(7 months, 2 weeks ago)
Grand CommitteeI do not have the benefit of seeing a Hansard update to know after which word I was interrupted and we had to leave to vote, so I will just repeat, I hope not unduly, the main point I was making at the time of the Division. This was that the central conclusion of the CRISP report is that the Government’s policy
“generates significant gaps in the formal oversight of biometrics and surveillance practices in addition to erasing many positive developments aimed at raising standards and constructive engagement with technology developers, surveillance users and the public”.
The reason I am very glad to support the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, in these amendments is that the complexities of the current regulatory landscape and the protections offered by the BSCC in an era of increasingly intensive advanced and intrusive surveillance mean that the abolition of the BSCC leaves these oversight gaps while creating additional regulatory complexity. I will be interested to see how the Minister defends the fact that this abolition is supposed to improve the situation.
I do not want to detain the Committee for very long, but I shall just read this one passage from the report into the record, because it is relevant to the debate we are having. We should not remove
“a mechanism for assuring Parliament and the public of appropriate surveillance use, affecting public trust and legitimacy at a critical moment concerning public trust in institutions, particularly law enforcement. As drafted, the Bill reduces public visibility and accountability of related police activities. The lack of independent oversight becomes amplified by other sections of the Bill that reduce the independence of the current Information Commissioner role”.
In short, I think it would be a mistake to abolish the biometrics commissioner, and on that basis, I support these amendments.
My Lords, it has been a pleasure to listen to noble Lords’ speeches in this debate. We are all very much on the same page and have very much the same considerations in mind. Both the protection of biometric data itself and also the means by which we regulate its use and have oversight over how it is used have been mentioned by everyone. We may have slightly different paths to making sure we have that protection and oversight, but we all have the same intentions.
The noble Lord, Lord Holmes, pointed to the considerable attractions of, in a sense, starting afresh, but I have chosen a rather different path. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, who mentioned Fraser Sampson, the former Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner. I must admit that I have very high regard for the work he did, and also for the work of such people as Professor Peter Fussey of Essex University. Of course, a number of noble Lords have mentioned the work of CRISP in all this, which kept us very well briefed on the consequence of these clauses.
No one has yet spoken to the stand part notices on Clauses 130 to 132; I will come on to those on Clauses 147 to 149 shortly. The Bill would drastically change the way UK law enforcement agencies can handle biometric personal data. Clauses 130 to 132 would allow for data received from overseas law enforcement agencies to be stored in a pseudonymised, traceable format indefinitely.
For instance, Clause 130 would allow UK law enforcement agencies to hold biometric data received from overseas law enforcement agencies in a pseudonymised format. In cases where the authority ceases to hold the material pseudonymously and the individual has no previous convictions or only one exempt conviction, the data may be retained in a non-pseudonymous format for up to three years. Therefore, the general rule is indefinite retention with continuous pseudonymisation, except for a specific circumstance where non-pseudonymised retention is permitted for a fixed period. I forgive noble Lords if they have to read Hansard to make total sense of that.
This is a major change in the way personal data can be handled. Permitting storage of pseudonymised or non-pseudonymised data will facilitate a vast biometric database that can be traced back to individuals. Although this does not apply to data linked to offences committed in the UK, it sets a concerning precedent for reshaping how law enforcement agencies hold data in a traceable and identifiable way. It seems that there is nothing to stop a law enforcement agency pseudonymising data just to reattach the identifying information, which they would be permitted to hold for three years.
The clauses do not explicitly define the steps that must be taken to achieve pseudonymisation. This leaves a broad scope for interpretation and variation in practice. The only requirement is that the data be pseudonymised
“as soon as reasonably practicable”,
which is a totally subjective threshold. The collective impact of these clauses, which were a late addition to the Bill on Report in the Commons, is deeply concerning. We believe that these powers should be withdrawn to prevent a dangerous precedent being set for police retention of vast amounts of traceable biometric data.
The stand part notices on Clauses 147 to 149 have been spoken to extremely cogently by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, and the noble Baroness, Lady Harding. I will not repeat a great deal of what they said but what the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, said about the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority really struck a chord with me. When we had our Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence, we looked at models for regulation and how to gain public trust for new technologies and concepts. The report that Baroness Warnock did into fertilisation and embryology was an absolute classic and an example of how to gain public trust. As the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, said, it has stood the test of time. As far as I am concerned, gaining that kind of trust is the goal for all of us.
What we are doing here risks precisely the reverse by abolishing the office of the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner. This was set up under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, which required a surveillance camera commissioner to be appointed and a surveillance camera code of practice to be published. Other functions of the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner are in essence both judicial and non-judicial. They include developing and encouraging compliance with the surveillance camera code of practice; raising standards for surveillance camera developers, suppliers and users; public engagement; building legitimacy; reporting annually to Parliament via the Home Secretary; convening expertise to support these functions; and reviewing all national security determinations and other powers by which the police can retain biometric data. The Bill proposes to erase all but one—I stress that—of these activities.
The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, quoted CRISP. I will not repeat the quotes he gave but its report, which the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, also cited, warns that
“plans to abolish and not replace existing safeguards in this crucial area will leave the UK without proper oversight just when advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and other technologies mean they are needed more than ever”.
The Bill’s reduction of surveillance-related considerations to data protection compares unfavourably to regulatory approaches in other jurisdictions. Many have started from data protection and extended it to cover the wider rights-based implications of surveillance. Here, the Bill proposes a move in precisely the opposite direction. I am afraid this is yet another example of the Bill going entirely in the wrong direction.
(1 year, 10 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, that was a suitable start to my own small intervention. I will not trouble the Minister for too long but I want to strike a note of genuine regret, rather along the lines of what the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said.
It is a very small crumb of comfort to be faced with this order when previously, right across the EU, there were no roaming charges for consumers. As we saw, last July the EU extended the exemption from roaming charges for another 10 years—an extensive period. I suspect we are all now much more aware of what we have lost as a result of leaving the EU, exactly as the noble Lord mentioned.
There is a small consolation offered in this free trade agreement. I do not know whether any negotiations will ever be underfoot again with the EU about taking advantage of its single market and the resulting lack of roaming charges. Maybe the Minister could say whether any kind of initiative was available.
I have only a couple of questions about these new regulations. The Minister talked about the technicalities of wholesale, retail and so on. Obviously, the retail charges—if any—follow from any wholesale charges. How are these charges to be set? What is the basis for them? Norway and Iceland are limited exemptions. Even Liechtenstein did not feel moved enough to join up to this great roaming exemption. Why has Liechtenstein excluded itself from this splendid initiative?
Of course, we support these regulations. I welcome particularly that there is a review. I am greatly in favour of government reviewing its own regulations, and the mechanism in Regulation 13 is very useful, but what does the Minister envisage? Do we do this after a couple of years, after five years, this time next year or never? What is the plan? It is useful at least to have in the department’s diary something that says, “Review these Norway and Iceland regulations”, when somebody has the spare time to do it. I hope that consumers will take great benefit from these regulations.
My Lords, I intervene briefly to ask two questions, one of which, about the review, has just been asked. Regulation 13 says that the review has to be within five years but can be in as little as a year. Can the Minister say anything about when the department might intend to consider a review? The subject of roaming charges is of pretty wide interest generally.
Secondly, in respect of the scope—which, let us face it, is modest—am I right in assuming that, under the reconsideration of the trade and co-operation agreement that has been signed and comes up for review in a year or two, this whole area might be an appropriate part of any reconsideration and renegotiation that the UK conducts with the EU?
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 6 is in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Fox, the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, and the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate. As my noble friend said in Committee, without the FOI amendments, ARIA would follow in the footsteps of a very small number of institutions that currently do not have Freedom of Information Act obligations. I will not extensively rehearse all the arguments, but suggest that the organisations involved, which include the Royal Family and security and intelligence bodies, are not natural bedfellows to ARIA. The Minister complained about the burdens for ARIA of responding to FOI requests but nowhere, not even in Dominic Cummings’s evidence to the Commons Science and Technology Committee last February, was the FoIA identified as an obstacle to ARIA’s success.
The Minister has continually highlighted that ARIA is modelled on DARPA. ARPA was subject to the US Freedom of Information Act and DARPA is subject to it as well. This has not prevented them achieving the successes which the Government wish ARIA to emulate. We talked in Committee about the equivalent number of requests received before the restructuring of the research bodies, which were exactly equivalent to those of DARPA. The argument that DARPA charges fees falls away too. The main classes of requester—the news media and educational staff—and requests in the public interest are not charged. In practice, only commercial requesters have to pay.
As I said in Committee, there is no question that, under the FoIA, ARIA’s research programme could be prejudiced, given the clear exemptions under the Act for research interests. In Committee, the Minister gave away the real reason for the Government’s refusal to include ARIA under the FoIA. He illustrated his general contempt for freedom of information legislation, saying:
“From my point of view, it is a truly malign piece of legislation”,
and that
“there must be many hundreds of civil servants engaged in doing nothing other than responding to these fishing expeditions”.
It looks like this is personal—or is the truth that the Government find the daylight shed on them by the FoIA truly inconvenient, and ARIA is just the start of an erosion of FoIA rights?
Transparency is crucial for all our public institutions. ARIA will be in receipt of a substantial amount of public funding—£500 million over the next three years—so there are compelling grounds for its inclusion. Coming under the FoIA is an essential part of retaining public trust.
As regards Amendment 7, which relates to procurement, the Minister said in Committee that:
“When ARIA is commissioning and contracting others to do research for it, it will be operating in a fundamentally different way from traditional R&D grant-making where procurement rules do not apply.
In my view, it is therefore appropriate for ARIA to be given freedom from procurement rules to ensure that the agency has greater flexibility in its contractual arrangements.”—[Official Report, 22/11/21; cols. GC 147-49.]
If ever I heard a circular argument, that was it.
Why are the Government having to perform drafting contortions to exclude ARIA from these procurement requirements in the Bill? Why on earth should ARIA not be subject to exactly the same procurement regime as other public bodies? UKRI is subject to rules and procures and commissions services, including research services. What makes ARIA so different? I beg to move.
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 6, to which I added my name. This is a subject I raised at Second Reading, but I reassure the noble Baroness acting as the Whip that, on this occasion, she can relax; there is unlikely to be any need to interrupt me on the grounds that I have gone on too long, because I want to be very brief.
There are two reasons why ARIA should be subject to the Freedom of Information Act. The first is one of principle. Public bodies set up in statute should be subjected to the same FOI requirements as apply elsewhere. In this country, I submit that FOI legislation is an essential safeguard in the political world in which we now live. To reject this amendment will send a bad signal and set a bad precedent. I even suggest to the Minister that he may reconsider his view as and when he sits on these Benches in the future.
The second reason is practical. We do not want to allow ARIA to come to be viewed with public suspicion and distrust, especially as it has the right to fail, so being open about its work will be beneficial. If it turns out that it is not easy to discover what it is doing, public support for ARIA might be damaged, to the detriment of its wider role. It is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which a campaign is waged against ARIA for excessive secrecy, possibly utilising inaccurate information about it, and for public support to be damaged; nor, in my judgment, would making ARIA subject to freedom of information turn out to be an excessive practical burden. Moreover, if there are aspects of ARIA’s future work that turn out to be sensitive, the Government already have powers elsewhere in the Bill for the Secretary of State to intervene on grounds of national security.
I will leave my remarks there, but I strongly urge the acceptance of Amendment 6.
(3 years ago)
Grand CommitteeThis has been such a short debate that it is barely worth winding up. I will just reinforce the point that this is a cultural issue, in the sense that we are trying to get over here. It was interesting that the Minister made the rather runic comment that ARIA will interact with Select Committees of this House and the other place in the normal way. I think what we are trying to do is underline the fact that we need rather more than that; we need disclosure as well—otherwise, we are worried that we will not get that. Good heavens, the committee might even look at the framework document when it eventually sees the light of day. How about that? That would be quite novel.
One has seen the benefit of committee reports. The Science and Technology Committee has made extremely constructive comments around ARIA and UKRI. It has demonstrated the benefit of parliamentary scrutiny. Why do the Government think that parliamentary oversight is such a bad thing?
I rise briefly to emphasise the points made by both Front Benches and to say that the Government should welcome an amendment that enables ARIA to be subject to investigation by both Select Committees in both Houses. One of the strengths of Parliament is its Select Committee system, and the reputation of the Science and Technology Committee in another place is very high. I think that, when the Government look back on ARIA in 2031, they will rather wish to have put on record their support for amendments such as this, for the reasons given.