Strategic Defence Review

Viscount Trenchard Excerpts

Wednesday 9th October 2024 Grand Committee

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, I congratulate the Government on their wise decision to place the strategic defence review in the most capable hands of the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, who is universally well regarded on all Benches; I too thank him for introducing this timely debate. I declare my interests as a consultant to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd, the lead industrial partner for Japan in the JICA project, and as the honorary Air Commodore of 600 (City of London) Squadron, Royal Auxiliary Air Force.

Under the previous Government, we saw two reviews: the integrated review of security, defence, development and foreign policy in 2021 and the integrated review refresh in 2023. Since then, the global security landscape has progressively deteriorated. It is in a more turbulent and unpredictable state than it has ever been since the end of the Second World War. The noble Lord, Lord Robertson, described China, Russia, Iran and North Korea as “the deadly quartet”, and many defence experts consider that the global community is on the path to a third world war.

The national defence strategy of the United States, as adopted in 2022, named China as a pacing challenge and identified it as the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to advance that objective. Against this background, it is essential that His Majesty’s Government—as well as the Governments of all friendly nations that believe in the international rules-based order—remember that the defence of the realm and the safety of the public is the first duty of a Government.

Can the Minister confirm that the fact that the review is to be reported to not only the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Defence, but the Chancellor of the Exchequer, is not significant? I worry that the Treasury may exert undue pressure on the review’s findings to prevent the Government setting out a clear pathway to increasing defence spending to at least 2.5% by 2030. I agree with the view of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, that the figure should be increased to 3% as soon as possible. As the previous Government’s paper, Defending Britain: Leading in a More Dangerous World, published in April this year, explained, any delay in setting out a pathway to reaching 2.5% is likely to lead to front-line cuts at the worst possible time for our Armed Forces. Spending more will not in itself be enough; reform of the Ministry of Defence, to build a less risk-averse department and improve its procurement process, is also essential.

My involvement with an RAF reserve squadron has taught me that the Reserve Forces have a major part to play in increasing total military output for less money. Today, 50% of the RAF reserves routine output is in support of the front line and operations. Against the background of today’s more flexible employment culture and the integration of the Reserve Forces into the regular forces, could we not aim to achieve a ratio of regulars to reserves of 1:1? The United States achieved that long ago, and other NATO allies such as France, Germany and Sweden are set on a pathway to the exponential growth of their reserve forces.

Can the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, confirm that the Government’s declared intention to reset our relationship with the EU does not mean that we will pull back at all from the tilt to the Indo-Pacific, which recognises our ability to punch above our weight in hard and soft power, working with our allies across the world? Japan remembers with affection the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902-22. The UK’s bilateral relationship with Japan has grown progressively closer in recent years. In particular, defence and security initiatives have strengthened the relationship, forming part of a more integrated defence approach across the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions. This strengthening has been especially appreciated by Japan against the background of growing uncertainty over the reliability of the United States’ security umbrella and the deteriorating geostrategic situation in east Asia.

The Japan-UK reciprocal access agreement of January 2023 and the Hiroshima accord of May 2023 committed both nations to the global combat air programme—GCAP—together with Italy as the third partner. Japan and the UK have therefore joined forces and pooled their technologies, together with Italy’s, to develop a sixth-generation fighter jet—in the nick of time as far as Japan is concerned, because the life of its existing F-2 fighter aircraft cannot be extended beyond 2035. Mutual expectations among the three industrial partners are very high. The failure of any of the three of them to honour commitments to complete this project on time would have serious consequences for the other partners.

For the UK, the role envisaged in the GCAP could create 21,000 jobs each year and contribute £26.2 billion to the economy by 2050, but GCAP is not mentioned at all in the terms of reference for the SDR; nor is Japan. The UK, US and Australian Defence Ministers said in May 2024 that they would consider expanding AUKUS pillar 2 to include Japan and other countries. The parameters of the SDR merely note that it will

“identify ways to maintain the UK’s defence ties to the Indo Pacific region, the Gulf and the Middle East”.

That statement falls short of the expectations of our Japanese friends. I believe also that other friendly nations in the Indo-Pacific region, including Australia, South Korea, and New Zealand, now share Japan’s concerns. Many of our Japanese friends think and believe that we have entered the age of the second Anglo-Japanese alliance. I look forward to the Minister’s speech, which I hope will provide some reassurance.