Ukraine: Defence Relationships

Viscount Waverley Excerpts

Thursday 9th June 2022 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Waverley (CB)]

My Lords, the broad conclusions of the more general integrated review were correct, but reference should also be made to the defence Command Paper. I propose to the Government that both be updated regularly to reflect changes in circumstances.

I am concerned that this war of attrition masks the fact that Ukraine, from Russia's perspective, is a means to an end and not a strategy in isolation, representing an attempt to craft a new world order with a reconstruction of its role in international affairs. Events are the consequences of 20 years of strategic thinking on Russia’s part. It follows, therefore, that the Euro-Atlantic community should frame a Russia strategy in the longer term, and not as a problem of the last century, looking forward not backwards, with all its future implications.

Russia has returned to its traditional role of an aggressive, expansionist state, and an effective response to this remains to be shaped. A senior British defence official said in 2016:

“Russia is a reality on the world scene and we cannot go on pretending it is not”.


That is correct, with all the opposing ideology, interests and explicitly differing values. A new generation of Russian leaders will change little. We must work to understand more than I suspect we do or face sleepwalking deeper into the quagmire.

The scale of the reconstruction required defies comprehension, with President Zelensky estimating in April that $7 billion monthly, totalling $600 billion, is required. From where is this to come and with what conditionality? A future Ukrainian state awash with money and flooded with arms could itself become a challenge.

HMG will be only too aware also that democratic politics can usher in a new guard. With elections supposedly due in a year or so, there will be many from a military background who will enter politics and, depending on outcomes, bring with them a differing approach. I must ask the Minister, therefore, what HMG’s assessment of that situation is. Are election assistance and process planning being conducted, or are we in active consultation with the electoral commission in Kyiv about a delay to a future election?

On the world stage, it would appear that Russia is hell-bent on building an Iran-China-India axis, in addition to quietly making inroads on relationship building in South America and Africa, with the Indo-Pacific also in its strategic planning. I have been calling around, and it has become clear that a large number of states wish to remain neutral, which is not good.

A vision of Russia would appear to be multiregional, now strengthened by the Arctic route becoming more realistic. That will be of particular appeal to China, which is already investing in securing land for its future infrastructure and military needs along that route.

London is acting in important ways in Ukraine, but very much in the now. Now and looking ahead are essential, and in this context the integrated review is right: Moscow will be a challenge for London through the 2020s. The UK has positioned itself as Moscow’s enemy 1.5, with our strategists having to manoeuvre through a minefield of British policy and determine how global Britain will manage a ubiquitous Russia. It is legitimate to ask what kind of threat Russia might pose to the UK. Moscow has not yet used its strategic assets in this war, but we should be prepared for an intensified cyberthreat.

On a practical note, I am reminded of the loss of the depth of expertise in the FCDO on Russia and the Russian language. We urgently need to build a cadre of Ukrainian expertise and language capability.

In the search for common ground with Russia, while always being explicit that London has very many policy and value disagreements with Moscow and vice versa, urbanisation, climate change, infrastructure, and issues of the 2030s, including how to manage ageing social disruption, might be areas of commonality of challenges.

The war in Ukraine has reignited great power competition. If we are ever to move forward, the institutions that govern the world order must adapt to new ways of thinking and new ways of working.