it would be useful to provide a further response to a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth. He asked how the Government defend setting up more criminal offences. I certainly do not propose to start discussing the wider criminal justice system today—I hope the noble Lord will forgive me for that—but the important point is that there are compelling reasons why we believe this new sanction is right, which I trust I have set out in my response.
I reiterate to the Committee that we believe it is right that deliberate, wide-eyed copying of registered designs is punished.
Before the Minister concludes, will he remember Scotland? At this stage, I only seek an answer about whether this requires a Sewel Motion. All the consequential questions would arise if it does not.
The noble Lord is quite right. I think it is best if I write to him on a number of the points that he has raised about Scotland. I could say something now, but I think a full answer is required. The noble Lord raised a number of questions, and we should give a holistic response.
The Government have sought to create a balance between protecting the rights of design owners and ensuring that innovation is not restricted. We believe that in this clause we have drawn the right balance. I commend the clause to the Committee.
(11 years, 10 months ago)
Grand CommitteeI would need to refer back to the report to give the noble Baroness a full answer. Indeed I shall do so.
The effectiveness of the health and safety regulatory framework has also been highlighted by Professor Löfstedt, as has been mentioned today by several noble Lords, in his independent review, Reclaiming Health and Safety for All. Both my noble friend Lord Young of Graffham, whose report received much support across the House when it was debated, and Professor Löfstedt found that there is no case for fundamental change of the health and safety framework itself and that the existing regulatory requirements are broadly right. In fact, the biggest problem today is the way in which the regulatory requirements are interpreted and applied.
No one can be complacent. If we are to build on the steady progress made, we need to take action to tackle the current myths about health and safety, myths which the Health and Safety Executive see as such a problem that it has set up the Myth Busters Challenge Panel to provide a mechanism so that anyone who receives advice in the name of health and safety which they believe is disproportionate or inaccurate can challenge that advice.
Businesses consistently report that these myths lead to confusion about what the law actually requires and a fear of being sued, which, in turn, drives employers to overimplement the law in an effort to protect themselves and indeed discourages them from expanding their business. This in turn reinforces the perception that the application of health and safety law is unduly burdensome. I shall have more to add to that later.
This situation results in responsible employers taking an overly cautious approach, which has a detrimental effect on their approach to controlling risks properly in the workplace. For example, spending considerable resources on disproportionate paperwork and record-keeping, far in excess of what is necessary to comply with the law, diverts employers from taking a sensible approach to identifying the risks that actually affect their business and their employees, and taking sensible day-to-day precautions to protect their employees from those risks.
In the interests of both employers and employees, the aim is to improve understanding of what the law actually requires and to allay fears about possible litigation to help build employers’ confidence to take on new activities and further develop their businesses and to include recruiting new employees, which is so vital today.
To address these issues, the Government are implementing a package of measures, based on the recommendations of my noble friend Lord Young of Graffham and Professor Löfstedt, to reform both the civil litigation system and to restore a common sense approach to health and safety. This measure forms part of this package and I would reassure noble Lords that its introduction into the Bill at a later stage is purely due to the timing of the publication of Professor Löfstedt’s report and the Government’s desire to address the concerns he raised at the earliest opportunity.
We have already put in place a programme of work to improve understanding by simplifying the supporting guidance that explains what the law requires and to consolidate and clarify the body of health and safety regulation in a number of key industrial sectors. This programme builds on the work carried out as part of the better regulation initiative led by the previous Administration.
The clause does not change the duties placed on employers, but amends Section 47 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act so that in future, unless the legislation provides for an exception, it will be possible to bring a claim for compensation in respect of a breach of health and safety legislation only where it can be proved that the employer has been negligent.
Claims for breaches of the general duties of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act can already be brought only for negligence. The change in this Bill simply extends this position to regulations made under the Act to create a consistent approach to civil litigation for all health and safety legislation. This means that if an employer fails in their duty of care towards their employee they can of course be successfully sued. However, where an accident has taken place and the employer could not have reasonably done anything about it, they should not be liable.
In the knowledge that they will not be liable if an accident happens which is totally outside their control, this change will support responsible employers, who take care to protect their employees, by encouraging them to take sensible steps to manage workplace risks. I am grateful for the speech made by my noble friend Lady Brinton and the example that she gave to support the helplessness that some businesses can experience where there is no defence for them. This will not assist irresponsible employers who fail to comply with the law as they will have no defence to an accusation that they did not take all reasonable steps to protect their employees.
This amendment to the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act has been adopted in preference to amending each strict liability duty, as Professor Löfstedt suggested, because an approach targeting each strict duty would be much more complex, and therefore complicated for businesses and their employees to understand.
The noble Baroness, Lady Turner of Camden, brought up the concern that the law would go backwards, which I think was her expression, and the employer would hold all the cards. I would like to assure her and all noble Lords that the provision will affect only a small number of duties that are unqualified. In any claim for negligence, the existing regulatory requirements on employers will remain relevant, as the courts will look to the statutory duties, approved codes of practice and established guidance to inform them about what risks a reasonable employer should be aware of and the steps they would be expected to take to manage those risks. I stress again that this change will only assist responsible employers who have done what is required of them and can demonstrate this.
This amendment reflects an adjustment to help rebalance the civil litigation system and, as part of the wider reforms of the system, is a proportionate response to the impact that strict duties currently have in the civil litigation system identified by Professor Löfstedt. It also has the benefit of creating a consistent approach to civil litigation for all health and safety legislation.
Currently, most claims are brought for both breach of statutory duty and negligence and, in practice, it is anticipated that the vast majority of claims will still be capable of being brought for negligence. For the small number of cases where this is not possible, as now, individuals will be able to claim for financial and other support through the state benefit system.
This measure is not about reducing the number of claims. It is about establishing the principle that an employer who has done nothing wrong should have the opportunity to defend themselves on the basis of having taken all reasonable precautions. Providing employers with this important reassurance will help them to manage health and safety risks in a sensible and proportionate way.
At the heart of the noble Viscount’s argument there are general arguments about numbers. The Health and Safety Executive’s impact assessment says that this change will affect 200 sets of health and safety regulations. When it seeks to answer its own question about the number of cases that this will effect, it says that it has not a clue. In the light of that information, which I have here in this assessment before me, could the Minister please tell the Committee on what basis he estimates that this will impact on a small number of regulations and cases? If that is wrong, we are legislating here on a false basis. The HSE has no idea what the statistical base of this is.