Defence: Reform

Viscount Trenchard Excerpts

Monday 27th June 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble and gallant Lord for his support. I agree with him that it is an excellent report, and I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Levene, my noble friend Lady Noakes and the rest of the team who did this excellent work.

The noble and gallant Lord asked whether I agree that the CDS alone represents the overall military view at the board. While the CDS will be the sole military representative on the new Defence Board, the advice of the single service chiefs will continue to inform the successful decision-making of the department. Their prime role will be running their services, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee will sit in a new Armed Forces mode to allow the CDS to draw on the environmental advice of the chiefs in formulating his advice to the Defence Board. The CDS should not be constrained by that advice, but this forum will ensure that there is a clear mechanism for the views and advice of the chiefs to be articulated. The Chiefs of Staff operations committee will continue as now so that the single service chiefs’ advice is still heard on operation issues.

The noble and gallant Lord asked whether the CDS having more power would be too much to ask of one man. In the new model, the role of the CDS will be clarified and strengthened. However, in making the recommendations, the steering group has been mindful of the need for a balanced model in which the CDS and the PUS would continue to jointly lead defence and ensure that the CDS is not overloaded. His prime function will continue to be as the principal military adviser to the Defence Board, Ministers and wider government, and as the strategic commander of operations. It was because of the heavy loading on the CDS post that the steering group recommended continuing with a deputy for him, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, even though some of the VCDS’s responsibilities are being transferred to the joint forces command.

[Viscount Trenchard]

My Lords, I also thank my noble friend the Minister very much for repeating the Statement. I will not delay the House as long as I intended because the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, put the points that I was going to put far more eloquently and with far more experience than I—although it is a pity that the House was prevented from hearing the conclusion of his remarks.

I have one or two further questions for my noble friend the Minister. First, I am not quite sure about the joint forces command. Is this an additional command similar to land, air and fleet? Where will it be located and what kind of operations will it undertake? Secondly, I entirely agree with the noble and gallant Lord about the Defence Board. At present, the balance on the Defence Board is seven civil servants to five military personnel—the chiefs and the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff—and it will be seven to one. That is an extraordinary change in balance. Like the noble and gallant Lords and other noble Lords who have spoken, I wonder whether the Chief of the Defence Staff really can represent the interests of all three services, let alone the interests of the three services in relation to the civil servants.

Thirdly, on the role of the Defence Council, I understand that in law it is not the Defence Board but the Defence Council in which the statutory authority to control defence is vested. I understand that there is no intention to remove the Chiefs of Staff from their place on that.

Lastly, does the Minister think—

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords, we are about to have a debate to deal with these abuses.

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours. He is trying to remind us that there is a House full of people wishing to start the next debate. I know that the noble and gallant Lord and others see this change in organisation at the Ministry of Defence as also highly important, but I remind the House that during Statements,

“although brief comments and questions from all quarters of the House are allowed, statements should not be made the occasion for immediate debate”.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours that questions and comments should be brief.

[Viscount Trenchard]

Briefly, my final question is whether the Minister thinks that the fact that the chiefs will spend more time with their services, and presumably in cars going to visit each other, and less time in offices next door to each other will lead to more “jointery” rather than less.

Strategic Defence and Security Review

Viscount Trenchard Excerpts

Friday 12th November 2010 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Trenchard]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for securing this debate and privileged to be able to make a contribution to it, given that my own experience and knowledge of military matters are so limited compared with those of the many noble Lords and noble and gallant Lords who are contributing today.

I firmly believe that the maintenance of excellent Armed Forces is one of the reasons why Britain punches above its weight in the world. This is of inestimable value to our international trade and business and a prime reason, together with our strong and respected diplomatic presence around the world, for the continued prosperity of the City of London.

I spent 11 years representing a British firm in Japan. I always felt comfortable in the support that I derived from our embassy and from the perception of Britain and the kind of country it was as informed in part by my Japanese counterparts’ understanding of our diplomatic and military capabilities. I am certain that this support provides some relative business advantage to British nationals and representatives of British organisations overseas.

More directly, our defence industry comprises a significant part of our diminished manufacturing base. It will be very difficult for us to retain our technological supremacy and market share if our Armed Forces are reduced to the level of those of countries whose overseas interests are on a much more modest scale than ours. It is doubtful that defence exports can entirely make up for cancelled or reduced orders from the MoD. This will undoubtedly threaten our leading defence manufacturers’ position in the market, particularly as their American competitors are now aggressively stepping up their overseas sales efforts.

Surely, if the Government really believe, as they claim in the national security strategy, that,

“the first duty of government remains: the security of our country”,

and given that defence expenditure has already been cut by some 60 per cent as a proportion of GDP since the Falklands War, are there not now compelling reasons to freeze defence spending in proportionate terms?

The national security strategy also tells us that we are a country whose political, economic and cultural authority far exceeds our size. Surely it is therefore necessary to maintain Armed Forces commensurate with that authority in order to avoid depletion. Actually, to argue that we meet NATO's target of 2 per cent, which applies to all NATO members, most of which have many fewer international interests, is misleading. If you strip out the costs of the nuclear deterrent and the operational costs of being in Afghanistan, the future spending on core defence capabilities falls to significantly less than 2 per cent.

Worse than that, I ask my noble friend to tell the House whether he has considered the cost of the destruction of the value of military equipment already owned or purchased. The SDSR shows us that unfortunately defence is less important than deficit reduction. Furthermore, the SDSR also considers expenditure in cash flow terms. If you consider Defence plc to be a company whose shareholders are the taxpayers, the management would have looked at the balance sheet as well and taken much more account of the need to protect shareholder value. Management would surely never contemplate scrapping or selling at a discount valuable assets, quite apart from the loss of capability that results.

The SDSR admits that the resources allocated to defence over the next four years will result in the reduction of some capabilities that are less critical to today's requirements. I ask my noble friend by which criteria he judges that the retention of our ISTAR capabilities are in any way less than critical. Indeed, with changing emphasis in homeland defence and overseas commitments, the Nimrod MRA4 was destined to make a significant contribution to the fight against terrorism. The decision to scrap the Nimrod project is completely incomprehensible and wasteful, as £3.8 billion have been spent on the project to date and the fourth aeroplane out of nine is now being painted. The cost of maintaining the force amount to some £200 million a year and even if we could not afford that, will my noble friend explain why the Government did not decide to put it into a state of extended readiness similar to the second aircraft carrier where the same logic applies?

The destruction of shareholder value of Defence plc resulting from scrapping the project is serious. The serious impairment of our marine surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities that will result from it significantly increase the operational risks faced by our Trident nuclear submarines, our surface fleet, our new aircraft carrier when it eventually enters service, and indeed our merchant fleet.

As for search and rescue, the Government have claimed that the C-130 Hercules can replace the lost capability. That, unfortunately, is not true. The Hercules may be capable of throwing out a 12-man dinghy, but that is all. Does the Minister agree that it is accepted in the MoD that if we lose Nimrod’s capabilities now we will definitely need to recover them in the future and at much higher cost? Does he not agree that it is illogical to ring-fence spending on the nuclear deterrent but to scrap the capability necessary to protect it?

Other decisions that make little sense are the decision to scrap the existing carrier and Harrier early rather than keeping them until the new carriers and the Joint Strike Fighter are ready, and the decision to scrap the Sentinel ground surveillance aircraft after the end of the Afghanistan campaign, although there is at least time to reverse that decision. If it is not essential for us to have these capabilities now, why is it essential for us to replace them?

I congratulate my noble friend on his commitment to reduce waste and improve efficiency and procurement at the MoD. That is very necessary. Finally, I welcome the recognition given in SDSR to the Reserve Forces, which are increasingly integrated with our regular forces and are extremely cost-effective. In particular, the Royal Auxiliary Air Force is already configured around a range of specialist skills, which enables regular squadrons at home and in theatre to fill gaps with experienced reservists possessing the relevant training and skills. I am confident that this model will be endorsed by the forthcoming review of the Reserve Forces.

Time does not allow me to comment on many other points more ably covered by many other noble Lords. While I congratulate my noble friend on having reduced the cuts from the levels initially sought, as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Boyce, and other noble Lords have said, it has been disingenuously put about that expenditure is being cut by only 7.5 per cent. Real cuts to core capabilities will be much more than this. In short, I join other noble Lords in regretting deeply that the SDSR pays insufficient attention to Britain’s strategic interests and that, if implemented as proposed, it will weaken our ability to continue to punch above our weight in the world, which will damage both the security and prosperity of future generations.